共同研发活动的经济分析
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摘要
由于高科技产业竞争激烈,产品的生命周期短,独自开发新产品所需的研发费用甚巨,且风险大。因此,近年来研发策略联盟(Research Joint Venture,RJV)似乎已成为全球竞争策略上的趋势,厂商在面临日益激烈的市场竞争下,且基于本身资源或能力的不足,希望透过策略联盟所形成的合资、共同研发等方式,结合各自稀有的有限资源,共同分担研发所需的成本及风险,以降低生产成本或开发新产品,而确保自己在市场的竞争优势。
首先,本文修改Atallah对外溢系数所作的对称性假设,使理论模型更贴近经济现实;本文除了希望能对外溢效果、研发产出与合作研发之间的关系能有更进一步的认识外,对于合作研发结构(包括不合作、一般合作、水平合作、垂直合作)的比较与选择也加以探讨。
关于各外溢效果在不同合作研发模式下对研发产出的影响,本研究结果发现,在各种情况下,垂直外溢程度的增加对研发产出与社会福利都有正面的效果;而水平外溢的增加,在厂商之间进行水平或一般合作的情况下,对研发与社会福利的影响也是正面的;只有在垂直合作或厂商之间完全没有合作关系的情况下,水平外溢对研发产出与社会福利的影响有可能是负面的。
另外,在不同外溢特性下,对于合作研发模式的选择,本文有以下结论:在大部分的情况下,一般合作研发模式可将大部分研发的竞争外部性内化,故就研发产出而言,优于其它合作研发模式,且最接近社会最优。若外溢效果普遍相当小时,垂直合作研发模式优于其它研发模式,且最接近社会最优(在完全无外溢的情况下,甚至等于社会最优)。
然后,本文则将Wang模型架构作延伸,并考虑RJV厂商与非RJV厂商间外溢效果(spillover effect)的存在。故理论模型假设寡占市场内有n家厂商,其中k家厂商设立共同研究室从事研发;而其余(n-k)的厂家不加入此研发联盟,但却可以透过外溢效果,使本身的单位生产成本下降,而下降的幅度不如RJV厂商多。并将依RJV厂商创新的幅度区分为重大创新(drastic innovation)与非重大创新(non-drastic innovation)二种。探讨当考虑外溢效果时,分别分析在这二种情况下,RJV厂商与非RJV厂商间授权行为的可行性?若双方有授权行为发生时,何者是RJV厂商的最优授权策略?另外,外溢效果对RJV厂商与非RJV厂商的均衡利润以及最优固定权利金费用与单位权利金比率有何影响?以及RJV厂商的均衡合作规模?并与社会最优合作规模作比较。
本文研究结果显示:(1)若创新为重大创新时,RJV厂商将不会授权给非RJV厂商。(2)若创新为非重大创新时,RJV厂商的最优授权策略为单位权利金授权方式。(3)若创新为非重大创新时,RJV厂商与非RJV厂商的均衡利润以及最优的固定权利金费用与单位权利金比率会随外溢效果增加而减少。(4)若创新为非重大创新时,RJV厂商的均衡合作规模小于社会最优合作规模。
最后,由于有限理性与交易成本的存在,使得研发合作契约在本质上便是一种不完全契约;更重要的是,契约当事人在收到适当的研发报酬前,进行必要的投资以方便契约的履行,可以想见的是,研发合作契约的不完全性,容易诱使一方当事人利用信息不对称,攫取其它当事人投资的准租。
如何让不完全研发合作契约降低或消除当事人之间信息的不对称,以消除不利研发投资的机会主义行为,将是科技管理的重要议题之一。本文的目的便是依据研发合作的特性,尝试利用不完全契约的架构,探讨并建立研发合作契约机制设计的理论模型。
首先,我们在当事人允诺事后不进行再协商的假设下,引入“由研发单位先宣告类型厂商再决定是否挑战”的序贯机制。在此机制中,整个机制的完美均衡为:(诚实宣告,{接受,挑战}),双方可以依照彼此的真实类型来决定交易内容,且研发投资的贝氏Nash均衡也等于最优的水平。
再者,当厂商与研发单位不允诺不进行再协商时,机制设计便需要考虑再协商所产生的效应。我们证明在契约中设计由厂商与研发单位同时显示类型,再加上Rubinstein式的非合作议价博弈,可以诱使显示机制的Nash均衡为(诚实宣告,诚实宣告),但双方事前的研发投资却低于最优水平。
Because of fierce competition in high-tech industries, life cycle of product is short, and self-development of new products is of very high cost and risks. Therefore, research joint venture has become globally competitive strategy trend recently. In face of increasingly fierce market competition and scarce resources or capacity, manufacturers hope to ensure their competitiveness in the market through research joint venture formed by strategic alliances.
First of all, the paper modifies Atallah’s symmetry assumptions on the spillover coefficient, so that it makes the theory model closer to economic reality; besides further understanding the spillover effect, the relationship between R&D outputs and R&D cooperation, the paper also discusses the comparison and selection of R&D cooperation structure (including incorporation, general cooperation, horizontal cooperation and vertical cooperation).
On the spillover effects of the R&D outputs under different modes of R&D cooperation, the paper finds that the increase of vertical spill extent has a positive effect on output and social welfare; Under the circumstance of general or horiz0ontal cooperation, the increase of horizontal spillover also has a positive impact on R&D output and social welfare; Only in the case of vertical cooperation or no cooperation between manufacturers, the horizontal spillover may have a negative impact on R&D output and social welfare.
Moreover, with different spillover characteristics, the paper has the following conclusion on the choice of R&D cooperation: in most cases, general cooperation model can make the external competition of majority research and development internal, so general R&D cooperation has advantages on the R&D outputs than other models, and it is closest to the social optimum. If the spillover effects are generally small, vertical cooperative R & D model is superior to other models, it is closest to the social optimum (under completely no spillover circumstance, even equals to social optimum).
Then, the paper will extend the framework of Wang (1998) model and consider the existence of spillover effect between RJV manufacturers and non-RJV manufacturers. Divide the range of manufacturers’innovation into drastic innovation and non-drastic innovation. When considering the spillover effects, it analyzes the feasibility of authorization under these two circumstances between RJV manufacturers and non-RJV manufacturers. If both sides have authorization action, what is the optimal authorized strategy? In addition, what influence does spillover effect have on equilibrium profit of RJV manufacturers and non-RJV manufacturers, and the influence between the optimal fixed premium and unit premium ratio? As well as the equilibrium cooperation scale of RJV manufacturers?
The results of this study show that: (1) if the innovation is drastic, RJV manufacturers will not grant authority to non-RJV manufacturers non-manufacturers. (2) If the innovation is not drastic, the optimal authorized strategy of RJV manufacturers is to authorize unit premium. (3) If the innovation is not drastic, the equilibrium profit of RJV manufacturers and non-RJV manufacturers, and the optimal fixed premium and unit premium ratio decrease with increasing spillover effect. (4) If the innovation is not drastic, the equilibrium cooperation scale of RJV manufacturers’is less than optimal social cooperation scale.
Finally, the existence of the limited rationality and transaction cost makes the R&D cooperation contract been an incomplete contract; More importantly, before receiving appropriate compensation, the parties of the contract make necessary investments to facilitate the performance of a contract. The incompleteness of R&D cooperation easily induces a party to make the use of information asymmetry for the quasi rent invested by the other party.
首先,本文修改Atallah对外溢系数所作的对称性假设,使理论模型更贴近经济现实;本文除了希望能对外溢效果、研发产出与合作研发之间的关系能有更进一步的认识外,对于合作研发结构(包括不合作、一般合作、水平合作、垂直合作)的比较与选择也加以探讨。
关于各外溢效果在不同合作研发模式下对研发产出的影响,本研究结果发现,在各种情况下,垂直外溢程度的增加对研发产出与社会福利都有正面的效果;而水平外溢的增加,在厂商之间进行水平或一般合作的情况下,对研发与社会福利的影响也是正面的;只有在垂直合作或厂商之间完全没有合作关系的情况下,水平外溢对研发产出与社会福利的影响有可能是负面的。
另外,在不同外溢特性下,对于合作研发模式的选择,本文有以下结论:在大部分的情况下,一般合作研发模式可将大部分研发的竞争外部性内化,故就研发产出而言,优于其它合作研发模式,且最接近社会最优。若外溢效果普遍相当小时,垂直合作研发模式优于其它研发模式,且最接近社会最优(在完全无外溢的情况下,甚至等于社会最优)。
然后,本文则将Wang模型架构作延伸,并考虑RJV厂商与非RJV厂商间外溢效果(spillover effect)的存在。故理论模型假设寡占市场内有n家厂商,其中k家厂商设立共同研究室从事研发;而其余(n-k)的厂家不加入此研发联盟,但却可以透过外溢效果,使本身的单位生产成本下降,而下降的幅度不如RJV厂商多。并将依RJV厂商创新的幅度区分为重大创新(drastic innovation)与非重大创新(non-drastic innovation)二种。探讨当考虑外溢效果时,分别分析在这二种情况下,RJV厂商与非RJV厂商间授权行为的可行性?若双方有授权行为发生时,何者是RJV厂商的最优授权策略?另外,外溢效果对RJV厂商与非RJV厂商的均衡利润以及最优固定权利金费用与单位权利金比率有何影响?以及RJV厂商的均衡合作规模?并与社会最优合作规模作比较。
本文研究结果显示:(1)若创新为重大创新时,RJV厂商将不会授权给非RJV厂商。(2)若创新为非重大创新时,RJV厂商的最优授权策略为单位权利金授权方式。(3)若创新为非重大创新时,RJV厂商与非RJV厂商的均衡利润以及最优的固定权利金费用与单位权利金比率会随外溢效果增加而减少。(4)若创新为非重大创新时,RJV厂商的均衡合作规模小于社会最优合作规模。
最后,由于有限理性与交易成本的存在,使得研发合作契约在本质上便是一种不完全契约;更重要的是,契约当事人在收到适当的研发报酬前,进行必要的投资以方便契约的履行,可以想见的是,研发合作契约的不完全性,容易诱使一方当事人利用信息不对称,攫取其它当事人投资的准租。
如何让不完全研发合作契约降低或消除当事人之间信息的不对称,以消除不利研发投资的机会主义行为,将是科技管理的重要议题之一。本文的目的便是依据研发合作的特性,尝试利用不完全契约的架构,探讨并建立研发合作契约机制设计的理论模型。
首先,我们在当事人允诺事后不进行再协商的假设下,引入“由研发单位先宣告类型厂商再决定是否挑战”的序贯机制。在此机制中,整个机制的完美均衡为:(诚实宣告,{接受,挑战}),双方可以依照彼此的真实类型来决定交易内容,且研发投资的贝氏Nash均衡也等于最优的水平。
再者,当厂商与研发单位不允诺不进行再协商时,机制设计便需要考虑再协商所产生的效应。我们证明在契约中设计由厂商与研发单位同时显示类型,再加上Rubinstein式的非合作议价博弈,可以诱使显示机制的Nash均衡为(诚实宣告,诚实宣告),但双方事前的研发投资却低于最优水平。
Because of fierce competition in high-tech industries, life cycle of product is short, and self-development of new products is of very high cost and risks. Therefore, research joint venture has become globally competitive strategy trend recently. In face of increasingly fierce market competition and scarce resources or capacity, manufacturers hope to ensure their competitiveness in the market through research joint venture formed by strategic alliances.
First of all, the paper modifies Atallah’s symmetry assumptions on the spillover coefficient, so that it makes the theory model closer to economic reality; besides further understanding the spillover effect, the relationship between R&D outputs and R&D cooperation, the paper also discusses the comparison and selection of R&D cooperation structure (including incorporation, general cooperation, horizontal cooperation and vertical cooperation).
On the spillover effects of the R&D outputs under different modes of R&D cooperation, the paper finds that the increase of vertical spill extent has a positive effect on output and social welfare; Under the circumstance of general or horiz0ontal cooperation, the increase of horizontal spillover also has a positive impact on R&D output and social welfare; Only in the case of vertical cooperation or no cooperation between manufacturers, the horizontal spillover may have a negative impact on R&D output and social welfare.
Moreover, with different spillover characteristics, the paper has the following conclusion on the choice of R&D cooperation: in most cases, general cooperation model can make the external competition of majority research and development internal, so general R&D cooperation has advantages on the R&D outputs than other models, and it is closest to the social optimum. If the spillover effects are generally small, vertical cooperative R & D model is superior to other models, it is closest to the social optimum (under completely no spillover circumstance, even equals to social optimum).
Then, the paper will extend the framework of Wang (1998) model and consider the existence of spillover effect between RJV manufacturers and non-RJV manufacturers. Divide the range of manufacturers’innovation into drastic innovation and non-drastic innovation. When considering the spillover effects, it analyzes the feasibility of authorization under these two circumstances between RJV manufacturers and non-RJV manufacturers. If both sides have authorization action, what is the optimal authorized strategy? In addition, what influence does spillover effect have on equilibrium profit of RJV manufacturers and non-RJV manufacturers, and the influence between the optimal fixed premium and unit premium ratio? As well as the equilibrium cooperation scale of RJV manufacturers?
The results of this study show that: (1) if the innovation is drastic, RJV manufacturers will not grant authority to non-RJV manufacturers non-manufacturers. (2) If the innovation is not drastic, the optimal authorized strategy of RJV manufacturers is to authorize unit premium. (3) If the innovation is not drastic, the equilibrium profit of RJV manufacturers and non-RJV manufacturers, and the optimal fixed premium and unit premium ratio decrease with increasing spillover effect. (4) If the innovation is not drastic, the equilibrium cooperation scale of RJV manufacturers’is less than optimal social cooperation scale.
Finally, the existence of the limited rationality and transaction cost makes the R&D cooperation contract been an incomplete contract; More importantly, before receiving appropriate compensation, the parties of the contract make necessary investments to facilitate the performance of a contract. The incompleteness of R&D cooperation easily induces a party to make the use of information asymmetry for the quasi rent invested by the other party.
引文
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