市场运营环境下电力供应链优化协调研究
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摘要
随着我国电力体制改革的逐步深入与电力市场的初步形成,电力供应链上的节点企业将成为电力市场中真正的竞争主体,尤其是发电企业、燃料企业,承担着优化整条供应链的责任。市场运营环境下电力供应链优化协调是指电力供应链上的节点企业相互沟通、协作,通过最优协调策略,同时实现自身利益最大化和电力供应链整体绩效的最优。论文在全面回顾一般商品供应链优化协调方法的研究基础上,借助博弈理论、非线性互补方法,系统研究了考虑输电网约束的电力供应链优化协调问题。
发电企业是电力供应链上重要的节点企业,通过为用户提供电能来盈利。为有效规避合约电量不确定性对收益所带来的风险,通过建立由若干发电企业组成的发电集团战略联盟,在考虑电力期货和现货市场共存环境下,基于供应函数模型,构建考虑输电网络约束的发电集团间的非劣纳什均衡模型。借助非线性互补方法对该问题进行求解,结合3节点电力市场算例,在输电网阻塞和无阻塞情况下,分析了合约市场的引入对发电集团最优策略及自身收益的影响。
电力供应链具有紧密的耦合性,发电集团间的优化问题不能反映链上各节点企业间的过程与关系。故考虑涵盖燃料企业的电力供应链,提出了基于数量折扣契约的电力供应链协调模型。在考虑输电网约束的条件下,针对发电企业的燃料采购价格引入数量折扣契约,耦合链上燃料企业、发电企业、用户、独立系统调度员的优化决策问题,构建起带有等式和不等式约束的多层优化数学模型,采用非线性互补方法对模型求解,在输电网阻塞和无阻塞情况下,通过14节点电力市场进行算例仿真。结果表明,数量折扣契约能够达到有效协调供应链的目的,但是却不能保证链上节点企业同时达到利益最大化,必须有一个链上节点企业牺牲自己的利益来达到整体绩效的最优。
为了改善数量折扣契约不能同时实现链上企业利润最大化的不足,进一步构建基于收入共享契约的电力供应链协调模型。在考虑输电网约束条件下,针对发电企业利润函数引入收入共享因子,耦合链上燃料企业、发电企业、独立系统调度员优化决策问题,构建模型,采用非线性互补方法对模型求解。结合3节点电力市场进行算例分析,结果表明,收入共享契约能将发电企业利润与燃料企业利润按收入共享因子进行再次分配,弥补了数量折扣契约的缺陷,并达到电力供应链在这种契约下协调的目的。
With the gradual deepening of China's electricity system and the initial formation of the electricity market, electricity supply chain node enterprises will become the real competitor of electric market, especially the power generation enterprises, fuel supply enterprises, which bears the optimization responsibility of the entire electricity supply chain. The optimization and coordination of electricity supply chain in market environment means that, the optimization and coordination strategies of node enterprises is established, which is based on the communication and collaboration among node enterprises, the purpose of which is in order to maximize its own profit and achieve the optimal performance of electricity supply chain also. In this paper, methods of research on the optimization and coordination of general merchandise is reviewed comprehensively. On this basis, optimization and coordination of electricity supply chain with the constraints of electricity transmission network is investigated systemically, which according as game theory and nonlinear complementarity method.
Power generation enterprises is an important node in the supply chain, which profiting from providing users with power. Strategic alliance of power group is established which is constituted by a number of power generation enterprises. For the purpose of effectively avoiding the risk of uncertainty of contract power. In the condition that coexisting with electricity futures contract market and spot market, model of power groups’non-inferior Nash equilibrium is proposed, which is based on the supply function model and transmission network constraints. With nonlinear complementarity method to solve the problem, combined with 3 node electricity market example under the circumstances that congestion and non-congestion of transmission network, the impact on optimal strategy and profit of power group is analysised which under the contract market circumstance.
Electricity supply chain with the character of close coupling, research on optimization among power groups is not enough, because the process and relationship of each node enterprise can’t be described clearly. So the electricity supply chain optimization and coordination is discussed deeply. Combined with fuel supply enterprises, coordination model of electricity supply chain based on quantity discount contract is proposed. The model makes the rational decision-making of individual members in the supply chain to achieve the optimal overall performance. With satisfying the power transmission network constraints, the model couples the optimal decision-making of fuel supply enterprises, power generation enterprises, customers and independent system operator by the quantity discount contracts of fuel procurement prices. Mathematically, it is represented by the multi-layer optimization with the equality and inequality constraints. By using the non-linear complementary function method to solve the model. Under the case of transmission network congestion and non-congestion, through the 14 node example to analysis, the result indicate that althought quantity discount contract can coordinate electricity supply chain effectively, but their maximum benefit can’t be achieved at the same time, because the best overall performance should be achieved by one node to sacrifice its own interests.
Because the node’s maximum benefit can't be achieved when the best overall performance of supply chain is achieved, the imperfection is caused by quantity discount contract, so the situation must be changed. On this basis, with satisfying the electricity transmission network constraints, revenue sharing contract model of the individual optimal decision-making of power generation enterprises and fuel supply enterprises is proprosed, and electricity supply chain joint decision-making model with no revenue sharing contract is put forward too, as well as the market clearing optimization decision-making model. By using the non-linear complementary function method to solve the problem above. Wth the 3 node example power market to analysis, the result shows that the revenue sharing contract can reallocate between electricity and fuel enterprises’profits, and coordination of electricity supply chain is achieved under revenue sharing contract.
发电企业是电力供应链上重要的节点企业,通过为用户提供电能来盈利。为有效规避合约电量不确定性对收益所带来的风险,通过建立由若干发电企业组成的发电集团战略联盟,在考虑电力期货和现货市场共存环境下,基于供应函数模型,构建考虑输电网络约束的发电集团间的非劣纳什均衡模型。借助非线性互补方法对该问题进行求解,结合3节点电力市场算例,在输电网阻塞和无阻塞情况下,分析了合约市场的引入对发电集团最优策略及自身收益的影响。
电力供应链具有紧密的耦合性,发电集团间的优化问题不能反映链上各节点企业间的过程与关系。故考虑涵盖燃料企业的电力供应链,提出了基于数量折扣契约的电力供应链协调模型。在考虑输电网约束的条件下,针对发电企业的燃料采购价格引入数量折扣契约,耦合链上燃料企业、发电企业、用户、独立系统调度员的优化决策问题,构建起带有等式和不等式约束的多层优化数学模型,采用非线性互补方法对模型求解,在输电网阻塞和无阻塞情况下,通过14节点电力市场进行算例仿真。结果表明,数量折扣契约能够达到有效协调供应链的目的,但是却不能保证链上节点企业同时达到利益最大化,必须有一个链上节点企业牺牲自己的利益来达到整体绩效的最优。
为了改善数量折扣契约不能同时实现链上企业利润最大化的不足,进一步构建基于收入共享契约的电力供应链协调模型。在考虑输电网约束条件下,针对发电企业利润函数引入收入共享因子,耦合链上燃料企业、发电企业、独立系统调度员优化决策问题,构建模型,采用非线性互补方法对模型求解。结合3节点电力市场进行算例分析,结果表明,收入共享契约能将发电企业利润与燃料企业利润按收入共享因子进行再次分配,弥补了数量折扣契约的缺陷,并达到电力供应链在这种契约下协调的目的。
With the gradual deepening of China's electricity system and the initial formation of the electricity market, electricity supply chain node enterprises will become the real competitor of electric market, especially the power generation enterprises, fuel supply enterprises, which bears the optimization responsibility of the entire electricity supply chain. The optimization and coordination of electricity supply chain in market environment means that, the optimization and coordination strategies of node enterprises is established, which is based on the communication and collaboration among node enterprises, the purpose of which is in order to maximize its own profit and achieve the optimal performance of electricity supply chain also. In this paper, methods of research on the optimization and coordination of general merchandise is reviewed comprehensively. On this basis, optimization and coordination of electricity supply chain with the constraints of electricity transmission network is investigated systemically, which according as game theory and nonlinear complementarity method.
Power generation enterprises is an important node in the supply chain, which profiting from providing users with power. Strategic alliance of power group is established which is constituted by a number of power generation enterprises. For the purpose of effectively avoiding the risk of uncertainty of contract power. In the condition that coexisting with electricity futures contract market and spot market, model of power groups’non-inferior Nash equilibrium is proposed, which is based on the supply function model and transmission network constraints. With nonlinear complementarity method to solve the problem, combined with 3 node electricity market example under the circumstances that congestion and non-congestion of transmission network, the impact on optimal strategy and profit of power group is analysised which under the contract market circumstance.
Electricity supply chain with the character of close coupling, research on optimization among power groups is not enough, because the process and relationship of each node enterprise can’t be described clearly. So the electricity supply chain optimization and coordination is discussed deeply. Combined with fuel supply enterprises, coordination model of electricity supply chain based on quantity discount contract is proposed. The model makes the rational decision-making of individual members in the supply chain to achieve the optimal overall performance. With satisfying the power transmission network constraints, the model couples the optimal decision-making of fuel supply enterprises, power generation enterprises, customers and independent system operator by the quantity discount contracts of fuel procurement prices. Mathematically, it is represented by the multi-layer optimization with the equality and inequality constraints. By using the non-linear complementary function method to solve the model. Under the case of transmission network congestion and non-congestion, through the 14 node example to analysis, the result indicate that althought quantity discount contract can coordinate electricity supply chain effectively, but their maximum benefit can’t be achieved at the same time, because the best overall performance should be achieved by one node to sacrifice its own interests.
Because the node’s maximum benefit can't be achieved when the best overall performance of supply chain is achieved, the imperfection is caused by quantity discount contract, so the situation must be changed. On this basis, with satisfying the electricity transmission network constraints, revenue sharing contract model of the individual optimal decision-making of power generation enterprises and fuel supply enterprises is proprosed, and electricity supply chain joint decision-making model with no revenue sharing contract is put forward too, as well as the market clearing optimization decision-making model. By using the non-linear complementary function method to solve the problem above. Wth the 3 node example power market to analysis, the result shows that the revenue sharing contract can reallocate between electricity and fuel enterprises’profits, and coordination of electricity supply chain is achieved under revenue sharing contract.
引文
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[2]国办发[2007]53号文件:国务院办公厅关于转发发展改革委等部门节能发电调度办法(试行)的通知[EB/OL].[2007212231].http//www.sdpc.gov.cn/2cfb/ 2cfbqt/2007qita
[3]刘建平.中国电力产业政策与产业发展.北京:中国电力出版社,2006
[4] Chee Y W, John J, Hans-Henrik Hvolby. Supply chain coordination problems: literature review. Working paper,No.08-04,January 2004
[5] Cachon G. Supply chain coordination with contracts Working paper. The Wharton School of Business university of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, 2001
[6]宋永华.电力企业的运营模式.中国电力.1997,10-11
[7]曾鸣.电力工业商业化运营与电力市场[M].北京:中国电力出版社,1998
[8]杨洪明,赖明勇.考虑输电网约束的电力市场有限理性古诺博弈的动态演化研究[J].中国电机工程学报,2005,25(23):71-79
[9]杨洪明,童小娇,赖明勇.基于光滑非线性互补函数的电力市场动态研究.电网技术,2006,22(30):42-48
[10]刘继春.电力市场运营系统.北京:中国电力出版社,2004
[11]马士华.供应链管理[M].北京:机械工业出版社,2000
[12]阮大伟.电力体制改革与供应链管理.北京:中国经济出版社,2006
[13] Padmanabhan V.and I. P. L. Png. Manufacturer’s returns policy and retail competition. Marketing Science,1997,16(1):81-94
[14]李龙洙.制造业供应链的协调问题探讨[J].航空制造技术,2002,(5):42-44
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