地方政府扰动下的中国食品安全规制问题研究
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摘要
中国目前食品安全状况令人堪忧。如何改变食品安全状况,提升政府食品安全规制绩效,实现食品安全规制由低效率状态向高效率状态的蝶变已是燃眉之急。
“横看成岭侧成峰”复杂事物的形成原因都是复杂的、多维度的。国内外学者针对食品安全问题产生的内在机理进行了多角度探究。学者探寻的角度多集中于食品安全问题产生的产品特性、产业特性、产业组织耦合关系、食品安全参与主体的影响因素、食品安全规制制度设计缺陷等。现有的研究多局限于食品、食品产业、规制机构、规制制度本身的分析。
中国食品安全事件频频爆发,并且食品安全问题已经呈现出新特点,特别是大企业频频成为食品安全事件的主角。大企业频频成为食品安全事件的主角有悖于声誉机制、资产专用性等经济学常识。同时,频繁的食品安全事件之后,中国政府对食品安全规制制度也进行了多角度的改革,如成立凌驾于各部门之上的协调机构——国家食品安全委员会、实施行政问责制度、颁布了食品安全法、制定新的食品安全标准、推行了问题食品召回制度等等,但是中国食品安全事件还是接连不断。食品安全规制制度的局部调整好像并没有收到良好效果,因此必须从更加宽广的制度视角研究中国食品安全规制问题。中国的食品安全规制处于中国大的制度环境变迁过程中,如市场机制的确立与完善,政治体制、经济体制的纵深推进,食品安全规制必然受到这些深层次制度变革的影响。只有从大的制度环境角度去研究中国的食品安全问题,才能抓住问题的根本而不是纠结于细枝末节。1994年的财政分权改革,中央政府将大量的事权、人事权、财权和法律权利下放到地方政府,地方政府作为区域内主要的政策制定者、政策执行者,地方政府的政治目标、经济目标必将对区域内各项经济活动产生深刻影响。从实践角度看,在财政分权的背景下,地方政府的角色从公共事务的管理者演变为“地方政府公司”,地方政府间的竞争在推动经济发展的同时也在扭曲着中国经济发展的制度环境。本文则是基于地方政府扰动视角,运用规范分析、实证分析、定量分析、定性分析等多种方法分析中国食品安全问题产生的纵深原因,并提出相应的政策措施。本文的结构框架如下：
第一章为导言。近年来中国食品安全事件频繁发生,中国的食品安全问题也呈现出一系列新特点,如食品安全事件的主角由小作坊、小企业演变为大型、知名企业；食品安全问题已经由个别企业的违规行为变成了行业潜规则；食品安全问题从食品的非必需品渗透到必需品；食品安全事件已经触及消费者的容忍底线。频繁发生的食品安全事件对经济生活的各参与主体都产生了不良影响。中国的食品安全问题呈现出前所未有的严峻性。
第二章为政府食品安全规制问题的研究综述。本文从两个层面对政府食品安全规制问题的研究进行了梳理。本文首先梳理了在食品安全问题上需要引入政府规制、提升政府规制质量的理论渊源研究。食品安全信息在各参与主体之间存在信息不对称、食品安全具有外部性和公共产品等问题,所以食品安全需要引入政府规制。由于规制成本高昂、规制俘获等原因,政府规制也会失灵,同时规制制度本身具有生命周期,因此,改进政府规制质量是个永恒话题。接着,本文对已有的政府食品安全规制绩效研究进行了梳理。目前食品安全规制绩效研究集中于以下几个方面：政府的食品安全规制能否具有好的效果；政府食品安全规制效果不佳的原因综述,如从政府监管体制的角度、政府监管的约束条件、产业发展的阶段性特征、国家制度的培育等。很少有学者从地方政府的角度研究中国食品安全规制绩效问题。本文结合中国食品安全规制的独特性,指出引入地方政府扰动因素分析的必要性。
第三章为地方政府扰动视角下食品安全规制研究的理论分析框架。本文主要围绕地方政府这一主线,从委托代理关系中的共性问题、共谋问题,从资本、消费者、政府的三方博弈势力制衡结构,从地方政府的“经济人”本性和企业不同规模结构食品安全问题产生的关联性,从市场化治理机制和行政性治理机制的相互作用等多个角度,阐明地方政府对食品安全规制效果的影响。
第四章为中国食品安全规制演进、缺陷及成因分析。本章是结合中国实际试图从地方政府的角度找出中国食品安全规制缺陷产生的原因。制度变迁具有强的路径依赖。要分析现有的食品安全规制制度的缺陷应该追本溯源,探寻制度变迁的过程。本文首先描述了中国食品安全规制体制的变迁的过程,并指出中国现有的食品安全规制体制缺陷和食品安全规制绩效缺陷,并分析食品安全规制缺陷产生的原因。财政分权背景下的政企合谋是食品安全规制缺陷产生的关键原因,失衡的资本、消费者和政府三方博弈结构导致食品食品安全规制缺陷难以及时补救,激励不相容、食品安全标准不完善、食品检查手段落后等现实状况为食品安全规制缺陷提供了制度掩饰借口,地方政府的“经济人”本性导致地方政府放松对大小企业的监管,双重治理机制的缺失导致食品安全规制深陷低效率泥沼。
第五章为提升我国地方政府食品安全规制绩效的政策建议。地方政府规制低效率导致中国令人担忧的食品安全状况。本文关注的重点是能否通过一定的制度安排实现中国食品安全由现在的效率状态向高效率状态的蝶变。本文从两个角度论证了中国食品安全规制存在由低效率状态向高效率状态蝶变的可能性。首先,从制度变迁的一般规律看,只要制度是开放的,理性的“经济人”都会自觉地追求制度的优化,不同利益集团之间的竞争会促使社会的制度变迁朝着高效率状态的转变,只是时间跨度会比较大,它可能以一个特权组织的毁灭和产业发展受损为代价。开放的制度环境和外部变量的引进是解开制度“锁定”状态的有效办法。其次,本文构造了一个简单的数理模型,分析结果表明中国食品安全规制存在由低效率状态向高效率状态变迁的可能性。制度本身并无效率。制度能否促进系统的效率增长的关键取决于它同人和组织的适应程度。因此,要实现我国食品安全规制由低效率状态向高效率状态的转化,所要做的制度设计应符合一定的基本要求。因此,本文接着分析了食品安全规制制度设计的原则。如实现制度系统内部的科学配置,制度设计应与意识形态建设相结合,制度设计要因时因地而异,增强与自有制度环境的契合性,建立社会纠错机制,以保证初始制度设计的良性制度依赖。针对中国食品安全规制过程中政企合谋的现象,本文提出如下措施：首先,调整现有的中央政府对地方政府官员的绩效考核指标体系和结构,增加食品安全规制绩效在官员绩效中的贡献度；其次,调整中央政府对地方政府官员激励的方向,增强地方政府对食品安全规制的积极性以提升地方政府食品安全规制效率；再者,调整激励方式,改变食品安全信息闭锁、内敛的传递方式,减少信息租金以提升地方政府对食品安全规制效率；再者,降低规制判定的权限,增强公众判定食品安全的权限,构筑食品安全监督的新均衡势力；再者,制定合适的食品安全检测标准,弱化制度掩饰因素；再者,地方食品安全规制机构也应该做出相应调整；最后,培育市场化治理机制。
本文的创新点为：一、以往的食品安全规制研究多是把政府作为一个统一体来研究,并没有区分中央政府和地方政府在食品安全治理中的差异,并没有分析地方政府对地方规制机构和食品安全规制绩效的影响。实际上在财政分权的制度下,地方政府具有强烈的投资驱动,地方政府常常会为了地方利益而扭曲中央政府的宏观调控措施,导致中央政府调控失灵。本文把地方政府和中央政府做了区分,从地方政府的角度去研究中国食品安全规制绩效差的原因。二、以往的研究并没有把不同生产规模的食品生产企业进行细分,而是把它们作为一个整体进行研究。不同规模食品生产企业生产不安全食品的内在机理和制度根源并不相同,这对我国以后的食品安全治理具有重要意义。本文通过构建地方食品安全规制机构与小规模食品生产企业,地方食品安全规制机构与大规模食品生产企业两组博弈模型,厘清了不同规模食品生产企业生产不安全食品的内在机理和制度根源,并提出了相应的政策建议。三、政企合谋产生的主要原因是信息不对称和利益不相容。改善信息不对称状态是解决政府合谋的关键。在现有制度激励下,食品安全信息传递机制具有内敛性、闭锁性。因为,目前行政问责制是事后对食品安全规制失职的惩罚,为了避免惩罚,地方政府和企业必然是形成联盟封锁不安全食品信息。如果中央政府能够对地方政府治理食品安全进行正面激励,就能够破坏地方政府和企业的默契合谋,从而形成开放的信息传递体制。同时,该激励措施能够通过政府的“强制性引致需求”,向下逐级传递,引导农户从生产源头上改善食品生产状况。
Recently food security situation is worrying in China. It is urgent to change China's food security situation, and improve regulation performance of food safety, and achieve transformation from the low efficiency to high efficiency of the state.
Causes of complex matters are complex, multi-dimensional. Scholars around the world have studied on the internal mechanism of food safety issues from different angles. Scholars' perspectives focus on product features, industry characteristics, the coupling between industrial organizations, the main factors impacting on consumers, design defects of food safety regulation system. In short, most researches have focused on food, food industry, regulation system itself.
China's food safety accidents outbreak constantly, problems of food safety have shown new features, especially big enterprises become protagonists of China's food safety accidents. This kind of phenomenon operates against economics common sense. Though many reforms have been made in food safety regulation field after food safety accidents, such as establishing the national food safety committee, carrying out the administration accountability system, issuing the Food Safety Law of the People's Republic of China, formulating new food safety standards, implementing food recall system etc, food safety incidents happen constantly. It seems that adjustment of food safety regulation affects nothing. Therefore, we must study the problems of China's food safety regulation from a broader perspective.China's food safety regulations happen in the process of reform of China's fundamental political system, economic systems, such as the establishment and improvement of market mechanisms. These deep-seated reforms must affect China's food safety regulations. Only from the perspective of a large institutional environment, can we detect the nature of the problem of food safety..After fiscal decentralization reforms in 1994, central government delegate powers to the local government, such as personnel rights, property rights and legal rights to the local government. As the policy-makers, policy implementers, the local government's political goals, economic goals must have a profound impact on activities happening in the region. In fact, in the context of fiscal decentralization, local government's role has evolving from manager of the public affairs to the "local government corporation". The competition between local governments has distorted China'System environment. Basing on the perspective of local government disturbances, this article analysis the deep reasons for problems of china'food safety regulation, and appropriate policy measures. Structural framework of this paper is as follows.
The first chapter is introduction. In recent years, incidences of food safety happen frequently. China's food safety problems have also shown a series of new features, such as characters have evolved from the small workshop, small business into large, well-known enterprises; It has become the industry unwritten rules. It has extended from non-essentials to essentials. It has hit the bottom line which consumer can tolerate. It has had a bad effect on all economic participants. We must immediately deal with food safety issues.
The second chapter is a comment on researches of government regulation of food safety. This paper summarizes the researches from two angles. Firstly, it summarizes the theory why must carry out government regulation and improve its performance. Because asymmetry information, externality, government regulation must be introduced. Due to the high cost of regulation, regulation capture, government regulation fails too. Meanwhile regulation system itself has the life cycle; therefore, improvement of government regulation quality also is an eternal topic. Then this paper summarizes the researches of government food safety regulation performance. Current food safety regulation performance researches have focused on the following aspects:whether or not the government's food safety regulation could have good effect, why the government food safety regulation cannot obtain good effect? Scholars analyze the reasons from the different angles, such as defects of government regulation system, the constraint conditions of food safety regulation, stage characteristics of industry development stage, and so on. Few scholars study it from the perspective of local government. Considering the uniqueness of China' food safety regulation, this paper analyzes it from the angle of local government.
The third chapter is the theoretical framework of food safety regulation research which bases on the perspective of local government. Focusing on the main line of the local government, this paper analyzes how the local government affects the performance of food safety regulation, from the angles of common problems of the principal-agent, problems of collusion, from the tripartite game balance structure of capital, consumers, the government, from the relevance of the local government food safety regulation and different enterprise scale structure, from the interaction between market governance mechanism and administrative management mechanism.
The fourth chapter includes the contents of Chinese food safety regulation evolution, defect and the cause of formation of the defects. This paper tries to find out the root of defects of Chinese food safety regulation from the angle of local government. Institutional change has path dependence. To analysis the food safety regulation problem, we should verify their source; we must make clear the changes process of Chins'food safety regulation institution. Firstly this paper describes China's food safety supervision system, and points out the defects of food safety regulation, and analyzes the causes of them. Under the background of fiscal decentralization conspiracy between the government and enterprise regulated is the key reason for defects of food safety regulation. Because of the unbalanced game structure of capital, consumer and government, it becomes difficult to remedy defects of food safety regulation in time. The realistic situation for food safety regulation provides excuses for defects of food safety regulation, such as incentive incompatibilities, incomplete food safety standards, and laggard equipment. The "economic man" nature of the local government causes the local government relaxes supervision on any type of enterprises. Lacking of double governance mechanism leads to food safety regulation in low efficiency trap.
The fifth chapter is policy Suggestions to upgrade local government food safety regulation performance. Low efficiency in local government regulation causes the Chinese worrying food safety conditions. The focus of this paper is whether it can be realized that the state of China's food safety shift from low efficiency to high efficiency. This paper demonstrates the possibility of this transformation from two angles. Firstly, from the general rule of institutional change, as long as the system is open, rational "economic man" is object to pursuit system optimization, the competition between different interest groups would make the social system toward the efficient state. Unfortunately, this time span will be longer, it may be in the death of a privilege class and industrial development damaged for cost. Open system environment and the introduction of external variable are avail ways to untie system "locked" state. Secondly, the paper constructs a model, the analysis results show that the China'food safety regulation have the possibility to shifting from low efficiency to high efficiency. System itself has no efficiency, whether the system can promote the efficiency of system depends on its adaptation to the organization. Therefore, system design should meet certain requirements to realize our country's food safety status'shifting from low efficiency to high efficiency. Food safety regulation system design should meet the following principles:the system of scientific configuration, system inside with ideology construction design should be combined, system design, enhance varies to also describe with self-owned institutional environment of the correspondence, establish a social error correction mechanism to ensure the initial system design, the benign system dependent. According to conspiracy between government and enterprises regulated, the paper suggests some measures. Firstly, we should adjust performance evaluation indicator system and structure, Increase Contribution of food safety regulation performance, adjust the incentive direction of the central government to the local government officials, enhance local government' enthusiasm to food safety regulation to improve local government food safety regulation efficiency. Moreover, we should adjust the incentive way, and change the food safety information transfer mode. Moreover, we should reduce regulation Judgment permissions, Local food safety regulatory organizations should also make corresponding adjustment; finally, we should cultivate market management mechanism.
This paper has three innovations. Firstly, governments are often considered as a unity in previous food safety regulation study, and few people distinguish differences between the central government and the local government in the process of food safety management. In fact, under the ground of fiscal decentralization system, local governments often distort macroeconomic measures in order to pursue the local interests, and result central government regulation to fail. This paper distinguishes the differences between the central government and local government, explore China' food safety regulation inefficient reasons from the perspective of local government. Secondly, enterprises are often considered as a whole in previous studies, few people distinguish the scale of enterprise. In fact, different scale enterprises product unsafe food with different internal mechanism and system root. This paper constructs two groups of game model, one is about food safety regulatory organization and small-scale food production enterprise, the other is about food safety regulatory organization and large-scale food production enterprise. Through the game model, the paper clarify that why the different scale enterprises all product unsafe food. Secondly, the information is asymmetry and interests are incompatible are the main causes of the conspiracy. Reducing information asymmetry state is the key to solve the government to conspiracy. At present, the food safety information transfer is self- closed. The administration accountability system is a kind of punishment afterwards aiming at negligence of food safety regulation. In order to avoid punishment, local government and enterprise must form an alliance to blockade unsafe food information. If the central government implement positive incentives to the local government food safety regulation, the conspiracy between local government and enterprises can be destroyed, thus open information transmission mechanism can be formed. At the same time, the incentive measures are passed down gradually, which ultimately lead farmers to product safe food in source of food production.
“横看成岭侧成峰”复杂事物的形成原因都是复杂的、多维度的。国内外学者针对食品安全问题产生的内在机理进行了多角度探究。学者探寻的角度多集中于食品安全问题产生的产品特性、产业特性、产业组织耦合关系、食品安全参与主体的影响因素、食品安全规制制度设计缺陷等。现有的研究多局限于食品、食品产业、规制机构、规制制度本身的分析。
中国食品安全事件频频爆发,并且食品安全问题已经呈现出新特点,特别是大企业频频成为食品安全事件的主角。大企业频频成为食品安全事件的主角有悖于声誉机制、资产专用性等经济学常识。同时,频繁的食品安全事件之后,中国政府对食品安全规制制度也进行了多角度的改革,如成立凌驾于各部门之上的协调机构——国家食品安全委员会、实施行政问责制度、颁布了食品安全法、制定新的食品安全标准、推行了问题食品召回制度等等,但是中国食品安全事件还是接连不断。食品安全规制制度的局部调整好像并没有收到良好效果,因此必须从更加宽广的制度视角研究中国食品安全规制问题。中国的食品安全规制处于中国大的制度环境变迁过程中,如市场机制的确立与完善,政治体制、经济体制的纵深推进,食品安全规制必然受到这些深层次制度变革的影响。只有从大的制度环境角度去研究中国的食品安全问题,才能抓住问题的根本而不是纠结于细枝末节。1994年的财政分权改革,中央政府将大量的事权、人事权、财权和法律权利下放到地方政府,地方政府作为区域内主要的政策制定者、政策执行者,地方政府的政治目标、经济目标必将对区域内各项经济活动产生深刻影响。从实践角度看,在财政分权的背景下,地方政府的角色从公共事务的管理者演变为“地方政府公司”,地方政府间的竞争在推动经济发展的同时也在扭曲着中国经济发展的制度环境。本文则是基于地方政府扰动视角,运用规范分析、实证分析、定量分析、定性分析等多种方法分析中国食品安全问题产生的纵深原因,并提出相应的政策措施。本文的结构框架如下：
第一章为导言。近年来中国食品安全事件频繁发生,中国的食品安全问题也呈现出一系列新特点,如食品安全事件的主角由小作坊、小企业演变为大型、知名企业；食品安全问题已经由个别企业的违规行为变成了行业潜规则；食品安全问题从食品的非必需品渗透到必需品；食品安全事件已经触及消费者的容忍底线。频繁发生的食品安全事件对经济生活的各参与主体都产生了不良影响。中国的食品安全问题呈现出前所未有的严峻性。
第二章为政府食品安全规制问题的研究综述。本文从两个层面对政府食品安全规制问题的研究进行了梳理。本文首先梳理了在食品安全问题上需要引入政府规制、提升政府规制质量的理论渊源研究。食品安全信息在各参与主体之间存在信息不对称、食品安全具有外部性和公共产品等问题,所以食品安全需要引入政府规制。由于规制成本高昂、规制俘获等原因,政府规制也会失灵,同时规制制度本身具有生命周期,因此,改进政府规制质量是个永恒话题。接着,本文对已有的政府食品安全规制绩效研究进行了梳理。目前食品安全规制绩效研究集中于以下几个方面：政府的食品安全规制能否具有好的效果；政府食品安全规制效果不佳的原因综述,如从政府监管体制的角度、政府监管的约束条件、产业发展的阶段性特征、国家制度的培育等。很少有学者从地方政府的角度研究中国食品安全规制绩效问题。本文结合中国食品安全规制的独特性,指出引入地方政府扰动因素分析的必要性。
第三章为地方政府扰动视角下食品安全规制研究的理论分析框架。本文主要围绕地方政府这一主线,从委托代理关系中的共性问题、共谋问题,从资本、消费者、政府的三方博弈势力制衡结构,从地方政府的“经济人”本性和企业不同规模结构食品安全问题产生的关联性,从市场化治理机制和行政性治理机制的相互作用等多个角度,阐明地方政府对食品安全规制效果的影响。
第四章为中国食品安全规制演进、缺陷及成因分析。本章是结合中国实际试图从地方政府的角度找出中国食品安全规制缺陷产生的原因。制度变迁具有强的路径依赖。要分析现有的食品安全规制制度的缺陷应该追本溯源,探寻制度变迁的过程。本文首先描述了中国食品安全规制体制的变迁的过程,并指出中国现有的食品安全规制体制缺陷和食品安全规制绩效缺陷,并分析食品安全规制缺陷产生的原因。财政分权背景下的政企合谋是食品安全规制缺陷产生的关键原因,失衡的资本、消费者和政府三方博弈结构导致食品食品安全规制缺陷难以及时补救,激励不相容、食品安全标准不完善、食品检查手段落后等现实状况为食品安全规制缺陷提供了制度掩饰借口,地方政府的“经济人”本性导致地方政府放松对大小企业的监管,双重治理机制的缺失导致食品安全规制深陷低效率泥沼。
第五章为提升我国地方政府食品安全规制绩效的政策建议。地方政府规制低效率导致中国令人担忧的食品安全状况。本文关注的重点是能否通过一定的制度安排实现中国食品安全由现在的效率状态向高效率状态的蝶变。本文从两个角度论证了中国食品安全规制存在由低效率状态向高效率状态蝶变的可能性。首先,从制度变迁的一般规律看,只要制度是开放的,理性的“经济人”都会自觉地追求制度的优化,不同利益集团之间的竞争会促使社会的制度变迁朝着高效率状态的转变,只是时间跨度会比较大,它可能以一个特权组织的毁灭和产业发展受损为代价。开放的制度环境和外部变量的引进是解开制度“锁定”状态的有效办法。其次,本文构造了一个简单的数理模型,分析结果表明中国食品安全规制存在由低效率状态向高效率状态变迁的可能性。制度本身并无效率。制度能否促进系统的效率增长的关键取决于它同人和组织的适应程度。因此,要实现我国食品安全规制由低效率状态向高效率状态的转化,所要做的制度设计应符合一定的基本要求。因此,本文接着分析了食品安全规制制度设计的原则。如实现制度系统内部的科学配置,制度设计应与意识形态建设相结合,制度设计要因时因地而异,增强与自有制度环境的契合性,建立社会纠错机制,以保证初始制度设计的良性制度依赖。针对中国食品安全规制过程中政企合谋的现象,本文提出如下措施：首先,调整现有的中央政府对地方政府官员的绩效考核指标体系和结构,增加食品安全规制绩效在官员绩效中的贡献度；其次,调整中央政府对地方政府官员激励的方向,增强地方政府对食品安全规制的积极性以提升地方政府食品安全规制效率；再者,调整激励方式,改变食品安全信息闭锁、内敛的传递方式,减少信息租金以提升地方政府对食品安全规制效率；再者,降低规制判定的权限,增强公众判定食品安全的权限,构筑食品安全监督的新均衡势力；再者,制定合适的食品安全检测标准,弱化制度掩饰因素；再者,地方食品安全规制机构也应该做出相应调整；最后,培育市场化治理机制。
本文的创新点为：一、以往的食品安全规制研究多是把政府作为一个统一体来研究,并没有区分中央政府和地方政府在食品安全治理中的差异,并没有分析地方政府对地方规制机构和食品安全规制绩效的影响。实际上在财政分权的制度下,地方政府具有强烈的投资驱动,地方政府常常会为了地方利益而扭曲中央政府的宏观调控措施,导致中央政府调控失灵。本文把地方政府和中央政府做了区分,从地方政府的角度去研究中国食品安全规制绩效差的原因。二、以往的研究并没有把不同生产规模的食品生产企业进行细分,而是把它们作为一个整体进行研究。不同规模食品生产企业生产不安全食品的内在机理和制度根源并不相同,这对我国以后的食品安全治理具有重要意义。本文通过构建地方食品安全规制机构与小规模食品生产企业,地方食品安全规制机构与大规模食品生产企业两组博弈模型,厘清了不同规模食品生产企业生产不安全食品的内在机理和制度根源,并提出了相应的政策建议。三、政企合谋产生的主要原因是信息不对称和利益不相容。改善信息不对称状态是解决政府合谋的关键。在现有制度激励下,食品安全信息传递机制具有内敛性、闭锁性。因为,目前行政问责制是事后对食品安全规制失职的惩罚,为了避免惩罚,地方政府和企业必然是形成联盟封锁不安全食品信息。如果中央政府能够对地方政府治理食品安全进行正面激励,就能够破坏地方政府和企业的默契合谋,从而形成开放的信息传递体制。同时,该激励措施能够通过政府的“强制性引致需求”,向下逐级传递,引导农户从生产源头上改善食品生产状况。
Recently food security situation is worrying in China. It is urgent to change China's food security situation, and improve regulation performance of food safety, and achieve transformation from the low efficiency to high efficiency of the state.
Causes of complex matters are complex, multi-dimensional. Scholars around the world have studied on the internal mechanism of food safety issues from different angles. Scholars' perspectives focus on product features, industry characteristics, the coupling between industrial organizations, the main factors impacting on consumers, design defects of food safety regulation system. In short, most researches have focused on food, food industry, regulation system itself.
China's food safety accidents outbreak constantly, problems of food safety have shown new features, especially big enterprises become protagonists of China's food safety accidents. This kind of phenomenon operates against economics common sense. Though many reforms have been made in food safety regulation field after food safety accidents, such as establishing the national food safety committee, carrying out the administration accountability system, issuing the Food Safety Law of the People's Republic of China, formulating new food safety standards, implementing food recall system etc, food safety incidents happen constantly. It seems that adjustment of food safety regulation affects nothing. Therefore, we must study the problems of China's food safety regulation from a broader perspective.China's food safety regulations happen in the process of reform of China's fundamental political system, economic systems, such as the establishment and improvement of market mechanisms. These deep-seated reforms must affect China's food safety regulations. Only from the perspective of a large institutional environment, can we detect the nature of the problem of food safety..After fiscal decentralization reforms in 1994, central government delegate powers to the local government, such as personnel rights, property rights and legal rights to the local government. As the policy-makers, policy implementers, the local government's political goals, economic goals must have a profound impact on activities happening in the region. In fact, in the context of fiscal decentralization, local government's role has evolving from manager of the public affairs to the "local government corporation". The competition between local governments has distorted China'System environment. Basing on the perspective of local government disturbances, this article analysis the deep reasons for problems of china'food safety regulation, and appropriate policy measures. Structural framework of this paper is as follows.
The first chapter is introduction. In recent years, incidences of food safety happen frequently. China's food safety problems have also shown a series of new features, such as characters have evolved from the small workshop, small business into large, well-known enterprises; It has become the industry unwritten rules. It has extended from non-essentials to essentials. It has hit the bottom line which consumer can tolerate. It has had a bad effect on all economic participants. We must immediately deal with food safety issues.
The second chapter is a comment on researches of government regulation of food safety. This paper summarizes the researches from two angles. Firstly, it summarizes the theory why must carry out government regulation and improve its performance. Because asymmetry information, externality, government regulation must be introduced. Due to the high cost of regulation, regulation capture, government regulation fails too. Meanwhile regulation system itself has the life cycle; therefore, improvement of government regulation quality also is an eternal topic. Then this paper summarizes the researches of government food safety regulation performance. Current food safety regulation performance researches have focused on the following aspects:whether or not the government's food safety regulation could have good effect, why the government food safety regulation cannot obtain good effect? Scholars analyze the reasons from the different angles, such as defects of government regulation system, the constraint conditions of food safety regulation, stage characteristics of industry development stage, and so on. Few scholars study it from the perspective of local government. Considering the uniqueness of China' food safety regulation, this paper analyzes it from the angle of local government.
The third chapter is the theoretical framework of food safety regulation research which bases on the perspective of local government. Focusing on the main line of the local government, this paper analyzes how the local government affects the performance of food safety regulation, from the angles of common problems of the principal-agent, problems of collusion, from the tripartite game balance structure of capital, consumers, the government, from the relevance of the local government food safety regulation and different enterprise scale structure, from the interaction between market governance mechanism and administrative management mechanism.
The fourth chapter includes the contents of Chinese food safety regulation evolution, defect and the cause of formation of the defects. This paper tries to find out the root of defects of Chinese food safety regulation from the angle of local government. Institutional change has path dependence. To analysis the food safety regulation problem, we should verify their source; we must make clear the changes process of Chins'food safety regulation institution. Firstly this paper describes China's food safety supervision system, and points out the defects of food safety regulation, and analyzes the causes of them. Under the background of fiscal decentralization conspiracy between the government and enterprise regulated is the key reason for defects of food safety regulation. Because of the unbalanced game structure of capital, consumer and government, it becomes difficult to remedy defects of food safety regulation in time. The realistic situation for food safety regulation provides excuses for defects of food safety regulation, such as incentive incompatibilities, incomplete food safety standards, and laggard equipment. The "economic man" nature of the local government causes the local government relaxes supervision on any type of enterprises. Lacking of double governance mechanism leads to food safety regulation in low efficiency trap.
The fifth chapter is policy Suggestions to upgrade local government food safety regulation performance. Low efficiency in local government regulation causes the Chinese worrying food safety conditions. The focus of this paper is whether it can be realized that the state of China's food safety shift from low efficiency to high efficiency. This paper demonstrates the possibility of this transformation from two angles. Firstly, from the general rule of institutional change, as long as the system is open, rational "economic man" is object to pursuit system optimization, the competition between different interest groups would make the social system toward the efficient state. Unfortunately, this time span will be longer, it may be in the death of a privilege class and industrial development damaged for cost. Open system environment and the introduction of external variable are avail ways to untie system "locked" state. Secondly, the paper constructs a model, the analysis results show that the China'food safety regulation have the possibility to shifting from low efficiency to high efficiency. System itself has no efficiency, whether the system can promote the efficiency of system depends on its adaptation to the organization. Therefore, system design should meet certain requirements to realize our country's food safety status'shifting from low efficiency to high efficiency. Food safety regulation system design should meet the following principles:the system of scientific configuration, system inside with ideology construction design should be combined, system design, enhance varies to also describe with self-owned institutional environment of the correspondence, establish a social error correction mechanism to ensure the initial system design, the benign system dependent. According to conspiracy between government and enterprises regulated, the paper suggests some measures. Firstly, we should adjust performance evaluation indicator system and structure, Increase Contribution of food safety regulation performance, adjust the incentive direction of the central government to the local government officials, enhance local government' enthusiasm to food safety regulation to improve local government food safety regulation efficiency. Moreover, we should adjust the incentive way, and change the food safety information transfer mode. Moreover, we should reduce regulation Judgment permissions, Local food safety regulatory organizations should also make corresponding adjustment; finally, we should cultivate market management mechanism.
This paper has three innovations. Firstly, governments are often considered as a unity in previous food safety regulation study, and few people distinguish differences between the central government and the local government in the process of food safety management. In fact, under the ground of fiscal decentralization system, local governments often distort macroeconomic measures in order to pursue the local interests, and result central government regulation to fail. This paper distinguishes the differences between the central government and local government, explore China' food safety regulation inefficient reasons from the perspective of local government. Secondly, enterprises are often considered as a whole in previous studies, few people distinguish the scale of enterprise. In fact, different scale enterprises product unsafe food with different internal mechanism and system root. This paper constructs two groups of game model, one is about food safety regulatory organization and small-scale food production enterprise, the other is about food safety regulatory organization and large-scale food production enterprise. Through the game model, the paper clarify that why the different scale enterprises all product unsafe food. Secondly, the information is asymmetry and interests are incompatible are the main causes of the conspiracy. Reducing information asymmetry state is the key to solve the government to conspiracy. At present, the food safety information transfer is self- closed. The administration accountability system is a kind of punishment afterwards aiming at negligence of food safety regulation. In order to avoid punishment, local government and enterprise must form an alliance to blockade unsafe food information. If the central government implement positive incentives to the local government food safety regulation, the conspiracy between local government and enterprises can be destroyed, thus open information transmission mechanism can be formed. At the same time, the incentive measures are passed down gradually, which ultimately lead farmers to product safe food in source of food production.
引文
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