信息不对称下的产品差异化与定价研究
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摘要
价格是经济学中的一个重要概念,无论是西方经济学还是马克思主义政治经济学,都对价格问题进行了长期深入的研究。价格是市场机制中最重要的机制,在国民经济中起着指示器和晴雨表的作用。价格是企业应对竞争环境变化最迅速的武器,是扩大市场占有率和追求长期利润增长的最重要的因素之一。在市场经济环境下,企业成为定价的主体是合理配置市场资源一种必然趋势。
    西方关于价格理论的研究可以追溯到几个世纪以前。最初的理论研究不是如何定价,而是在于揭示价格运动和形成的基础问题。十九世纪效用价值论提出以后,关于企业定价的研究越来越受到重视,日益成为经济学领域的热点问题之一。六十年代后博弈论和不对称信息的观点引入企业定价研究,使得这一研究领域有了巨大的发展。但是关于信息不对称下企业的定价研究文献,大多数都是从社会计划者的角度出发,重点分析了产品价格制定如何影响整个社会福利,以及产品价格向消费者传递了何种信息等等。而国内的企业定价研究发展比较晚,尤其是在不对称信息领域还有相当的空白。针对这一情况,本文从企业的角度出发,通过引入不对称信息,研究了企业如何通过合理的定价最大化企业利润。本文的主要研究内容有:
    ①对企业定价的基本概念进行了总结与分析,概述了企业的基本概念、企业定价的目标、重要性和条件以及垄断企业和寡头企业的一般定价理论和方法。
    ②概述了前人关于消费者与企业在信息不对称下的分析模型,并在此基础上建立了消费者与企业对产品质量信息不对称下的企业产品选择与定价模型,分别讨论和比较了消费者与企业只有一次购买关系和多次购买关系下企业在产品选择和定价策略上的选择以及两种情况下的差别。
    ③分析了产品差异化条件下,由于成本信息不对称的企业定价。分析了拥有完全成本信息的企业与没有完全信息企业在定价考虑上的差异,并对影响企业产品选择和定价决策的因素作了分析说明。
    ④通过对彩电行业企业定价的实证研究,说明了企业定价与信息以及市场环境的关系。分析了彩电行业企业降价策略失败的原因,探索了改善价格竞争的对策。
Price is a very important conception in economy, so this question has been studied deeply no matter in West Economy and Marxism Plutonomy for a long time. Price mechanism is one of the most important ones in market, which is used as the indicator and weatherglass in National Economy. Price is the best weapon by which the enterprises can reply the changing competition environment quickly and enlarge market rate and pursue the lasting profit increasing. In the market economy condition, enterprises become the main body of pricing is the necessary trend to collocate resources reasonably.
    The study of price theory in westward can be traced back to several centuries ago. The early studies were not how to make a price but to open out the basic question of the foundation and movement. After the avail-axiology had been brought forward in nineteen century, the study of enterprise pricing has been regarded more and more, which has become the hot-point in economy field increasingly. Game Theory and asymmetry information were introduced into enterprises pricing in 1960's, which lead the great improvement in this field. Since the most study literatures of enterprise pricing under asymmetry information condition are from the point of society planner, which analyze how pricing affects the welfare of the whole society and what kind of information is transferred to consumer across the price; while the study of enterprises pricing in our country began rather late and there are many lacks especially under asymmetry information condition, this paper studies from the point of enterprises that how can they maximize profit by rational price under asymmetry information condition. The contents of the dissertation include:
    First, Sum up and study the basic conception of enterprises pricing, which include the basic conception of enterprises, the aim, importance and terms of enterprises pricing, the common pricing theory and methods of monopoly and oligarch enterprises.
    Second, Sum up the former models that studied asymmetry information between consumers and enterprises. Set up enterprises' products chosen and pricing models. Discuss the strategy' differences when consumers buy the product only once and repetitious.
    Third, Analyze the pricing of products difference under asymmetry cost
    
    information. Study the difference consideration of pricing between the enterprises who have entirely information and those who haven't and explain the factors that affect product chosen and pricing.
    At last, According to the real case of the enterprises in color TV industry, explain the relation between enterprises pricing and market environment. Analyze why the depreciating strategy among the industry was aborted; explore the countermeasure of improving the condition of price competition.
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