纵向交易模式选择的经济分析
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摘要
随着中国社会经济的高速发展,电力装机容量经历了从不足到过剩,电力“失衡”问题已然突出。特别由于煤炭价格率先市场化,导致电煤价格上涨,而电力企业却仍然处于政府规制之下,结果煤-电关系紧张,前些年甚至到了“剑拔弩张”的境地。
煤炭订货会早已不能解决“焦头烂额”的煤-电问题。在煤价看涨而电价短期难以调整的时候,煤-电价格联动又只是一个过渡性措施,并非长远之计。煤-电联营呢?这种“计划电”与“市场煤”的结合能解决困扰彼此的难题吗?我们应该如何看待越来越多的煤-电纵向整合现象?这种盲目的、过度的整合方式是解决煤-电问题的一剂良方吗?特别地,要如何判别煤-电整合是否过度以及为什么过度?这些问题都值得我们认真思考和深入研究。
对于这个问题,从现有的研究文献来看,可以把纵向整合或者分解的动因归结为以下几个方面：追求规模经济或范围经济、获取策略效应、节约交易成本或组织成本和培育持续竞争优势等等,但如何选择一种合适的理论解释中国煤-电纵向交易关系是一个重要课题。本文的工作是构建一个企业纵向交易理论,并用来解释中国煤-电纵向交易模式的选择,尤其是,本文的重点放在近些年煤-电产业是否存在以及为什么过度纵向整合现象上,得出了一些有意思的结论。
首先,纵向交易理论的核心在于专业化经济和一体化经济之间的取舍与平衡。节约组织成本会产生专业化经济,节约交易成本会带来一体化经济。两条成本曲线的交点决定纵向交易模式的最优选择。影响专业化经济效率的主要因素是生产技术和专用性人力资本价值,影响一体化经济效应的主要因素是交易方式和制度环境。
其次,中国煤-电纵向交易模式可分为市场交易型,企业组织型和政府干预型。其理论分析的核心在于交易成本、组织成本和政策成本之间的权衡。因此,煤-电纵向交易在市场、企业和政府三者之间寻找平衡,而这要视煤-电所处的环境而定。我们区分了市场失灵和市场不完善,在市场不完善情况下,采取过渡性的干预方式也许比完全市场化的激进手段更为有效。但是,随着市场的不断完善和政府干预成本的提高,根本方法是逐渐地依靠市场交易。
然后,本文以中国48个煤-电上市公司的纵向整合状况为例,运用面板数据模型分析了企业纵向整合时考虑的因素。研究结果表明,交易成本和组织成本对煤-电企业采用纵向整合的影响较大,生产成本和策略效应的影响较小。这证实了交易成本和组织成本影响到纵向整合的选择,支持和校正了纵向交易理论。
接着,本文试图建立过度整合的判别基准,并提出过度整合的判别指标。在此基础上以煤-电上市公司为样本进行了聚类分析,以便准确判断煤-电产业出现的过度整合现象及这些企业的共同特征,为探讨过度整合的形成原因提供依据。
最后,本文针对中国煤-电企业的实际情况,探讨是否存在以及为什么存在“过度纵向整合”。基本观点是,电煤定价政策的过频导致了煤-电市场交易的成本过高,煤-电市场交易的成本过高又导致了煤-电纵向整合的过度。一方面,政策的强干预和法律软约束使得煤-电契约交易方式不理想,另一方面,预算软约束和国企投资冲动使得煤-电产权交易方式受青睐。此外,经济体制改革的滞后和踌躇使得在煤电纵向模式的选择上经常倾向于政府出面。
本文用八章篇幅来进行展开,具体的章节安排和研究要点如下：第一章导言,论述了本文研究产生的理论、现实背景以及所需要解决的问题。第二章关于企业纵向交易理论文献,将主要纵向交易理论包括新古典经济学、产业组织理论、新制度经济学、企业能力理论加以综述,并对中国煤-电纵向关系的研究做了回顾。第三章构建一个企业纵向交易理论,提出纵向整合与纵向分解取决于交易成本与组织成本之间的权衡。在第四章中我们拓展了纵向交易理论,运用企业、市场和政府三方均衡模型来解释中国煤-电纵向交易模式的演化和选择,并且区别了市场不完善和市场失灵情况下,中国煤-电纵向模式的运作效果。接下来的第五章,我们以2001-2006年中国煤-电上市公司为例,运用回归模型分析了煤-电企业纵向整合的影响因素。研究结果表明,交易成本和组织成本对中国煤-电企业纵向整合程度的影响最大。在第六章中,我们试图建立过度整合的判别基准和判别指标,并在此基础上进行了聚类分析。第七章探讨了煤-电纵向整合是否存在以及为什么存在,指出煤-电政策的频繁变动导致了煤-电交易成本过高,进而导致煤-电纵向整合过度。最后,第八章是全文的结尾章。这章对论文的研究结论、研究建议和研究展望加以总结。
Along with high-speed development of Chinese social and economy, the electricity installed capacities have present from shortage to surplus; the electricity "unbalance" problem becomes more prominent. Specially, because that coal industry take a lead to market, it cause coal price soar, but the electricity enterprises are still placed under government regulation, these result the relationship between coal and electricity get nervous and even arrived at daggers drawn in the last years.
Order coal conference already has not solved the helpless conflict between coal and electricity. At the time that coal price anticipate rise but electricity price get hard adjustment in short time, coal and electricity prices linkage again just be a transition measure, not a long plan for the future. How about coal and electricity vertical integration? Can this kind of "planned electricity" and "marketed coal" combination solve the puzzle which perplexes each other? Is signing long-term contract a good method which prevent from electricity industry shock of coal? How we look upon more and more the vertical integration phenomenon of coal and electricity? Is this blind and excessive vertical integration mode a recipe to solve the coal and electricity issues? Particularly, how can we judge that coal and electricity integration was excessive and why vertical integration is excessive? All problems deserve us to seriously consider and go deep into study.
For this problem, see from the existing research literature, we can generalize the motive of vertical integration or desintegration as following aspects:Pursue scope economy or scale economy, intent to obtain strategy effect, economy come from transaction cost or organization cost and get keep on competitive advantage etc. But how to select an appropriate theory to explain Chinese coal and electricity vertical transaction relationship is an important issue. This work wishes to build a firm vertical transaction theory and used itt to explain the choice of Chinese coal and electricity vertical transaction patterns. In particular, this paper focused on in recent years coal and electricity industry exists the phenomenon of excessive vertical integration and why. We may make some interesting conclusions.
Firstly, the vertical transaction theory lies in the trade-off between specialization economy and integration economy. Savings of the organization cost will produce specialization economy and saving of transaction cost will bring integration economy. The intersection of two cost curves determines the optimal form of vertical transaction mode choice. The major factor to affect economy of specialization is the efficiency of production technology and value of specific human capital; the main factor to affect the economic effect of integration is transaction method and system environment.
Secondly, this paper puts forward that Chinese coal and electricity vertical transaction modes can be divided into property right type, contractual type and intervention type. The core of theory analysis lie in the trade-off between transaction cost, organization cost and policy cost. Therefore, coal and electricity vertical transactions look for balance between market, firm and government, but it needs to depend on the environment coal and electricity enterprises placed. We classified market failure and imperfect market. Under imperfect market circumstance, the intervention mode which was adopted transitionally and perhaps turns more valid than the radical means aim at complete market. But, along with market continuous perfect and exaltation of government interference cost, the basic method depends on market contract transaction little by little.
Then, as vertical integration status of forty-eight Chinese coal and electricity listed companies for example, this paper use panel data model to analysis factors firm taken into account during vertical integration. The results show that transaction cost and organization cost make greater influence on coal and electricity firm vertical integration, production cost and strategic effect make less influence. It confirms that transaction cost and organization cost affect the choice of vertical integration, support and correct the vertical transaction theory.
Next, this paper attempts to establish the discriminator benchmarks and discriminator indicators of excessive-integration. On this basis, by Chinese coal and electricity listed companies, cluster analysis were carried out in order to accurately determine the excessive integration phenomenon of coal and electricity industry appears and the common features of these firms, it provide the basis to explore the reasons for excessive-integration.
Finally, for actual circumstance of Chinese coal and electricity industry, we discuss whether coal and electricity enterprises excessively vertical integration exists or not and why from the angle of transaction cost economy. The base standpoint is that over frequent of coal price policy caused over high of coal and electricity market transaction cost, over high of coal and electricity market transaction cost again cause excessiveness of coal and electricity vertical integration. On the one hand, strong policy intervention and law soft-constraint makes that coal and electricity contract transaction mode is not ideal, on the other hand, budget soft-constraint and coal and electricity state-owned enterprises investment impulse make that property right mode is favored. In addition, the lag and hesitation of economic system reform makes the choice of coal and electricity vertical mode often tend government intervention.
The paper has eight chapters introduced; concrete chapter arrangement and key point are as follows:Chapter 1 is introduction which discussed the theoretical and realistic background of this literature research and the problem need resolved. Chapters 2 is literature review concerning theatrical research of the fim main vertical transaction theory including Neo-classical Economics, Industrial Organization Theory, New Institutional Economics, Firm Ability Theory…etc and take into an overview. Additionally we review the research on Chinese coal and electricity vertical relationship. In Chapter 3; we tried to build vertical transaction theory and put forward that vertical integration or desintegration be decided by the trade-off between transaction cost and organization cost. In chapter 4 we revised vertical transaction theory framework and make use of three squares named that firm, market and government balance model to explained Chinese coal and electricity vertical transaction mode choice evolution, and distinguished effect of Chinese coal and electricity vertical mode operate in the circumstance under imperfect market or market failure. In next chapter 5, as the Chinese coal and electric listed company from 2001 to 2006 for example, we use regression model to analyze factor which impact coal and electricity firm vertical integration. Study result demonstrates that transaction cost and organization cost make Chinese coal and electricity firm vertical integration biggest influence. In chapter 4, this paper attempts to establish the discriminator benchmarks and discriminator indicators of excessive-integration. On this basis, cluster analysis was carried. Chapter 7 inquired into coal and electricity vertical integration exist or not and why. We point out that over frequent of coal for electricity price policy caused over high of coal and electricity market transaction cost, over high of coal and electricity market transaction cost again cause excessiveness of coal and electricity vertical integration. Finally, chapter 8 is a conclusion. This chapter sums up research conclusion, advice and value.
煤炭订货会早已不能解决“焦头烂额”的煤-电问题。在煤价看涨而电价短期难以调整的时候,煤-电价格联动又只是一个过渡性措施,并非长远之计。煤-电联营呢?这种“计划电”与“市场煤”的结合能解决困扰彼此的难题吗?我们应该如何看待越来越多的煤-电纵向整合现象?这种盲目的、过度的整合方式是解决煤-电问题的一剂良方吗?特别地,要如何判别煤-电整合是否过度以及为什么过度?这些问题都值得我们认真思考和深入研究。
对于这个问题,从现有的研究文献来看,可以把纵向整合或者分解的动因归结为以下几个方面：追求规模经济或范围经济、获取策略效应、节约交易成本或组织成本和培育持续竞争优势等等,但如何选择一种合适的理论解释中国煤-电纵向交易关系是一个重要课题。本文的工作是构建一个企业纵向交易理论,并用来解释中国煤-电纵向交易模式的选择,尤其是,本文的重点放在近些年煤-电产业是否存在以及为什么过度纵向整合现象上,得出了一些有意思的结论。
首先,纵向交易理论的核心在于专业化经济和一体化经济之间的取舍与平衡。节约组织成本会产生专业化经济,节约交易成本会带来一体化经济。两条成本曲线的交点决定纵向交易模式的最优选择。影响专业化经济效率的主要因素是生产技术和专用性人力资本价值,影响一体化经济效应的主要因素是交易方式和制度环境。
其次,中国煤-电纵向交易模式可分为市场交易型,企业组织型和政府干预型。其理论分析的核心在于交易成本、组织成本和政策成本之间的权衡。因此,煤-电纵向交易在市场、企业和政府三者之间寻找平衡,而这要视煤-电所处的环境而定。我们区分了市场失灵和市场不完善,在市场不完善情况下,采取过渡性的干预方式也许比完全市场化的激进手段更为有效。但是,随着市场的不断完善和政府干预成本的提高,根本方法是逐渐地依靠市场交易。
然后,本文以中国48个煤-电上市公司的纵向整合状况为例,运用面板数据模型分析了企业纵向整合时考虑的因素。研究结果表明,交易成本和组织成本对煤-电企业采用纵向整合的影响较大,生产成本和策略效应的影响较小。这证实了交易成本和组织成本影响到纵向整合的选择,支持和校正了纵向交易理论。
接着,本文试图建立过度整合的判别基准,并提出过度整合的判别指标。在此基础上以煤-电上市公司为样本进行了聚类分析,以便准确判断煤-电产业出现的过度整合现象及这些企业的共同特征,为探讨过度整合的形成原因提供依据。
最后,本文针对中国煤-电企业的实际情况,探讨是否存在以及为什么存在“过度纵向整合”。基本观点是,电煤定价政策的过频导致了煤-电市场交易的成本过高,煤-电市场交易的成本过高又导致了煤-电纵向整合的过度。一方面,政策的强干预和法律软约束使得煤-电契约交易方式不理想,另一方面,预算软约束和国企投资冲动使得煤-电产权交易方式受青睐。此外,经济体制改革的滞后和踌躇使得在煤电纵向模式的选择上经常倾向于政府出面。
本文用八章篇幅来进行展开,具体的章节安排和研究要点如下：第一章导言,论述了本文研究产生的理论、现实背景以及所需要解决的问题。第二章关于企业纵向交易理论文献,将主要纵向交易理论包括新古典经济学、产业组织理论、新制度经济学、企业能力理论加以综述,并对中国煤-电纵向关系的研究做了回顾。第三章构建一个企业纵向交易理论,提出纵向整合与纵向分解取决于交易成本与组织成本之间的权衡。在第四章中我们拓展了纵向交易理论,运用企业、市场和政府三方均衡模型来解释中国煤-电纵向交易模式的演化和选择,并且区别了市场不完善和市场失灵情况下,中国煤-电纵向模式的运作效果。接下来的第五章,我们以2001-2006年中国煤-电上市公司为例,运用回归模型分析了煤-电企业纵向整合的影响因素。研究结果表明,交易成本和组织成本对中国煤-电企业纵向整合程度的影响最大。在第六章中,我们试图建立过度整合的判别基准和判别指标,并在此基础上进行了聚类分析。第七章探讨了煤-电纵向整合是否存在以及为什么存在,指出煤-电政策的频繁变动导致了煤-电交易成本过高,进而导致煤-电纵向整合过度。最后,第八章是全文的结尾章。这章对论文的研究结论、研究建议和研究展望加以总结。
Along with high-speed development of Chinese social and economy, the electricity installed capacities have present from shortage to surplus; the electricity "unbalance" problem becomes more prominent. Specially, because that coal industry take a lead to market, it cause coal price soar, but the electricity enterprises are still placed under government regulation, these result the relationship between coal and electricity get nervous and even arrived at daggers drawn in the last years.
Order coal conference already has not solved the helpless conflict between coal and electricity. At the time that coal price anticipate rise but electricity price get hard adjustment in short time, coal and electricity prices linkage again just be a transition measure, not a long plan for the future. How about coal and electricity vertical integration? Can this kind of "planned electricity" and "marketed coal" combination solve the puzzle which perplexes each other? Is signing long-term contract a good method which prevent from electricity industry shock of coal? How we look upon more and more the vertical integration phenomenon of coal and electricity? Is this blind and excessive vertical integration mode a recipe to solve the coal and electricity issues? Particularly, how can we judge that coal and electricity integration was excessive and why vertical integration is excessive? All problems deserve us to seriously consider and go deep into study.
For this problem, see from the existing research literature, we can generalize the motive of vertical integration or desintegration as following aspects:Pursue scope economy or scale economy, intent to obtain strategy effect, economy come from transaction cost or organization cost and get keep on competitive advantage etc. But how to select an appropriate theory to explain Chinese coal and electricity vertical transaction relationship is an important issue. This work wishes to build a firm vertical transaction theory and used itt to explain the choice of Chinese coal and electricity vertical transaction patterns. In particular, this paper focused on in recent years coal and electricity industry exists the phenomenon of excessive vertical integration and why. We may make some interesting conclusions.
Firstly, the vertical transaction theory lies in the trade-off between specialization economy and integration economy. Savings of the organization cost will produce specialization economy and saving of transaction cost will bring integration economy. The intersection of two cost curves determines the optimal form of vertical transaction mode choice. The major factor to affect economy of specialization is the efficiency of production technology and value of specific human capital; the main factor to affect the economic effect of integration is transaction method and system environment.
Secondly, this paper puts forward that Chinese coal and electricity vertical transaction modes can be divided into property right type, contractual type and intervention type. The core of theory analysis lie in the trade-off between transaction cost, organization cost and policy cost. Therefore, coal and electricity vertical transactions look for balance between market, firm and government, but it needs to depend on the environment coal and electricity enterprises placed. We classified market failure and imperfect market. Under imperfect market circumstance, the intervention mode which was adopted transitionally and perhaps turns more valid than the radical means aim at complete market. But, along with market continuous perfect and exaltation of government interference cost, the basic method depends on market contract transaction little by little.
Then, as vertical integration status of forty-eight Chinese coal and electricity listed companies for example, this paper use panel data model to analysis factors firm taken into account during vertical integration. The results show that transaction cost and organization cost make greater influence on coal and electricity firm vertical integration, production cost and strategic effect make less influence. It confirms that transaction cost and organization cost affect the choice of vertical integration, support and correct the vertical transaction theory.
Next, this paper attempts to establish the discriminator benchmarks and discriminator indicators of excessive-integration. On this basis, by Chinese coal and electricity listed companies, cluster analysis were carried out in order to accurately determine the excessive integration phenomenon of coal and electricity industry appears and the common features of these firms, it provide the basis to explore the reasons for excessive-integration.
Finally, for actual circumstance of Chinese coal and electricity industry, we discuss whether coal and electricity enterprises excessively vertical integration exists or not and why from the angle of transaction cost economy. The base standpoint is that over frequent of coal price policy caused over high of coal and electricity market transaction cost, over high of coal and electricity market transaction cost again cause excessiveness of coal and electricity vertical integration. On the one hand, strong policy intervention and law soft-constraint makes that coal and electricity contract transaction mode is not ideal, on the other hand, budget soft-constraint and coal and electricity state-owned enterprises investment impulse make that property right mode is favored. In addition, the lag and hesitation of economic system reform makes the choice of coal and electricity vertical mode often tend government intervention.
The paper has eight chapters introduced; concrete chapter arrangement and key point are as follows:Chapter 1 is introduction which discussed the theoretical and realistic background of this literature research and the problem need resolved. Chapters 2 is literature review concerning theatrical research of the fim main vertical transaction theory including Neo-classical Economics, Industrial Organization Theory, New Institutional Economics, Firm Ability Theory…etc and take into an overview. Additionally we review the research on Chinese coal and electricity vertical relationship. In Chapter 3; we tried to build vertical transaction theory and put forward that vertical integration or desintegration be decided by the trade-off between transaction cost and organization cost. In chapter 4 we revised vertical transaction theory framework and make use of three squares named that firm, market and government balance model to explained Chinese coal and electricity vertical transaction mode choice evolution, and distinguished effect of Chinese coal and electricity vertical mode operate in the circumstance under imperfect market or market failure. In next chapter 5, as the Chinese coal and electric listed company from 2001 to 2006 for example, we use regression model to analyze factor which impact coal and electricity firm vertical integration. Study result demonstrates that transaction cost and organization cost make Chinese coal and electricity firm vertical integration biggest influence. In chapter 4, this paper attempts to establish the discriminator benchmarks and discriminator indicators of excessive-integration. On this basis, cluster analysis was carried. Chapter 7 inquired into coal and electricity vertical integration exist or not and why. We point out that over frequent of coal for electricity price policy caused over high of coal and electricity market transaction cost, over high of coal and electricity market transaction cost again cause excessiveness of coal and electricity vertical integration. Finally, chapter 8 is a conclusion. This chapter sums up research conclusion, advice and value.
引文
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