多重均衡的刀刃解：产品责任制度的法经济学分析
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摘要
用以“规制瑕疵、不合理危险产品的使用而导致人身及财产损害分配的法律体系”的产品责任制度,在过去50年中变得极为重要,但作为法经济学的一个议题而提出,理论研究大致可追溯至McKean(1970a,b)和Oi(1973)开创性地将完全信息的产品责任研究置于经济理性的视角下,从而引起了世界各国,尤其是普通法系国家法学界、经济学界,乃至社会学界的热烈讨论。之后通过Viscusi、Priest. Shave11.Polinsky. Posner. Cooter.Ulen等经济学家逐渐引入新制度经济学、信息经济学、博弈论、机制设计理论等新主流经济学对假设前提与分析方法的明确与修正,不断向现实似合,使产品责任研究逐渐形成一个具有较强逻辑自恰性的理论体系。研究指出,虽然产品责任自诞生之日起就标榜,保护现代社会弱势消费者利益,但作为一种普适于社会全体成员的法律制度,必然要影响消费者的效用、厂商的投资与创新、乃至整个社会的福利与经济发展,产品责任问题最终是一个激励问题。因而,该领域的主要问题集中于：(1)产品责任制度的内涵是什么,为何存在,是规范安全,是保证创新,还是合二有之?(2)产品责任制度的外延又是什么?是普通法下的责任法,是政府的安全规则,甚至还包括一个群体内所固有的道德准则?‘(3)社会组织、法庭、政府又在其中扮演何种角色?(4)产品责任制度所规范的对象是什么,是产品安全,是生产者,还是消费者?(5)对社会而言,是否存在最优的、最有效率的产品责任制度?为何对不同群体,基于同样制度目标的产品责任制度会千差万别?(6)千差万别的产品责任制度是否存在统一内核?对各方主体行为有何影响?
本文通过回顾文献及比较各国产品责任立法现状发现,尽管国内外法学家及经济学家就上述问题提出了角度不同的观点,尤其70年代后,从事产品责任制度研究的法经济学家试图为该领域的研究提供一个标准的经济学理论框架,但目前的研究仍主要关注于对某些条款的考证及某方交易主体的论述,即使从社会福利角度,同时考虑交易双方的分析也不够完整与全面,因而有必要对原有分析框架作一定补充,尤其对适用于不同责任制度的产品应予以清楚界定；另外,学术界对责任法与规则竞合的讨论层出不穷、意见不一,缺乏具有一定包容性、统一的理论框架；更重要的是,脱胎于普通法的产品责任法经济学研究是否能实现在大陆法的“本土化”。至于具体而言,有关卖方责任的计量问题及责任与创新的竞合问题似乎还更为迫切。综上所述,现有研究仍不能很好解决以下问题：(1)何为经济学家视野中的产品责任,其内涵与外延如何界定?适用范围又是如何；(2)为何产品责任从横向看,会有从自我约束到私法规制再到公权救济的扩展,又为何从纵向看,能实现从契约责任向疏忽责任再向严格责任的演进,内在机理与原因究竟何在；这过程中,是如何实现既相斥又相容的各方主体利益间的调和?(3)脱胎于普通法系的法经济学研究在产品责任领域能否实现在大陆法系的“本土化”,如果可以,又将如何实现?此外,世界各国,尤其是中国,近年来,产品责任问题不断攀升,国内法学界对上述问题的含混讨论,预示着对于这样一个传统以来由法学理论来解决的问题,必须另辟蹊径,虽然并不是怀疑法学理论的解释力,但面对这样的一个社会性问题,经济学也不应沉默以对。
带着以上的三个悬而未决的问题,在现有文献基础上,本文将致力于产品责任制度经济学逻辑的研究,试图提供一个统一的分析框架,理清产品责任扩展与演进的内在逻辑和规律。根据论文的假设,产品责任制度既是一个内生的责任系统对生产者和消费者的最优选择的理解问题,又是这个群体内的生产者与消费者之间最优契约的设计问题。因而,如果将制度视为一种博弈均衡,那么产品责任就可视为是博弈各方建立合作博弈均衡的一套博弈规则或支付条件；如果将制度视为一种激励机制,那么产品责任就是通过对个体约束条件的改变而使个体间目标趋于一致、信息趋向集中。换言之,本文研究主要着眼于对历史和现实的产品责任制度分析,给出一个产品责任制度产生与演进的统一分析框架,探讨其是如何内生于各种不同约束条件下的当事人的博弈选择,以及这些制度又是如何作用于当事人的行为(或改变其约束条件)。
作为博弈均衡的产品责任制度就其扩展而言,包含四个层面的秩序：一是,交易主体间基于个体理性而自发形成的交易者规范；二是,源于第三方的私人仲裁；三是,私法基于社会福利最大化而制定的产品责任法；四是,管制者根据特定社会发展目标而形成的产品责任规则。因而,本文拟就从信息不对称的视角出发,探讨产品责任制度的一般发展机理,基本逻辑是,产品市场是一个各方交易主体间存在各种信息不对称的制度空间,个体将在现有机会集约束下,出于自利而内生出各种方法与制度对信息不对称进行矫正,从而形成交易者规范、第三方的私人仲裁和产品责任法的内在需求；而诉讼成本、第三方同样的信息不完全以及特定社会发展目标又进一步使个体逐渐用具有事前规制功能的产品责任规则作为对事后规制的私法的补充；而规则的累积效应又会进一步影响私法的更叠……简言之,这是一个“从不完全信息的非均衡到信息矫正后的均衡再到更高的不完全信息非均衡”的循环演进过程。
换言之,本文将提供对产品责任制度的完全描述,分析将在一个局部分均衡的完全竞争框架下进行。即,分三部分展开论述并组织如下：
(一)第一部分由第一、二、三章组成,致力于理清问题,综述本研究所立足的现实背景和理论基础,并在对现有理论进行批判的基础上,提出论文所要研究的主要问题。第一章,从选题的目的和意义出发,在对本文有关概念明确定义的基础上,提出研究所立足的背景——存在信息不对称的现实世界——和本文所采用的研究方法,框架,及与原有产品责任制度分析框架的不同之处。第二章与第三章集中于对产品责任制度的历史与现实及相关文献作简要回顾与批判。
(二)作为本文核心的第二部分,由第四、五、六、七章构成,围绕着信息不对称问题,在理论上,通过建立标准的经济数理模型,沿着本文的逻辑路线而逐步展开对“交易者规范——私人仲裁——产品责任法——产品责任规则”的理论探讨,以实现理论逐渐向现实拟合。开篇第四章将在一个新的研究视角上提出,产品责任中的生产者与消费者间是一种博弈关系。第五章,在上述研究视角下,正式开启产品责任法经济学研究的序幕——建立生产者与消费者博弈的“交易者规范”模型,描述在不存在任何外部强制力(法庭和政府)情况下,一种内生性责任制度——“交易者规范”的形成机理,求出可能的最优“交易者规范”和相应的激励相容约束、交易双方的效用函数、及社会福利函数；并指出,现实中“交易者规范”对于责任规制的次优性将使群体内生出对事后规则——第三方治理结构的需求。延续前一章所得结论,第六章分析了第三方治理机制——私人仲裁者和侵权责任法(普通法法庭)的存在对交易双方的效用函数及社会福利函数的影响,求出责任法的最优路径及相应的激励相容约束；指出,其是体现生产者的生产创新激励和消费者的安全保障激励间的折衷。本章还进一步通过生产者资不抵债与存在逃避被控告的可能性及法官的错误判断的可能性和信息处理能力约束下的“理性人规则”适用的现实拟合来修正前面的基本假设,从而推出存在“私法失灵”现实。接下来的第七章,继续前一章“私法失灵”的现实,论证选择事前规则——“政府的产品安全管制”作为私法失灵的可能矫正方式,考虑责任法与安全规则的互补均衡,探讨最优责任制度的设计模型,以及是否存在均衡解的可能。作为对这一章的完善,本文还进一步指出,理论上管制者的不完全信息和现实中管制者共谋或被贿赂的可能也会造成“公法失灵”。因而,这部分的研究结果表明,涉及多方主体的、内生于群体所固有机会群的产品责任制度的最优路径尤如“刀刃上的均衡”一样,可能是很难达到的,但交易者规范、私人仲裁、产品责任法与产品责任规则等多种方式的结合,将有助于现实中次优制度与最优解间的偏差不断缩小,且其演进路径可能是收敛的,故,其是一个建立在有效控制产品责任风险目标基础上的互补性整体。
(三)最后,作为本文第三部分,第八章的结论,总结了前面的主要分析结果,及给出了本研究的一些不足之处与深入研究的建议与方向。
Product liability-the body of law governing the allocation of personal harm and property losses caused by defective and unreasonably dangerous products use-has acquired immense importance in the last 50 years. However, as one of law and economics issue, the theoretic researches approximately are traced back to the inaugural studies of McKean's(1970a,b) and Oi's(1973). As viewed from economics, they investigated the products liability under complete information for the first time. Inevitably, it stirred up the aboil discussion among jurisprudents, economists and sociologists, particularly in common law countries. By the studies of Viscusi's, Priest's, Shavell's, Polinsky's, Posner's, Cooter's, Ulen's etc., the disquisitive ways of the mainstream economics, such as new institution economics, information economics, game theory,the theory of mechanism etc. have been introduced into the studies of product liability, gradually resulted in making assumptions and analytical methods become unambiguous and modified. Ultimately, it makes the studies of product liability become an academic system of logicality. Such researches have indicated, although since the day of naissance product liability's tenet is protecting the benefits of the less infirm consumers relative to manufactures in a modern society; however, as a kind of law which is abided coequally by all members in this society, it inevitably affects the utility of consumers', the investment and innovation of manufacturers', the social welfare and the economic development. Accordingly, the problem of product liability is essentially an incentive problem. As a result, this topic concerned mainly focuses on:(1)What is the connotation of product liability system? Why should it exist, for governing safety, or for prompting innovation, just the same for both? (2)What does the extension of product liability system include, liability law in common law, governmental product safety regulation, and inherent moral standard in certain colony?(3)Following ex-problem, what is the respective function of social organizations, courts and governments?(4)What is the objects of product Liability system governing? Is it product safety, manufacturer, or consumer? (5)For a society, whether does the optimal and most efficient products Liability system exist or not? For different communities, why are product liability systems meeting the same system target different in a thousand and one ways? (6)However, is there the uniform kernel in dissimilar products liability systems? How does it influence on the behavior of every player?
Our retrospective literatures and advised current legislation in all countries indicate in spite of diversified standpoints which have been put forward by jurisprudents and economists from various views on the above problems, particularly, after 70's,law economists engaging in studying product liability have tried to provide the standard economic framework for this realm; however, regretfully, at present, existing formal analyses on the subject have largely captured only the research of certain doctrines and discussion of certain bargainer, even when the social welfare is taken into account, it's still absence of comprehensive research of considering both players. Thus, it's necessary to complement those previously framework of analysis, particularly, define clearly different products which different product Liability systems are applied to. Moreover, although the academic discussions about combining liability with regulation have been piled up one after another, but in theory there are distinct viewpoints and short of comprehensive and uniform frame. More importantly, whether law economic research born out of common law can realize "localization" in statute law countries or not. As regards idiographic issues, apparently, it's more pressing to consider the measure problem about seller's liability and the relationship between liability and innovation. As a result, the current researches have not still resolved nicely below problems:(1) With the economic perspective, what's the product liability? How does define the connotation and extension of product liability? Which scopes does it apply to?(2) As viewed from horizontal direction, why had product liability extended from controlling by oneself to governing by private law to redressing by public right; while as viewed from longitudinal direction, why had it evolved from negligence liability to strict liability? What is on earth the internal mechanism and reason? In this process, how had it realized the concordance of every party which is not only compatible, but also adverse? (3)Can the law economic research born out of common law realize "localization" in statute law countries? On the other hand, in all countries in the world, particularly China, the upswing of product Liability in recent years, along with the ambiguous discussion in the jurisprudence, also necessitates the new approaches as opposed to the traditional jurisprudential theories. Even although there is no the excuse to the question the ability of jurisprudence, but facing such social problem, economists also shouldn't keep silence.
With above two pending problems, based on the existing literatures, this paper takes up with the research of product Liability' economic logic; and tries to provide a unified framework; then opens out the inherent logicality and law of product liability's extension and evolvement; in the end hopes to discuss primarily whether the law economic research on product liability can realize "localization" in statute law countries or not. According to the assumptions of this paper, product liability systems are not only one of understanding the influence of an exogenous liability system on both the firm's and consumers'optimal choices, but also an issue of endogenously designed contracts between the firms and consumers. As a result, if the system could be treated as a kind of game equilibrium, product liability can be regarded as a set of the rules of game or payoff conditions of cooperative game equilibrium. If the system could be treated as a kind of a incentive mechanism, product liability can be regards as the mechanism which makes the aims among individuals become coincident and information incline towards concentrative by changing individual constraints. In other words, this paper focuses leading attention on historical and realistic analysis of product liability systems; and provides the a unified framework of analyzing the creation and evolvement of product liability; then inquiries how exogenous is product liability in players'game choices under various constraints, and how these systems influence the behaviors of the players'concerned (or change players'constraints). This paper thinks, as a game equilibrium, the extension of product liability systems includes four levels of orders. First is norm of exchange which comes into being among the players according to individual rationality; second is law merchant which is constituted according to maximizing a business domain welfare; third is product liability law which is constituted according to maximizing social welfare; fourth is product liability regulation which is chosen based on certain goals of social development by governors. As a result, this paper intends to study the generic mechanism of product liability systems'evolution under asymmetrical information. Hereinto, the essential logic is:the product market is the system space where there are all kinds of asymmetric information among players; under the restriction of existing change set, proceeding from considering own benefit individuals can voluntarily develop all kinds of measures and systems in order to remedying information asymmetry, thus can create the inherent requirement of norms of exchange, law merchant and product liability law which is compelling to third-party and has the function of private relief. But, the existence of litigation costs, third-party' imperfect information, and particular goals of social development further makes individuals gradually choose ex ante product liability regulation as the complement of ex post product liability law. Then the accumulating effects of regulation further impact the alteration of private law To be brief, this is a process of rotative evolution-"from out of equilibrium under incomplete information to equilibrium after remedying information, then to new off-equilibrium under incomplete information". In other words, this paper provides a complete characterization of product liability systems, and the analysis is mainly undertaken in a partial-equilibrium framework.
Hence, this paper engages in expatiation by dividing third parts:
a) Part I is constitute by chapterⅠ, chapterⅡand chapterⅢ.Tt endeavors to clarify the issues concerned, and summarize the practical background and theoretical foundation, then point out the dominating problem which this paper will account for derived from the critics on contribution of existing documentaries. Starting off the motive and sense of this research, based on definitely defining concerned concepts, chapter I puts forward that the background of this study is real world where there is asymmetric information; then further shows the research methods, framework and different counts comparing with the former frameworks of studies about product liability system. Expatiating on the history and praxis of product liability system and making the literature concerned review and animadvert on are presented respectively in chapter II and chapterⅢ.
b) As a central feature of this part of this paper, Part II includes chapter IV, chapter V, chapter VI and chapterⅦ.Surrounding the information asymmetry problem and along the logistic path of this study, Part II establishes some standard economic models to go on theoretic discussion on "norms of exchange-law merchant-product liability law-product liability regulation" by degrees, in order to carry out that the theory is close to praxis inch by inch. Based a set of supposes, this paper bring forward a new research view:there are games between manufacturer and consumer in chapter IV. And a model of "norms of exchange" between manufacturer and consumer is established in chapter V, which describes a kind of mechanism forming a endogenetic liability system--"norms of exchange" without considering any third-party's compulsion (law merchant,court or government). Further, the possibly optimal "norms of exchange", corresponding incentive compatibility constraints, utility (or profit) functions of both players'and social welfare function also are sketched. Chapter V goes on indicate that it's sub-optimal for "norms of exchange" to govern liability in practice, so it will result in the demand for third-party governance mechanism. Having educed the conclusions in former chapter, this paper moves on in chapter V to analyze that how the existence of the law merchant and liability law (ex post) -courts in common law-affects utility (or profit) functions of both players'and social welfare function, and work out the optimal path of liability law and corresponding incentive compatibility constraint. Moreover, chapterⅥindieates it incarnates the tradeoff between the innovative encouragement of manufacturers and the safety warranty encouragement of consumers'. Eventually, chapterⅥalso modifies the elementary supposes by considering the feasibilities of the existence of manufacturers who are not able to pay fully for liability and judges who sentence on players'liability by mistake and select "the reasonable person standard" owing to the limited abilities of dealing with information, then deduces the existence of "private law failure" in practice. ChapterⅦtraces the path of studies in former chapter, further refines some elementary supposes; and chooses ex ante regulation-product safety regulation of governments'as an antidote against "private law failure". Then the author illustrates the complementary equilibrium between liability law and safety regulation; and by establishing the model of designing optimal product liability systems discusses whether there is an equilibrium solution or not. Eventually, in order to consummate the analysis in partⅡ, the paper further points that in theory owing to the possibility of the existence of regulators who only have incomplete information and are bribed; it's possible to produce "public law failure". To summarize, the research results of partⅡexpress that, the optimal path of product liability system, which involves in many players and is decided endogeneticly by inherent change set in certain colony,is the same as "the equilibrium on a blade", so it is very hard to arrive. However, combining norms of exchange, product liability law and product liability regulation redounds to reducing difference between second-best system and best solution, furthermore, the path of evolving is possibly convergent. And these government mechanisms make up of complementary whole, in order to control efficiently risk.
c)Finally, as the conclusions of this paper, partⅢchapterⅧ, sums up the central analytical outcomes in front. Then this paper closes with some shortages of this research, and some suggested extension.
本文通过回顾文献及比较各国产品责任立法现状发现,尽管国内外法学家及经济学家就上述问题提出了角度不同的观点,尤其70年代后,从事产品责任制度研究的法经济学家试图为该领域的研究提供一个标准的经济学理论框架,但目前的研究仍主要关注于对某些条款的考证及某方交易主体的论述,即使从社会福利角度,同时考虑交易双方的分析也不够完整与全面,因而有必要对原有分析框架作一定补充,尤其对适用于不同责任制度的产品应予以清楚界定；另外,学术界对责任法与规则竞合的讨论层出不穷、意见不一,缺乏具有一定包容性、统一的理论框架；更重要的是,脱胎于普通法的产品责任法经济学研究是否能实现在大陆法的“本土化”。至于具体而言,有关卖方责任的计量问题及责任与创新的竞合问题似乎还更为迫切。综上所述,现有研究仍不能很好解决以下问题：(1)何为经济学家视野中的产品责任,其内涵与外延如何界定?适用范围又是如何；(2)为何产品责任从横向看,会有从自我约束到私法规制再到公权救济的扩展,又为何从纵向看,能实现从契约责任向疏忽责任再向严格责任的演进,内在机理与原因究竟何在；这过程中,是如何实现既相斥又相容的各方主体利益间的调和?(3)脱胎于普通法系的法经济学研究在产品责任领域能否实现在大陆法系的“本土化”,如果可以,又将如何实现?此外,世界各国,尤其是中国,近年来,产品责任问题不断攀升,国内法学界对上述问题的含混讨论,预示着对于这样一个传统以来由法学理论来解决的问题,必须另辟蹊径,虽然并不是怀疑法学理论的解释力,但面对这样的一个社会性问题,经济学也不应沉默以对。
带着以上的三个悬而未决的问题,在现有文献基础上,本文将致力于产品责任制度经济学逻辑的研究,试图提供一个统一的分析框架,理清产品责任扩展与演进的内在逻辑和规律。根据论文的假设,产品责任制度既是一个内生的责任系统对生产者和消费者的最优选择的理解问题,又是这个群体内的生产者与消费者之间最优契约的设计问题。因而,如果将制度视为一种博弈均衡,那么产品责任就可视为是博弈各方建立合作博弈均衡的一套博弈规则或支付条件；如果将制度视为一种激励机制,那么产品责任就是通过对个体约束条件的改变而使个体间目标趋于一致、信息趋向集中。换言之,本文研究主要着眼于对历史和现实的产品责任制度分析,给出一个产品责任制度产生与演进的统一分析框架,探讨其是如何内生于各种不同约束条件下的当事人的博弈选择,以及这些制度又是如何作用于当事人的行为(或改变其约束条件)。
作为博弈均衡的产品责任制度就其扩展而言,包含四个层面的秩序：一是,交易主体间基于个体理性而自发形成的交易者规范；二是,源于第三方的私人仲裁；三是,私法基于社会福利最大化而制定的产品责任法；四是,管制者根据特定社会发展目标而形成的产品责任规则。因而,本文拟就从信息不对称的视角出发,探讨产品责任制度的一般发展机理,基本逻辑是,产品市场是一个各方交易主体间存在各种信息不对称的制度空间,个体将在现有机会集约束下,出于自利而内生出各种方法与制度对信息不对称进行矫正,从而形成交易者规范、第三方的私人仲裁和产品责任法的内在需求；而诉讼成本、第三方同样的信息不完全以及特定社会发展目标又进一步使个体逐渐用具有事前规制功能的产品责任规则作为对事后规制的私法的补充；而规则的累积效应又会进一步影响私法的更叠……简言之,这是一个“从不完全信息的非均衡到信息矫正后的均衡再到更高的不完全信息非均衡”的循环演进过程。
换言之,本文将提供对产品责任制度的完全描述,分析将在一个局部分均衡的完全竞争框架下进行。即,分三部分展开论述并组织如下：
(一)第一部分由第一、二、三章组成,致力于理清问题,综述本研究所立足的现实背景和理论基础,并在对现有理论进行批判的基础上,提出论文所要研究的主要问题。第一章,从选题的目的和意义出发,在对本文有关概念明确定义的基础上,提出研究所立足的背景——存在信息不对称的现实世界——和本文所采用的研究方法,框架,及与原有产品责任制度分析框架的不同之处。第二章与第三章集中于对产品责任制度的历史与现实及相关文献作简要回顾与批判。
(二)作为本文核心的第二部分,由第四、五、六、七章构成,围绕着信息不对称问题,在理论上,通过建立标准的经济数理模型,沿着本文的逻辑路线而逐步展开对“交易者规范——私人仲裁——产品责任法——产品责任规则”的理论探讨,以实现理论逐渐向现实拟合。开篇第四章将在一个新的研究视角上提出,产品责任中的生产者与消费者间是一种博弈关系。第五章,在上述研究视角下,正式开启产品责任法经济学研究的序幕——建立生产者与消费者博弈的“交易者规范”模型,描述在不存在任何外部强制力(法庭和政府)情况下,一种内生性责任制度——“交易者规范”的形成机理,求出可能的最优“交易者规范”和相应的激励相容约束、交易双方的效用函数、及社会福利函数；并指出,现实中“交易者规范”对于责任规制的次优性将使群体内生出对事后规则——第三方治理结构的需求。延续前一章所得结论,第六章分析了第三方治理机制——私人仲裁者和侵权责任法(普通法法庭)的存在对交易双方的效用函数及社会福利函数的影响,求出责任法的最优路径及相应的激励相容约束；指出,其是体现生产者的生产创新激励和消费者的安全保障激励间的折衷。本章还进一步通过生产者资不抵债与存在逃避被控告的可能性及法官的错误判断的可能性和信息处理能力约束下的“理性人规则”适用的现实拟合来修正前面的基本假设,从而推出存在“私法失灵”现实。接下来的第七章,继续前一章“私法失灵”的现实,论证选择事前规则——“政府的产品安全管制”作为私法失灵的可能矫正方式,考虑责任法与安全规则的互补均衡,探讨最优责任制度的设计模型,以及是否存在均衡解的可能。作为对这一章的完善,本文还进一步指出,理论上管制者的不完全信息和现实中管制者共谋或被贿赂的可能也会造成“公法失灵”。因而,这部分的研究结果表明,涉及多方主体的、内生于群体所固有机会群的产品责任制度的最优路径尤如“刀刃上的均衡”一样,可能是很难达到的,但交易者规范、私人仲裁、产品责任法与产品责任规则等多种方式的结合,将有助于现实中次优制度与最优解间的偏差不断缩小,且其演进路径可能是收敛的,故,其是一个建立在有效控制产品责任风险目标基础上的互补性整体。
(三)最后,作为本文第三部分,第八章的结论,总结了前面的主要分析结果,及给出了本研究的一些不足之处与深入研究的建议与方向。
Product liability-the body of law governing the allocation of personal harm and property losses caused by defective and unreasonably dangerous products use-has acquired immense importance in the last 50 years. However, as one of law and economics issue, the theoretic researches approximately are traced back to the inaugural studies of McKean's(1970a,b) and Oi's(1973). As viewed from economics, they investigated the products liability under complete information for the first time. Inevitably, it stirred up the aboil discussion among jurisprudents, economists and sociologists, particularly in common law countries. By the studies of Viscusi's, Priest's, Shavell's, Polinsky's, Posner's, Cooter's, Ulen's etc., the disquisitive ways of the mainstream economics, such as new institution economics, information economics, game theory,the theory of mechanism etc. have been introduced into the studies of product liability, gradually resulted in making assumptions and analytical methods become unambiguous and modified. Ultimately, it makes the studies of product liability become an academic system of logicality. Such researches have indicated, although since the day of naissance product liability's tenet is protecting the benefits of the less infirm consumers relative to manufactures in a modern society; however, as a kind of law which is abided coequally by all members in this society, it inevitably affects the utility of consumers', the investment and innovation of manufacturers', the social welfare and the economic development. Accordingly, the problem of product liability is essentially an incentive problem. As a result, this topic concerned mainly focuses on:(1)What is the connotation of product liability system? Why should it exist, for governing safety, or for prompting innovation, just the same for both? (2)What does the extension of product liability system include, liability law in common law, governmental product safety regulation, and inherent moral standard in certain colony?(3)Following ex-problem, what is the respective function of social organizations, courts and governments?(4)What is the objects of product Liability system governing? Is it product safety, manufacturer, or consumer? (5)For a society, whether does the optimal and most efficient products Liability system exist or not? For different communities, why are product liability systems meeting the same system target different in a thousand and one ways? (6)However, is there the uniform kernel in dissimilar products liability systems? How does it influence on the behavior of every player?
Our retrospective literatures and advised current legislation in all countries indicate in spite of diversified standpoints which have been put forward by jurisprudents and economists from various views on the above problems, particularly, after 70's,law economists engaging in studying product liability have tried to provide the standard economic framework for this realm; however, regretfully, at present, existing formal analyses on the subject have largely captured only the research of certain doctrines and discussion of certain bargainer, even when the social welfare is taken into account, it's still absence of comprehensive research of considering both players. Thus, it's necessary to complement those previously framework of analysis, particularly, define clearly different products which different product Liability systems are applied to. Moreover, although the academic discussions about combining liability with regulation have been piled up one after another, but in theory there are distinct viewpoints and short of comprehensive and uniform frame. More importantly, whether law economic research born out of common law can realize "localization" in statute law countries or not. As regards idiographic issues, apparently, it's more pressing to consider the measure problem about seller's liability and the relationship between liability and innovation. As a result, the current researches have not still resolved nicely below problems:(1) With the economic perspective, what's the product liability? How does define the connotation and extension of product liability? Which scopes does it apply to?(2) As viewed from horizontal direction, why had product liability extended from controlling by oneself to governing by private law to redressing by public right; while as viewed from longitudinal direction, why had it evolved from negligence liability to strict liability? What is on earth the internal mechanism and reason? In this process, how had it realized the concordance of every party which is not only compatible, but also adverse? (3)Can the law economic research born out of common law realize "localization" in statute law countries? On the other hand, in all countries in the world, particularly China, the upswing of product Liability in recent years, along with the ambiguous discussion in the jurisprudence, also necessitates the new approaches as opposed to the traditional jurisprudential theories. Even although there is no the excuse to the question the ability of jurisprudence, but facing such social problem, economists also shouldn't keep silence.
With above two pending problems, based on the existing literatures, this paper takes up with the research of product Liability' economic logic; and tries to provide a unified framework; then opens out the inherent logicality and law of product liability's extension and evolvement; in the end hopes to discuss primarily whether the law economic research on product liability can realize "localization" in statute law countries or not. According to the assumptions of this paper, product liability systems are not only one of understanding the influence of an exogenous liability system on both the firm's and consumers'optimal choices, but also an issue of endogenously designed contracts between the firms and consumers. As a result, if the system could be treated as a kind of game equilibrium, product liability can be regarded as a set of the rules of game or payoff conditions of cooperative game equilibrium. If the system could be treated as a kind of a incentive mechanism, product liability can be regards as the mechanism which makes the aims among individuals become coincident and information incline towards concentrative by changing individual constraints. In other words, this paper focuses leading attention on historical and realistic analysis of product liability systems; and provides the a unified framework of analyzing the creation and evolvement of product liability; then inquiries how exogenous is product liability in players'game choices under various constraints, and how these systems influence the behaviors of the players'concerned (or change players'constraints). This paper thinks, as a game equilibrium, the extension of product liability systems includes four levels of orders. First is norm of exchange which comes into being among the players according to individual rationality; second is law merchant which is constituted according to maximizing a business domain welfare; third is product liability law which is constituted according to maximizing social welfare; fourth is product liability regulation which is chosen based on certain goals of social development by governors. As a result, this paper intends to study the generic mechanism of product liability systems'evolution under asymmetrical information. Hereinto, the essential logic is:the product market is the system space where there are all kinds of asymmetric information among players; under the restriction of existing change set, proceeding from considering own benefit individuals can voluntarily develop all kinds of measures and systems in order to remedying information asymmetry, thus can create the inherent requirement of norms of exchange, law merchant and product liability law which is compelling to third-party and has the function of private relief. But, the existence of litigation costs, third-party' imperfect information, and particular goals of social development further makes individuals gradually choose ex ante product liability regulation as the complement of ex post product liability law. Then the accumulating effects of regulation further impact the alteration of private law To be brief, this is a process of rotative evolution-"from out of equilibrium under incomplete information to equilibrium after remedying information, then to new off-equilibrium under incomplete information". In other words, this paper provides a complete characterization of product liability systems, and the analysis is mainly undertaken in a partial-equilibrium framework.
Hence, this paper engages in expatiation by dividing third parts:
a) Part I is constitute by chapterⅠ, chapterⅡand chapterⅢ.Tt endeavors to clarify the issues concerned, and summarize the practical background and theoretical foundation, then point out the dominating problem which this paper will account for derived from the critics on contribution of existing documentaries. Starting off the motive and sense of this research, based on definitely defining concerned concepts, chapter I puts forward that the background of this study is real world where there is asymmetric information; then further shows the research methods, framework and different counts comparing with the former frameworks of studies about product liability system. Expatiating on the history and praxis of product liability system and making the literature concerned review and animadvert on are presented respectively in chapter II and chapterⅢ.
b) As a central feature of this part of this paper, Part II includes chapter IV, chapter V, chapter VI and chapterⅦ.Surrounding the information asymmetry problem and along the logistic path of this study, Part II establishes some standard economic models to go on theoretic discussion on "norms of exchange-law merchant-product liability law-product liability regulation" by degrees, in order to carry out that the theory is close to praxis inch by inch. Based a set of supposes, this paper bring forward a new research view:there are games between manufacturer and consumer in chapter IV. And a model of "norms of exchange" between manufacturer and consumer is established in chapter V, which describes a kind of mechanism forming a endogenetic liability system--"norms of exchange" without considering any third-party's compulsion (law merchant,court or government). Further, the possibly optimal "norms of exchange", corresponding incentive compatibility constraints, utility (or profit) functions of both players'and social welfare function also are sketched. Chapter V goes on indicate that it's sub-optimal for "norms of exchange" to govern liability in practice, so it will result in the demand for third-party governance mechanism. Having educed the conclusions in former chapter, this paper moves on in chapter V to analyze that how the existence of the law merchant and liability law (ex post) -courts in common law-affects utility (or profit) functions of both players'and social welfare function, and work out the optimal path of liability law and corresponding incentive compatibility constraint. Moreover, chapterⅥindieates it incarnates the tradeoff between the innovative encouragement of manufacturers and the safety warranty encouragement of consumers'. Eventually, chapterⅥalso modifies the elementary supposes by considering the feasibilities of the existence of manufacturers who are not able to pay fully for liability and judges who sentence on players'liability by mistake and select "the reasonable person standard" owing to the limited abilities of dealing with information, then deduces the existence of "private law failure" in practice. ChapterⅦtraces the path of studies in former chapter, further refines some elementary supposes; and chooses ex ante regulation-product safety regulation of governments'as an antidote against "private law failure". Then the author illustrates the complementary equilibrium between liability law and safety regulation; and by establishing the model of designing optimal product liability systems discusses whether there is an equilibrium solution or not. Eventually, in order to consummate the analysis in partⅡ, the paper further points that in theory owing to the possibility of the existence of regulators who only have incomplete information and are bribed; it's possible to produce "public law failure". To summarize, the research results of partⅡexpress that, the optimal path of product liability system, which involves in many players and is decided endogeneticly by inherent change set in certain colony,is the same as "the equilibrium on a blade", so it is very hard to arrive. However, combining norms of exchange, product liability law and product liability regulation redounds to reducing difference between second-best system and best solution, furthermore, the path of evolving is possibly convergent. And these government mechanisms make up of complementary whole, in order to control efficiently risk.
c)Finally, as the conclusions of this paper, partⅢchapterⅧ, sums up the central analytical outcomes in front. Then this paper closes with some shortages of this research, and some suggested extension.
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