相关者利益均衡与上市公司盈余管理关系研究
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摘要
盈余管理是管理层通过调整财务报告的盈余结果来影响利益相关者决策的管理活动,公司相关者为了实现各自利益的最大化在与公司的经营合作决策中会激励或约束管理层的盈余管理行为。而哪些相关者会激励或约束盈余管理的过度现象?如何通过相关者的利益均衡降低公司的盈余管理程度?是否存在有效路径可以解决盈余管理对相关者利益获得的不利影响?这些都是需要理论与实践研究亟待解决的问题。
因此,本文从利益相关者共同参与会计行为的角度出发,分析相关者对盈余管理的激励或约束影响,研究相关者的利益均衡与盈余管理的关系,提出解决盈余管理对利益相关者不利影响的有效途径,有利于保护与均衡利益相关者的利益,进而降低公司的盈余管理程度,提高社会资源的配置效率。
全文共分七章内容：第一章为绪论；第二章为国内外研究文献综述；第三章研究盈余管理的计量与相关者利益获得的衡量问题；第四章分析了相关者对盈余管理的激励与约束影响,并对相关者进行分类；第五章分析了相关者的利益均衡对盈余管理的影响,在建立“利益熵”的基础上,纳入宏观经济与公司异质性影响因素,检验了“利益熵”与盈余管理的关系；第六章运用系统动力学方法建立了“利益相关者.盈余管理”(Stakeholder-Earnings Management,简称SEM)的因果关系模型,分析了SEM系统中激励型、约束型、综合型利益相关者和相关者利益均衡与盈余管理的协同演化路径,提出提高SEM系统效率的政策建议；第七章为本文的研究结论与展望。本文主要的研究成果如下：
(1)构建盈余管理的相关者分类模型,明确了对盈余管理产生影响的三类相关者,即激励型利益相关者、约束型利益相关者与综合型利益相关者。
本文以2007-2011年间A股上市公司700家财务数据为样本,建立盈余管理与相关者利益获得情况的回归模型,并将高管、独立董事、股东、供应商划分为激励型利益相关者,董事、债权人划分为约束型利益相关者,监事与分销商划分为综合型利益相关者；并通过逐步回归研究发现高管、董事、股东与债权人四者是盈余管理的主要影响者。
(2)构建盈余管理的“利益熵”评价模型,揭示了相关者的利益均衡对盈余管理的约束作用。
本文运用熵理论建立了盈余管理的“利益熵”评价模型,并在回归模型中纳入影响盈余管理的宏观经济与公司异质性因素,研究结果发现“利益熵”越大相关者的利益越均衡,公司盈余管理程度越小；公司规模与盈余管理负相关,公司实际控制人、公司负债水平、公司盈利能力、审计意见、市盈率货币供应量增长率(M2)与盈余管理正相关；而且公司异质性对盈余管理的影响要强于宏观经济影响因素。
(3)构建“利益相关者-盈余管理”(SEM)因果关系模型,剖析了SEM系统中激励型、约束型、综合型利益相关者和相关者利益均衡与盈余管理的协同演化路径。
本文运用系统动力学理论,在分析利益相关者结构与盈余管理结构的基础上,明确了SEM系统的定义与边界。通过建立SEM系统的资产负债子系统、利润子系统与经营活动现金流量子系统因果关系模型,分析了不同类型利益相关者和相关者利益均衡与盈余管理的协同演化路径,提出提高SEM系统效率的政策建议。
Earnings management is the management behavior that impact the stakeholder decisions management through financial report adjusting. Company stakeholders will encourage or restrain earnings management behavior in order to maximize the interests in cooperation with the company's operating decision-making. What kind of stakeholders will encourage or restrain excessive earnings management phenomenon?How to reduce companies'earnings management degree with stakeholder interest balance? How to solve the adverse effect that earnings management takes on stakeholders through effective path? They need to be solved through both theory and practice.
Therefore, from the perspective of stakeholder' participation behavior on the accounting, this thesis analyses of stakeholders incentives or constraints effect on earnings management and does research on interests balance of stakeholder and earnings management; put forward the effective way to solve the adverse effect that earnings management takes on stakeholders; which is conducive to the protection and balance of the interests of the stakeholders, thereby lowering the company's earnings management behavior to improve the allocation efficiency of social resources.
Seven chapters are discussed:the first chapter is introduction. The second chapter is literature summary both at home and abroad. The third chapter studies measurement problem on earnings management metering and stakeholders to obtain. The fourth chapter analyzes the stakeholders incentive and constraint effects on earnings management and also classifies the stakeholders. The fifth chapter analyses the influence that interests balance of stakeholders' impacts on earnings management. And it established an "Interest Entropy" basis with macro-economic factors and the heterogeneity of the company, and testified the relationship between "Interest Entropy" and earnings management. Chapter six using system dynamics method to set up the casual model of "Stakeholders-Earnings Management"(SEM), and analyzes collaboration evolution path of SEM along with assets and liabilities subsystem, profit subsystem, cash flow of operating activities subsystem and stakeholders interests balance. It also submits the policy suggestions of promoting SEM system efficiency. Chapter seven is the research conclusion and prospect of this thesis. The main research results are as follows in this paper:
(1) Setting up the stakeholder's classification model of earnings management, it can be divided into three categories as incentive model, constraint model, and comprehensive model.
Chosen700A-share listed companies from2007to2011as samples; it establishes regression model of earnings management and the stakeholders. And classifies the executive officers, independent directors, shareholders, suppliers as incentive type stakeholders; the directors and creditor as the constraint stakeholders; and supervisors and distributors (client) as the comprehensive stakeholders. The studies found out that the four-executives, shareholders, creditors and directors have the most significant influence on earnings management through the stepwise regression research.
(2) It constructs the evaluation model of "Interest Entropy" of earnings management. The study also finds out the more balance interests of stakeholders is and the smaller the degree of earnings management.
This paper uses physical entropy theory, established the evaluation model of "Interest Entropy". It also bring the macroeconomic factors and corporate heterogeneity factor that affect earnings management in empirical regression model. The empirical results is that the bigger "Interest Entropy" is the smaller earnings management degree is. The scale of companise is negatively related to the earnings management; company actual controllers, company debt levels, corporate profitability,PE ratio, audit opinion, the money supply (M2) growth rate have positive correlation with earnings management; while company heterogeneity and its impact on earnings management is more than macroeconomic factors.
(3) Constructing causal relation model of "Stakeholder-Earnings Management", and specifically analyses the collaboration evolution path earnings management and subsystems-assets and liabilities, profit, cash flow of operating activities subsystems and stakeholders interests balance of SEM.
Using system dynamics theory, this paper defines the boundary of SEM system, on the basis of the stakeholder structure and earnings management structure. It establishes causal relation model of three subsystems of SEM system--assets and liabilities subsystem, profit subsystem, cash flow subsystem in operating activities and stakeholders interests balance. And at the same time, it analyzes the collaboration evolution path of the three subsystems and put forward the policy suggestion to improve the efficiency of earnings management.
因此,本文从利益相关者共同参与会计行为的角度出发,分析相关者对盈余管理的激励或约束影响,研究相关者的利益均衡与盈余管理的关系,提出解决盈余管理对利益相关者不利影响的有效途径,有利于保护与均衡利益相关者的利益,进而降低公司的盈余管理程度,提高社会资源的配置效率。
全文共分七章内容：第一章为绪论；第二章为国内外研究文献综述；第三章研究盈余管理的计量与相关者利益获得的衡量问题；第四章分析了相关者对盈余管理的激励与约束影响,并对相关者进行分类；第五章分析了相关者的利益均衡对盈余管理的影响,在建立“利益熵”的基础上,纳入宏观经济与公司异质性影响因素,检验了“利益熵”与盈余管理的关系；第六章运用系统动力学方法建立了“利益相关者.盈余管理”(Stakeholder-Earnings Management,简称SEM)的因果关系模型,分析了SEM系统中激励型、约束型、综合型利益相关者和相关者利益均衡与盈余管理的协同演化路径,提出提高SEM系统效率的政策建议；第七章为本文的研究结论与展望。本文主要的研究成果如下：
(1)构建盈余管理的相关者分类模型,明确了对盈余管理产生影响的三类相关者,即激励型利益相关者、约束型利益相关者与综合型利益相关者。
本文以2007-2011年间A股上市公司700家财务数据为样本,建立盈余管理与相关者利益获得情况的回归模型,并将高管、独立董事、股东、供应商划分为激励型利益相关者,董事、债权人划分为约束型利益相关者,监事与分销商划分为综合型利益相关者；并通过逐步回归研究发现高管、董事、股东与债权人四者是盈余管理的主要影响者。
(2)构建盈余管理的“利益熵”评价模型,揭示了相关者的利益均衡对盈余管理的约束作用。
本文运用熵理论建立了盈余管理的“利益熵”评价模型,并在回归模型中纳入影响盈余管理的宏观经济与公司异质性因素,研究结果发现“利益熵”越大相关者的利益越均衡,公司盈余管理程度越小；公司规模与盈余管理负相关,公司实际控制人、公司负债水平、公司盈利能力、审计意见、市盈率货币供应量增长率(M2)与盈余管理正相关；而且公司异质性对盈余管理的影响要强于宏观经济影响因素。
(3)构建“利益相关者-盈余管理”(SEM)因果关系模型,剖析了SEM系统中激励型、约束型、综合型利益相关者和相关者利益均衡与盈余管理的协同演化路径。
本文运用系统动力学理论,在分析利益相关者结构与盈余管理结构的基础上,明确了SEM系统的定义与边界。通过建立SEM系统的资产负债子系统、利润子系统与经营活动现金流量子系统因果关系模型,分析了不同类型利益相关者和相关者利益均衡与盈余管理的协同演化路径,提出提高SEM系统效率的政策建议。
Earnings management is the management behavior that impact the stakeholder decisions management through financial report adjusting. Company stakeholders will encourage or restrain earnings management behavior in order to maximize the interests in cooperation with the company's operating decision-making. What kind of stakeholders will encourage or restrain excessive earnings management phenomenon?How to reduce companies'earnings management degree with stakeholder interest balance? How to solve the adverse effect that earnings management takes on stakeholders through effective path? They need to be solved through both theory and practice.
Therefore, from the perspective of stakeholder' participation behavior on the accounting, this thesis analyses of stakeholders incentives or constraints effect on earnings management and does research on interests balance of stakeholder and earnings management; put forward the effective way to solve the adverse effect that earnings management takes on stakeholders; which is conducive to the protection and balance of the interests of the stakeholders, thereby lowering the company's earnings management behavior to improve the allocation efficiency of social resources.
Seven chapters are discussed:the first chapter is introduction. The second chapter is literature summary both at home and abroad. The third chapter studies measurement problem on earnings management metering and stakeholders to obtain. The fourth chapter analyzes the stakeholders incentive and constraint effects on earnings management and also classifies the stakeholders. The fifth chapter analyses the influence that interests balance of stakeholders' impacts on earnings management. And it established an "Interest Entropy" basis with macro-economic factors and the heterogeneity of the company, and testified the relationship between "Interest Entropy" and earnings management. Chapter six using system dynamics method to set up the casual model of "Stakeholders-Earnings Management"(SEM), and analyzes collaboration evolution path of SEM along with assets and liabilities subsystem, profit subsystem, cash flow of operating activities subsystem and stakeholders interests balance. It also submits the policy suggestions of promoting SEM system efficiency. Chapter seven is the research conclusion and prospect of this thesis. The main research results are as follows in this paper:
(1) Setting up the stakeholder's classification model of earnings management, it can be divided into three categories as incentive model, constraint model, and comprehensive model.
Chosen700A-share listed companies from2007to2011as samples; it establishes regression model of earnings management and the stakeholders. And classifies the executive officers, independent directors, shareholders, suppliers as incentive type stakeholders; the directors and creditor as the constraint stakeholders; and supervisors and distributors (client) as the comprehensive stakeholders. The studies found out that the four-executives, shareholders, creditors and directors have the most significant influence on earnings management through the stepwise regression research.
(2) It constructs the evaluation model of "Interest Entropy" of earnings management. The study also finds out the more balance interests of stakeholders is and the smaller the degree of earnings management.
This paper uses physical entropy theory, established the evaluation model of "Interest Entropy". It also bring the macroeconomic factors and corporate heterogeneity factor that affect earnings management in empirical regression model. The empirical results is that the bigger "Interest Entropy" is the smaller earnings management degree is. The scale of companise is negatively related to the earnings management; company actual controllers, company debt levels, corporate profitability,PE ratio, audit opinion, the money supply (M2) growth rate have positive correlation with earnings management; while company heterogeneity and its impact on earnings management is more than macroeconomic factors.
(3) Constructing causal relation model of "Stakeholder-Earnings Management", and specifically analyses the collaboration evolution path earnings management and subsystems-assets and liabilities, profit, cash flow of operating activities subsystems and stakeholders interests balance of SEM.
Using system dynamics theory, this paper defines the boundary of SEM system, on the basis of the stakeholder structure and earnings management structure. It establishes causal relation model of three subsystems of SEM system--assets and liabilities subsystem, profit subsystem, cash flow subsystem in operating activities and stakeholders interests balance. And at the same time, it analyzes the collaboration evolution path of the three subsystems and put forward the policy suggestion to improve the efficiency of earnings management.
引文
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