外资并购的绩效研究
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摘要
20世纪90年代以来,以跨国并购为主要特征的第五次并购浪潮席卷全球,作为全球最大的经济新兴体,日益崛起的中国已成为世界经济巨头争夺的战略要地。近年来,随着我国外资并购政策的逐步松绑,外资在中国的机械制造、钢铁、银行金融、零售等行业掀起了一股新的并购浪潮。不可否认,外资的进入对我国经济发展起着十分重要的推动作用,但是,随着凯雷并购徐工、高盛收购双汇等事件的发生,外资并购行为和政策值得我们重新审视和思考。外资并购能否像预期一样对企业绩效产生正面效果?外资并购长短期绩效影响因素如何?是否存在利益输送现象?这些问题都是值得研究的课题。
本文拟通过对国际投资理论、代理理论、内部资本市场等理论进疏理,从新制度经济学制度变迁的视角,剖析外资并购中国企业的实质动机；结合我国新兴加转轨经济中引进外资的制度背景,以1995年-2007年的外资并购中国上市公司的事件作为研究样本,对外资并购的长短期绩效及其影响因素、利益输送效应进行了实证研究。
通过单变量均值检验研究发现,外资并购目标公司短期绩效显著为正；外资并购目标公司长期绩效为负,但统计结果不显著。通过分组检验发现,外资并购短期绩效倾向于比民营并购表现更好,但长期绩效倾向于比民营并购表现更差。说明中国资本市场对外资改善目标公司治理、经营管理和技术水平等方面在短期内存在正面预期,但长期来看,外资进入的正面影响未能持续下去。
通过多元回归研究发现,控制权发生转移的目标公司比未发生转移的目标公司短期绩效更高,长期绩效则更低,利益输送效应更大；被红筹股收购的目标公司被比非红筹股收购的目标公司短期绩效更低,长期绩效和利益输送效应则没有显著的差异；被金融外资收购与被非金融外资收购的目标公司二者之间短期绩效和长期绩效、利益输送效应没有显著差异；被外资直接收购和被外资间接收购的目标公司二者之间短期绩效没有显著差异,但前者长期绩效更低、利益输送效应更大。
本文研究结论表明,虽然短期内包括资本市场在内的我国各界对外资并购寄予较高的期望,但从长期来看实际运作效果却不尽如人意。本文认为,应该在肯定改革开放三十年外资对我国经济增长贡献基础上,对外资并购政策进行适当调整,实施鼓励与约束并举的外资并购激励与监管政策。
The fifth wave of Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) characterized by Cross-border M&As has spread throughout the world since the 1990's. As one of the largest emerging economies in the world, China is playing a significant role on the global stage. With the foreign acquisition policies gradually unlashing in China, foreign capital has largely entered the fields of manufacturing, steeling, retailing and financing in recent years. Foreign capital has brought advanced technology and management concepts to China's economic reform and growth, however, we are obliged to review the foreign acquisition policies after acquisitions of Xugong Construction Machinery by the Carlyle Group and Shuanghui Investment & Development by Goldman Sachs Group. Questions about the affects of foreign acquisitions to Chinese enterprises, i.e., whether it creates positive effects on companies operation and performance, what influence it has on the long-term and short-term performance of the listed companies in China, and whether tunneling exists, need to be focused and researched on in terms of capital market development.
The paper studies the long-term and short-term performance involving foreign mergers and acquisitions from 1995 to 2007 in the framework of Cross-border M&A theories, Agency Cost and Internal Capital Markets theories. The analysis studies the background of Foreign Investment Induction policies in China, also the factors of long-term and short-term performance and tunneling.
We find that outcome of the short-term performance of the target companies of foreign mergers and acquisitions is significantly positive, while the outcome of long-term performance is negative but insignificantly by the univariate mean test. The study indicates that the short-term result of foreign M&As tends to be better than private mergers, while the long-term performance of foreign M&As is lower than that of the private ones by the independent samples T test. It is found that although there is positive expectation on improvement of advanced management concept, technology introduction and corporate governance of the target companies in Chinese capital market, but the positive effects are not sustained in the long run.
The evidence shows that companies with controlling power transfer performed better than those without such transfer in the short-term, and lower in the long-term, while more tunneling occurs by the multi-regression analysis. Performances of the red chip acquisition of the target companies are lower than the non red chip acquisition in the short-term, but there is no significant difference in the long-term and tunneling. There is no significant difference between foreign financial acquisitions and non-financial acquisitions both in the short-term and long-term, nor in tunneling. There is no significant difference between direct and indirect foreign acquisition in the short-term, but direct acquisition performs poorer and more tunneling occurs in the long-term than the other.
The results suggest that the operational effectiveness of foreign mergers and acquisitions is under satisfaction in the long term despite the high expectations of them in the capital market in the short term. The paper concludes that although the contribution of foreign investment to the economic reform and growth in the past 30 years in China cannot be underestimated, it is highly necessary to make adjustments of China's foreign mergers and acquisitions policies to intensify supervision and support of foreign M&As by and providing incentives and restrains.
本文拟通过对国际投资理论、代理理论、内部资本市场等理论进疏理,从新制度经济学制度变迁的视角,剖析外资并购中国企业的实质动机；结合我国新兴加转轨经济中引进外资的制度背景,以1995年-2007年的外资并购中国上市公司的事件作为研究样本,对外资并购的长短期绩效及其影响因素、利益输送效应进行了实证研究。
通过单变量均值检验研究发现,外资并购目标公司短期绩效显著为正；外资并购目标公司长期绩效为负,但统计结果不显著。通过分组检验发现,外资并购短期绩效倾向于比民营并购表现更好,但长期绩效倾向于比民营并购表现更差。说明中国资本市场对外资改善目标公司治理、经营管理和技术水平等方面在短期内存在正面预期,但长期来看,外资进入的正面影响未能持续下去。
通过多元回归研究发现,控制权发生转移的目标公司比未发生转移的目标公司短期绩效更高,长期绩效则更低,利益输送效应更大；被红筹股收购的目标公司被比非红筹股收购的目标公司短期绩效更低,长期绩效和利益输送效应则没有显著的差异；被金融外资收购与被非金融外资收购的目标公司二者之间短期绩效和长期绩效、利益输送效应没有显著差异；被外资直接收购和被外资间接收购的目标公司二者之间短期绩效没有显著差异,但前者长期绩效更低、利益输送效应更大。
本文研究结论表明,虽然短期内包括资本市场在内的我国各界对外资并购寄予较高的期望,但从长期来看实际运作效果却不尽如人意。本文认为,应该在肯定改革开放三十年外资对我国经济增长贡献基础上,对外资并购政策进行适当调整,实施鼓励与约束并举的外资并购激励与监管政策。
The fifth wave of Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) characterized by Cross-border M&As has spread throughout the world since the 1990's. As one of the largest emerging economies in the world, China is playing a significant role on the global stage. With the foreign acquisition policies gradually unlashing in China, foreign capital has largely entered the fields of manufacturing, steeling, retailing and financing in recent years. Foreign capital has brought advanced technology and management concepts to China's economic reform and growth, however, we are obliged to review the foreign acquisition policies after acquisitions of Xugong Construction Machinery by the Carlyle Group and Shuanghui Investment & Development by Goldman Sachs Group. Questions about the affects of foreign acquisitions to Chinese enterprises, i.e., whether it creates positive effects on companies operation and performance, what influence it has on the long-term and short-term performance of the listed companies in China, and whether tunneling exists, need to be focused and researched on in terms of capital market development.
The paper studies the long-term and short-term performance involving foreign mergers and acquisitions from 1995 to 2007 in the framework of Cross-border M&A theories, Agency Cost and Internal Capital Markets theories. The analysis studies the background of Foreign Investment Induction policies in China, also the factors of long-term and short-term performance and tunneling.
We find that outcome of the short-term performance of the target companies of foreign mergers and acquisitions is significantly positive, while the outcome of long-term performance is negative but insignificantly by the univariate mean test. The study indicates that the short-term result of foreign M&As tends to be better than private mergers, while the long-term performance of foreign M&As is lower than that of the private ones by the independent samples T test. It is found that although there is positive expectation on improvement of advanced management concept, technology introduction and corporate governance of the target companies in Chinese capital market, but the positive effects are not sustained in the long run.
The evidence shows that companies with controlling power transfer performed better than those without such transfer in the short-term, and lower in the long-term, while more tunneling occurs by the multi-regression analysis. Performances of the red chip acquisition of the target companies are lower than the non red chip acquisition in the short-term, but there is no significant difference in the long-term and tunneling. There is no significant difference between foreign financial acquisitions and non-financial acquisitions both in the short-term and long-term, nor in tunneling. There is no significant difference between direct and indirect foreign acquisition in the short-term, but direct acquisition performs poorer and more tunneling occurs in the long-term than the other.
The results suggest that the operational effectiveness of foreign mergers and acquisitions is under satisfaction in the long term despite the high expectations of them in the capital market in the short term. The paper concludes that although the contribution of foreign investment to the economic reform and growth in the past 30 years in China cannot be underestimated, it is highly necessary to make adjustments of China's foreign mergers and acquisitions policies to intensify supervision and support of foreign M&As by and providing incentives and restrains.
引文
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