需求信息更新条件下易逝品供应链期权协调契约研究
|
摘要
易逝品是指具有生产提前期比较长、销售季节比较短、季末残值比较低、市场需求不确定性大等特点的一类产品的总称。随着科学技术的迅猛发展，企业创新速度越来越快，产品生命周期逐渐缩短，越来越多的产品具有易逝品的特点，比如，创新型和创意型产品，使得易逝品逐渐成为国民经济的主要组成部分。此外，随着人们生活水平的提高，顾客需求逐渐趋向多样化和个性化，要求的服务水平也有所提高，使得易逝品的市场需求不确定特性更加突出，导致需求预测难度增加而精度降低，制造商生产和零售商订货都将失去可靠依据，供给和需求更难实现匹配和平衡，这种不匹配要么造成产品缺货，要么造成产品积压。这对易逝品供应链上各企业都将是急需解决的重要问题。
需求信息更新条件下的两阶段生产和订货策略就是在这种背景下提出的：零售商发出初始订单后，制造商启动生产应对其订购需求；然后，零售商更新需求预测，并调整其初始订货量，制造商据此确定是否需要启动第二轮生产。但需求信息更新条件下的两阶段生产和订购策略必须面对一个问题：销售季节一旦开始，订货量将无法修订，零售商需要承担订货过多的风险。虽然可以考虑销售季末退货或者提供滞销补贴，但制造商接受零售商的退货或者为零售商提供滞销补贴，就意味着自己要承担生产过多的风险，并且退货过程是有形的，必将产生装卸、运输等物流成本和时间等机会成本。
然而，如果生产提前期内零售商在常规订货的基础上购买一定数量的期权，销售季节来临时，根据实际需求情况确定是否执行期权以及执行的数量，即可回避订货过多的风险。虽然零售商执行期权的过程在本质上也属于“退货”（执行期权后的剩余产品即相当于“退”给了制造商），但其过程是无形的，不会产生任何额外的成本；对于“退货”，零售商已经通过支付“期权购买价格”为制造商分担了一部分风险。这意味着期权契约能够实现风险共担和收益共享，因此，被广泛应用到需求信息更新型的供应链决策中。本文在已有研究基础上，针对单一制造商和单一零售商组成的易逝品二级供应链，在需求信息更新条件下不断变化期权购买与执行的决策点位置，以挖掘期权契约应用的新形式，为供应链成员建立合作伙伴关系提供新的选择，共作以下四个方面的研究：
（1）针对零售商销售季节前夕可以知道准确需求信息的情形，考虑销售季节前夕需求预测信息更新后执行期权：提前期开始时刻，零售商根据制造商发布的价格确定固定订购量和期权购买量，制造商据此安排生产计划，需求预测更新后，零售商确定期权的执行量，制造商根据零售商的交货请求以准时制形式响应。
（2）针对零售商提前期内无法知道准确需求数据、但仍然愿意发出固定订单的情况，考虑需求预测信息更新后购买期权：提前期开始时刻，零售商根据制造商发布的价格政策确定固定订购量；需求预测更新后，零售商确定是否需要购买期权及购买类型。
（3）针对零售商提前期内无法知道准确需求数据、且不愿意发出固定订单、希望延迟购买的情况，考虑以纯期权模式订货：提前期开始时刻，零售商根据制造商发布的价格政策确定期权购买量，需求预测更新后，零售商根据最新信息确定是否需要调整期权的购买量，销售季节来临时，零售商执行期权以满足市场需求。
（4）针对销售季节中两阶段需求相关的情形，考虑了制造商满足零售商订货需求的模式选择问题：零售商在提前期内确定固定订购量和期权购买量，并承诺最小期权执行量。销售季节中，首先交付固定订购量以满足第一阶段市场需求；根据第一阶段的需求满足情况，零售商确定期权的执行量以满足第二阶段的市场需求。制造商根据零售商的决策确定普通模式和昂贵模式的生产数量。
针对以上四种情形，分别得到如下结论：
（1）需求预测更新后制造商以准时制模式响应零售商的期权执行数量时，供应链可以得到协调；但是单向期权只能让零售商受益，而制造商将遭受重大损失；双向期权可以使二者的期望利润都得到帕累托改进。
（2）需求预测更新后制造商以库存制模式响应零售商的期权购买请求时，供应链可以实现协调，并且可以使两成员收益均得到改善；单向期权比双向期权易执行，双向期权比单向期权更具柔性。
（3）在需要预测信息即时更新的前提下考虑以纯期权形式订货并赋予其数量柔性时，契约参数的合理设置能够使供应链系统在其成员间任意分配，系统利润增量的具体分配与成员的谈判能力和风险偏好特点相关；期权契约下的需求预测更新时刻比没有协调契约下的预测更新时刻更接近销售季节。
（4）销售季节中两阶段需求相关时，考虑结合价格折扣策略以分段形式购买和执行期权，此种形式的期权契约可以实现供应链协调，但是制造商从协调中一无所获；但在引入退货策略后，期权契约不仅能够供应链得到协调，还可使两成员有利可图；两阶段需求相关性越高，系统利润越高，供应链利润最大化时所对应的两阶段分界点越靠前。
Perishable goods are those with long lead time, short product life cycles, low salvagevalue and highly unpredictable demands. With the rapid development of science andtechnology, innovation is promoted faster than before and then the product life cycle isgradually shortened, as a result, more and more products have the characteristics of perishablegoods, which mean the perishable goods have become an important part of national economy.Besides, with the improvements of living standards, customer demand tends to diversificationand personalization, and customers require a higher service level. These two features leads toa more highly unpredictable market demand, which cause the demand forecast more difficultand the accuracy of forecast decreases. Therefore, both the manufacturer and the retailer losethe reliable basis for their own decisions, and it is difficult for the supply and the demand toachieve consistent. The mismatch will result in overstock or shortage, both of which areimportant issues that supply chain members have to resolve.
The two-stage production and order policy with demand information updating developsin this context, and it means the retailer has an opportunity to adjust its order level accordingto the updated forecast information before the season begins, and the manufacturer will start asecond run of production to meet the retailer’s second order. However, the policy has to face adifficulty that the retailer has no opportunity to adjust its order level once the selling seasonbegins and it has to bear the risk of excessive ordering. Maybe the manufacturer allows theretailer to return the unsold products at the end of selling season, or provides subsidies for theoverstock products. Obviously, this means the manufacturer has to bear the risk ofoverproduction. Moreover, the return process is visible and it must bring logistics cost such ashandling cost and transportation cost, and opportunity cost due to time consumption.
Nevertheless, if the retailer purchase some options along with the firm orders andexercise the options according the actual market demand, there will be no overstock risk. Theprocess of exercising options is that of returning products in essence, but it doesn’t bringbuyback cost; moreover, the risk of overproduction for the manufacturer has been shared bythe retailer through the option price. Thus, option contracts can achieve risk-sharing and alsorevenue-sharing and has been applied in the supply chain coordination with demand information updating. This dissertation focuses on a two-stage supply chain withsingle-manufacturer and single-retailer and introduces option contracts to coordinate thesupply chain, considering changing decision-making position of option purchase and exercise,excavates new form of option application, and provides new choice for the supply chainmembers to develop partner relationship. Overall, the dissertation considers four cases:
(1) Exercise the option purchased at the beginning of the lead-time after the demandforecast information is updated just before the selling season starts: at the beginning of thelead-time, the retailer places firm orders and purchases some options at the same time. Themanufacturer then organizes the production plan; after the demand forecast updates, theretailer decides the quantity of options to exercise, and the manufacturer prepares for thedelivery of the products, purchased by exercising options, with just-in-time mode.
(2) Purchase a few quantities of options after the demand forecast is updated, whichmeans the option purchase is separated from the firm order: the retailer just places firm ordersat the beginning of the lead-time, and buy some options to adjust the firm order after thedemand forecast is updated. When the selling season comes, the retailer observes therealization of the actual demand, and decides whether to exercise and the correspondingquantity of options to exercise.
(3) Purchase products completely through options: the retailer place option orders at thebeginning of the lead-time, and adjust the quantity of options after the demand forecastupdates. At the very first beginning of the selling season comes, the retailer observes therealization of the actual demand, and decides the quantity of options to exercise.
(4) Consider the two-stage production and order policy in the context that the demand inthe two stages is correlated: the retailer places firm orders for the first-stage demand of sellingseason and purchase some options preparing for the second-stage demand of the sellingseason. During the selling season, which is divided into two unequal lengths, the retailersatisfies the first-stage demand with the products delivered by firm order, observes therealization of the first-stage demand, and decides the specific quantity of options to exercise.The manufacturer delivers the products for the second-stage demand with just-in-time mode.
The corresponding conclusions for the above four cases are as follows:
(1) When the retailer exercises options after the demand forecast is updated and the manufacturer delivers the products with just-in-time mode, the supply chain can becoordinated. However, the unidirectional option contracts just benefits the retailer, and themanufacturer is worse off and always keeps negative profit. Oppositely, the bidirectionaloption contracts not only maximizes the total supply chain profit but brings Paretoimprovements for the profits of both the manufacturer and the retailer.
(2) When the retailer purchases options after the demand forecast is updated, to adjustthe firm order, supply chain coordination can be realized. Both the unidirectional option andthe bidirectional option contracts are effective. The former is easier to administrator and thelatter is more flexible.
(3) When the retailer places no firm orders and just purchase options to reserve capacity,the contracts can be designed to coordinate the supply chain. Moreover, the designedcontracts can allocate the system profit arbitrarily between the manufacturer and the retailer.The allocation of additional profit from coordination is related to the negotiating power andrisk-adverse characteristics of the supply chain members.
(4) When the demands in the two stages of the selling season are correlated, optioncontracts can be designed with piecewise form, which means the retailer should commit aminimum quantity that he would exercise and the commitment makes the retailer enjoys aprice discount for both option purchase and option exercise. This kind of policy cancoordinate the supply chain; however, the manufacturer earns nothing from coordination andkeeps zero profit under the option contracts. Nevertheless, when the manufacturer allows theretailer return unsold products at the end of the selling season, the supply chain could becoordinated. Moreover, the correlation parameter of the demands in the two stages has apositive effect on the supply chain profit, the higher the parameter is, and the earlier thesecond-stage decision point is.
需求信息更新条件下的两阶段生产和订货策略就是在这种背景下提出的：零售商发出初始订单后，制造商启动生产应对其订购需求；然后，零售商更新需求预测，并调整其初始订货量，制造商据此确定是否需要启动第二轮生产。但需求信息更新条件下的两阶段生产和订购策略必须面对一个问题：销售季节一旦开始，订货量将无法修订，零售商需要承担订货过多的风险。虽然可以考虑销售季末退货或者提供滞销补贴，但制造商接受零售商的退货或者为零售商提供滞销补贴，就意味着自己要承担生产过多的风险，并且退货过程是有形的，必将产生装卸、运输等物流成本和时间等机会成本。
然而，如果生产提前期内零售商在常规订货的基础上购买一定数量的期权，销售季节来临时，根据实际需求情况确定是否执行期权以及执行的数量，即可回避订货过多的风险。虽然零售商执行期权的过程在本质上也属于“退货”（执行期权后的剩余产品即相当于“退”给了制造商），但其过程是无形的，不会产生任何额外的成本；对于“退货”，零售商已经通过支付“期权购买价格”为制造商分担了一部分风险。这意味着期权契约能够实现风险共担和收益共享，因此，被广泛应用到需求信息更新型的供应链决策中。本文在已有研究基础上，针对单一制造商和单一零售商组成的易逝品二级供应链，在需求信息更新条件下不断变化期权购买与执行的决策点位置，以挖掘期权契约应用的新形式，为供应链成员建立合作伙伴关系提供新的选择，共作以下四个方面的研究：
（1）针对零售商销售季节前夕可以知道准确需求信息的情形，考虑销售季节前夕需求预测信息更新后执行期权：提前期开始时刻，零售商根据制造商发布的价格确定固定订购量和期权购买量，制造商据此安排生产计划，需求预测更新后，零售商确定期权的执行量，制造商根据零售商的交货请求以准时制形式响应。
（2）针对零售商提前期内无法知道准确需求数据、但仍然愿意发出固定订单的情况，考虑需求预测信息更新后购买期权：提前期开始时刻，零售商根据制造商发布的价格政策确定固定订购量；需求预测更新后，零售商确定是否需要购买期权及购买类型。
（3）针对零售商提前期内无法知道准确需求数据、且不愿意发出固定订单、希望延迟购买的情况，考虑以纯期权模式订货：提前期开始时刻，零售商根据制造商发布的价格政策确定期权购买量，需求预测更新后，零售商根据最新信息确定是否需要调整期权的购买量，销售季节来临时，零售商执行期权以满足市场需求。
（4）针对销售季节中两阶段需求相关的情形，考虑了制造商满足零售商订货需求的模式选择问题：零售商在提前期内确定固定订购量和期权购买量，并承诺最小期权执行量。销售季节中，首先交付固定订购量以满足第一阶段市场需求；根据第一阶段的需求满足情况，零售商确定期权的执行量以满足第二阶段的市场需求。制造商根据零售商的决策确定普通模式和昂贵模式的生产数量。
针对以上四种情形，分别得到如下结论：
（1）需求预测更新后制造商以准时制模式响应零售商的期权执行数量时，供应链可以得到协调；但是单向期权只能让零售商受益，而制造商将遭受重大损失；双向期权可以使二者的期望利润都得到帕累托改进。
（2）需求预测更新后制造商以库存制模式响应零售商的期权购买请求时，供应链可以实现协调，并且可以使两成员收益均得到改善；单向期权比双向期权易执行，双向期权比单向期权更具柔性。
（3）在需要预测信息即时更新的前提下考虑以纯期权形式订货并赋予其数量柔性时，契约参数的合理设置能够使供应链系统在其成员间任意分配，系统利润增量的具体分配与成员的谈判能力和风险偏好特点相关；期权契约下的需求预测更新时刻比没有协调契约下的预测更新时刻更接近销售季节。
（4）销售季节中两阶段需求相关时，考虑结合价格折扣策略以分段形式购买和执行期权，此种形式的期权契约可以实现供应链协调，但是制造商从协调中一无所获；但在引入退货策略后，期权契约不仅能够供应链得到协调，还可使两成员有利可图；两阶段需求相关性越高，系统利润越高，供应链利润最大化时所对应的两阶段分界点越靠前。
Perishable goods are those with long lead time, short product life cycles, low salvagevalue and highly unpredictable demands. With the rapid development of science andtechnology, innovation is promoted faster than before and then the product life cycle isgradually shortened, as a result, more and more products have the characteristics of perishablegoods, which mean the perishable goods have become an important part of national economy.Besides, with the improvements of living standards, customer demand tends to diversificationand personalization, and customers require a higher service level. These two features leads toa more highly unpredictable market demand, which cause the demand forecast more difficultand the accuracy of forecast decreases. Therefore, both the manufacturer and the retailer losethe reliable basis for their own decisions, and it is difficult for the supply and the demand toachieve consistent. The mismatch will result in overstock or shortage, both of which areimportant issues that supply chain members have to resolve.
The two-stage production and order policy with demand information updating developsin this context, and it means the retailer has an opportunity to adjust its order level accordingto the updated forecast information before the season begins, and the manufacturer will start asecond run of production to meet the retailer’s second order. However, the policy has to face adifficulty that the retailer has no opportunity to adjust its order level once the selling seasonbegins and it has to bear the risk of excessive ordering. Maybe the manufacturer allows theretailer to return the unsold products at the end of selling season, or provides subsidies for theoverstock products. Obviously, this means the manufacturer has to bear the risk ofoverproduction. Moreover, the return process is visible and it must bring logistics cost such ashandling cost and transportation cost, and opportunity cost due to time consumption.
Nevertheless, if the retailer purchase some options along with the firm orders andexercise the options according the actual market demand, there will be no overstock risk. Theprocess of exercising options is that of returning products in essence, but it doesn’t bringbuyback cost; moreover, the risk of overproduction for the manufacturer has been shared bythe retailer through the option price. Thus, option contracts can achieve risk-sharing and alsorevenue-sharing and has been applied in the supply chain coordination with demand information updating. This dissertation focuses on a two-stage supply chain withsingle-manufacturer and single-retailer and introduces option contracts to coordinate thesupply chain, considering changing decision-making position of option purchase and exercise,excavates new form of option application, and provides new choice for the supply chainmembers to develop partner relationship. Overall, the dissertation considers four cases:
(1) Exercise the option purchased at the beginning of the lead-time after the demandforecast information is updated just before the selling season starts: at the beginning of thelead-time, the retailer places firm orders and purchases some options at the same time. Themanufacturer then organizes the production plan; after the demand forecast updates, theretailer decides the quantity of options to exercise, and the manufacturer prepares for thedelivery of the products, purchased by exercising options, with just-in-time mode.
(2) Purchase a few quantities of options after the demand forecast is updated, whichmeans the option purchase is separated from the firm order: the retailer just places firm ordersat the beginning of the lead-time, and buy some options to adjust the firm order after thedemand forecast is updated. When the selling season comes, the retailer observes therealization of the actual demand, and decides whether to exercise and the correspondingquantity of options to exercise.
(3) Purchase products completely through options: the retailer place option orders at thebeginning of the lead-time, and adjust the quantity of options after the demand forecastupdates. At the very first beginning of the selling season comes, the retailer observes therealization of the actual demand, and decides the quantity of options to exercise.
(4) Consider the two-stage production and order policy in the context that the demand inthe two stages is correlated: the retailer places firm orders for the first-stage demand of sellingseason and purchase some options preparing for the second-stage demand of the sellingseason. During the selling season, which is divided into two unequal lengths, the retailersatisfies the first-stage demand with the products delivered by firm order, observes therealization of the first-stage demand, and decides the specific quantity of options to exercise.The manufacturer delivers the products for the second-stage demand with just-in-time mode.
The corresponding conclusions for the above four cases are as follows:
(1) When the retailer exercises options after the demand forecast is updated and the manufacturer delivers the products with just-in-time mode, the supply chain can becoordinated. However, the unidirectional option contracts just benefits the retailer, and themanufacturer is worse off and always keeps negative profit. Oppositely, the bidirectionaloption contracts not only maximizes the total supply chain profit but brings Paretoimprovements for the profits of both the manufacturer and the retailer.
(2) When the retailer purchases options after the demand forecast is updated, to adjustthe firm order, supply chain coordination can be realized. Both the unidirectional option andthe bidirectional option contracts are effective. The former is easier to administrator and thelatter is more flexible.
(3) When the retailer places no firm orders and just purchase options to reserve capacity,the contracts can be designed to coordinate the supply chain. Moreover, the designedcontracts can allocate the system profit arbitrarily between the manufacturer and the retailer.The allocation of additional profit from coordination is related to the negotiating power andrisk-adverse characteristics of the supply chain members.
(4) When the demands in the two stages of the selling season are correlated, optioncontracts can be designed with piecewise form, which means the retailer should commit aminimum quantity that he would exercise and the commitment makes the retailer enjoys aprice discount for both option purchase and option exercise. This kind of policy cancoordinate the supply chain; however, the manufacturer earns nothing from coordination andkeeps zero profit under the option contracts. Nevertheless, when the manufacturer allows theretailer return unsold products at the end of the selling season, the supply chain could becoordinated. Moreover, the correlation parameter of the demands in the two stages has apositive effect on the supply chain profit, the higher the parameter is, and the earlier thesecond-stage decision point is.
引文
[1]Chopra S, Meindl P. Supply Chain Management: Strategy, Planning and Operation [M]. thesecond Edition, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall Press,2004.
[2]Lovejoy, J. Personal communication.1999.
[3]机电在线.徐工集团与IBM获得中国供应链最佳合作伙伴奖[EB/OL].http://www.jdol.com.cn/jdnews/348106.html,2011-11-18.
[4]Spengler J.Vertical integration and antitrust policy [J]. Journal of Political Economy,1950,58(4):347-352.
[5]Farlow D., G. Schmidt, A. Tsay. Supplier management at Sun Microsystems [R]. Casestudy, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford, CA.1995.
[6]Ng S. Supply chain management at Solectron [R]. Industrial Symposium on Supply ChainManagement, Stanford University, Stanford, CA.1997.
[7]Connors D., An C., Buckley S., Feigin G., Levas A., Nayak N., Petrakian R., Srinivasan R.Dynamic modeling for re-engineering supply chains [R]. IBM Research Report, T. J.Watson Research Center, Yorktown Heights, NY.1995.
[8]Faust M. Personal communication from a product manager at one of Compaq’s suppliers ofmemory chips, Santa Clara, CA,1996.
[9]Pasternack B A. Optional pricing and returns policies for perishable commodities [J].Marketing Science,1985,4(2):166-176.
[10]Emmons H, Gilbert S. Returns policies in pricing and inventory decisions for cataloguegoods [J]. Management Science,1998,44(2):276-283.
[11]Anupindi R, Bassok Y, Zemel E. A general framework for the study of decentralizeddistribution systems [J]. Manufacturing and Service Operation Management,2001,3(4):349-368.
[12]Barnes-Schuster D., Bassok,Y., Anupind R. Coordination and flexibility in supplycontracts with options [J]. Manufacturing&Service Operations Management,2002(4):171-207.
[13]Iyer G, Villas-boas J M. A bargaining theory of distribution channels [J]. Journal ofMarketing Research,2003(6):80-100.
[14]Brown A, Chou M C, Tang C S. The implications of pooled returns policies [J].International Journal of Production Economics,2008,111(1):129-146.
[15]Ding D, Chen J. Coordinating a three level supply chain with flexible return policies [J].Omega,2008,36(5):865-876.
[16]刘家国,吴冲.基于报童模型的两级供应链回购契约协调研究[J]中国管理科学,2010,18(4):73-78.
[17]张义刚,唐小我.考虑资金收益情况下的供应链回购契约[J]管理工程学报,2012,26(1):137-142.
[18]Chang C. Semiconductor contract manufacturing. Report#SCMS-WW-FR-9601,Dataquest Corporation, Stamford, CT,1996.
[19]Tsay A, Nahmias S, Agrawal N. Modeling supply chain contracts: a review [M]//Tayur S, Ganeshan R. Quantitative Models for Supply Chain Management, Boston: Kluwer,1999:299-336.
[20]Fisher M, Raman A. Reducing the cost of demand uncertainty through accurate responseto early sales [J]. Operat ions Research,1996,44(1):87-99.
[21]Iyer A V, Bergen M E. Quick response in manufacturer-retailer channels [J].Management Science,1997,43(4):559-570.
[22] zer., Uncu O., Wei W. Selling to the “Newsvendor” with a forecast update: Analysisof a dual purchase contract[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2007,182(3):1150-1176.
[23]陈旭.需求信息更新条件下易逝品的批量订购策略[J].管理科学学报,2005,8(5):38-42.
[24]王圣东.基于多种生产和订购模式的Newsvendor型产品供应链协调问题研究[D].合肥:合肥工业大学,2009.
[25]Donohue K. Efficient supply contracts for fashion goods with forecast updating and twoproduction modes [J]. Management Science,2000,46(11):1397-1411.
[26]丁利军,夏国平,葛健.两次生产和订货模式下的供应链契约式协调[J].管理科学学报,2004,7(4):24-32.
[27]Huang H Y, Sethi S P, Yan H M. Purchase contract management with demand forecastupdates [J]. IIE Transactions,2005,37(8):775-785.
[28]蒋洪伟.供应链中的竞争与协调问题研究[D].天津:天津大学，2000.
[29]Lariviere M, Porteus E. Selling to the newsvendor: an analysis of price-only contracts [J].Manufacturing and Service Operations Management,2001,3(4):293-305.
[30]Van der Rhee B., Van der Veen J. A. A., Venugopal V., Nalla V. R. A new revenue sharingmechanism for coordinating multi-echelon supply chains [J]. Operation Research Letters,2010,38(4):296-301.
[31]Lian Z T., Deshmukh A. Analysis of supply contracts with quantity flexibility [J].European Journal of Operational Research,2009,196(2):526-533.
[32]Lau A.H.L., Lau H.S., Wang J.C. Designing a quantity discount scheme for anewsvendor-type product with numerous heterogeneous retailers [J]. European Journal ofOperational Research,2009,180(2):585-600.
[33]Wei Y., Choi T. M. Mean-variance analysis of supply chains under wholesale pricing andprofit sharing schemes [J]. European Journal of Operational Research,2010,204(2):255-262.
[34]Brown A O, Lee H L. The impact of demand signal quality on optimal decisions insupply contacts [M]//Shanthikumar J G, Yao D D, Zijm W H M. Stochastic Modeling andOptimization of Manufacturing Systems and Supply Chains. International Series inOperations Research and Management Science (63). Kluwer,2003.
[35]Ritchken P H, Tapiero C S. Contingent Claims Contracting for Purchasing Decision inInventory Management [J].Operation Research,1986,34(6):864-870.
[36]孟令全,周永务.供应链期权合同分类综述[J].合肥工业大学学报(自然科学版),2009,32(5):674-679.
[37]Chen H., Jian Chen J., Chen Y. A coordination mechanism for a supply chain withdemand information updating [J]. International Journal of Production Economics,2006,103(1):347-361.
[38]Gurnani H, Tang C. Note: Optimal ordering decision with uncertain cost and demandforecast updating [J]. Management Science,1999,45(10):1456-1462.
[39]陈旭.考虑需求信息更新的易逝品的订货策略[J].计算机集成制造系统,2003,9(ll):1038-1043.
[40]盛方正,季建华.需求预测信息更新的零售商三阶段最优采购策略[J].管理工程学报,2009,23(2):156-159.
[41]陈金亮,宋华,徐渝.不对称信息下具有需求预测更新的供应链合同协调研究[J].中国管理科学,2010(2):84-89.
[42]Gallego G, Obzer O. Integrating replenishment decisions with advance demandinformation [J]. Management Science,2001,47(10):1344-1360.
[43]Gilbert S M, Ballou R H. Supply chain benefits from advanced customer commitments[J]. Journal of Operations Management,1999,18(2):61-73.
[44]Bengtsson J. Pricing and coordination of supply chains under limited return: Theone-period case [Z]. Working paper WP-309, Department of Production Economics,Linkoping Institute of Technology,2003a.
[45]Bengtsson J. Pricing and coordination of supply chains under limited return: Thetwo-period case [Z]. Working paper WP-310, Department of Production Economics,Linkoping Institute of Technology,2003b.
[46]Chen J, Xu L J. Coordination of the supply chain of seasonal products [J]. IEEETransaction on Systems, Man and Cyberretics-part A: Systems and Humans,2001,31(6):524-533.
[47]Choi T M, Li D, Yan H. Optimal single ordering policy with multiple delivery modes withBayesian information updates [J]. Computers and Operations Research,2004,31(12):1965-1984.
[48]Weng Z.K.. Coordinating order quantities between the manufacturer and the buyer: Ageneralized newsvendor model [J]. European Journal of Operational Research,2004,156(1):148-161.
[49]Zhou Y., Li D.H. Coordinating order quantity decisions in the supply chain contract underrandom demand[J]Applied Mathematical Modeling,2007,31(6):1029-1038.
[50]Zhou Y.W., Wang S.D. Manufacturer-buyer coordination for newsvendor-type-productswith two ordering opportunities and partial backorders [J]. European Journal ofOperational Research2009,198(3):958-974.
[51]Fisher M, Hammond H. Making supply meet demand in an uncertainty world.[J].Harvard Business Review,1994(5-6):83-89.
[52]Eppen G D, Iyer A V. Improved fashion buying with Bayesian updates [J]. OperationsResearch,1997,43(6):805-819.
[53]Jeuland A., Shugan S. Managing channel profits [J]. Marketing Science,1983,2(3):239-272.
[54]Tsay A A. Management retailer channel overstock: markdown money and return policies[J]. Journal of Retailing,2001,77(4):451-492.
[55]Webster S, Weng Z K. A risk-free perishable item returns policy [J]. Manufacturing andService Operations Management,2000,2(1):100-106.
[56]Lovejoy W. S. Integrated Operations[M]. Southwestern College Publishing, Cincinnati,OH.1999.
[57]Tsay A. A.1995. Supply chain control with quantity flexibility. Ph.D. dissertation,Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford, CA.
[58]Tsay A. Quantity-flexibility contract and supplier-customer incentives [J]. ManagementScience,1999,45(10):1339-1358.
[59]Bassok Y., Anupindi, R. Analysis of supply contracts with total minimum commitment [J].IIE Transactions,1997a,29(5):373–381.
[60]Bassok Y., Anupindi, R. Analysis of supply contracts with commitments and flexibility.Northwestern University, Evanston, IL60208,1997b.
[61]Tsay A A, Lovejoy W S. Quantity-flexibility contacts and supply chain performance [J].Manufacturing and Service Operations Management,1999,1(2):89-111.
[62]Lariviere M. Inducing forecast revelation through restricted returns [Z]. Working paper ofNorthwestern University,2002.
[63] zgür Y., Erhun F. Retailing the multiple supply problem to quantity flexibility contacts[J]. Operations Research Letters,2007,35(6):767-772.
[64]Wu J H. Quantity flexibility contracts under Bayesian updating [J]. Computers&Operations Research,2005,32(5):1267-1288.
[65]Bassok Y, Anupindi R. Analysis of supply contracts with commitments and flexibility [J].Naval Research Logistics,2008,55(5):459-477.
[66]Brown A., Lee H. Optimal pay-to-delay capacity reservation with application to thesemiconductor industry [Z]. Working paper, Department of Industrial Engineering andEngineering Management, Stanford University, U.S.A,1997.
[67]Lee H.L., Padmanabhan P., Whang S. The bullwhip effect in supply chains[J]. SloanManagement Review,1997,38(3):93-102.
[68]Donohue K. Supply contracts and fashion goods: Optimizing channel profit[D]. TheWharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA,1996.
[69]Milner J.M., Rosenblatt M.J. Flexible supply contracts for short life-cycle goods: Thebuyer’s perspective [J]. Naval Research Logistics,2002(49):25-45.
[70]Wang X L, Liu L W. Coordination in a retailer-led supply chain through option contracts[J]. International Journal of Production Economics,2007,110(1-2):115-127.
[71]Van Delft Ch., Vial J. A practical implementation of stochastic programming: anapplication to the evaluation of option contracts in supply chains [J]. Automatica,2004,40(5):743-756.
[72]Xu N X. Flexible supply policy with options and capacity constraints [J] OperationsResearch Letters,2006,34(5):508-516.
[73]Fukuda Y. Optimal policies for the inventory problem with negotiable lead-time [J].Management Science.1964(10):690-708.
[74]Federgruen A., Zipkin P. An inventory model with limited production capacity anduncertain demands [J]. The discounted-cost criterion, Math. Oper. Res.1986(11):208–215.
[75]Tayur S.R., Computing the optimal policy for capacitated inventory models [J]. Stochast.Model,1993(9):585–598.
[76]Xu H. Managing production and procurement through option contracts in supply chainswith random yield [J]. International Journal of Production Economics,2010,126(2):306-313.
[77]Cachon G.P., Lariviere, M.A. Contracting to assure supply: how to share demandforecasts in a supply chain [J]. Management Science,2001(47):629-646.
[78]Cheng F., Ettl M., Lin G.Y., Schwarz M., Yao D.D. Flexible supply contracts via options[Z]. Working paper, IBM T.J. Watson Research Center, Yorktown Heights, NY,2003.
[79]Martínez-de-Albéniz V., Simchi-Levi D. Competition in the supply option market [Z].Working paper, Operations Research Center, MIT, Cambridge, MA,2003.
[80]Mukhopadhyay S.K., Ma H. Joint procurement and production decisionsinremanufacturing under quality and demand uncertainty [J]. International Journal ofProduction Economics,2009(120):5-17.
[81]Fu Q., Lee C.Y., Teo C.P. Procurement risk management using option: random spot priceand the portfolio effect [Z]. Working paper, Hong Kong University of Science andTechnology, China,2006.
[82]Jin X., Li L., Ni J. Option model for joint production and preventive maintenance system[J]. International Journal of Production Economics,2009,119(2):347–353.
[83]马士华,胡剑阳,林勇.一种基于期权的供应商能力预订模型[J].管理工程学报,2004,18(1):8-11.
[84]郭琼,杨德礼,迟国泰.基于期权的供应链契约式协调模型[J].系统工程,2005,23(10):1-6.
[85]佟斌,郭琼,潘新.基于需求预测的供应链期权式契约协调[J].系统工程,2006,24(11):13-18.
[86]张子刚,刘开军.柔性供应链中的三阶段期权型契约模型[J].系统工程理论方法应用,2006,15(4):326-331.
[87]慕永国,麦强,冯英浚.基于CVaR的能力预定期权契约模型[C].中国第七届中国软科学年会,2009:252-257.
[88]Chaharsooghi S.K, Heydari J. Supply chain coordination for the joint determination oforder quantity and reorder point using credit option [J]. European Journal of OperationalResearch,2010,204(1):86-95.
[89]Wang X L, Liu L W. Coordination by Option Contracts in a Retailer-Led Supply Chainwith Demand Update [J]. Tsinghua Science&Technology,2008,13(4):570-580.
[90]Sarmah S.P., Acharya D., Goyal S.K. Coordination and profit sharing between amanufacturer and a buyer with target profit under credit option [J]. European Journal ofOperational Research,2007,182(3):1469-1478.
[91]Zhao Y X, Wang S Y, Cheng T CE, et al. Coordination of supply chains by optioncontracts: A cooperative game theory approach [J]. European Journal of OperationalResearch,2010,207(2):668-675.
[92]Wang Q Z, Tsao D B. Supply contract with bidirectional options: The buyer's perspective[J]. International Journal of Production Economics,2006,101(1):30-52.
[93]Gomez_Padilla A., Mishina T. Supply contract with options [J]. International Journal ofProduction Economics,2009,122(1):312-318.
[94]胡本勇,王性玉,彭其渊.供应链单向及双向期权柔性契约比较分析[J].中国管理科学,2007,15(6):92-97.
[95]胡本勇,王性玉,彭其渊.基于双向期权的供应链柔性契约模型[J].管理工程学报,2008,22(4):79-84.
[96]胡本勇,王性玉,彭其渊.供应链柔性契约与单向及双向期权模式选择[J].系统管理学报,2009,18(4):165-171.
[97]李荧玉,崔文田.用期权调整补货和退货的供应链契约模型[J].预测,2006,25(6):74-80.
[98]韩瑞珠,李智.基于双向期权的食品供应链三阶段订货契约模型[J].东南大学学报(自然科学版),2007,37(S2):403-408.
[99]包晓英,蒲云,王翠红.基于双重期权机制的定制件采购合同利润模型研究[J].科技管理研究,2007(6):251-255.
[100]李娟,黄培清,赵晓敏.基于更新信息的两级供应链双向期权合同研究[J]系统工程学报,2008,23(3):295-301.
[101]Du R., Banerjee A.,Kim S.L. Coordination of two-echelon supply chains usingwholesale price discount and credit option[J]International Journal of ProductionEconomics, In Press, Corrected Proof, Available online17December2011.
[102]梁樑,浦徐进,张廷龙. VMI中基于期权的供应商风险管理[J].中国科学技术大学学报,2004,34(5):549-556.
[103]吴丽娜,周永务.期权执行价格可变的VMI供应链中零售商收益研究[J].工业工程,2009,12(4):32-35.
[104]胡本勇,雷东,陈旭.基于收益共享与努力成本共担的供应链期权销量担保契约[J].管理工程学报,2010,24(3):33-38.
[105]郑克俊.考虑期权的两阶段生产易逝品供应链协调[J].工业工程,2010,13(3):29-33.
[106]郭琼,杨德礼.需求信息不对称下基于期权的供应链协作机制的研究[J].计算机集成制造系统,2006,12(9):1466-1471.
[107]崔爱平,刘伟,张旭.不对称信息和风险规避下的能力期权契约模型[J].计算机工程与应用,2009,45(33):209-212.
[108]Li H T, Ritchken P., Wang Y Z. Option and forward contracting with asymmetricinformation Valuation issues in supply chains [J]. European Journal of OperationalResearch,2009,197(1):134-148.
[109]潘景铭,唐小我,倪得兵.基于实物期权的供应链能力柔性决策研究[J].电子科技大学学报,2005,34(2):285-288.
[110]陈祥锋,朱晨波.供应链采购管理中的期权合同价值研究[J].系统工程学报,2007,22(4):401-406.
[111]胡本勇,彭其渊,王性玉.考虑采购资金约束的供应链期权柔性契约[J].管理科学学报,2009,12(6):62-71.
[112]马成,周永务.期权契约下应对突发事件的供应链协调[J].合肥工业大学学报(自然科学版),2009,32(3):430-434.
[113]赵金实,王浣尘.期权定价市场化情况下的供应链协调机制[J].工业工程与管理,2009,14(2):27-31.
[114]赵金实,王浣尘,郑晓涛.期权定价市场化情况下逆向主导型供应链协调机制研究[J].管理工程学报,2009,23(2):111-115.
[115]常志平,蒋馥.供应链中电子市场与合约市场的协调研究[J].华中科技大学学报(自然科学版),2004,32(1):111-113.
[116]王庆东,黄小原,晏妮娜.电子市场批量订货与期权采购协调的鲁棒策略[J].东北大学学报(自然科学版),2006,27(1):107-110.
[117]郭琼,杨德礼.基于期权与现货市场的供应链契约式协调的研究[J].控制与决策,2006,21(11):1229-1238.
[118]晏妮娜,黄小原,朱宏.基于混合智能算法的电子市场供应链期权合同协调[J].管理学报,2006,3(5):524-528.
[119]晏妮娜,黄小原. B2B电子市场下供应链期权合同协调模型与优化[J].控制与决策,2007,22(5):535-539.
[120]晏妮娜,黄小原. B2B在线市场期权合同协调的鲁棒策略[J].系统工程理论与实践,2006(1):102-106.
[121]李培勤.电子市场与期权合约市场并存下的供应链优化[J].数学的实践与认识,2009,39(17):28-43.
[122]徐经意,杨德礼.一种期权契约协调下供应链的交易成本和电子佣金分析[J].预测,2005,24(6):61-66.
[123]Wu D.J., Kleindorfer P.R., Zhang Jin E. Optimal bidding and contracting strategies forcapital-intensive goods [J]. European Journal of Operational Research,2002,137(3):657-676.
[124]Kleindorfer, P R., Wu, D.J. Integrating long-and short-term contracting viabusiness-to-business exchanges for capital-intensive industries [J]. Management Science,2003,49(11):1597-1615.
[125]Wu D.J., Kleindorfer Paul R. Competitive options, supply contracting and electronicmarkets [J]. Management Science,2005,51(3):452-466.
[126]徐经意,杨德礼,郭琼.在线逆向拍卖期权和单方支付契约下的供应链协调机制分析[J].中国管理科学,2005,13(4):100-105.
[127]陈旭.考虑期权合同供应链的零售商订货研究[J].管理科学学报,2006,9(3):17-23.
[128]宁钟,戴俊俊.期权在供应链风险管理中的应用[J].系统工程理论与实践,2005(7):49-54.
[129]宁钟,林滨.供应链风险管理中的期权机制[J].系统工程学报,2007,22(2):141-147.
[130]刘蕾,鄢章华,腾春贤.基于期权契约的供应链协调研究[J].运筹与管理,2011,20(4):48-57.
[131]赵金实,王浣尘,郑晓涛,庞清武.大宗商品的供应链期权契约影响因素研究[J].工业工程与管理,2008(5):36-47.
[132]崔爱平,刘伟.物流服务供应链中基于期权契约的能力协调[J].中国管理科学,2009,17(2):59-65.
[133]Wu J., Yue W., Yamamoto Y., Wang S. Risk analysis of a pay to delay capacityreservation contract[J]Optimization Methods and Software.2006,21(4):635-651.
[134]Buzacotta J., Yanb H., Zhang H. Risk analysis of commitment–option contracts withforecast updates[J]. IIE Transactions,2011,43(6):415-431.
[135]Wang Q., Chu B., Wang J., Kumakiri Yuki. Risk analysis of supply contract with calloptions for buyers[J]. International Journal of Production Economics, In Press, CorrectedProof, Available online1February2011.
[136]Wang Q.Z.,Tang O., Tsao D.B.A flexible contract strategy in a supply chain with aninflexible production mode[J]. International Journal of Operational Research,2006,1(3):228-248
[137]von Neumann, J. Morgenstern O. Theory of Games and Economic Behavior[M]. Thesecond edition, Princeton University Press, Princeton:1953.
[138]Nash, J. The bargaining problem [J]. Econometrica,1950(18):155-162.
[139]Kohli, R. Park H. A cooperative game theory model of quantity discounts [J].Management Science,1989,35(6):693-707.
[140]Arda Y., Hennet J.C. Supply chain coordination through contract negotiation[C].Proceedings of the44th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, and the EuropeanControl Conference Seville, Spain,2005:4658-4663.
[141]Sobel M.J., Turcic D. Risk Aversion and Supply Chain Contract Negotiation [Z].Working paper, Department of Operations, Weatherhead School of Management, CaseWestern Reserve University,2008.
[142]Nagarajan M., So i G. Game-theoretic analysis of cooperation among supply chainagents: Review and extensions [J]. European Journal of Operational Research,2008,187(3):719-745.
[143]Hou J., Zeng A. Z., Zhao L.D. Achieving better coordination through revenue sharingand bargaining in a two-stage supply chain [J]. Computers&Industrial Engineering,2009,57(1):383-394.
[144]Leng M. M., Parlar M. Lead-time reduction in a two-level supply chain:Non-cooperative equilibria vs. coordination with a profit-sharing contract [J].International Journal of Production Economics,2009,118(2):521-544.
[145]Eliashberg. Arbitrating a dispute: A decision analytic approach [J]. Management Science,1986,32(8):963-974.
[146]Pratt J W. Risk aversion in the small and in the large [J]. Econometrica,1964,32(1-2):122-136.
[147]胡胜强,张华西,关迎莹.基于Shapley值法的四级供应链利润分配[J].系统工程,2009,27(9):49-54.
[148]胡本勇,彭其渊.基于广告-研发的供应链合作博弈分析[J].管理科学学报,2008,11(2):61-70.
[149]Cachon P.G. The Allocation of Inventory Risk in a Supply Chain: Push, Pull, andAdvance-Purchase Discount Contracts[J]. Management Science.2004,50(2):222-238.
[150]Sethi S.P., Yan H. Zhang H. Quantity Flexibilty Contracts: Optimal Decisions withInformation Updates [J]. Decision Sciences,2004,35(4):691-711.
[2]Lovejoy, J. Personal communication.1999.
[3]机电在线.徐工集团与IBM获得中国供应链最佳合作伙伴奖[EB/OL].http://www.jdol.com.cn/jdnews/348106.html,2011-11-18.
[4]Spengler J.Vertical integration and antitrust policy [J]. Journal of Political Economy,1950,58(4):347-352.
[5]Farlow D., G. Schmidt, A. Tsay. Supplier management at Sun Microsystems [R]. Casestudy, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford, CA.1995.
[6]Ng S. Supply chain management at Solectron [R]. Industrial Symposium on Supply ChainManagement, Stanford University, Stanford, CA.1997.
[7]Connors D., An C., Buckley S., Feigin G., Levas A., Nayak N., Petrakian R., Srinivasan R.Dynamic modeling for re-engineering supply chains [R]. IBM Research Report, T. J.Watson Research Center, Yorktown Heights, NY.1995.
[8]Faust M. Personal communication from a product manager at one of Compaq’s suppliers ofmemory chips, Santa Clara, CA,1996.
[9]Pasternack B A. Optional pricing and returns policies for perishable commodities [J].Marketing Science,1985,4(2):166-176.
[10]Emmons H, Gilbert S. Returns policies in pricing and inventory decisions for cataloguegoods [J]. Management Science,1998,44(2):276-283.
[11]Anupindi R, Bassok Y, Zemel E. A general framework for the study of decentralizeddistribution systems [J]. Manufacturing and Service Operation Management,2001,3(4):349-368.
[12]Barnes-Schuster D., Bassok,Y., Anupind R. Coordination and flexibility in supplycontracts with options [J]. Manufacturing&Service Operations Management,2002(4):171-207.
[13]Iyer G, Villas-boas J M. A bargaining theory of distribution channels [J]. Journal ofMarketing Research,2003(6):80-100.
[14]Brown A, Chou M C, Tang C S. The implications of pooled returns policies [J].International Journal of Production Economics,2008,111(1):129-146.
[15]Ding D, Chen J. Coordinating a three level supply chain with flexible return policies [J].Omega,2008,36(5):865-876.
[16]刘家国,吴冲.基于报童模型的两级供应链回购契约协调研究[J]中国管理科学,2010,18(4):73-78.
[17]张义刚,唐小我.考虑资金收益情况下的供应链回购契约[J]管理工程学报,2012,26(1):137-142.
[18]Chang C. Semiconductor contract manufacturing. Report#SCMS-WW-FR-9601,Dataquest Corporation, Stamford, CT,1996.
[19]Tsay A, Nahmias S, Agrawal N. Modeling supply chain contracts: a review [M]//Tayur S, Ganeshan R. Quantitative Models for Supply Chain Management, Boston: Kluwer,1999:299-336.
[20]Fisher M, Raman A. Reducing the cost of demand uncertainty through accurate responseto early sales [J]. Operat ions Research,1996,44(1):87-99.
[21]Iyer A V, Bergen M E. Quick response in manufacturer-retailer channels [J].Management Science,1997,43(4):559-570.
[22] zer., Uncu O., Wei W. Selling to the “Newsvendor” with a forecast update: Analysisof a dual purchase contract[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2007,182(3):1150-1176.
[23]陈旭.需求信息更新条件下易逝品的批量订购策略[J].管理科学学报,2005,8(5):38-42.
[24]王圣东.基于多种生产和订购模式的Newsvendor型产品供应链协调问题研究[D].合肥:合肥工业大学,2009.
[25]Donohue K. Efficient supply contracts for fashion goods with forecast updating and twoproduction modes [J]. Management Science,2000,46(11):1397-1411.
[26]丁利军,夏国平,葛健.两次生产和订货模式下的供应链契约式协调[J].管理科学学报,2004,7(4):24-32.
[27]Huang H Y, Sethi S P, Yan H M. Purchase contract management with demand forecastupdates [J]. IIE Transactions,2005,37(8):775-785.
[28]蒋洪伟.供应链中的竞争与协调问题研究[D].天津:天津大学，2000.
[29]Lariviere M, Porteus E. Selling to the newsvendor: an analysis of price-only contracts [J].Manufacturing and Service Operations Management,2001,3(4):293-305.
[30]Van der Rhee B., Van der Veen J. A. A., Venugopal V., Nalla V. R. A new revenue sharingmechanism for coordinating multi-echelon supply chains [J]. Operation Research Letters,2010,38(4):296-301.
[31]Lian Z T., Deshmukh A. Analysis of supply contracts with quantity flexibility [J].European Journal of Operational Research,2009,196(2):526-533.
[32]Lau A.H.L., Lau H.S., Wang J.C. Designing a quantity discount scheme for anewsvendor-type product with numerous heterogeneous retailers [J]. European Journal ofOperational Research,2009,180(2):585-600.
[33]Wei Y., Choi T. M. Mean-variance analysis of supply chains under wholesale pricing andprofit sharing schemes [J]. European Journal of Operational Research,2010,204(2):255-262.
[34]Brown A O, Lee H L. The impact of demand signal quality on optimal decisions insupply contacts [M]//Shanthikumar J G, Yao D D, Zijm W H M. Stochastic Modeling andOptimization of Manufacturing Systems and Supply Chains. International Series inOperations Research and Management Science (63). Kluwer,2003.
[35]Ritchken P H, Tapiero C S. Contingent Claims Contracting for Purchasing Decision inInventory Management [J].Operation Research,1986,34(6):864-870.
[36]孟令全,周永务.供应链期权合同分类综述[J].合肥工业大学学报(自然科学版),2009,32(5):674-679.
[37]Chen H., Jian Chen J., Chen Y. A coordination mechanism for a supply chain withdemand information updating [J]. International Journal of Production Economics,2006,103(1):347-361.
[38]Gurnani H, Tang C. Note: Optimal ordering decision with uncertain cost and demandforecast updating [J]. Management Science,1999,45(10):1456-1462.
[39]陈旭.考虑需求信息更新的易逝品的订货策略[J].计算机集成制造系统,2003,9(ll):1038-1043.
[40]盛方正,季建华.需求预测信息更新的零售商三阶段最优采购策略[J].管理工程学报,2009,23(2):156-159.
[41]陈金亮,宋华,徐渝.不对称信息下具有需求预测更新的供应链合同协调研究[J].中国管理科学,2010(2):84-89.
[42]Gallego G, Obzer O. Integrating replenishment decisions with advance demandinformation [J]. Management Science,2001,47(10):1344-1360.
[43]Gilbert S M, Ballou R H. Supply chain benefits from advanced customer commitments[J]. Journal of Operations Management,1999,18(2):61-73.
[44]Bengtsson J. Pricing and coordination of supply chains under limited return: Theone-period case [Z]. Working paper WP-309, Department of Production Economics,Linkoping Institute of Technology,2003a.
[45]Bengtsson J. Pricing and coordination of supply chains under limited return: Thetwo-period case [Z]. Working paper WP-310, Department of Production Economics,Linkoping Institute of Technology,2003b.
[46]Chen J, Xu L J. Coordination of the supply chain of seasonal products [J]. IEEETransaction on Systems, Man and Cyberretics-part A: Systems and Humans,2001,31(6):524-533.
[47]Choi T M, Li D, Yan H. Optimal single ordering policy with multiple delivery modes withBayesian information updates [J]. Computers and Operations Research,2004,31(12):1965-1984.
[48]Weng Z.K.. Coordinating order quantities between the manufacturer and the buyer: Ageneralized newsvendor model [J]. European Journal of Operational Research,2004,156(1):148-161.
[49]Zhou Y., Li D.H. Coordinating order quantity decisions in the supply chain contract underrandom demand[J]Applied Mathematical Modeling,2007,31(6):1029-1038.
[50]Zhou Y.W., Wang S.D. Manufacturer-buyer coordination for newsvendor-type-productswith two ordering opportunities and partial backorders [J]. European Journal ofOperational Research2009,198(3):958-974.
[51]Fisher M, Hammond H. Making supply meet demand in an uncertainty world.[J].Harvard Business Review,1994(5-6):83-89.
[52]Eppen G D, Iyer A V. Improved fashion buying with Bayesian updates [J]. OperationsResearch,1997,43(6):805-819.
[53]Jeuland A., Shugan S. Managing channel profits [J]. Marketing Science,1983,2(3):239-272.
[54]Tsay A A. Management retailer channel overstock: markdown money and return policies[J]. Journal of Retailing,2001,77(4):451-492.
[55]Webster S, Weng Z K. A risk-free perishable item returns policy [J]. Manufacturing andService Operations Management,2000,2(1):100-106.
[56]Lovejoy W. S. Integrated Operations[M]. Southwestern College Publishing, Cincinnati,OH.1999.
[57]Tsay A. A.1995. Supply chain control with quantity flexibility. Ph.D. dissertation,Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford, CA.
[58]Tsay A. Quantity-flexibility contract and supplier-customer incentives [J]. ManagementScience,1999,45(10):1339-1358.
[59]Bassok Y., Anupindi, R. Analysis of supply contracts with total minimum commitment [J].IIE Transactions,1997a,29(5):373–381.
[60]Bassok Y., Anupindi, R. Analysis of supply contracts with commitments and flexibility.Northwestern University, Evanston, IL60208,1997b.
[61]Tsay A A, Lovejoy W S. Quantity-flexibility contacts and supply chain performance [J].Manufacturing and Service Operations Management,1999,1(2):89-111.
[62]Lariviere M. Inducing forecast revelation through restricted returns [Z]. Working paper ofNorthwestern University,2002.
[63] zgür Y., Erhun F. Retailing the multiple supply problem to quantity flexibility contacts[J]. Operations Research Letters,2007,35(6):767-772.
[64]Wu J H. Quantity flexibility contracts under Bayesian updating [J]. Computers&Operations Research,2005,32(5):1267-1288.
[65]Bassok Y, Anupindi R. Analysis of supply contracts with commitments and flexibility [J].Naval Research Logistics,2008,55(5):459-477.
[66]Brown A., Lee H. Optimal pay-to-delay capacity reservation with application to thesemiconductor industry [Z]. Working paper, Department of Industrial Engineering andEngineering Management, Stanford University, U.S.A,1997.
[67]Lee H.L., Padmanabhan P., Whang S. The bullwhip effect in supply chains[J]. SloanManagement Review,1997,38(3):93-102.
[68]Donohue K. Supply contracts and fashion goods: Optimizing channel profit[D]. TheWharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA,1996.
[69]Milner J.M., Rosenblatt M.J. Flexible supply contracts for short life-cycle goods: Thebuyer’s perspective [J]. Naval Research Logistics,2002(49):25-45.
[70]Wang X L, Liu L W. Coordination in a retailer-led supply chain through option contracts[J]. International Journal of Production Economics,2007,110(1-2):115-127.
[71]Van Delft Ch., Vial J. A practical implementation of stochastic programming: anapplication to the evaluation of option contracts in supply chains [J]. Automatica,2004,40(5):743-756.
[72]Xu N X. Flexible supply policy with options and capacity constraints [J] OperationsResearch Letters,2006,34(5):508-516.
[73]Fukuda Y. Optimal policies for the inventory problem with negotiable lead-time [J].Management Science.1964(10):690-708.
[74]Federgruen A., Zipkin P. An inventory model with limited production capacity anduncertain demands [J]. The discounted-cost criterion, Math. Oper. Res.1986(11):208–215.
[75]Tayur S.R., Computing the optimal policy for capacitated inventory models [J]. Stochast.Model,1993(9):585–598.
[76]Xu H. Managing production and procurement through option contracts in supply chainswith random yield [J]. International Journal of Production Economics,2010,126(2):306-313.
[77]Cachon G.P., Lariviere, M.A. Contracting to assure supply: how to share demandforecasts in a supply chain [J]. Management Science,2001(47):629-646.
[78]Cheng F., Ettl M., Lin G.Y., Schwarz M., Yao D.D. Flexible supply contracts via options[Z]. Working paper, IBM T.J. Watson Research Center, Yorktown Heights, NY,2003.
[79]Martínez-de-Albéniz V., Simchi-Levi D. Competition in the supply option market [Z].Working paper, Operations Research Center, MIT, Cambridge, MA,2003.
[80]Mukhopadhyay S.K., Ma H. Joint procurement and production decisionsinremanufacturing under quality and demand uncertainty [J]. International Journal ofProduction Economics,2009(120):5-17.
[81]Fu Q., Lee C.Y., Teo C.P. Procurement risk management using option: random spot priceand the portfolio effect [Z]. Working paper, Hong Kong University of Science andTechnology, China,2006.
[82]Jin X., Li L., Ni J. Option model for joint production and preventive maintenance system[J]. International Journal of Production Economics,2009,119(2):347–353.
[83]马士华,胡剑阳,林勇.一种基于期权的供应商能力预订模型[J].管理工程学报,2004,18(1):8-11.
[84]郭琼,杨德礼,迟国泰.基于期权的供应链契约式协调模型[J].系统工程,2005,23(10):1-6.
[85]佟斌,郭琼,潘新.基于需求预测的供应链期权式契约协调[J].系统工程,2006,24(11):13-18.
[86]张子刚,刘开军.柔性供应链中的三阶段期权型契约模型[J].系统工程理论方法应用,2006,15(4):326-331.
[87]慕永国,麦强,冯英浚.基于CVaR的能力预定期权契约模型[C].中国第七届中国软科学年会,2009:252-257.
[88]Chaharsooghi S.K, Heydari J. Supply chain coordination for the joint determination oforder quantity and reorder point using credit option [J]. European Journal of OperationalResearch,2010,204(1):86-95.
[89]Wang X L, Liu L W. Coordination by Option Contracts in a Retailer-Led Supply Chainwith Demand Update [J]. Tsinghua Science&Technology,2008,13(4):570-580.
[90]Sarmah S.P., Acharya D., Goyal S.K. Coordination and profit sharing between amanufacturer and a buyer with target profit under credit option [J]. European Journal ofOperational Research,2007,182(3):1469-1478.
[91]Zhao Y X, Wang S Y, Cheng T CE, et al. Coordination of supply chains by optioncontracts: A cooperative game theory approach [J]. European Journal of OperationalResearch,2010,207(2):668-675.
[92]Wang Q Z, Tsao D B. Supply contract with bidirectional options: The buyer's perspective[J]. International Journal of Production Economics,2006,101(1):30-52.
[93]Gomez_Padilla A., Mishina T. Supply contract with options [J]. International Journal ofProduction Economics,2009,122(1):312-318.
[94]胡本勇,王性玉,彭其渊.供应链单向及双向期权柔性契约比较分析[J].中国管理科学,2007,15(6):92-97.
[95]胡本勇,王性玉,彭其渊.基于双向期权的供应链柔性契约模型[J].管理工程学报,2008,22(4):79-84.
[96]胡本勇,王性玉,彭其渊.供应链柔性契约与单向及双向期权模式选择[J].系统管理学报,2009,18(4):165-171.
[97]李荧玉,崔文田.用期权调整补货和退货的供应链契约模型[J].预测,2006,25(6):74-80.
[98]韩瑞珠,李智.基于双向期权的食品供应链三阶段订货契约模型[J].东南大学学报(自然科学版),2007,37(S2):403-408.
[99]包晓英,蒲云,王翠红.基于双重期权机制的定制件采购合同利润模型研究[J].科技管理研究,2007(6):251-255.
[100]李娟,黄培清,赵晓敏.基于更新信息的两级供应链双向期权合同研究[J]系统工程学报,2008,23(3):295-301.
[101]Du R., Banerjee A.,Kim S.L. Coordination of two-echelon supply chains usingwholesale price discount and credit option[J]International Journal of ProductionEconomics, In Press, Corrected Proof, Available online17December2011.
[102]梁樑,浦徐进,张廷龙. VMI中基于期权的供应商风险管理[J].中国科学技术大学学报,2004,34(5):549-556.
[103]吴丽娜,周永务.期权执行价格可变的VMI供应链中零售商收益研究[J].工业工程,2009,12(4):32-35.
[104]胡本勇,雷东,陈旭.基于收益共享与努力成本共担的供应链期权销量担保契约[J].管理工程学报,2010,24(3):33-38.
[105]郑克俊.考虑期权的两阶段生产易逝品供应链协调[J].工业工程,2010,13(3):29-33.
[106]郭琼,杨德礼.需求信息不对称下基于期权的供应链协作机制的研究[J].计算机集成制造系统,2006,12(9):1466-1471.
[107]崔爱平,刘伟,张旭.不对称信息和风险规避下的能力期权契约模型[J].计算机工程与应用,2009,45(33):209-212.
[108]Li H T, Ritchken P., Wang Y Z. Option and forward contracting with asymmetricinformation Valuation issues in supply chains [J]. European Journal of OperationalResearch,2009,197(1):134-148.
[109]潘景铭,唐小我,倪得兵.基于实物期权的供应链能力柔性决策研究[J].电子科技大学学报,2005,34(2):285-288.
[110]陈祥锋,朱晨波.供应链采购管理中的期权合同价值研究[J].系统工程学报,2007,22(4):401-406.
[111]胡本勇,彭其渊,王性玉.考虑采购资金约束的供应链期权柔性契约[J].管理科学学报,2009,12(6):62-71.
[112]马成,周永务.期权契约下应对突发事件的供应链协调[J].合肥工业大学学报(自然科学版),2009,32(3):430-434.
[113]赵金实,王浣尘.期权定价市场化情况下的供应链协调机制[J].工业工程与管理,2009,14(2):27-31.
[114]赵金实,王浣尘,郑晓涛.期权定价市场化情况下逆向主导型供应链协调机制研究[J].管理工程学报,2009,23(2):111-115.
[115]常志平,蒋馥.供应链中电子市场与合约市场的协调研究[J].华中科技大学学报(自然科学版),2004,32(1):111-113.
[116]王庆东,黄小原,晏妮娜.电子市场批量订货与期权采购协调的鲁棒策略[J].东北大学学报(自然科学版),2006,27(1):107-110.
[117]郭琼,杨德礼.基于期权与现货市场的供应链契约式协调的研究[J].控制与决策,2006,21(11):1229-1238.
[118]晏妮娜,黄小原,朱宏.基于混合智能算法的电子市场供应链期权合同协调[J].管理学报,2006,3(5):524-528.
[119]晏妮娜,黄小原. B2B电子市场下供应链期权合同协调模型与优化[J].控制与决策,2007,22(5):535-539.
[120]晏妮娜,黄小原. B2B在线市场期权合同协调的鲁棒策略[J].系统工程理论与实践,2006(1):102-106.
[121]李培勤.电子市场与期权合约市场并存下的供应链优化[J].数学的实践与认识,2009,39(17):28-43.
[122]徐经意,杨德礼.一种期权契约协调下供应链的交易成本和电子佣金分析[J].预测,2005,24(6):61-66.
[123]Wu D.J., Kleindorfer P.R., Zhang Jin E. Optimal bidding and contracting strategies forcapital-intensive goods [J]. European Journal of Operational Research,2002,137(3):657-676.
[124]Kleindorfer, P R., Wu, D.J. Integrating long-and short-term contracting viabusiness-to-business exchanges for capital-intensive industries [J]. Management Science,2003,49(11):1597-1615.
[125]Wu D.J., Kleindorfer Paul R. Competitive options, supply contracting and electronicmarkets [J]. Management Science,2005,51(3):452-466.
[126]徐经意,杨德礼,郭琼.在线逆向拍卖期权和单方支付契约下的供应链协调机制分析[J].中国管理科学,2005,13(4):100-105.
[127]陈旭.考虑期权合同供应链的零售商订货研究[J].管理科学学报,2006,9(3):17-23.
[128]宁钟,戴俊俊.期权在供应链风险管理中的应用[J].系统工程理论与实践,2005(7):49-54.
[129]宁钟,林滨.供应链风险管理中的期权机制[J].系统工程学报,2007,22(2):141-147.
[130]刘蕾,鄢章华,腾春贤.基于期权契约的供应链协调研究[J].运筹与管理,2011,20(4):48-57.
[131]赵金实,王浣尘,郑晓涛,庞清武.大宗商品的供应链期权契约影响因素研究[J].工业工程与管理,2008(5):36-47.
[132]崔爱平,刘伟.物流服务供应链中基于期权契约的能力协调[J].中国管理科学,2009,17(2):59-65.
[133]Wu J., Yue W., Yamamoto Y., Wang S. Risk analysis of a pay to delay capacityreservation contract[J]Optimization Methods and Software.2006,21(4):635-651.
[134]Buzacotta J., Yanb H., Zhang H. Risk analysis of commitment–option contracts withforecast updates[J]. IIE Transactions,2011,43(6):415-431.
[135]Wang Q., Chu B., Wang J., Kumakiri Yuki. Risk analysis of supply contract with calloptions for buyers[J]. International Journal of Production Economics, In Press, CorrectedProof, Available online1February2011.
[136]Wang Q.Z.,Tang O., Tsao D.B.A flexible contract strategy in a supply chain with aninflexible production mode[J]. International Journal of Operational Research,2006,1(3):228-248
[137]von Neumann, J. Morgenstern O. Theory of Games and Economic Behavior[M]. Thesecond edition, Princeton University Press, Princeton:1953.
[138]Nash, J. The bargaining problem [J]. Econometrica,1950(18):155-162.
[139]Kohli, R. Park H. A cooperative game theory model of quantity discounts [J].Management Science,1989,35(6):693-707.
[140]Arda Y., Hennet J.C. Supply chain coordination through contract negotiation[C].Proceedings of the44th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, and the EuropeanControl Conference Seville, Spain,2005:4658-4663.
[141]Sobel M.J., Turcic D. Risk Aversion and Supply Chain Contract Negotiation [Z].Working paper, Department of Operations, Weatherhead School of Management, CaseWestern Reserve University,2008.
[142]Nagarajan M., So i G. Game-theoretic analysis of cooperation among supply chainagents: Review and extensions [J]. European Journal of Operational Research,2008,187(3):719-745.
[143]Hou J., Zeng A. Z., Zhao L.D. Achieving better coordination through revenue sharingand bargaining in a two-stage supply chain [J]. Computers&Industrial Engineering,2009,57(1):383-394.
[144]Leng M. M., Parlar M. Lead-time reduction in a two-level supply chain:Non-cooperative equilibria vs. coordination with a profit-sharing contract [J].International Journal of Production Economics,2009,118(2):521-544.
[145]Eliashberg. Arbitrating a dispute: A decision analytic approach [J]. Management Science,1986,32(8):963-974.
[146]Pratt J W. Risk aversion in the small and in the large [J]. Econometrica,1964,32(1-2):122-136.
[147]胡胜强,张华西,关迎莹.基于Shapley值法的四级供应链利润分配[J].系统工程,2009,27(9):49-54.
[148]胡本勇,彭其渊.基于广告-研发的供应链合作博弈分析[J].管理科学学报,2008,11(2):61-70.
[149]Cachon P.G. The Allocation of Inventory Risk in a Supply Chain: Push, Pull, andAdvance-Purchase Discount Contracts[J]. Management Science.2004,50(2):222-238.
[150]Sethi S.P., Yan H. Zhang H. Quantity Flexibilty Contracts: Optimal Decisions withInformation Updates [J]. Decision Sciences,2004,35(4):691-711.