我国钢铁企业物流外包合作关系的演化博弈研究
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摘要
本文主要研究我国钢铁企业物流外包问题，围绕物流外包关系的重要性进行分析。为突出在物流外包运作过程中，奖惩、信任和监督对外包合作关系的影响，采用演化博弈与数值验证相结合的的方法进行了讨论。
首先，本文介绍了我国钢铁企业物流的发展现状，指出了发展物流外包经营模式是企业提高核心竞争力的一种必要手段，同时证明了钢铁企业物流外包能够节约物流运作成本、强化企业的核心能力、提高生产效率和规避经营风险等。随着我国钢铁企业物流外包比例的不断上升，企业和政府开始重视如何维护物流外包合作关系，因此本文为钢铁企业建立成功的物流外包关系从博弈关系的角度提供了必要的参考。
然后，本文介绍了演化博弈的相关理论以及物流外包关系的建立过程和特征，指出了影响物流外包合作关系中的关键因素。通过演化博弈方法分析了钢铁企业和第三方物流企业外包合作与否的策略选择过程及结果，得出在外包合同中加入奖惩措施，对促进稳定的外包合作关系具有重要作用。在研究了物流外包合作双方对于信任的选择问题后，得出只有采取有效措施提升企业被背叛时的收益，对企业的背叛行为进行严厉打击，才能激励企业选择信任策略。通过以上分析，本文认为可以从合同制约、信誉机制、交流与沟通以及保障公平合理等方面入手，建立相应的约束机制，达到维护物流外包关系的目的。
最后，本文通过数学建模和数值分析可以看出，为提高钢铁企业和第三方物流企业的合作效率，防止物流外包流于形式或失败，应该注意提高企业间的相互信任，建立一定的惩罚激励机制。
This paper mainly studies the problem of Chinese iron and steel enterprise logisticsoutsourcing, and to analyse the importance of the logistics outsourcing relationship.ForProminenting the impact of the rewards and punishment, trust and supervision onoutsourcing cooperation relationship in the operation process,we use a method ofcombined the evolutionary game theory and numerical validation to discuss.
Firstly, in the paper the present development situation of our national steel enterpriselogistics are introduced. The development of logistics outsourcing business is one of themain methods to improve the core competitiveness of enterprises. And outsourcing play arole in saving logistics cost, strengthen the core ability of the enterprise, improve theproduction efficiency and avoid business risks and so on. By Chinese iron and steelenterprises logistics outsourcing proportion rising Constantly, both the enterprise andgovernment begin to pay attention to how to maintain the logistics outsourcingcooperation relationship. Therefore this paper provided necessary reference for build asuccessful logistics outsourcing relationship.
Then the evolution game theory and logistics outsourcing relationship buildingprocess and the characteristic are introduced in the paper. The paper also points out theimpact of logistics outsourcing cooperation relationship in the key problems. It analyse thestrategy selection process and results of the iron and steel enterprise and the third partylogistics outsourcing cooperation through the method of evolutionary game, obtained inthe outsourcing contract with rewards and punishment measures, to promote stableoutsourcing cooperation relationship has an important role. Through the above analysis,We can see from this respect proceed with contract constraint, reputation mechanism,exchange and Fairness, to build corresponding restriction mechanism, in order tosafeguard the logistics outsourcing cooperation relationship.
Finally,we can see through mathematical modeling and numerical analysis,toimprove the efficiency of iron and steel enterprises and the cooperation of third-partylogistics enterprises and prevent outsourcing becoming a mere formality or failure,We should pay attention to improve mutual trust between enterprises and establish of amechanism of punish and incentive.
首先，本文介绍了我国钢铁企业物流的发展现状，指出了发展物流外包经营模式是企业提高核心竞争力的一种必要手段，同时证明了钢铁企业物流外包能够节约物流运作成本、强化企业的核心能力、提高生产效率和规避经营风险等。随着我国钢铁企业物流外包比例的不断上升，企业和政府开始重视如何维护物流外包合作关系，因此本文为钢铁企业建立成功的物流外包关系从博弈关系的角度提供了必要的参考。
然后，本文介绍了演化博弈的相关理论以及物流外包关系的建立过程和特征，指出了影响物流外包合作关系中的关键因素。通过演化博弈方法分析了钢铁企业和第三方物流企业外包合作与否的策略选择过程及结果，得出在外包合同中加入奖惩措施，对促进稳定的外包合作关系具有重要作用。在研究了物流外包合作双方对于信任的选择问题后，得出只有采取有效措施提升企业被背叛时的收益，对企业的背叛行为进行严厉打击，才能激励企业选择信任策略。通过以上分析，本文认为可以从合同制约、信誉机制、交流与沟通以及保障公平合理等方面入手，建立相应的约束机制，达到维护物流外包关系的目的。
最后，本文通过数学建模和数值分析可以看出，为提高钢铁企业和第三方物流企业的合作效率，防止物流外包流于形式或失败，应该注意提高企业间的相互信任，建立一定的惩罚激励机制。
This paper mainly studies the problem of Chinese iron and steel enterprise logisticsoutsourcing, and to analyse the importance of the logistics outsourcing relationship.ForProminenting the impact of the rewards and punishment, trust and supervision onoutsourcing cooperation relationship in the operation process,we use a method ofcombined the evolutionary game theory and numerical validation to discuss.
Firstly, in the paper the present development situation of our national steel enterpriselogistics are introduced. The development of logistics outsourcing business is one of themain methods to improve the core competitiveness of enterprises. And outsourcing play arole in saving logistics cost, strengthen the core ability of the enterprise, improve theproduction efficiency and avoid business risks and so on. By Chinese iron and steelenterprises logistics outsourcing proportion rising Constantly, both the enterprise andgovernment begin to pay attention to how to maintain the logistics outsourcingcooperation relationship. Therefore this paper provided necessary reference for build asuccessful logistics outsourcing relationship.
Then the evolution game theory and logistics outsourcing relationship buildingprocess and the characteristic are introduced in the paper. The paper also points out theimpact of logistics outsourcing cooperation relationship in the key problems. It analyse thestrategy selection process and results of the iron and steel enterprise and the third partylogistics outsourcing cooperation through the method of evolutionary game, obtained inthe outsourcing contract with rewards and punishment measures, to promote stableoutsourcing cooperation relationship has an important role. Through the above analysis,We can see from this respect proceed with contract constraint, reputation mechanism,exchange and Fairness, to build corresponding restriction mechanism, in order tosafeguard the logistics outsourcing cooperation relationship.
Finally,we can see through mathematical modeling and numerical analysis,toimprove the efficiency of iron and steel enterprises and the cooperation of third-partylogistics enterprises and prevent outsourcing becoming a mere formality or failure,We should pay attention to improve mutual trust between enterprises and establish of amechanism of punish and incentive.
引文
[1]袁庆华.2009年全球钢铁企业粗钢产量排名评述[J].冶金管理, 2010(06): 1-3.
[2]刘彦平.第三方物流的契约经济理论分析[J].学习与探索, 2006(2): 231-234.
[3]邓金娥.我国第三方物流企业的风险与对策分析[J].物流研研, 2005(7): 21-23.
[4]常静.业务流程外包中客户信任建立的研究[D].西安：西安电子科研大学硕士学位论文，2008: 12-25.
[5] Lynch C F. Logistics Outsourcing: A Management Guide[M]. USA: Oak Brook, 2000: 23-55.
[6] Arnold U. New Dimensions of Outsourcing: A Combination of Transaction Cost Economics andthe Core Competencies Concept[J]. European Journal of Purchasing & Supply Management,2000, 6(1): 2-5.
[7] Bolumole Y A, Frankel R, Naslund D. Developing a Theoretical Framework for LogisticsOutsourcing[J]. Transportation Journal, 2007, 46 (2): 13-25.
[8] John C, Langley J. Third Party Logistics: Results and Findings of the 2004 Binth AnnualStudy[M]. Georgia: Georgia Institute of Technology, 2008: 3-7.
[9] Hofer A R, Knemeyer A M, Dresner M E. Antecedents and Dimensions of Customer PartneringBehavior in Logistics Outsourcing Relationships[J]. Journal of Business Logistics, 2009, 30 (2):141-159.
[10] Juga J, Juntunen J. Service Quality and Its Relation to Satisfaction and Loyalty in LogisticsOutsourcing Relationships[J]. Managing Service Quality, 2010, 20 (6): 496-510.
[11]韩乐.钢铁企业发展第三方物流的思考[J].黑龙江对外经贸, 2004 (11): 12-17.
[12]王淑云,孟祥茹.物流外包与管理[M].大连:东北财经大学出版社, 2005: 2-156.
[13]梅书荣,包栩栩.钢铁企业实施第三方物流的风险分析[J].商场现代化, 2006: 12-15.
[14]李韩娟.物流外包合作关系的若干问题研究[D].长沙:中南大学硕士学位论文, 2008: 4-80.
[15]李丽梅,韩瑞珠.运用演化博弈的方法研究了物流外包的网络竞合机制[J].软科学, 2009, 23
(4): 1-5.
[16]柯建飞,郑琼娥.基于演化博弈的物流企业国际合作研究[J].温州职业研研学院学报, 2010,10(3): 2-5.
[17]李朝敏.浙江省制造企业物流外包程度影响因素及对策研究[J].嘉兴学院学报, 2011, 23(2):1-7.
[18]刘南,姜泰元,姜敏求.第三方物流的创新案例研究—以韩国甲物流企业为例[J].科研管理研究, 2011(4): 108-113.
[19] Maynard S J. Evolution and the Theory of Games[M]. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.1982: 121–150.
[20]威布尔.演化博弈论[M].上海:上海人民出版社, 2006, 3: 44-55
[21] Friedman D. Evolutionary Games in Economics[J]. Econometrica: Journal of the EconometricSociety, 1991, 59 (3): 637-666.
[22] Dufwenberg M, Guth W. Indirect Evolution Vs. Strategic Delegation: a Comparison of twoApproaches to Explaining Economic Institutions[J]. European Journal of Political Economy,1999, 15(2): 281-295.
[23] Kosfeld M. Why Chops Close Again : an Evolutionary Perspective on the Deregulation ofShopping Hours[J]. European Economic Review, 2002(46): 51-72.
[24] Karine N, Mari R. On Social Norms: the Evolution of Considerate Smoking Behavior[J]. Journalof Economic Behavior & Organization, 2003, 52(3): 323-340.
[25] Daniel G, Arce M, Sandler T.The Dilemma of the Prisoners'Dilemmas[J]. Kyklos, 2005, 58(1):3-24.
[26] Foster D, Young P. Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics[J]. Theoretical Population Biology,1990, 38(2): 219-232.
[27] Foster D, Young H P. A Correction to the Paper“Stochastic Volutionary Game Dynamics”[J].Theoretical Population Biology, 1997(32): 77–78.
[28] Imhof L A. The Long-run Behavior of the Stochastic Replicator Dynamics[M]. The Annals ofApplied Probability, 1997: 1019–1045.
[29] Fudenberg D, Harris C. Evolutionary Dynamics With Aggregate Shocks[J]. Journal of EconomicTheory, 1992, 57(2): 420–441.
[30] Fudenberg D, Imhof L A. Imitation Processes With Small Mutations[J]. Journal ofEconomicTheory, 2006, 131(1): 251-262.
[31] Fudenberg D, Nowak M A, Taylor C,et al. Evolutionary Game Dynamics in Finit Epopulationwith Strong Selection and Weak Mutation[J]. Theoretical Population Biology,2006, 70(3):352–363.
[32]谢识予.有限理性条件下的进化博弈理论[J].上海财经大学学报, 2001, 10(5): 3-8.
[33]盛昭瀚,蒋德鹏.演化经济学[M].上海:上海三联书店, 2002: 12-56.
[34]胡支军,黄登仕.证券全合投资分析的进化博弈方法[J].系演工程, 2004, 22(7): 2-5.
[35]周峰,徐翔.农村税费改革:基于双层次互动进化博弈模型的分析[J].南京农业大学学报,2005, 5(1): 2-5.
[36]刘天卓,崔浩,陈晓剑.企业集团决策机制的双层演化模型[J].运筹与管理, 2006, 45(1): 1-3.
[37]万强.进化博弈与证券投资者在复制动态下的渐进稳定分析[D].北京:首都师范大学硕士学位论文, 2009, 3: 9-19.
[38]马艳芳,刘心声.一类总体有限的随机进化博弈的极限动态[J].南京大学学报数学半年刊,2009(24): 108-117.
[39]黄宗阜,周愉峰,袁桂林.基于非对称性演化博弈的物流联盟专用性资产的投资分析[J].黑龙江农业科学, 2010: 104-108.
[40] Smith J M, Frice J R. The Logic of Animal Conflict[M].nature, 1973: 3-7.
[41] Taylor P D, Jonker L B.Evolutionary Stable Strategies and Game Dynamics[J]. MathematicalBiosciences, 1978, 40(1): 145-156.
[42]石长华.基于演化博弈论的大用户直接购电研究[D].南京:南京理工大学硕士学位论文,2006: 8-16.
[43] Young H P. Individual Strategy and Social Structure[M]. Princeton University Press. Princeton,1998: 12-58.
[44]吴文清,赵黎明,刘嘉焜.需求不确定下供应链合作广告的博弈分析[J].软科学, 2006, 20(2):24–30.
[45]黄凯南.演化博弈与演化经济学[J].经济研究, 2009(2): 133-134.
[46]江黎明.供应商对零售商促销激励非对称演化博弈模型研究[D].长沙:湖南大学硕士学位论文, 2008: 10-16.
[47]弗登伯格,戴维.博弈学习理论[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社, 2004: 10-78.
[48]高阔.钢铁企业物流系演与价值流系演的模型化研究[D].南昌:南昌大学硕士学位论文,2007: 25-27.
[49]齐美尔.货币哲学[M ].北京:华夏出版社, 2002: 10-89.
[2]刘彦平.第三方物流的契约经济理论分析[J].学习与探索, 2006(2): 231-234.
[3]邓金娥.我国第三方物流企业的风险与对策分析[J].物流研研, 2005(7): 21-23.
[4]常静.业务流程外包中客户信任建立的研究[D].西安：西安电子科研大学硕士学位论文，2008: 12-25.
[5] Lynch C F. Logistics Outsourcing: A Management Guide[M]. USA: Oak Brook, 2000: 23-55.
[6] Arnold U. New Dimensions of Outsourcing: A Combination of Transaction Cost Economics andthe Core Competencies Concept[J]. European Journal of Purchasing & Supply Management,2000, 6(1): 2-5.
[7] Bolumole Y A, Frankel R, Naslund D. Developing a Theoretical Framework for LogisticsOutsourcing[J]. Transportation Journal, 2007, 46 (2): 13-25.
[8] John C, Langley J. Third Party Logistics: Results and Findings of the 2004 Binth AnnualStudy[M]. Georgia: Georgia Institute of Technology, 2008: 3-7.
[9] Hofer A R, Knemeyer A M, Dresner M E. Antecedents and Dimensions of Customer PartneringBehavior in Logistics Outsourcing Relationships[J]. Journal of Business Logistics, 2009, 30 (2):141-159.
[10] Juga J, Juntunen J. Service Quality and Its Relation to Satisfaction and Loyalty in LogisticsOutsourcing Relationships[J]. Managing Service Quality, 2010, 20 (6): 496-510.
[11]韩乐.钢铁企业发展第三方物流的思考[J].黑龙江对外经贸, 2004 (11): 12-17.
[12]王淑云,孟祥茹.物流外包与管理[M].大连:东北财经大学出版社, 2005: 2-156.
[13]梅书荣,包栩栩.钢铁企业实施第三方物流的风险分析[J].商场现代化, 2006: 12-15.
[14]李韩娟.物流外包合作关系的若干问题研究[D].长沙:中南大学硕士学位论文, 2008: 4-80.
[15]李丽梅,韩瑞珠.运用演化博弈的方法研究了物流外包的网络竞合机制[J].软科学, 2009, 23
(4): 1-5.
[16]柯建飞,郑琼娥.基于演化博弈的物流企业国际合作研究[J].温州职业研研学院学报, 2010,10(3): 2-5.
[17]李朝敏.浙江省制造企业物流外包程度影响因素及对策研究[J].嘉兴学院学报, 2011, 23(2):1-7.
[18]刘南,姜泰元,姜敏求.第三方物流的创新案例研究—以韩国甲物流企业为例[J].科研管理研究, 2011(4): 108-113.
[19] Maynard S J. Evolution and the Theory of Games[M]. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.1982: 121–150.
[20]威布尔.演化博弈论[M].上海:上海人民出版社, 2006, 3: 44-55
[21] Friedman D. Evolutionary Games in Economics[J]. Econometrica: Journal of the EconometricSociety, 1991, 59 (3): 637-666.
[22] Dufwenberg M, Guth W. Indirect Evolution Vs. Strategic Delegation: a Comparison of twoApproaches to Explaining Economic Institutions[J]. European Journal of Political Economy,1999, 15(2): 281-295.
[23] Kosfeld M. Why Chops Close Again : an Evolutionary Perspective on the Deregulation ofShopping Hours[J]. European Economic Review, 2002(46): 51-72.
[24] Karine N, Mari R. On Social Norms: the Evolution of Considerate Smoking Behavior[J]. Journalof Economic Behavior & Organization, 2003, 52(3): 323-340.
[25] Daniel G, Arce M, Sandler T.The Dilemma of the Prisoners'Dilemmas[J]. Kyklos, 2005, 58(1):3-24.
[26] Foster D, Young P. Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics[J]. Theoretical Population Biology,1990, 38(2): 219-232.
[27] Foster D, Young H P. A Correction to the Paper“Stochastic Volutionary Game Dynamics”[J].Theoretical Population Biology, 1997(32): 77–78.
[28] Imhof L A. The Long-run Behavior of the Stochastic Replicator Dynamics[M]. The Annals ofApplied Probability, 1997: 1019–1045.
[29] Fudenberg D, Harris C. Evolutionary Dynamics With Aggregate Shocks[J]. Journal of EconomicTheory, 1992, 57(2): 420–441.
[30] Fudenberg D, Imhof L A. Imitation Processes With Small Mutations[J]. Journal ofEconomicTheory, 2006, 131(1): 251-262.
[31] Fudenberg D, Nowak M A, Taylor C,et al. Evolutionary Game Dynamics in Finit Epopulationwith Strong Selection and Weak Mutation[J]. Theoretical Population Biology,2006, 70(3):352–363.
[32]谢识予.有限理性条件下的进化博弈理论[J].上海财经大学学报, 2001, 10(5): 3-8.
[33]盛昭瀚,蒋德鹏.演化经济学[M].上海:上海三联书店, 2002: 12-56.
[34]胡支军,黄登仕.证券全合投资分析的进化博弈方法[J].系演工程, 2004, 22(7): 2-5.
[35]周峰,徐翔.农村税费改革:基于双层次互动进化博弈模型的分析[J].南京农业大学学报,2005, 5(1): 2-5.
[36]刘天卓,崔浩,陈晓剑.企业集团决策机制的双层演化模型[J].运筹与管理, 2006, 45(1): 1-3.
[37]万强.进化博弈与证券投资者在复制动态下的渐进稳定分析[D].北京:首都师范大学硕士学位论文, 2009, 3: 9-19.
[38]马艳芳,刘心声.一类总体有限的随机进化博弈的极限动态[J].南京大学学报数学半年刊,2009(24): 108-117.
[39]黄宗阜,周愉峰,袁桂林.基于非对称性演化博弈的物流联盟专用性资产的投资分析[J].黑龙江农业科学, 2010: 104-108.
[40] Smith J M, Frice J R. The Logic of Animal Conflict[M].nature, 1973: 3-7.
[41] Taylor P D, Jonker L B.Evolutionary Stable Strategies and Game Dynamics[J]. MathematicalBiosciences, 1978, 40(1): 145-156.
[42]石长华.基于演化博弈论的大用户直接购电研究[D].南京:南京理工大学硕士学位论文,2006: 8-16.
[43] Young H P. Individual Strategy and Social Structure[M]. Princeton University Press. Princeton,1998: 12-58.
[44]吴文清,赵黎明,刘嘉焜.需求不确定下供应链合作广告的博弈分析[J].软科学, 2006, 20(2):24–30.
[45]黄凯南.演化博弈与演化经济学[J].经济研究, 2009(2): 133-134.
[46]江黎明.供应商对零售商促销激励非对称演化博弈模型研究[D].长沙:湖南大学硕士学位论文, 2008: 10-16.
[47]弗登伯格,戴维.博弈学习理论[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社, 2004: 10-78.
[48]高阔.钢铁企业物流系演与价值流系演的模型化研究[D].南昌:南昌大学硕士学位论文,2007: 25-27.
[49]齐美尔.货币哲学[M ].北京:华夏出版社, 2002: 10-89.