人力资本、薪酬制度与企业绩效关系研究
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摘要
在现实的经济环境中,企业绩效即受到外部市场竞争、市场结构和产业环境等因素的影响,同时又是企业内部特征、资源禀赋、制度安排综合作用的结果,单纯从内部和外部来解释企业绩效差异的根源,无论是外生论还是内生论,都存在着局限性。事实上,企业绩效是诸多因素综合作用的结果。而影响企业绩效的众多因素均是围绕人力资本而发挥作用的,人力资本对企业绩效具有最直接、最决定性的影响。
由于人力资本对企业竞争优势的构筑和绩效提升上的决定性影响,因此,如何建立有效的激励机制,最大限度的发挥人力资本的积极性,促进人力资本增值,并转化为企业的经济效益,就成为企业可持续发展的关键问题。人力资本激励的基础是人力资本产权,人力资本产权的核心是人力资本的收益权,而人力资本收益权的实现形式是薪酬,因此,在通过完善薪酬制度促进人力资本收益权实现的同时,科学合理的薪酬制度能够激励人力资本所有者努力工作,提高人力资本的使用效率。人力资本、薪酬制度与企业绩效之间具有理论和现实意义上的必然联系。
论文即以“人力资本、薪酬制度与企业绩效关系”作为研究主题,将人力资本理论、薪酬管理理论和企业绩效差异根源理论作为理论基础,通过规范研究、数量分析和案例研究的方法,全面、系统、深入地研究人力资本理论、薪酬管理理论与企业绩效差异根源理论,力图构建一个关于人力资本、薪酬制度与企业绩效相互作用关系的理论框架,论证人力资本对企业绩效的决定作用,解释企业绩效差异的根源,揭示薪酬制度与企业人力资本之间的相互作用关系,探讨构建基于人力资本产权的现代企业薪酬制度,并将该理论成果运用于中国企业的薪酬制度建设,为中国企业薪酬制度的完善提供意见和建议。
Since reform and opening up, China has significantly improved enterprise performance, enterprise reform has made great achievements. However, different enterprises have emerged a clear differentiation of achievement, compared to private enterprises, state-owned enterprises performance as a whole is relatively low, compared to Chinese enterprises and multinational corporations, as a whole lack of competitive edge apparently. On this issue, domestic academic have a lively discussion. At present, although the literature on the issue of enterprise performance differences is a large and trivial, but generally, it can basically be divided into two schools: The root causes of differences in performance of exogenous and endogenous. The root causes of differences in performance of endogenous can be divided into the root causes of differences in performance on the contract and on the basis of resources. However, regardless of differences in the performance of exogenous or endogenous theory, there are limitative and can not be satisfied. In fact, in the real economic environment, enterprise performance that is subject to external market competition, market structure and industrial environment factors, at the same time it is the results of the combined effects of internal features, resource endowment and institutional arrangements. To explain the causes of differences in performance from the purely enterprise internal and external, whether endogenous or exogenous on the theory that there are limitations. In fact, the performance is a lot of factors. The factors which impact on enterprise performance play an important role around human capital, human capital has the most direct and decisive impact on enterprise performance.
As the decisive influence of the human capital on the building of enterprise competitive advantage and performance enhance, it has become the key issue of enterprise sustainable development that how to establish an effective incentive mechanism, make the human capital play the enthusiasm to the greatest, promote value-added of human capital and into the economic efficiency of enterprises. Human capital as a scarce resource, it is necessary to give full play to their enthusiasm and creativity, achieve an effective incentive to the human capital, the key is human capital value of property rights must be recognized and have made corresponding gains. Human capital incentive is based on the property rights of human capital, the core of human capital property rights is human capital earning right, the realization of human capital earning right is in the form of salary. Therefore, the improvement of the pay system and promote the realization of human capital earning right, scientific and rational pay system can inspire the owners of human capital with work hard, improve the efficiency in the use of human capital. For a long time, however, there is a severe lack of human capital property rights in our pay system, many companies will be equal to the labor and human capital, physical capital that is the source of corporate wealth, human capital create and realize their value only through physical capital, the distribution of surplus value is implemented only in physical capital, human capital earning only reflected the established wages or bonuses, human capital can not participate in the distribution of enterprises surplus value, human capital property rights does not exist. The lack of human capital property rights makes human capital earning right can not be achieved. The unreasonable pay system resulted in the loss of a large number of high-quality personnel and the low efficiency of enterprises, leading Chinese enterprises in international competition, lack of vitality and superiority. China's enterprises fully mobilize the creative potential of human capital, enhance enterprise competitiveness and enhance the performance, it is the inevitable choice that reforming Chinese enterprises pay system, respecting for human capital attributes of property rights, promoting the realization of human capital earning right. building modern pay system based on the human capital property rights.
From the above analysis, we can see human capital, pay system and corporate performance have the inevitable link with the theoretical and practical significance. However, due to academic circles at home and abroad focus on economics and management, macro-economic and micro-economic paradigm, the research on the root causes of differences in human capital, pay system, enterprise performance often into a single system, focused on the relationship between human capital and enterprise performance, human capital and pay system, pay and enterprise performance, there are more vague understanding in the knowledge of interactive relation in human capital, enterprise performance and pay system. Paper choose "human capital, enterprise performance and pay system" as the theme, human capital theory, management pay theory and the root of enterprise performance difference as the theoretical foundation , through the way of normative research, quantitative analysis and case studies, study human capital theory, management pay theory and the root of enterprise performance difference comprehensively, systematically and in-depth in an attempt to build a theoretical framework about interact relation on human capital, enterprise performance and pay system, demonstrate human capital's decisive impact on enterprise performance , explain the causes of differences in performance, reveal interaction relation between pay system and enterprise human capital, discuss of building modern pay system basis on human capital property rights, and will apply the theoretical achievements in Chinese enterprises, provide comments and suggestions for improving Chinese enterprise pay system.
This paper includes 5 chapters:
Chapter 1 is a part as the introduction. It includes the main topic background, the theoretical value and practical significance of this paper, the research, analysis and structural arrangement, as well as the main points of innovation in this paper.
Chapter 2 is a review and comment for the relevant theoretical literature. It is a main review and comment for the relevant theoretical literature about the topic of paper, including human capital theory, theory of pay and the root causes of differences in performance theory. The purpose and value of this chapter is to make a early theoretical groundwork for discussing and building the theoretical framework about interaction relation about human capital, pay system and enterprise performance in next chapters, build a solid theoretical foundation support.
Chapter 3 is theoretical analysis for relationship between human capital and enterprise performance. On the basis of reviewing and analysis about human capital, management of pay theory and the root causes of difference in performance theory in this chapter: First of all, human capital is strategic resource in enterprise; Second, enterprise human capital decide the role of physical capital; Third, the institutional arrangements have an impact on enterprise performance through human capital; Finally, human capital is the discoverer and user of corporate external market opportunities. Combine the root of the difference in performance endogenous and exogenous by human capital, we got the conclusion that human capital is the decisive factor in enterprise performance, and build enterprise performance decision model on this basis, analysis the mechanism of action which human capital deciding the performance , at last, discuss the importance of incentives on the human capital. The part is the theory core of this paper, and an important theoretical reference that building of enterprise incentive pay system based on human capital property right and analysis about Chinese enterprise pay system construction in the next chapters.
Chapter 4 discusses the building of the human capital incentive and enterprise pay system. First of all, this chapter analyzes theory and the logic of relations between human capital and pay system, gets the conclusion that the basis of human capital incentive is human capital property right, the core of human capital property right is human capital earning right, pay is the form of human capital earning right, building the pay system based on human capital property right is the inevitable choose to incentive human capital effectively. On this basis, there is a discussion about pay system has an impact on enterprise performance by human capital. Finally, from the composition of income, we got the inclusion that marginal utility of income incentive is diminished by the quantitative analysis about income incentive based on analyzing traditional pay model and human capital participating in the distribution of the income of enterprise model, make a suggestion for how to use income incentive leverage and build modern pay system based on human capital property right.
Chapter 5 introduces the building of Chinese enterprise pay system based on human capital property right. On the basis of previous research, in this chapter, we analysis the problem in existing Chinese enterprise pay system and research into the cause with reference to foreign enterprise. By analyzing the view that, although there is a salary management concept and practice of operational problems, but the most fundamental reason is that the current pay system does not fully reflect the value of the property right of human capital, neglect effective incentives of property right. On this basis, we have a thought for improving Chinese enterprises pay system, building enterprise pay system based on human capital property right. Finally, through case studies on the Chinese enterprises to explore reforming of Chinese pay system, expatiate that enterprise pay incentive system have an incentive impact on state-owned enterprise human capital. We will obtain a talent competitive advantage by effective incentive, improve enterprise performance, but also draw this paper study to an end.
There are some innovations in this paper:
First, there is the innovation in the paper's architecture. Due to academic circles at home and abroad focus on economics and management, macro-economic and micro-economic paradigm, the research on the root causes of differences in human capital, pay system, enterprise performance often into a single system, focused on the relationship between human capital and enterprise performance, human capital and pay system, pay and enterprise performance, there are more vague understanding in the knowledge of interactive relation in human capital, enterprise performance and pay system. This article integrate human capital, enterprise performance and pay system, study human capital theory, management pay theory and the root of enterprise performance difference comprehensively, systematically and in-depth. This article will think human capital as the decisive factor which will impact on enterprise performance, make the designing and improving of pay system based on human capital property right. The designing and improving of pay system must fully respect for human capital property right, inspire human capital into enterprise income distribution, promote the realization of human capital earning right.
Second, it is the innovation that the root causes of difference in enterprise performance theory. On the basis of reviewing of the root causes of difference in enterprise performance theory , paper integrate endogenous and exogenous up originally, build the enterprise performance decision model for human capital as the center, advance: "Enterprise performance is that enterprise human capital create by discovering and using market opportunity, creative using the material, playing a role of human capital strategy resource in the incentive of property right incentive, governance arrangements, such as an integrated system in the market environment. Human capital is the key cause which impact on enterprise performance." Therefore, improving enterprise performance strategically must understand the significance and impact on enterprise performance of human capital.
Third, it is the innovation that the human capital theory and salary management theory. This article breaks the barriers in economic and management, pay system has been into vision of human capital theory research. We have a study on the relation about human capital theory, management pay theory and the root of enterprise performance difference comprehensively, systematically and in-depth, build the theory model and logic analysis framework "the basis of human capital incentive is human capital property right, the core of human capital property right is human capital earning right, pay is the form of human capital earning right". Therefore, the improvement of the pay system and promote the realization of human capital earning right, scientific and rational pay system can inspire the owners of human capital with work hard, improve the efficiency in the use of human capital. This article is also theory significant for studying the relation about human capital, pay system and enterprise performance, improving human capital theory and salary management theory.
Fourth, it is the innovation that the designing and improving of Chinese enterprise pay system. On the basis of previous research, in this chapter, we analysis the problem in existing Chinese enterprise pay system and research into the cause with reference to foreign enterprise. By analyzing the view that, although there is a salary management concept and practice of operational problems, but the most fundamental reason is that the current pay system does not fully reflect the value of the property right of human capital, neglect effective incentives of property right. As a basis for the practice, the article announce improving of Chinese enterprise performance begin from strategy ,improve enterprise pay system, recognize the existence of human capital property right, think much of realization of human capital's participation in enterprise income distribution, build scientific rational modern pay system based on human capital property right, inspire fully human capital incentive, creative and initiative.
Fifth, it is the innovation that study scope and method. Research has focused on the relations between human capital and enterprise performance, pay and performance, human capital and salary incentive. Discussion of this article is not only limited to the scope of the study of entrepreneurs human capital, but includes the overall concept based on all the human capital, so it is more objective and comprehensive. In addition, about research method, the article used strict conduct analysis, but also uses quantities analysis and case study making research more rich, more comprehensive study with greater reliability and practical reference value.
由于人力资本对企业竞争优势的构筑和绩效提升上的决定性影响,因此,如何建立有效的激励机制,最大限度的发挥人力资本的积极性,促进人力资本增值,并转化为企业的经济效益,就成为企业可持续发展的关键问题。人力资本激励的基础是人力资本产权,人力资本产权的核心是人力资本的收益权,而人力资本收益权的实现形式是薪酬,因此,在通过完善薪酬制度促进人力资本收益权实现的同时,科学合理的薪酬制度能够激励人力资本所有者努力工作,提高人力资本的使用效率。人力资本、薪酬制度与企业绩效之间具有理论和现实意义上的必然联系。
论文即以“人力资本、薪酬制度与企业绩效关系”作为研究主题,将人力资本理论、薪酬管理理论和企业绩效差异根源理论作为理论基础,通过规范研究、数量分析和案例研究的方法,全面、系统、深入地研究人力资本理论、薪酬管理理论与企业绩效差异根源理论,力图构建一个关于人力资本、薪酬制度与企业绩效相互作用关系的理论框架,论证人力资本对企业绩效的决定作用,解释企业绩效差异的根源,揭示薪酬制度与企业人力资本之间的相互作用关系,探讨构建基于人力资本产权的现代企业薪酬制度,并将该理论成果运用于中国企业的薪酬制度建设,为中国企业薪酬制度的完善提供意见和建议。
Since reform and opening up, China has significantly improved enterprise performance, enterprise reform has made great achievements. However, different enterprises have emerged a clear differentiation of achievement, compared to private enterprises, state-owned enterprises performance as a whole is relatively low, compared to Chinese enterprises and multinational corporations, as a whole lack of competitive edge apparently. On this issue, domestic academic have a lively discussion. At present, although the literature on the issue of enterprise performance differences is a large and trivial, but generally, it can basically be divided into two schools: The root causes of differences in performance of exogenous and endogenous. The root causes of differences in performance of endogenous can be divided into the root causes of differences in performance on the contract and on the basis of resources. However, regardless of differences in the performance of exogenous or endogenous theory, there are limitative and can not be satisfied. In fact, in the real economic environment, enterprise performance that is subject to external market competition, market structure and industrial environment factors, at the same time it is the results of the combined effects of internal features, resource endowment and institutional arrangements. To explain the causes of differences in performance from the purely enterprise internal and external, whether endogenous or exogenous on the theory that there are limitations. In fact, the performance is a lot of factors. The factors which impact on enterprise performance play an important role around human capital, human capital has the most direct and decisive impact on enterprise performance.
As the decisive influence of the human capital on the building of enterprise competitive advantage and performance enhance, it has become the key issue of enterprise sustainable development that how to establish an effective incentive mechanism, make the human capital play the enthusiasm to the greatest, promote value-added of human capital and into the economic efficiency of enterprises. Human capital as a scarce resource, it is necessary to give full play to their enthusiasm and creativity, achieve an effective incentive to the human capital, the key is human capital value of property rights must be recognized and have made corresponding gains. Human capital incentive is based on the property rights of human capital, the core of human capital property rights is human capital earning right, the realization of human capital earning right is in the form of salary. Therefore, the improvement of the pay system and promote the realization of human capital earning right, scientific and rational pay system can inspire the owners of human capital with work hard, improve the efficiency in the use of human capital. For a long time, however, there is a severe lack of human capital property rights in our pay system, many companies will be equal to the labor and human capital, physical capital that is the source of corporate wealth, human capital create and realize their value only through physical capital, the distribution of surplus value is implemented only in physical capital, human capital earning only reflected the established wages or bonuses, human capital can not participate in the distribution of enterprises surplus value, human capital property rights does not exist. The lack of human capital property rights makes human capital earning right can not be achieved. The unreasonable pay system resulted in the loss of a large number of high-quality personnel and the low efficiency of enterprises, leading Chinese enterprises in international competition, lack of vitality and superiority. China's enterprises fully mobilize the creative potential of human capital, enhance enterprise competitiveness and enhance the performance, it is the inevitable choice that reforming Chinese enterprises pay system, respecting for human capital attributes of property rights, promoting the realization of human capital earning right. building modern pay system based on the human capital property rights.
From the above analysis, we can see human capital, pay system and corporate performance have the inevitable link with the theoretical and practical significance. However, due to academic circles at home and abroad focus on economics and management, macro-economic and micro-economic paradigm, the research on the root causes of differences in human capital, pay system, enterprise performance often into a single system, focused on the relationship between human capital and enterprise performance, human capital and pay system, pay and enterprise performance, there are more vague understanding in the knowledge of interactive relation in human capital, enterprise performance and pay system. Paper choose "human capital, enterprise performance and pay system" as the theme, human capital theory, management pay theory and the root of enterprise performance difference as the theoretical foundation , through the way of normative research, quantitative analysis and case studies, study human capital theory, management pay theory and the root of enterprise performance difference comprehensively, systematically and in-depth in an attempt to build a theoretical framework about interact relation on human capital, enterprise performance and pay system, demonstrate human capital's decisive impact on enterprise performance , explain the causes of differences in performance, reveal interaction relation between pay system and enterprise human capital, discuss of building modern pay system basis on human capital property rights, and will apply the theoretical achievements in Chinese enterprises, provide comments and suggestions for improving Chinese enterprise pay system.
This paper includes 5 chapters:
Chapter 1 is a part as the introduction. It includes the main topic background, the theoretical value and practical significance of this paper, the research, analysis and structural arrangement, as well as the main points of innovation in this paper.
Chapter 2 is a review and comment for the relevant theoretical literature. It is a main review and comment for the relevant theoretical literature about the topic of paper, including human capital theory, theory of pay and the root causes of differences in performance theory. The purpose and value of this chapter is to make a early theoretical groundwork for discussing and building the theoretical framework about interaction relation about human capital, pay system and enterprise performance in next chapters, build a solid theoretical foundation support.
Chapter 3 is theoretical analysis for relationship between human capital and enterprise performance. On the basis of reviewing and analysis about human capital, management of pay theory and the root causes of difference in performance theory in this chapter: First of all, human capital is strategic resource in enterprise; Second, enterprise human capital decide the role of physical capital; Third, the institutional arrangements have an impact on enterprise performance through human capital; Finally, human capital is the discoverer and user of corporate external market opportunities. Combine the root of the difference in performance endogenous and exogenous by human capital, we got the conclusion that human capital is the decisive factor in enterprise performance, and build enterprise performance decision model on this basis, analysis the mechanism of action which human capital deciding the performance , at last, discuss the importance of incentives on the human capital. The part is the theory core of this paper, and an important theoretical reference that building of enterprise incentive pay system based on human capital property right and analysis about Chinese enterprise pay system construction in the next chapters.
Chapter 4 discusses the building of the human capital incentive and enterprise pay system. First of all, this chapter analyzes theory and the logic of relations between human capital and pay system, gets the conclusion that the basis of human capital incentive is human capital property right, the core of human capital property right is human capital earning right, pay is the form of human capital earning right, building the pay system based on human capital property right is the inevitable choose to incentive human capital effectively. On this basis, there is a discussion about pay system has an impact on enterprise performance by human capital. Finally, from the composition of income, we got the inclusion that marginal utility of income incentive is diminished by the quantitative analysis about income incentive based on analyzing traditional pay model and human capital participating in the distribution of the income of enterprise model, make a suggestion for how to use income incentive leverage and build modern pay system based on human capital property right.
Chapter 5 introduces the building of Chinese enterprise pay system based on human capital property right. On the basis of previous research, in this chapter, we analysis the problem in existing Chinese enterprise pay system and research into the cause with reference to foreign enterprise. By analyzing the view that, although there is a salary management concept and practice of operational problems, but the most fundamental reason is that the current pay system does not fully reflect the value of the property right of human capital, neglect effective incentives of property right. On this basis, we have a thought for improving Chinese enterprises pay system, building enterprise pay system based on human capital property right. Finally, through case studies on the Chinese enterprises to explore reforming of Chinese pay system, expatiate that enterprise pay incentive system have an incentive impact on state-owned enterprise human capital. We will obtain a talent competitive advantage by effective incentive, improve enterprise performance, but also draw this paper study to an end.
There are some innovations in this paper:
First, there is the innovation in the paper's architecture. Due to academic circles at home and abroad focus on economics and management, macro-economic and micro-economic paradigm, the research on the root causes of differences in human capital, pay system, enterprise performance often into a single system, focused on the relationship between human capital and enterprise performance, human capital and pay system, pay and enterprise performance, there are more vague understanding in the knowledge of interactive relation in human capital, enterprise performance and pay system. This article integrate human capital, enterprise performance and pay system, study human capital theory, management pay theory and the root of enterprise performance difference comprehensively, systematically and in-depth. This article will think human capital as the decisive factor which will impact on enterprise performance, make the designing and improving of pay system based on human capital property right. The designing and improving of pay system must fully respect for human capital property right, inspire human capital into enterprise income distribution, promote the realization of human capital earning right.
Second, it is the innovation that the root causes of difference in enterprise performance theory. On the basis of reviewing of the root causes of difference in enterprise performance theory , paper integrate endogenous and exogenous up originally, build the enterprise performance decision model for human capital as the center, advance: "Enterprise performance is that enterprise human capital create by discovering and using market opportunity, creative using the material, playing a role of human capital strategy resource in the incentive of property right incentive, governance arrangements, such as an integrated system in the market environment. Human capital is the key cause which impact on enterprise performance." Therefore, improving enterprise performance strategically must understand the significance and impact on enterprise performance of human capital.
Third, it is the innovation that the human capital theory and salary management theory. This article breaks the barriers in economic and management, pay system has been into vision of human capital theory research. We have a study on the relation about human capital theory, management pay theory and the root of enterprise performance difference comprehensively, systematically and in-depth, build the theory model and logic analysis framework "the basis of human capital incentive is human capital property right, the core of human capital property right is human capital earning right, pay is the form of human capital earning right". Therefore, the improvement of the pay system and promote the realization of human capital earning right, scientific and rational pay system can inspire the owners of human capital with work hard, improve the efficiency in the use of human capital. This article is also theory significant for studying the relation about human capital, pay system and enterprise performance, improving human capital theory and salary management theory.
Fourth, it is the innovation that the designing and improving of Chinese enterprise pay system. On the basis of previous research, in this chapter, we analysis the problem in existing Chinese enterprise pay system and research into the cause with reference to foreign enterprise. By analyzing the view that, although there is a salary management concept and practice of operational problems, but the most fundamental reason is that the current pay system does not fully reflect the value of the property right of human capital, neglect effective incentives of property right. As a basis for the practice, the article announce improving of Chinese enterprise performance begin from strategy ,improve enterprise pay system, recognize the existence of human capital property right, think much of realization of human capital's participation in enterprise income distribution, build scientific rational modern pay system based on human capital property right, inspire fully human capital incentive, creative and initiative.
Fifth, it is the innovation that study scope and method. Research has focused on the relations between human capital and enterprise performance, pay and performance, human capital and salary incentive. Discussion of this article is not only limited to the scope of the study of entrepreneurs human capital, but includes the overall concept based on all the human capital, so it is more objective and comprehensive. In addition, about research method, the article used strict conduct analysis, but also uses quantities analysis and case study making research more rich, more comprehensive study with greater reliability and practical reference value.
引文
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