弹性特许期在基础设施BOT融资中的应用
摘要
目前,在基础设施投资随经济增长不断增加的情况下,BOT模式在基础设施建设中被广泛应用。但是许多BOT项目受自身的建设运营周期长、项目相关方众多以及所处环境的不确定等因素影响,运营状况并不理想,国内外失败的案例也屡见不鲜。弱化这些不利因素的方法始终是研究的重要课题,其中特许期作为BOT项目特许权合同的关键要素之一,一直是学术界和实践界关注的热点。
本论文通过归纳总结国内外该领域的文献与案例,理论分析对比两类特许期形式,即固定特许期和弹性特许期,通过固定特许期原理分析得出固定特许期模式在应用中的不足——中标者不一定是有能力的项目公司且需经过反复的合同谈判过程。同时,借助国外高速公路项目应用案例,在总收入净额和维修成本纯二维出价的基础上归纳出一种在国内未曾引用过的特许经营机制——弹性特许期。相比于固定特许期,这种新机制在选择有能力的项目公司和消除风险等方面具有不可比拟的优越性。
本论文将弹性特许期引入污水处理厂项目案例,以实证研究的方法论证了上述观点,从而得出有必要在国内项目建设领域适用弹性特许期机制的结论。文章通过案例的详尽论证,分别从以下几个角度,证实了本文观点：(1)采用固定特许期,受外部不可控因素的影响造成特许期内项目公司无法达到预期投资回报率,延长特许期需经过频繁的合同谈判,这样不仅消耗成本而且项目运营风险较大。并且当投标者信息不对称时,不能确保选中匹配最佳的项目公司；(2)通过弹性特许期的引入,解决了固定特许期的局限性,特别是当实际流量与预期流量产生偏差时,特许权期可以自动调节其长短,直至满足项目公司的预期收益,既规避了谈判风险,又避免了项目公司为了中标而恶意降低报价,这样项目质量得到有力保证；(3)弹性特许期不仅适用于高速公路项目,亦可应用于诸如污水处理厂、港口建设等与其有共性的BOT项目中,并且通过这种机制的实施降低成本,同时消除风险。
At present, BOT model is widely used in infrastructure development due to the increasing infrastructure investment with economic growth.However,a lot of problems are exposed at the same time. Longer time of a BOT project in construction and operation, more correlative parts on the project interest and the uncertainty of the economic environment are all reasons of the problem. To weaken these disadvantageous factors is always an important task. And, concession period, which is a key factor of BOT franchising contract, has been a hot topic in both academy and practice.
This thesis analyses two common forms,which are fixed-term and flexibility-term. It is concluded that winning bidders may not those competitive companies and frequent contract negotiations become more often, which are disadvantages of fixed-term in the application. As a result, a new flexibility-term mechanism is proposed. It is based on calculating price by net revenues and maintenance costs. On the contrast of fixed concession period, it will play a positive role in choosing a more competitive company and eliminating risk.
The thesis introduces the flexibility-term in the sewage treatment plant project case. Use the detailed case to demonstrate the above point of view. Concluded that it is necessary to adopt the flexibility-term in the national infrastructure development area. The thesis demonstrates this conclusion from the following aspects:First, suffering from uncontrollable external factors, fixed-term usually can not help company to achieve the expected ROI. To extend the concession period needs frequent contract negotiations. Not only increase consumption cost but also lead to the high risk of the project operation. And it's difficult to match the best bidders under the information asymmetry condition. Second, the application of flexibility-term, addresses the limitations of the fixed-term. Especially when the deviation occurred between actual traffic flows and the expected. The concession period can adjust its length until it meets the project's ROI.It can avoid the risk of frequent negotiations and potential quality problem which is usually caused by low-price bidder. Third, the flexibility-term can not only be used in the Highway projects but also in BOT projects, e.g. sewage treatment plant, the port construction. It can effectively reduce the cost and the risk in the project operation process.
本论文通过归纳总结国内外该领域的文献与案例,理论分析对比两类特许期形式,即固定特许期和弹性特许期,通过固定特许期原理分析得出固定特许期模式在应用中的不足——中标者不一定是有能力的项目公司且需经过反复的合同谈判过程。同时,借助国外高速公路项目应用案例,在总收入净额和维修成本纯二维出价的基础上归纳出一种在国内未曾引用过的特许经营机制——弹性特许期。相比于固定特许期,这种新机制在选择有能力的项目公司和消除风险等方面具有不可比拟的优越性。
本论文将弹性特许期引入污水处理厂项目案例,以实证研究的方法论证了上述观点,从而得出有必要在国内项目建设领域适用弹性特许期机制的结论。文章通过案例的详尽论证,分别从以下几个角度,证实了本文观点：(1)采用固定特许期,受外部不可控因素的影响造成特许期内项目公司无法达到预期投资回报率,延长特许期需经过频繁的合同谈判,这样不仅消耗成本而且项目运营风险较大。并且当投标者信息不对称时,不能确保选中匹配最佳的项目公司；(2)通过弹性特许期的引入,解决了固定特许期的局限性,特别是当实际流量与预期流量产生偏差时,特许权期可以自动调节其长短,直至满足项目公司的预期收益,既规避了谈判风险,又避免了项目公司为了中标而恶意降低报价,这样项目质量得到有力保证；(3)弹性特许期不仅适用于高速公路项目,亦可应用于诸如污水处理厂、港口建设等与其有共性的BOT项目中,并且通过这种机制的实施降低成本,同时消除风险。
At present, BOT model is widely used in infrastructure development due to the increasing infrastructure investment with economic growth.However,a lot of problems are exposed at the same time. Longer time of a BOT project in construction and operation, more correlative parts on the project interest and the uncertainty of the economic environment are all reasons of the problem. To weaken these disadvantageous factors is always an important task. And, concession period, which is a key factor of BOT franchising contract, has been a hot topic in both academy and practice.
This thesis analyses two common forms,which are fixed-term and flexibility-term. It is concluded that winning bidders may not those competitive companies and frequent contract negotiations become more often, which are disadvantages of fixed-term in the application. As a result, a new flexibility-term mechanism is proposed. It is based on calculating price by net revenues and maintenance costs. On the contrast of fixed concession period, it will play a positive role in choosing a more competitive company and eliminating risk.
The thesis introduces the flexibility-term in the sewage treatment plant project case. Use the detailed case to demonstrate the above point of view. Concluded that it is necessary to adopt the flexibility-term in the national infrastructure development area. The thesis demonstrates this conclusion from the following aspects:First, suffering from uncontrollable external factors, fixed-term usually can not help company to achieve the expected ROI. To extend the concession period needs frequent contract negotiations. Not only increase consumption cost but also lead to the high risk of the project operation. And it's difficult to match the best bidders under the information asymmetry condition. Second, the application of flexibility-term, addresses the limitations of the fixed-term. Especially when the deviation occurred between actual traffic flows and the expected. The concession period can adjust its length until it meets the project's ROI.It can avoid the risk of frequent negotiations and potential quality problem which is usually caused by low-price bidder. Third, the flexibility-term can not only be used in the Highway projects but also in BOT projects, e.g. sewage treatment plant, the port construction. It can effectively reduce the cost and the risk in the project operation process.
引文
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[6]国家统计局：改革开放30年报告之四基础产业和基础设施建设成绩斐然,http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjfx/ztfx/jnggkf30n/t20081030_402513138.htm,2009.1.
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[13]侍玉成,万法菊.城市供水项目特许权期决策的博弈分析[J].南京工程学院学报(自然科学版),2006,4(2)：28-33.
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[21]黄海军.拥挤道路使用收费的研究进展和实践难题[J].中国科学基金,2003,17(4)：198-203.
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[25]孙淑云,戴大双,杨卫华.高速公路项目特许定价中的风险分担研究[J].科技管理研究,2006,26(10)：154-157.
[26]杨卫华,戴大双,韩明杰.污水处理BOT项目特许定价的关键风险实证研究[J].大连理工大学学报(社会科学版),2006,26(6)：14-18.
[27]Anthony c,Kitfi s.Analysis of Ilegulation and policy of private toll roads in a bund-Operate-transfer scheme under uncertainty [J]. Transportation Research Part A,2007,41(6):537-558.
[28]超鸿燕.BOT项目融资的特许经营问题研究[D].(硕士学位论文).昆明：昆明理工大学,2004
[29]王敏正,王松江.BOT项目实施指南[M].昆明：云南省科技出版社,2001.
[30]FRANCESCA CARNEVALE.Putting BOT on the road[J].Euroumoney,1989(4):88-91
[31]王雅杰.国际金融：理论·实务·案例[M].北京：清华大学出版社,2006.
[32]Shaw L N,Kenneth G M, Thompson L S. Concessions in transport [R]. The World Bank Group, TWU-27,1996.1-127.
[33]李启明,申立银.基础设施BOT项目特许权期的决策模型[J].管理工程学报,2000,14(1)43-46.
[34]Shen L. Y., Li H. and Li Q. M, A ltemative Concession Model for Build Operate Transfer Contract Projects [J]. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management,2002,Vol.128, No.4:326-330.
[35]Shen L. Y., and Wu Y Z. Risk Concession Model for Build Operate Transfer Contract Projects [J]. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, Vol.131, No.2,211-220.
[36]Robert L.K.Tiong, Sudong Ye. The effect of concession period design on completion risk management of BOT projects.Construction Management and Economecs,2003(21):471-482.
[37]夏家承.BOT作业程序与关键问题[J].中兴工程,2000.68：71-97.
[38]姚乃嘉,李俊宪,林芸湘.BOT特许合约研究系列(二)-特许权篇[J].现代营建,2001,253：43-51.
[39]于国安.基础设施特许经营中特许权期的决策分析[J].商业研究,2006,(11)：52-56.
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[2]李炎,牟焕森.英法海底隧道工程：历史过程和成功经验[J].工程研究——跨学科视野中的工程,2009(3)：90-96
[3]Zhang X Q, Kumaraswamy M. Hong Kong Experience in Managing BOT Projects, Journal of Construction Engineering and Management,2001,127(2):154-162.
[4]王坤,王泽森.BOT在香港隧道项目中的应用：经验与教训[J].国际经贸探索,2007,23(9)：26-30.
[5]洪建智.BOT工程管理机制之研究[D].(硕士学位论文).台湾：台湾大学,2004.
[6]国家统计局：改革开放30年报告之四基础产业和基础设施建设成绩斐然,http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjfx/ztfx/jnggkf30n/t20081030_402513138.htm,2009.1.
[7]王守清,柯永建.特许经营项目融资[M].北京：清华大学出版社2008,第一版.
[8]Ye S D.Robert L K T,NPV-at-risk method in infrastructure project investment evaluation.Journal of Construction Engineering and Management,2000,126(3):227-233.
[9]秦旋.基于CAPM的BOT项目特许期的计算模型[J].管理工程学报,2005,19(2)：60-63.
[10]杨宏伟,周晶,何建敏.基于博弈论的交通BOT项目特许权期的决策模型[J].管理工程学报,2003,17(3)：93-95.
[11]杨宏伟,何建敏,周晶.在BOT模式下收费道路定价和投资的博弈决策模型[J].中国管理科学,2003,11(4)：30-33.
[12]高丽峰,张国杰,杜燕.利用动态博弈中的“分蛋糕”模型确定BOT项目特许权期[J].商业研究,2006,(2)：24-26.
[13]侍玉成,万法菊.城市供水项目特许权期决策的博弈分析[J].南京工程学院学报(自然科学版),2006,4(2)：28-33.
[14]Shen L Y.Bao H J,W u Y Z.etal.Using bargaining-game theory for negotiating concession period for BOT-type contract[J].Journal of construction Engineering and Management,2007,133(5):385-392.
[15]Shen L Y,W u Y Z.Risk concession model for build-operate-transfer contract projects[J],Joumal of construction Engineering and Management,2005,131(2):211-220.
[16]Zhang X Q,AbouRizk S M.Determining a reasonable concession period for private sector provision of public works and services[J].Canadian Journal of Civil Enneering,2006,33(5):622-631.
[17]Thomas S Ng,Xie J Z,Skitmore Metal. A fluzzy simulation model for evaluating the concession items of public-private pannership schemes[J]. Automation in Construction,2007,17(1):22-29.
[18]Walker C,Smith A J. Privatized infrastructure:the BOT approach[M]. London:Thomas Telford,1995.1-20.
[19]Engel E, Fisher R, Galetovic A.Revenue-based auction and unbundling infrastructure fanchises[R]. Washington D. C,IFM-112,1997.1-29.
[20]Engel E,Fisher R,Galetovic A.Highway flranchising:pitfalls and opponunities[J].American Economic Review,1997,87(2):68-72.
[21]黄海军.拥挤道路使用收费的研究进展和实践难题[J].中国科学基金,2003,17(4)：198-203.
[22]何胜学.道路拥挤收费定价分析[J].上海理工大学学报,2005,27(1)：870.
[23]Nombela G.Gines de Rus.FlexIble-term contmcts for road franc hising[J].Transportation Research Part A,2004,38(3):163-179.
[24]Vassallo J M.Traffic Risk Mitigation in Highway Concession Projects:The Experience of Chile.Journal of Transport Economics and Policy,2006,40(3):359-381.
[25]孙淑云,戴大双,杨卫华.高速公路项目特许定价中的风险分担研究[J].科技管理研究,2006,26(10)：154-157.
[26]杨卫华,戴大双,韩明杰.污水处理BOT项目特许定价的关键风险实证研究[J].大连理工大学学报(社会科学版),2006,26(6)：14-18.
[27]Anthony c,Kitfi s.Analysis of Ilegulation and policy of private toll roads in a bund-Operate-transfer scheme under uncertainty [J]. Transportation Research Part A,2007,41(6):537-558.
[28]超鸿燕.BOT项目融资的特许经营问题研究[D].(硕士学位论文).昆明：昆明理工大学,2004
[29]王敏正,王松江.BOT项目实施指南[M].昆明：云南省科技出版社,2001.
[30]FRANCESCA CARNEVALE.Putting BOT on the road[J].Euroumoney,1989(4):88-91
[31]王雅杰.国际金融：理论·实务·案例[M].北京：清华大学出版社,2006.
[32]Shaw L N,Kenneth G M, Thompson L S. Concessions in transport [R]. The World Bank Group, TWU-27,1996.1-127.
[33]李启明,申立银.基础设施BOT项目特许权期的决策模型[J].管理工程学报,2000,14(1)43-46.
[34]Shen L. Y., Li H. and Li Q. M, A ltemative Concession Model for Build Operate Transfer Contract Projects [J]. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management,2002,Vol.128, No.4:326-330.
[35]Shen L. Y., and Wu Y Z. Risk Concession Model for Build Operate Transfer Contract Projects [J]. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, Vol.131, No.2,211-220.
[36]Robert L.K.Tiong, Sudong Ye. The effect of concession period design on completion risk management of BOT projects.Construction Management and Economecs,2003(21):471-482.
[37]夏家承.BOT作业程序与关键问题[J].中兴工程,2000.68：71-97.
[38]姚乃嘉,李俊宪,林芸湘.BOT特许合约研究系列(二)-特许权篇[J].现代营建,2001,253：43-51.
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