村委会选举中国家的角色、成本和收益
摘要
本文采取个案研究的研究方法、以社会交换理论为基本理论框架来研究村委会选举问题。把村委会选举中各个参与主体的社会互动过程看作是他们追求报酬、视自身的成本和收益而进行的社会交换过程。村委会选举的参与主体主要包括国家政权(又包括国家高层政权和基层政权)、农村精英和普通选民。每个参与主体的成本与收益都不可能脱离开他在该项参与中所表现的角色特征即社会地位的外在动态表现,故本文首先描述了村委会选举的参与主体之一——国家的角色特征。通过调查发现:国家政权在村委会选举中一直处于(集“立法者”、“执法者”、“监督者”于一身的)强势主导地位,而且在本届村委会选举中,国家进一步加强了自己的主导地位。国家主导地位的加强表现在以下几个方面:一是强调党对本届村委会选举的领导并将做好本届村委会选举工作与贯彻党的十六届四中全会精神紧密联系在一起;二是在县级层次国家政权,由组织部具体负责本届村委会选举工作;三是“两委兼职”、“一肩挑”成为本届村委会选举中国家政权所要把握的硬性指标,选举结果也达到了国家政权的预期;四是在未经各个参与主体达成共识的前提下,国家政权单方面将选举日期提前,但并未有引起其他参与主体的异议甚至察觉。按照社会交换理论的观点,国家主导村委会选举肯定是为了获得一定的报酬(这也符合“谁主导,谁受益”的原则),当然要获取报酬也必定付出一定的代价。已经有学者研究了国家政权参与村委会选举的成本与收益,但是既有的分析由于缺乏有力的理论指导而没能对成本与收益进行全面深入的分析。本文认为国家参与村委会选举的成本除了学者们所强调的经济成本、政治成本(其中政治成本指乡镇基层政权的权威由于村委会选举而受到来自乡村社会合法及不合法的挑战)外,还有布劳一直所强调的并且认为最重要的社会交换的成本——时间;本文认为国家政权参与村委会选举的收益除了学者们所强调的经济收益、政治收益(主要指民主化进程)外,还有社会赞同、权威合法化、社会稳定、社会团结等,高层国家政权还可以获得基层的服从而基层之所以服从就在于能从服从中获得足够的酬赏;最后,本文指出村委会选举所造成的政治成本的主要承担者
This thesis adopts the research method of the case study, using the social exchange theories as the basic theory frame to study the problem of villager commission election. Regarding the social interactive process between the participants in the villager commission election as the process of social exchange, every participant pursues reward and pays much attention to the cost and income. The participants in the villager commission election mainly include the state (including the high political power and grass-roots political power), the village elites and common voters. The cost and income of each participant can't have nothing to do with the participant's role (namely the outside dynamic state performance of the social status), so this article describes the role of state in the villager commission election first .Through investigation, I find that our state (the national political power)has been in predominant position(incorporating the strong points of " legislator"、 "role enforcing the law"、 "supervisor" in its whole body) in the villager commission election, and in current villager commission election, the state has further strengthened its predominant position. The performance of state's strengthening its predominant position is as folio wings: One is to emphasize that the Communist Party of China should lead the current villager commission election; Secondly, in political power of the county class, the Organization Department of the Communist Party of China is in charge of the current villager commission election; Thirdly, an important rigid election index is that each member of the two commissions should hold two posts (one post is in the villager commission and the other is in the village party branch commission of the Communist Party of China), and the election result also attains the expectation of the state; Fourthly ,our state advanced the date of the current election unilaterally without reaching consensus with other participants, which didn't cause other participants' objection and even realization. According to the standpoint of the social exchange theories, the cause of the state's leading villager commission election is to acquire a certain reward (this also matches the principle of who predominates, who benefits"), and those who benefit also need to pay a certain cost certainly. Some scholars have studied the cost and income of the state's participating in the villager commission election, but their analyses are not complete and thorough because of lacking the emollient theories to guide their study. This article views that the
state's costs in the villager commission election include time which in Peter M. Blau's opinion is the most important cost in addition to the economic costs, political costs (the main political cost is that the authority of the grass-roots political power will descend as a result of facing the legal and illegal challenge from country society caused by the villager commission election) that the above-mentioned scholars have emphasized; This article argues that the state's incomes in the villager commission election include social approval, authority legalization, social stability, social unity in addition to the economic incomes, political incomes( only referring to democratization progress) that the above-mentioned scholars have emphasized; the high political power can also acquire obedience from the grass-roots political power ,and the reason for the grass-roots political power to obey is that it can acquire enough reward from the obedience; Finally, this thesis points out that the grass-roots political power which undertakes the political cost caused by the villager commission election has a variety of ways to prevent its authority from descending, and we can suppose that the grass-roots political power acquires its income in those ways. Those ways include emphasizing that the village party branch commissions are the leading nucleus of the villages, promoting that each member of the two commissions should hold two posts (one post is in the villager commission and the other is in the village party branch commission of the Communist Party of China), holding the power of controlling the village cadre's wages tightly, seizing the village cadre's "small plaits"(mistakes), etc. Among them, promoting that each member of the two commissions should hold two posts (one post is in the villager commission and the other is in the village party branch commission of the Communist Party of China) is "one stone many birds" measures. After studying the costs and incomes of the state's participating in the villager commission election, we can discover that the incomes that the state acquires is considerable, because the state still has acquired many other social rewards on condition that it has made enough compensation for its political costs.
This thesis adopts the research method of the case study, using the social exchange theories as the basic theory frame to study the problem of villager commission election. Regarding the social interactive process between the participants in the villager commission election as the process of social exchange, every participant pursues reward and pays much attention to the cost and income. The participants in the villager commission election mainly include the state (including the high political power and grass-roots political power), the village elites and common voters. The cost and income of each participant can't have nothing to do with the participant's role (namely the outside dynamic state performance of the social status), so this article describes the role of state in the villager commission election first .Through investigation, I find that our state (the national political power)has been in predominant position(incorporating the strong points of " legislator"、 "role enforcing the law"、 "supervisor" in its whole body) in the villager commission election, and in current villager commission election, the state has further strengthened its predominant position. The performance of state's strengthening its predominant position is as folio wings: One is to emphasize that the Communist Party of China should lead the current villager commission election; Secondly, in political power of the county class, the Organization Department of the Communist Party of China is in charge of the current villager commission election; Thirdly, an important rigid election index is that each member of the two commissions should hold two posts (one post is in the villager commission and the other is in the village party branch commission of the Communist Party of China), and the election result also attains the expectation of the state; Fourthly ,our state advanced the date of the current election unilaterally without reaching consensus with other participants, which didn't cause other participants' objection and even realization. According to the standpoint of the social exchange theories, the cause of the state's leading villager commission election is to acquire a certain reward (this also matches the principle of who predominates, who benefits"), and those who benefit also need to pay a certain cost certainly. Some scholars have studied the cost and income of the state's participating in the villager commission election, but their analyses are not complete and thorough because of lacking the emollient theories to guide their study. This article views that the
state's costs in the villager commission election include time which in Peter M. Blau's opinion is the most important cost in addition to the economic costs, political costs (the main political cost is that the authority of the grass-roots political power will descend as a result of facing the legal and illegal challenge from country society caused by the villager commission election) that the above-mentioned scholars have emphasized; This article argues that the state's incomes in the villager commission election include social approval, authority legalization, social stability, social unity in addition to the economic incomes, political incomes( only referring to democratization progress) that the above-mentioned scholars have emphasized; the high political power can also acquire obedience from the grass-roots political power ,and the reason for the grass-roots political power to obey is that it can acquire enough reward from the obedience; Finally, this thesis points out that the grass-roots political power which undertakes the political cost caused by the villager commission election has a variety of ways to prevent its authority from descending, and we can suppose that the grass-roots political power acquires its income in those ways. Those ways include emphasizing that the village party branch commissions are the leading nucleus of the villages, promoting that each member of the two commissions should hold two posts (one post is in the villager commission and the other is in the village party branch commission of the Communist Party of China), holding the power of controlling the village cadre's wages tightly, seizing the village cadre's "small plaits"(mistakes), etc. Among them, promoting that each member of the two commissions should hold two posts (one post is in the villager commission and the other is in the village party branch commission of the Communist Party of China) is "one stone many birds" measures. After studying the costs and incomes of the state's participating in the villager commission election, we can discover that the incomes that the state acquires is considerable, because the state still has acquired many other social rewards on condition that it has made enough compensation for its political costs.
引文
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2、哈贝马斯《合法化危机》刘北成、曹卫东译 上海人民出版社,上海 2000
3、马克斯·韦伯《经济与社会》商务印书馆,林荣远译 北京 1997
4、马克斯·韦伯《新教伦理与资本主义精神》彭强、黄晓京译 陕西师范大学出版社 陕西西安 2002。
5、乔纳森·H·特纳《社会学理论的结构》邱泽奇译 浙江人民出版社 杭州 1987。
6、卢梭《社会契法论》何兆武译 商务印书馆 北京 2003。
7、J·C亚历山大《国家与市民社会》邓正来编(多人翻译)中央编译出版社 北京 1999。
8、费孝通《乡土中国·生育制度》北京大学出版社 北京 1998。
9、欧博文(O’Bfien,Kevm J)《村民选举及公民权》胡荣译 香港中文大学大学服务中心、香港浸会大学政府与国际研究系《中国大陆第二届村级组织建设学术讨论会文集》2001第三期。
10、Robert A.Pastor、谭青山:The meaning of China's Village Elections,载香港中文大学大学服务中心、香港浸会大学政府与国际研究系《中国大陆第二届村级组织建设学术讨论会论文集》2001 第三期原载《中国季刊》(China Quarterly)2000年6月。
11、Dearlove, John. 1995. "Village Politics" in China in the 1990S, edited by Robert Benewick and Paul Wingrove. Vancouver: UBC Press
12、Kelliher, Dniel. 1997 "the Chinese Debate over Village self-government ", The China Journal 37: 63-86
13、Lawrence, Susan V. 1994. " Democracy, Chinese style", The Australia Journal of Chinese Affairs 32: 59-68.
14、Manion, Melanie. 1996. "The Electoral Connection in the Chinese Countryside", American Political Science Review 90(4): 736-48.
15、O' Brien, Kevin J 1994 "The implementing Political Reform in China's villages", The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, 32: 33-59.
16、Oi, Jean and Scott Rozelle. 1997. "Democracy and Markets: The Link Between Participatory Decision-making and Development in China's Rural Economy ", presented at the International Symposium on State and Society in China, University of Shizuoka, Japan, November 23-24, 1997.
17、Oi, Jean. 1996. "Economic Development, Stability and Democratic Village Selfgovernance", in China Review 1996 edited by Maurice Brosseau, Suzanne Pepper and Tsang Shu-ki Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press.
18、White, Tyrene. 1992. "Reforming the Countryside", Current History, 91(566): 273-7.
19、肖唐镖、唐晓腾《基层政府在村委会选举中的角色:对江西省40个村委会换届选举的综合分析》《国家行政学院学报》2001.第6期。
20、肖唐镖、邱新有《选民在村委会选举中的心态与行为:对40个村委会选举情况的综合分析》《中国农村观察》2001.第5期。
21、肖唐镖:《国家、乡村社会与村民自治(村民自治中乡村社会的心态和行为研究及其它)》,北京大学社会学系“中国农村组织建设与农村可持续发展”国际学术会议论文1999.7月。
22、肖唐镖:‘村委会选举中的宗族因素——对40个村选举的综合研究》,香港中文大学大学服务中心、香港浸会大学政府与国际研究系《中国大陆第二届村级组织建设学术讨论会论文集》2001.3月。
23、肖唐镖、邱新有《村干部在村委会选举中的角色与行为特征》《调研世界》2002第8期。
24、贺雪峰《村委会选举为何会出现倒退:湖北袁扬、姚周两村调查》《中国农村观察》1998第4期。
25、贺雪峰《村庄精英与社区记忆:理解村庄性质的二维框架》《社会科学辑刑》2000年第4期。
26、贺雪峰《论村级权力结构的模化:兼论与村委会选举之间的互动关系》《社会科学战线》2001年第2期。
27、贺雪峰《论民主化村级政治理的村庄基础》《社会学研究》2002年第2期。
28、贺雪峰《缺乏分层与缺失记忆型村庄的权力结构》《社会学研究》2001年第2期。
29、詹姆斯·C·斯科特,《弱者的武器:农民反抗的日常形式》耶鲁大学出版社。
30、美Rugh A.Wallace & Alison wolf《当代社会交换论的权力观详析》王茂福、黄勤译《武当学刑》1996第16卷第2期.
31、孙庆民《行为主义与社会交换》《湖南师范大学社会科学学报》1995年第3期。
32、陈政《资本与社会交换论纲》《新余高专学报》2002.第4期
33、孙庆民《社会交换资源理论评述》《湖南师范大学社会科学学报》1994年第6期。
34、兆曙《乡村社会交换方式变迁的双重趋势》《中国农村观察》2002.第2期。
35、曹海林《乡村社会交换的演变及其生成逻辑》《人文杂志》2003年第2期。
36、沈远新《论市场经济下的社会交换错位——兼谈反腐败中的道德建设》《探索》1997年第1期。
37、包俊洪、吴治平《乡村选举中的“两票制”》红旗出版社 北京,2004。
38、雷洪、胡涛《村委会选举中选民的公共冷漠》《社会》2003第6期。
39、焦友龙《走调的村委会选举》《社会》1999第4期。
40、詹成付《我国村委会选举10年实践的启示》《现代农业》1999第1期。
41、黄陵东《村委会选举与农村民主化进程》《理论探讨》2003年第5期。
42、王春生《圈家与社会关系视野中的村委会选举制度》《湖北社会科学》2003.第12期。
43、吕东明《村委会选举工作存在的问题及对策》《昭乌达蒙族师专学报》第23卷,第2期。
44、郭云春、刘梅芳《利益博奕下的乡村治理:透视村民自治的新视角》《社会》2003第2期。
45、金太军《从国家的视角看村委会选举的成本与收益》《南京师范大学报》2001第9期。
46、涂用凯《基层政府在村委会选举中的失范问题研究》《江西教育学院学报》2002第8期。
47、潘允康《二元体制下村民自治的理性思考》《社会科学研究》2003年第3期。
48、王晓旭《对有关村委会选举的一百封上访信的分析》《中国农村观察》2001第1期。
49、胡荣《理性选择与制度实施》上海远东出版社 上海2001。
50、范瑜《村委会选举制度的演进及特点》《中国农村观察》2001第1期.
51、胡涛《村委会选举问题研究的现状与趋势》《湖北社会科学》2003第5期。
52、詹成付《正确看待村委会选举中的‘拉票’现象》《乡村组织》2002第7期。
53、刘志鹏《论村委会选举中的村民选举权》《中国农村观察》2002第3期。
54、刘志鹏《村委会选举法律基本原则研究》《探求》2002年第4期。
55、李学田《竞选演说:村委会选举新创造》《民政论坛》2000第2期。
56、肖唐镖、邱新有《村委会选举中的选举委员会》《求实》(2002.2)。
57、中共济南市委组织部、济南市民政局《济南市村“两委”换届选举工作资料选编》二○○四年十一月(内部资料,是各种条例、法规、办法、意见、通知及省市领导讲话的汇编)
58、中国——欧盟村务管理培训项目《山东省村民委员会选举知识手册》(内部资料,是法规、办法、释义、意见、通知等的汇编,包含三个有关妇女参与村委会选举被选举的文件)。
59、李森(主编)《村民委员会换届选举手册》山东大学出版社 山东济南 1999。