BOT项目公司的股东结构选择及股东行为特征研究
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摘要
随着社会经济的迅速发展,世界各国尤其是发展中国家面临着大型基础设施建设急需大量资金与政府投资不足之间的矛盾。而采用BOT模式则可以吸纳大量的民间资本或国际资金为社会经济的发展提供支持,能够解决发展中国家在经济发展过程中的这一矛盾,所以近年来BOT项目融资建设模式得到了比较快的发展,有关BOT模式的研究也越来越多。但是这些研究大都集中在特许权期的确定、项目风险的分担、产品价格、价格调整机制、政府保证等方面,涉及BOT项目公司股东结构以及相应股东结构下收益问题的研究却非常少,而BOT项目公司的股东选择及其决策行为也是BOT项目能否成功的关键因素之一。所以本文选择对BOT项目公司的股东结构选择及其决策行为进行研究,以便为正在实施和未来将实施的BOT项目的决策提供理论指导,其主要研究内容如下：
论文首先对BOT项目公司股东分类及股东结构进行分析。组成BOT项目公司的股东类型包括以下三种：由专业公司组成的BOT项目公司、由纯投资者组成的BOT项目公司和既有专业公司又有纯投资者组成的BOT项目公司,分析了这三种BOT项目公司的优缺点；并界定了组成BOT项目公司股东结构的六种情况：建设商作为BOT项目公司的股东、运营商作为BOT项目公司的股东、设备供应商作为BOT项目公司的股东、国际贸易公司作为BOT项目公司的股东、纯投资者作为BOT项目公司的股东以及其他公司作为BOT项目公司的股东。
收益问题的分析是研究BOT项目公司股东结构选择的关键内容之一。论文为了说明问题的方便,假设组成BOT项目的项目公司只由两个股东组成,分两种情况从委托一代理理论的角度来分析两种股东结构下BOT项目公司的收益及其股东收益：一是选择建设商作为BOT项目公司股东之一,将其与股东全是纯投资者的情况进行比较,对比两种股东结构下BOT项目的收益,通过模型构建及求解等分析,得出的结论是：建设商作为BOT项目公司股东之一的项目公司收益,优于BOT项目公司股东全部是纯投资者情况下的收益,在此情况下社会效益也得到了提高。在本章中,论文还给出了项目发起人让建设商参股的最优比例；二是选择运营商作为BOT项目公司股东之一,将其与股东全是纯投资者情况进行比较,对比两种股东结构下BOT项目的收益,通过模型构建及求解等分析,得出的结论是：运营商作为BOT项目公司股东之一的项目公司收益,优于BOT项目公司股东全部是纯投资者情况下的收益,在此情况下社会效益也得到了提高。论文还给出了项目发起人让运营商参股的最优比例。以上研究结论为组建BOT项目公司时如何选择合理的项目公司股东结构提供了较好的理论依据。
在研究了两种股东结构下BOT项目公司及各个股东的收益情况后,论文对BOT项目公司的稳定性和行为特征进行了研究。论文为了研究的方便将BOT项目公司的股东简化为建设承包商、设备供应商和主要投资人,然后根据假设条件求出了建设商和供应商作假的最优概率,在此基础上通过进一步研究表明项目公司的稳定性与作假被查实的罚金密切相关,且当作假的查处成本降低到一定的水平时,项目公司会具有更好的稳定性。另一方面,在项目公司有三个股东的情况下,股东在意图作假时不会像只有两个股东那样只权衡自己被查实的概率、惩罚的力度和查处自己的成本,同时还会考虑另一股东作假的概率和项目公司股权的分布并且会比较自己作假和另一股东作假的相对收益。根据对BOT项目公司稳定情况下的股东作假行为的分析为投资人建议了一些应对措施。这些研究结论为BOT项目公司的股东如何进行合理决策提供了较好的理论依据。
在前面研究的基础上进一步对建设商作为BOT项目公司股东的行为进行分析。通过模型构建和求解,得出了使建设商付出最大努力的条件,并给出了建设商作为BOT项目公司股东情况下的一些建议。并通过实例分析印证了本论文的一些研究结论。
With the rapid development of society and economy, all countries in the world, especially developing ones, are facing the contradiction between large-scale infrastructure construction and insufficient government investment. The Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) model can effectively solve the problem to some extent by absorbing a large number of private capital or international funds. So, in recent years, BOT enjoys a rapid development and researches on the new project financing mode are also more and more. However, most of these studies focus on the determination of concession period, project risk sharing, pricing, price adjustment mechanism, and government guarantees, etc., and few research has been found on the shareholder structure of BOT project company and its corresponding benefit issues which serve as two of the key factors for the success of BOT project. So this dissertation aims to study the choice of BOT company shareholders and their decision-making behavior in order to provide a theoretical guidance for the decision-making of ongoing and future BOT projects. The main contents are as follows:
Firstly, shareholder classifications and structures are analyzed for BOT project companies. Then three types of BOT project company and six kinds of shareholder structures are defined.
BOT project benefit is one of the key elements of shareholder structure choice. To facilitate the description, assuming that BOT project company is only formed by two shareholders, the BOT project company's benefits and shareholders'benefits are analyzed by dividing them into two cases using principal-agent theory. One is the comparison of project benefits between the project company with one builder as one of the shareholders and the project company with two pure investors as its shareholders. Through the model construction and solution, it is concluded that the project benefits of the first company are better than the project benefits of the second company, and the social benefits are also improved. As well, it discusses the optimal share proportion of builder in the project company. The other is the comparison of project benefits between the project company with one operator as one of the shareholders and the project company with two pure investors as its shareholders. It concludes that the project benefits of the former company are better than the project benefits of the latter company, and the social benefits are improved, too. As before, it discusses the optimal share proportion of operator in the project company. These findings can provide a good theoretical basis for choosing a reasonable shareholder structure when a BOT project company is set up.
After the study on BOT project company's benefits and shareholders'benefits, the stability and behavior characteristics of BOT project company are discussed. To facilitate the research, the BOT project company shareholders are simplified as builder, equipment supplier, and major investor. Then the optimal probability of builder fraud and of supplier fraud is obtained under four main assumptions. On this basis, further research indicates that the stability of the project company is closely related to the fines of cheating. When the investigation costs decrease to a certain level, the project company will have a better stability. On the other hand, if the project company has three shareholders, they (shareholders) will consider not only the probability of being investigated, punishment intensity, and investgator's cost, just as they do when there are two shareholders, but also the fraud probability of the third shareholder and the distribution of the project company shares. The relative benefits of the case with one frauder and the case with the other frauder are also compared. Some suggestions for investors are given according to the analysis of shareholders'cheating behavior when the BOT project company is stable. The conclusion will provide a good theoretical basis for choosing a reasonable shareholder decision of the BOT project company.
In the previous research, the behavior of builder as one shareholder of the BOT project company is further analyzed. Through the model construction and solution, the conditions are derived to make the builder devote his best efforts, and some suggestions are made for the project company with the builder as one of its shareholders. To confirm the research findings in this dissertation, a case study is made finally.
论文首先对BOT项目公司股东分类及股东结构进行分析。组成BOT项目公司的股东类型包括以下三种：由专业公司组成的BOT项目公司、由纯投资者组成的BOT项目公司和既有专业公司又有纯投资者组成的BOT项目公司,分析了这三种BOT项目公司的优缺点；并界定了组成BOT项目公司股东结构的六种情况：建设商作为BOT项目公司的股东、运营商作为BOT项目公司的股东、设备供应商作为BOT项目公司的股东、国际贸易公司作为BOT项目公司的股东、纯投资者作为BOT项目公司的股东以及其他公司作为BOT项目公司的股东。
收益问题的分析是研究BOT项目公司股东结构选择的关键内容之一。论文为了说明问题的方便,假设组成BOT项目的项目公司只由两个股东组成,分两种情况从委托一代理理论的角度来分析两种股东结构下BOT项目公司的收益及其股东收益：一是选择建设商作为BOT项目公司股东之一,将其与股东全是纯投资者的情况进行比较,对比两种股东结构下BOT项目的收益,通过模型构建及求解等分析,得出的结论是：建设商作为BOT项目公司股东之一的项目公司收益,优于BOT项目公司股东全部是纯投资者情况下的收益,在此情况下社会效益也得到了提高。在本章中,论文还给出了项目发起人让建设商参股的最优比例；二是选择运营商作为BOT项目公司股东之一,将其与股东全是纯投资者情况进行比较,对比两种股东结构下BOT项目的收益,通过模型构建及求解等分析,得出的结论是：运营商作为BOT项目公司股东之一的项目公司收益,优于BOT项目公司股东全部是纯投资者情况下的收益,在此情况下社会效益也得到了提高。论文还给出了项目发起人让运营商参股的最优比例。以上研究结论为组建BOT项目公司时如何选择合理的项目公司股东结构提供了较好的理论依据。
在研究了两种股东结构下BOT项目公司及各个股东的收益情况后,论文对BOT项目公司的稳定性和行为特征进行了研究。论文为了研究的方便将BOT项目公司的股东简化为建设承包商、设备供应商和主要投资人,然后根据假设条件求出了建设商和供应商作假的最优概率,在此基础上通过进一步研究表明项目公司的稳定性与作假被查实的罚金密切相关,且当作假的查处成本降低到一定的水平时,项目公司会具有更好的稳定性。另一方面,在项目公司有三个股东的情况下,股东在意图作假时不会像只有两个股东那样只权衡自己被查实的概率、惩罚的力度和查处自己的成本,同时还会考虑另一股东作假的概率和项目公司股权的分布并且会比较自己作假和另一股东作假的相对收益。根据对BOT项目公司稳定情况下的股东作假行为的分析为投资人建议了一些应对措施。这些研究结论为BOT项目公司的股东如何进行合理决策提供了较好的理论依据。
在前面研究的基础上进一步对建设商作为BOT项目公司股东的行为进行分析。通过模型构建和求解,得出了使建设商付出最大努力的条件,并给出了建设商作为BOT项目公司股东情况下的一些建议。并通过实例分析印证了本论文的一些研究结论。
With the rapid development of society and economy, all countries in the world, especially developing ones, are facing the contradiction between large-scale infrastructure construction and insufficient government investment. The Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) model can effectively solve the problem to some extent by absorbing a large number of private capital or international funds. So, in recent years, BOT enjoys a rapid development and researches on the new project financing mode are also more and more. However, most of these studies focus on the determination of concession period, project risk sharing, pricing, price adjustment mechanism, and government guarantees, etc., and few research has been found on the shareholder structure of BOT project company and its corresponding benefit issues which serve as two of the key factors for the success of BOT project. So this dissertation aims to study the choice of BOT company shareholders and their decision-making behavior in order to provide a theoretical guidance for the decision-making of ongoing and future BOT projects. The main contents are as follows:
Firstly, shareholder classifications and structures are analyzed for BOT project companies. Then three types of BOT project company and six kinds of shareholder structures are defined.
BOT project benefit is one of the key elements of shareholder structure choice. To facilitate the description, assuming that BOT project company is only formed by two shareholders, the BOT project company's benefits and shareholders'benefits are analyzed by dividing them into two cases using principal-agent theory. One is the comparison of project benefits between the project company with one builder as one of the shareholders and the project company with two pure investors as its shareholders. Through the model construction and solution, it is concluded that the project benefits of the first company are better than the project benefits of the second company, and the social benefits are also improved. As well, it discusses the optimal share proportion of builder in the project company. The other is the comparison of project benefits between the project company with one operator as one of the shareholders and the project company with two pure investors as its shareholders. It concludes that the project benefits of the former company are better than the project benefits of the latter company, and the social benefits are improved, too. As before, it discusses the optimal share proportion of operator in the project company. These findings can provide a good theoretical basis for choosing a reasonable shareholder structure when a BOT project company is set up.
After the study on BOT project company's benefits and shareholders'benefits, the stability and behavior characteristics of BOT project company are discussed. To facilitate the research, the BOT project company shareholders are simplified as builder, equipment supplier, and major investor. Then the optimal probability of builder fraud and of supplier fraud is obtained under four main assumptions. On this basis, further research indicates that the stability of the project company is closely related to the fines of cheating. When the investigation costs decrease to a certain level, the project company will have a better stability. On the other hand, if the project company has three shareholders, they (shareholders) will consider not only the probability of being investigated, punishment intensity, and investgator's cost, just as they do when there are two shareholders, but also the fraud probability of the third shareholder and the distribution of the project company shares. The relative benefits of the case with one frauder and the case with the other frauder are also compared. Some suggestions for investors are given according to the analysis of shareholders'cheating behavior when the BOT project company is stable. The conclusion will provide a good theoretical basis for choosing a reasonable shareholder decision of the BOT project company.
In the previous research, the behavior of builder as one shareholder of the BOT project company is further analyzed. Through the model construction and solution, the conditions are derived to make the builder devote his best efforts, and some suggestions are made for the project company with the builder as one of its shareholders. To confirm the research findings in this dissertation, a case study is made finally.
引文
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