现代商业银行资本结构治理效应研究
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摘要
现代资本结构理论的发展将公司资本结构与公司治理紧密联系起来，资本结构是企业治理众多协调与控制机制中一个十分重要的控制机制。商业银行作为一种金融企业，同样需要建立一个有效的治理机制，以保证所有者对银行的控制，同时使经营者获得激励。商业银行的资本结构既具有一般企业的基本特征，又具有区别于一般企业的行业特性。以企业资本结构理论为指导，结合商业银行资本结构的行业特性，本文首先从银行股东的控制与股权结构治理效应和银行债权人控制与债权结构治理效应两方面对银行业资本结构治理效应作了一般性分析。之后本文重点对我国商业银行资本结构治理效应作以具体分析。我国商业银行经过近半个世纪的发展形成了当前以国有独资商业银行为主体、以上市股份制商业银行为发展方向的商业银行体系，因而对我国商业银行的分析可以以上述两类银行为代表。先以八家商业银行财务报表提供的数据为基础，分别分析两类银行不同的所有权结构特征和基本相同的债权结构特征；在此基础上对两类银行不同的所有权结构以及相同的债权结构的治理效应再分别作以分析。最后综合以上分析，从优化银行自身资本结构和优化银行外部治理环境两个方面提出优化我国商业银行治理效应的具体对策。
It has been found that the capital structure and the corporation governance can interact each other with the development of modern theory of capital structure. Capital structure is one of the most important control mechanisms on the corporation governance. As financial companies, commercial banks also need to have an effective governance mechanism in order to assure that the owners have powerful control on the bank and the managers have enough encouragement. The capital structure of commercial banks has both the fundamental character of common company and the special character of its own. Under the guidance of the capital structure theory, considering the special character of commercial banks, the paper first commonly analyzes the governance effect of commercial banks' capital structure from the two side of the shareholder's and the creditor's control. Then the paper analyzes the governance effect of china's banks' capital structure in detail. With the development of nearly half of century, China's commercial banks have formed a system in which the four state-owned commercial banks take up the most important position and the four public commercial banks represent the trend of China' commercial banks' future. So the paper analyzes the China's commercial banks with the symbol of the above two kind of banks. First, on the basis of the eight banks' financial statements, analyzes the different equity structure and the similar debt structure of the two kind commercial banks; Second, analyzes the governance effect of the equity structure and the debt structure of the two kind commercial banks. Last, put forward the suggestion to improve the governance effect of China's commercial banks' capital structure from the two side of capital structure in the bank and governance environment out of the bank.
It has been found that the capital structure and the corporation governance can interact each other with the development of modern theory of capital structure. Capital structure is one of the most important control mechanisms on the corporation governance. As financial companies, commercial banks also need to have an effective governance mechanism in order to assure that the owners have powerful control on the bank and the managers have enough encouragement. The capital structure of commercial banks has both the fundamental character of common company and the special character of its own. Under the guidance of the capital structure theory, considering the special character of commercial banks, the paper first commonly analyzes the governance effect of commercial banks' capital structure from the two side of the shareholder's and the creditor's control. Then the paper analyzes the governance effect of china's banks' capital structure in detail. With the development of nearly half of century, China's commercial banks have formed a system in which the four state-owned commercial banks take up the most important position and the four public commercial banks represent the trend of China' commercial banks' future. So the paper analyzes the China's commercial banks with the symbol of the above two kind of banks. First, on the basis of the eight banks' financial statements, analyzes the different equity structure and the similar debt structure of the two kind commercial banks; Second, analyzes the governance effect of the equity structure and the debt structure of the two kind commercial banks. Last, put forward the suggestion to improve the governance effect of China's commercial banks' capital structure from the two side of capital structure in the bank and governance environment out of the bank.
引文
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2. Aghion, P. and Botton,P., "An incomplete contracts approach to financial contracting", Review of Economic Studies, 590,1992.
3. Jensen,M.C. and Meckling,W.H., "The Theory and the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure", Journal of Financial Economics, October, 1976.
4. Jensen,M.C., "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and Takeovers", American Economic Review, Vol.76,1986.
5. Grossman,S.J. and Oliver Hart "Corporate Finance Structure and Managerial Incentives", in J. McCall.ed: The Economics of Information and Uncertainty. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
6．沈如军：《国有商业银行资源配置》，经济管理出版社，2002
7．成思危：《现代公司治理研究—资本结构、公司治理和国有企业股份制改造》，中国人民大学出版社，2002
8．刘汉民、刘锦：《资本结构、公司治理与国企改革》，《经济研究》，2001．10
9．单之明：《论我国存款保险制度的构建》，《财经理论与实践》，2003．2
10．郭金林：《企业产权契约与公司治理结构—演进与创新》，经济管理出版社，2002
2. Aghion, P. and Botton,P., "An incomplete contracts approach to financial contracting", Review of Economic Studies, 590,1992.
3. Jensen,M.C. and Meckling,W.H., "The Theory and the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure", Journal of Financial Economics, October, 1976.
4. Jensen,M.C., "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and Takeovers", American Economic Review, Vol.76,1986.
5. Grossman,S.J. and Oliver Hart "Corporate Finance Structure and Managerial Incentives", in J. McCall.ed: The Economics of Information and Uncertainty. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
6．沈如军：《国有商业银行资源配置》，经济管理出版社，2002
7．成思危：《现代公司治理研究—资本结构、公司治理和国有企业股份制改造》，中国人民大学出版社，2002
8．刘汉民、刘锦：《资本结构、公司治理与国企改革》，《经济研究》，2001．10
9．单之明：《论我国存款保险制度的构建》，《财经理论与实践》，2003．2
10．郭金林：《企业产权契约与公司治理结构—演进与创新》，经济管理出版社，2002