审计关系人利益均衡导向下的审计合谋治理研究
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摘要
现实审计环境的复杂性,导致了审计关系人的现实角色与理想角色的错位和扭曲,审计关系人的正当利益失去应有的保护,进而导致了审计合谋的产生,而审计合谋又进一步加剧了审计关系失衡。审计合谋之所以一直未能得到有效的治理,究其原因关键还是在于审计关系人利益分割不公平或不合法及其权责利不明晰。审计合谋治理是一个世界性的难题。因此,研究审计合谋治理在理论上和实务上都具有重要意义。
本文以信息不对称理论、有限政府理论、审计合谋共生理论和投资者保护的法律论等作为研究的理论基础。本文首先对审计关系人的范畴予以重新界定,将预期审计报告使用者纳入审计关系人范畴以取代传统审计关系下的委托者。并且将作为监管者的政府与新审计关系人一同纳入审计合谋利益关系主体的范畴。认为当审计合谋泛滥时,作为监管者的政府应当承担政策失误和监管无效的社会责任和行政责任。然后,结合我国的国情分析了审计关系人利益失衡的原因和审计合谋机理,认为审计关系人的经济人特性和审计环境的复杂性决定了审计合谋是各方利益主体之间的一个长期共存和博弈的过程,并对此进行博弈分析和案例分析。提出被审计者的信息权优势决定了其相对于审计者而言应当为审计合谋的后果承担更大的责任,同时认为预期审计报告使用者拥有获取真实而完整的审计信息的权力和投资损失的有限求偿权。本文通过利益均衡分析,最后立足于国情提出审计合谋治理应当遵循的思路是:被审计者和审计者有效自我约束、委托者有效监督、政府有效监管和投资者有效信赖。并提出审计合谋的“三维治理观”,即动机诱正、过程控制以及结果的监督和惩戒。
The complexity of realistic audit environment leads to the distortion phenomena of audit relationship. So the legitimate interest of audit relationship parties can’t be completely protected, then audit collusion happened, which deteriorates the imbalance of audit relationship. The reason of why audit collusion is so difficult to be solved is that the interest of audit relationship parties can’t be distributed fairly or legally, the power and responsibility are not transparent. Audit collusion is a world-widely difficult problem. So it is meaningful to research on audit collusion governance.
The study is based on the theories of imbalanced information theory、limited government theory、audit collusion accrete theory, the juristic protection of investors theory and so on. First of all, we redefined the category of audit relationship parties, replaced the traditional audit receiver with prospective audit report users, and defined the audit collusion interest relationship bodies, which contains auditors、managers、prospective audit report users and the government. We think the government should be responsible for its policy mistakes and non-effective supervision when accounting cheat and audit collusion exist seriously. Secondly, with the consideration of our country’s situation, we deeply analyzed the reasons and mechanism of audit collusion, we also used a game model and a case to analyze it. We think the management authorities of listed company should have greater responsibility for audit collusion and the loss of the investors, and prospective audit report users have the right to gain real information and be compensated limitedly. Finally, through the analysis of balanced interest, we point the leading idea of audit collusion is as follows: the management authorities of listed company and auditors must restrict themselves effectively、auditor receiver supervision effectively、government supervision effectively and investors trust effectively. We also put forward the three-dimensional governance viewpoint, which contains motivation correction、process control、the result supervision and punishment.
本文以信息不对称理论、有限政府理论、审计合谋共生理论和投资者保护的法律论等作为研究的理论基础。本文首先对审计关系人的范畴予以重新界定,将预期审计报告使用者纳入审计关系人范畴以取代传统审计关系下的委托者。并且将作为监管者的政府与新审计关系人一同纳入审计合谋利益关系主体的范畴。认为当审计合谋泛滥时,作为监管者的政府应当承担政策失误和监管无效的社会责任和行政责任。然后,结合我国的国情分析了审计关系人利益失衡的原因和审计合谋机理,认为审计关系人的经济人特性和审计环境的复杂性决定了审计合谋是各方利益主体之间的一个长期共存和博弈的过程,并对此进行博弈分析和案例分析。提出被审计者的信息权优势决定了其相对于审计者而言应当为审计合谋的后果承担更大的责任,同时认为预期审计报告使用者拥有获取真实而完整的审计信息的权力和投资损失的有限求偿权。本文通过利益均衡分析,最后立足于国情提出审计合谋治理应当遵循的思路是:被审计者和审计者有效自我约束、委托者有效监督、政府有效监管和投资者有效信赖。并提出审计合谋的“三维治理观”,即动机诱正、过程控制以及结果的监督和惩戒。
The complexity of realistic audit environment leads to the distortion phenomena of audit relationship. So the legitimate interest of audit relationship parties can’t be completely protected, then audit collusion happened, which deteriorates the imbalance of audit relationship. The reason of why audit collusion is so difficult to be solved is that the interest of audit relationship parties can’t be distributed fairly or legally, the power and responsibility are not transparent. Audit collusion is a world-widely difficult problem. So it is meaningful to research on audit collusion governance.
The study is based on the theories of imbalanced information theory、limited government theory、audit collusion accrete theory, the juristic protection of investors theory and so on. First of all, we redefined the category of audit relationship parties, replaced the traditional audit receiver with prospective audit report users, and defined the audit collusion interest relationship bodies, which contains auditors、managers、prospective audit report users and the government. We think the government should be responsible for its policy mistakes and non-effective supervision when accounting cheat and audit collusion exist seriously. Secondly, with the consideration of our country’s situation, we deeply analyzed the reasons and mechanism of audit collusion, we also used a game model and a case to analyze it. We think the management authorities of listed company should have greater responsibility for audit collusion and the loss of the investors, and prospective audit report users have the right to gain real information and be compensated limitedly. Finally, through the analysis of balanced interest, we point the leading idea of audit collusion is as follows: the management authorities of listed company and auditors must restrict themselves effectively、auditor receiver supervision effectively、government supervision effectively and investors trust effectively. We also put forward the three-dimensional governance viewpoint, which contains motivation correction、process control、the result supervision and punishment.
引文
[1] Leo Herpert..Auditing the Performance of Management.Wadsworth Inc,1979,4-5
[2] Ross L .Watts, Jerold L .Zimmerman.实证会计理论.黄世忠等译.北京:中国商业出版社,1990,413-446
[3]辛金国.审计关系人的博弈行为分析.数量经济技术经济研究,2001(7):51-53
[4]冯均科.审计关系契约链解析.中国注册会计师,2004(4):51-54
[5]李玉平,贾榕泉.论委托人与独立审计关系的变革.山东财政学院学报,2006(5):56-59
[6]文学.审计关系人博弈分析.集团经济研究,2006(11):261-262
[7]庄立,王玉蓉.现代风险导向审计下审计三方关系人的博弈分析.审计与经济研究,2007(6):26-31
[8]陈志强.审计三方关系人的理论嬗变及其解读.会计之友,2008(6):66
[9] Bologna G Jack, Lindquist Robert J , Wells Joseph T. The Accountants Handbook of Fraud and Commercial Crime. John Wiley & Sons Inc, 1993, 20-31
[10] Albrecht W S, Wemz G W ,Williams T L. Fraud Bring the Light to the Dark side of Business. New York Irwin Inc, 1995, 15-52
[11]雷光勇.审计合谋的经济学分析.审计与经济研究,1999 (2):23-25
[12]叶雪芳.上市公司审计合谋及治理对策.财经论丛,2001(3):72-76
[13]梁莱歆,田鹏.上市公司审计合谋现象的制度分析及对策.事业财会,2003(3):53-54
[14]雷光勇.审计合谋与财务报告舞弊:共生与治理.管理世界,2004(2):97-116
[15]韩德宗.对上市公司虚假信息审计失职的经济学分析.财经论丛,2004(3):64-68
[16]许柳英,陈启欢.审计合谋模型和AM机制.东华大学学报,2005(5):35-39
[17] Fellingham,J. C .and D .P .Newman.Strategic Considerationsin Auditing.The Accounting Review,1985,60
[18] Tirole Jean. Hierarchies and Bureaucracies. On the Role of Collusion in organizations.journal of law, economics and organizations,1986(2):181-214
[19] Kofman Fred and Jacques Lawaree. Collusion in Hierarchical Agency, Econometrica,1993(3):629-656
[20] Lee, C .J .,Gn. Z. Y ..Low Balling, Legal liability and Auditor Independence. Accounting Review,1998,33-555
[21] Lafant, Jean-Jacques , David Martimort. Separation of Regulators AgainstCollusive Behavior.R and Journal of Economics,1999(30):32-62
[22] Kessler, Anke S.On Monitoring and Collusion in Hierarchies.Journal of Economic Theory, 2000(91):280-291
[23] Vafa?, K..Abuse of authority and collusion in organizations.European Journal of Political Economy, 2005(21), 385-405
[24]王善平,赵国宇.奖励审计师与防范审计合谋.系统工程,2005(5):85-88
[25]张文斌.不同审计委托模式下审计合谋的博弈分析.审计与经济研究,2005(1):23-27
[26]雷光勇.证券市场审计合谋识别与规制.中国经济出版社,2005,64
[27]龚启辉,刘桂良.审计合谋的治理:来自审计收费模型的风险博弈分析.审计研究,2006(4):68-71
[28]王艳丽,张强.允许或制止审计合谋的最优性分析.北京理工大学学报,2006 (4):53-56
[29]徐慧.审计合谋的动态博弈分析.时代经贸,2007(64):40-42
[30] DeAngelo L .E.Auditor independence,low-balling and disclosure regulation.Journal of Accounting and Economics,1981 (3):113-121
[31] Antle, R..Auditor Independence.Journal of Accounting Research ,1984(22):1-20
[32]刘国常,韩春生.上市公司审计合谋的博弈分析和治理对策.审计与经济研究,2005(3):3 1-35
[33]刘昌胜.审计独立性:均衡视角.科技信息,2006(2):184
[34]雷光勇,王立彦.投资秩序与利益相关者审计.审计研究,2006(1):71-77
[35]陈小林.审计独立性水平:模型与分析.中南财经政法大学学报,2007(1): 99-103
[36]袁纯清.共生理论——兼论小型经济[M].经济科学出版社,1998,59
[37]冯均科.审计关系契约论.北京:中国财政经济出版社.2003,25
[38]王艳艳.审计在投资者保护中的作用.财会月刊,2005(7):43-44
[39]雷光勇.审计制度安排与企业契约机制运行.审计研究,2003(6):53-58
[40]彭桃英.审计质量与审计市场行为主体关系研究.北京:经济管理出版社,2007,172
[41]马斯洛.人的动机理论.华夏出版社,1987,324
[42]雷光勇,雷小芳.上市公司选择性披露研究.内蒙古财经学院学报,2005(3):46-50
[43]文守逊,杨武.上市公司违规信息披露处罚效果的研究.重庆大学学报,2002(11):83-86
[44]张烨.投资者保护理论述评.经济学动态,2004(10):82-87
[45]王善平.独立审计的诚信问题.会计研究,2002(7):39
[46]陈晓,李静.地方政府财政行为在提升上市公司业绩中的作用探析.会计研究,2001(12):20-29
[47]魏明海.代理人行使信息权力过程中的会计问题.当代经济管理,2006(2):88-94
[48]周其仁.市场里的企业:一个人力资本与非人力资本的特别合约.经济研究,1996(6):71-80
[49]张维迎.所有者、治理结构及委托—代理关系——兼评崔之元和周其仁的一些观点.经济研究,1996,3-26
[50]杜兴强.公司治理生态与会计信息的可靠性问题研究.会计研究,2004(7),46
[51]刘桂良,李洁.审计合谋治理:来自有效惩罚及其注册会计师私人财富抵押的分析.会计研究,2007(1):68-74
[2] Ross L .Watts, Jerold L .Zimmerman.实证会计理论.黄世忠等译.北京:中国商业出版社,1990,413-446
[3]辛金国.审计关系人的博弈行为分析.数量经济技术经济研究,2001(7):51-53
[4]冯均科.审计关系契约链解析.中国注册会计师,2004(4):51-54
[5]李玉平,贾榕泉.论委托人与独立审计关系的变革.山东财政学院学报,2006(5):56-59
[6]文学.审计关系人博弈分析.集团经济研究,2006(11):261-262
[7]庄立,王玉蓉.现代风险导向审计下审计三方关系人的博弈分析.审计与经济研究,2007(6):26-31
[8]陈志强.审计三方关系人的理论嬗变及其解读.会计之友,2008(6):66
[9] Bologna G Jack, Lindquist Robert J , Wells Joseph T. The Accountants Handbook of Fraud and Commercial Crime. John Wiley & Sons Inc, 1993, 20-31
[10] Albrecht W S, Wemz G W ,Williams T L. Fraud Bring the Light to the Dark side of Business. New York Irwin Inc, 1995, 15-52
[11]雷光勇.审计合谋的经济学分析.审计与经济研究,1999 (2):23-25
[12]叶雪芳.上市公司审计合谋及治理对策.财经论丛,2001(3):72-76
[13]梁莱歆,田鹏.上市公司审计合谋现象的制度分析及对策.事业财会,2003(3):53-54
[14]雷光勇.审计合谋与财务报告舞弊:共生与治理.管理世界,2004(2):97-116
[15]韩德宗.对上市公司虚假信息审计失职的经济学分析.财经论丛,2004(3):64-68
[16]许柳英,陈启欢.审计合谋模型和AM机制.东华大学学报,2005(5):35-39
[17] Fellingham,J. C .and D .P .Newman.Strategic Considerationsin Auditing.The Accounting Review,1985,60
[18] Tirole Jean. Hierarchies and Bureaucracies. On the Role of Collusion in organizations.journal of law, economics and organizations,1986(2):181-214
[19] Kofman Fred and Jacques Lawaree. Collusion in Hierarchical Agency, Econometrica,1993(3):629-656
[20] Lee, C .J .,Gn. Z. Y ..Low Balling, Legal liability and Auditor Independence. Accounting Review,1998,33-555
[21] Lafant, Jean-Jacques , David Martimort. Separation of Regulators AgainstCollusive Behavior.R and Journal of Economics,1999(30):32-62
[22] Kessler, Anke S.On Monitoring and Collusion in Hierarchies.Journal of Economic Theory, 2000(91):280-291
[23] Vafa?, K..Abuse of authority and collusion in organizations.European Journal of Political Economy, 2005(21), 385-405
[24]王善平,赵国宇.奖励审计师与防范审计合谋.系统工程,2005(5):85-88
[25]张文斌.不同审计委托模式下审计合谋的博弈分析.审计与经济研究,2005(1):23-27
[26]雷光勇.证券市场审计合谋识别与规制.中国经济出版社,2005,64
[27]龚启辉,刘桂良.审计合谋的治理:来自审计收费模型的风险博弈分析.审计研究,2006(4):68-71
[28]王艳丽,张强.允许或制止审计合谋的最优性分析.北京理工大学学报,2006 (4):53-56
[29]徐慧.审计合谋的动态博弈分析.时代经贸,2007(64):40-42
[30] DeAngelo L .E.Auditor independence,low-balling and disclosure regulation.Journal of Accounting and Economics,1981 (3):113-121
[31] Antle, R..Auditor Independence.Journal of Accounting Research ,1984(22):1-20
[32]刘国常,韩春生.上市公司审计合谋的博弈分析和治理对策.审计与经济研究,2005(3):3 1-35
[33]刘昌胜.审计独立性:均衡视角.科技信息,2006(2):184
[34]雷光勇,王立彦.投资秩序与利益相关者审计.审计研究,2006(1):71-77
[35]陈小林.审计独立性水平:模型与分析.中南财经政法大学学报,2007(1): 99-103
[36]袁纯清.共生理论——兼论小型经济[M].经济科学出版社,1998,59
[37]冯均科.审计关系契约论.北京:中国财政经济出版社.2003,25
[38]王艳艳.审计在投资者保护中的作用.财会月刊,2005(7):43-44
[39]雷光勇.审计制度安排与企业契约机制运行.审计研究,2003(6):53-58
[40]彭桃英.审计质量与审计市场行为主体关系研究.北京:经济管理出版社,2007,172
[41]马斯洛.人的动机理论.华夏出版社,1987,324
[42]雷光勇,雷小芳.上市公司选择性披露研究.内蒙古财经学院学报,2005(3):46-50
[43]文守逊,杨武.上市公司违规信息披露处罚效果的研究.重庆大学学报,2002(11):83-86
[44]张烨.投资者保护理论述评.经济学动态,2004(10):82-87
[45]王善平.独立审计的诚信问题.会计研究,2002(7):39
[46]陈晓,李静.地方政府财政行为在提升上市公司业绩中的作用探析.会计研究,2001(12):20-29
[47]魏明海.代理人行使信息权力过程中的会计问题.当代经济管理,2006(2):88-94
[48]周其仁.市场里的企业:一个人力资本与非人力资本的特别合约.经济研究,1996(6):71-80
[49]张维迎.所有者、治理结构及委托—代理关系——兼评崔之元和周其仁的一些观点.经济研究,1996,3-26
[50]杜兴强.公司治理生态与会计信息的可靠性问题研究.会计研究,2004(7),46
[51]刘桂良,李洁.审计合谋治理:来自有效惩罚及其注册会计师私人财富抵押的分析.会计研究,2007(1):68-74