论经营者激励机制的创新
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摘要
20世纪90年代以来,经理股票期权制度已经成为现代公司架构下用以解决委托——代理问题和道德风险的不可或缺的一个重要的制度安排,而且,其制度本身也随着相关金融资产、法律法规等方面的逐渐完备而日臻完善。可以说,如何充分理解经理股票期权制度,如何将这个制度有效地整合到我国企业的公司治理结构当中,就成为一项颇为紧迫而重要的任务。
经理股票期权制度在我国仍是新鲜事物,不仅缺乏深入的理论研讨,其实际操作也处于摸索阶段,如何适合我国国情有取舍地借鉴西方日臻完善的股票期权激励机制,这是本文探讨的出发点。本论文第二章是经理股票期权制度的概述,介绍经理股票期权的发展状况,并分析其成因和效应;第三章从经济学的角度来解释经理股票期权制度,从理论的高度来探讨经理股票期权制度存在的理论基础;第四章对经理股票期权的制度设计提出建议,包括内在构成要素的设计和外部环境的建设;第五章主要将平均价格期权和“确定性等值法”应用于经理股票期权;第六章是经理股票期权制度在我国企业中的应用,分析我国企业采用股权激励机制的必要性和实施中存在的问题,提出了从创业板企业入手,推动我国经理股票期权制度建设的思路。
股票期权制度在我国的实施不是一蹴而就的,它将是一个复杂的系统工程。本文在此讨论经理股票期权问题,希望能对我国新型激励机制的形成与现代企业制度的建立提供一些参考。
Since the beginning of the 1990s, executive stock option system has become an indispensable institutional arrangement under the modern corporate structure to solve the problem of principal-agent and moral hazard. Moreover, executive stock option system developed along with financial system and laws in such areas. It can be said that, how to fully understand executive stock option system and how to effectively integrate the system to the corporate governance structure of China's enterprises, has become a rather urgent and important task.
Executive stock option system in our country is a rather new thing, not only lack of in-depth theoretical discussions, but also short of the practical exercise. How to draw a good lesson from the western countries and better use it in our country, this is the starting point which this paper discusses. Chapter II introduces executive stock option system, and analyzes its causes and effects; Chapter III explain executive stock option system from the perspective of economics and explore the theoretical basis which executive stock option system existence in; Chapter IV discusses how to design executive stock option system, including the inherent elements of the design and construction of the external environment; Chapter V applies the average price stock option and“certainty equivalent value”in executive stock option system. Chapter VI discusses executive stock option system in our country’s enterprise applications, analyzes the necessity our country’s enterprise to use executive stock option system and the problem exists in implementation, proposes from the second board to impel executive stock option system construction.
Executive stock option system in the implementation is a complex system, which can not be done in one day. We hope this paper can provide some references to the formation of the new incentive mechanism with the establishment of a modern enterprise system in our country.
经理股票期权制度在我国仍是新鲜事物,不仅缺乏深入的理论研讨,其实际操作也处于摸索阶段,如何适合我国国情有取舍地借鉴西方日臻完善的股票期权激励机制,这是本文探讨的出发点。本论文第二章是经理股票期权制度的概述,介绍经理股票期权的发展状况,并分析其成因和效应;第三章从经济学的角度来解释经理股票期权制度,从理论的高度来探讨经理股票期权制度存在的理论基础;第四章对经理股票期权的制度设计提出建议,包括内在构成要素的设计和外部环境的建设;第五章主要将平均价格期权和“确定性等值法”应用于经理股票期权;第六章是经理股票期权制度在我国企业中的应用,分析我国企业采用股权激励机制的必要性和实施中存在的问题,提出了从创业板企业入手,推动我国经理股票期权制度建设的思路。
股票期权制度在我国的实施不是一蹴而就的,它将是一个复杂的系统工程。本文在此讨论经理股票期权问题,希望能对我国新型激励机制的形成与现代企业制度的建立提供一些参考。
Since the beginning of the 1990s, executive stock option system has become an indispensable institutional arrangement under the modern corporate structure to solve the problem of principal-agent and moral hazard. Moreover, executive stock option system developed along with financial system and laws in such areas. It can be said that, how to fully understand executive stock option system and how to effectively integrate the system to the corporate governance structure of China's enterprises, has become a rather urgent and important task.
Executive stock option system in our country is a rather new thing, not only lack of in-depth theoretical discussions, but also short of the practical exercise. How to draw a good lesson from the western countries and better use it in our country, this is the starting point which this paper discusses. Chapter II introduces executive stock option system, and analyzes its causes and effects; Chapter III explain executive stock option system from the perspective of economics and explore the theoretical basis which executive stock option system existence in; Chapter IV discusses how to design executive stock option system, including the inherent elements of the design and construction of the external environment; Chapter V applies the average price stock option and“certainty equivalent value”in executive stock option system. Chapter VI discusses executive stock option system in our country’s enterprise applications, analyzes the necessity our country’s enterprise to use executive stock option system and the problem exists in implementation, proposes from the second board to impel executive stock option system construction.
Executive stock option system in the implementation is a complex system, which can not be done in one day. We hope this paper can provide some references to the formation of the new incentive mechanism with the establishment of a modern enterprise system in our country.
引文
[1]亚当.斯密.国民财富的性质与原因研究[M].商务印书馆,1981.
[2]Coase, R. H.The Nature of The Firm[J].Economica.1937, (4): 386-405.
[3]威廉姆森,资本主义经济制度[M],商务印书馆 2004,27-38.
[4] Alchian and Demsetz.Production, Information Cost and Economic Organization[J]. The American Economic Review.1972,(9):777-792.
[5]芮明杰.管理学的现代观点[M].上海人民出版社,1999.
[6]谢德仁.企业剩余索取权:分享安排与剩余计量[M].上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,2001.
[7]方竹兰.人力资本产权论[M].经济理论与经济管理.1999,(1):36-39.
[8]Dawn Harris and Constomce Helfat . Specificity of CEO Human Capital and Compensation[J].Strategic Management Journal, 1997,(18):68-71.
[9]Jensen and Murphy.Performance Pay and Top-management Incentives[J].Journal of Political Economy.1990,(8):43-48.
[10]张维迎.企业的企业家——契约理论[M] .上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,1996.
[11]张维迎.所有权、治理结构及委托代理[J] .经济研究, 1996, (9):3-15.
[12]方竹兰.人力资本所有者拥有企业所有权是一种趋势[J].经济研究,1997, (6):36-40.
[13]陈俊杰.股票期权现象的一种制度解释[J].上海财经大学学报,2000,(8):28-33.
[14]国家经贸委.企业股票期权运作实务[M].中国财政经济出版社,2002,26.
[15]高闯.经理股票期权制度分析[M].经济管理出版社,2003.
[16]张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,1996.
[17]周其仁.控制权回报和企业家控制的企业[J].经济研究,1997,(5).
[18]Mehran and Hamid . Executive Compensation Structure . Ownership and Firm Performance[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1995,(6) .
[19]刘长庚.论企业的联合产权制度性质[J].湘潭大学学报,2005,(11):121-125.
[20]莫旋、杨广.委托——代理理论与经理股票期权激励[J].河北理工大学学报,2006(2).
[21]陈昕.财产权利与制度变迁——产权学派与新制度学派译文集[M].上海三联书店.
[22]诺思、托马斯.西方世界的兴起[M].华夏出版社,1989,1.
[23]香港上市规则[R],第 17 章.
[24]黄钟苏.经理激励与股票期权[M].中华工商联出版社, 2001, 197.
[25]刘圆、李志群.股票期权制度分析[M].对外经济贸易大学学报,2002,300.
[26]张剑文.公司治理与股权激励[M].广东经济出版社,2001.
[27]张维迎.加强职业经理人队伍建设[J].管理与财富,2001,(5):16-18.
[28]中华人民共和国公司法[R].第 142,143 条,中国法制出版社.2006.
[29]王键、张敏.Monte-Carlo 模拟法在期权定价中的应用[J].湖南商学院学报,2003,(4).
[30]Hull. John .Option, Futures and Derivative Securities[M]. Prentice Hall, 1993.
[31]Cuthbertson. Financial Engineering-s and Risk Management[M].John Wileyandsons. Ltd, 2001.
[32]陈舜.期权定价理论及其应用[M].中国金融出版社,1998.
[33]刘国买.经理股票期权定价模型及实证研究[J].福建工程学院学报,2004,(3).
[34]莫旋、解煊.确定性等值法在经理股票期权定价中的应用研究[J].成都理工大学学报,2006,(1):71-75.
[35]Hall and Murphy . Stock Option for Undiversified Executives[J] . Harvard Business School,2000,(1).
[36]中共中央、国务院关于加强技术创新、实现产业化的决定[R].
[37]中共中央关于国有企业改革和发展若干重大问题的决定[R].
[38]顾慧慧、张文璋.引入股票期权制度,重塑长期激励机制[J].经济理论与经济管理, 2000,(3).
[39]关于我国上市公司实施经营者期权激励制度的若干问题研究[R].上海荣正投资咨询有限公司,1999.
[40]袁国良.上市公司股权激励的实证分析及相关问题[J].资本市场杂志,1999,(10).
[41]杜海龙、胡涛.我国创业板市场建设研究[J].云南财贸学院学报,2005,(5):46-48.
[2]Coase, R. H.The Nature of The Firm[J].Economica.1937, (4): 386-405.
[3]威廉姆森,资本主义经济制度[M],商务印书馆 2004,27-38.
[4] Alchian and Demsetz.Production, Information Cost and Economic Organization[J]. The American Economic Review.1972,(9):777-792.
[5]芮明杰.管理学的现代观点[M].上海人民出版社,1999.
[6]谢德仁.企业剩余索取权:分享安排与剩余计量[M].上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,2001.
[7]方竹兰.人力资本产权论[M].经济理论与经济管理.1999,(1):36-39.
[8]Dawn Harris and Constomce Helfat . Specificity of CEO Human Capital and Compensation[J].Strategic Management Journal, 1997,(18):68-71.
[9]Jensen and Murphy.Performance Pay and Top-management Incentives[J].Journal of Political Economy.1990,(8):43-48.
[10]张维迎.企业的企业家——契约理论[M] .上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,1996.
[11]张维迎.所有权、治理结构及委托代理[J] .经济研究, 1996, (9):3-15.
[12]方竹兰.人力资本所有者拥有企业所有权是一种趋势[J].经济研究,1997, (6):36-40.
[13]陈俊杰.股票期权现象的一种制度解释[J].上海财经大学学报,2000,(8):28-33.
[14]国家经贸委.企业股票期权运作实务[M].中国财政经济出版社,2002,26.
[15]高闯.经理股票期权制度分析[M].经济管理出版社,2003.
[16]张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,1996.
[17]周其仁.控制权回报和企业家控制的企业[J].经济研究,1997,(5).
[18]Mehran and Hamid . Executive Compensation Structure . Ownership and Firm Performance[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1995,(6) .
[19]刘长庚.论企业的联合产权制度性质[J].湘潭大学学报,2005,(11):121-125.
[20]莫旋、杨广.委托——代理理论与经理股票期权激励[J].河北理工大学学报,2006(2).
[21]陈昕.财产权利与制度变迁——产权学派与新制度学派译文集[M].上海三联书店.
[22]诺思、托马斯.西方世界的兴起[M].华夏出版社,1989,1.
[23]香港上市规则[R],第 17 章.
[24]黄钟苏.经理激励与股票期权[M].中华工商联出版社, 2001, 197.
[25]刘圆、李志群.股票期权制度分析[M].对外经济贸易大学学报,2002,300.
[26]张剑文.公司治理与股权激励[M].广东经济出版社,2001.
[27]张维迎.加强职业经理人队伍建设[J].管理与财富,2001,(5):16-18.
[28]中华人民共和国公司法[R].第 142,143 条,中国法制出版社.2006.
[29]王键、张敏.Monte-Carlo 模拟法在期权定价中的应用[J].湖南商学院学报,2003,(4).
[30]Hull. John .Option, Futures and Derivative Securities[M]. Prentice Hall, 1993.
[31]Cuthbertson. Financial Engineering-s and Risk Management[M].John Wileyandsons. Ltd, 2001.
[32]陈舜.期权定价理论及其应用[M].中国金融出版社,1998.
[33]刘国买.经理股票期权定价模型及实证研究[J].福建工程学院学报,2004,(3).
[34]莫旋、解煊.确定性等值法在经理股票期权定价中的应用研究[J].成都理工大学学报,2006,(1):71-75.
[35]Hall and Murphy . Stock Option for Undiversified Executives[J] . Harvard Business School,2000,(1).
[36]中共中央、国务院关于加强技术创新、实现产业化的决定[R].
[37]中共中央关于国有企业改革和发展若干重大问题的决定[R].
[38]顾慧慧、张文璋.引入股票期权制度,重塑长期激励机制[J].经济理论与经济管理, 2000,(3).
[39]关于我国上市公司实施经营者期权激励制度的若干问题研究[R].上海荣正投资咨询有限公司,1999.
[40]袁国良.上市公司股权激励的实证分析及相关问题[J].资本市场杂志,1999,(10).
[41]杜海龙、胡涛.我国创业板市场建设研究[J].云南财贸学院学报,2005,(5):46-48.