自然垄断产业价格规制改革研究
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摘要
电力产业作为国民经济和社会发展的基础性能源产业,对于保障国民经济的正常运行,保证国家的能源安全以及保持经济社会的持续稳定发展等都具有重要意义。基于电力产业的自然垄断特性和基础性战略地位,世界各国一直将电力产业的价格规制作为政府经济性规制的核心内容。目前,世界范围内的电力产业正在进行以放松规制和引入竞争为主题的电力体制改革和电力市场化改革。在这场改革过程中,作为电力体制变迁和电力市场化模式重构的关键环节-电价规制的改革更加成为人们瞩目的焦点。有效的电价规制机制对于优化电力资源配置,促进竞争性电力市场的形成,保障社会分配的公平性,保证企业的简单再生产和扩大再生产以及促进企业提高效率等方面都具有十分重要的意义。
在世界电力产业规制改革浪潮的推动下,改革开放以来,我国电价规制也经历了一系列的调整改革措施,目前已基本形成以社会平均成本为基础的成本加成定价模式。然而,从国外发达国家电价规制改革的经验来看,我国电价规制改革相当滞后,竞争性领域的价格形成缺乏市场化基础,自然垄断领域的价格规制也缺乏有效的手段,距市场化价格形成机制以及激励性价格规制模式的建立都具有相当大的距离。现行的电价规制机制远不能满足我国电力产业发展和电力市场化建设的需要,因此,亟需进一步改革。基于上述背景,本文选择我国电力产业的价格规制改革作为研究对象,希望通过此项研究,不但可以对我国电力产业价格规制的改革起到积极的促进作用,而且也能够对其他自然垄断产业的价格规制改革提供有益参考。
本文的研究内容主要包括以下几个方面：
首先,对政府规制理论以及价格规制理论进行系统的梳理,从而奠定全文研究的理论基础。本文从最基础的政府规制以及价格规制理论出发,通过对自然垄断产业政府规制理论的演进历程、最新发展进行有所取舍的综述和对价格规制的内涵、目标以及模式的深入分析,为全文研究的展开奠定坚实的理论基础。
其次,对我国电价规制改革的历程进行了全面系统的回顾和分析,以确定我国电力产业价格规制改革的现实环境。本文从严格规制时期、规制改革起步时期、基于成本的电价规制形成时期、电价规制改革调整时期以及电价规制改革深化时期等五个阶段全面回顾了我国电价规制改革的历程；从电价规制主体和电价规制客体两个方面解析了我国现行的电价规制结构,从电价水平规制和电价结构规制两个角度剖析了我国现行的电价规制模式；最后,基于上述规制现状,对我国电价规制中存在的问题进行了识别。
第三,总结了国外电力产业价格规制改革的成功经验,并分别提出了我国竞争性发、售电领域以及自然垄断性输、配电领域的价格规制改革路径。特别地,基于影响价格规制改革模式选择的制度性以及产业特征方面的因素分析,提出了我国输、配电价格规制应该采取的渐进式改革思路,也即在改革初期,建立回报率价格规制模式；在改革的中远期,再逐步引入具有激励性的价格规制模式。
第四,对政府的主要规制对象-我国输配电企业在回报率规制模式下的有效投资问题进行了系统分析。首先,基于A-J效应和输配电企业的投资实践提出“有效投资”的概念；然后,基于输配电企业与规制者之间的单次合约关系以及无限次重复合约关系,分别建立了回报率规制模式下的单次非合作动态博弈模型以及无限次重复博弈模型。并基于两种情况下的模型,分别推导出基于博弈均衡实现企业有效投资水平需要满足的条件；最后对如何促进我国输配电企业进行有效投资提出相关对策建议。
第五,对政府的主要规制对象-我国输配电企业在回报率规制模式下准许投资回报率水平的确定进行了深入研究。首先,对准许投资回报率的内涵和加权平均资本成本法下输配电企业各参数的确定进行了分析；然后,深入研究了我国输配电企业准许权益资本成本的确定。通过对权益资本成本各种计算方法的分析和比较,并基于国外输配电企业权益资本成本测算实践以及我国资本市场实际,提出适用于我国资本市场电力产业上市公司的准许权益资本成本计算方法-剩余收益折现模型法；分别基于净资产收益率评价标准和剩余收益折现模型对我国输配电企业的权益资本成本进行测算。特别是通过选取我国电力产业35家上市公司为样本,首次采用“三阶段”剩余收益折现模型对我国电力产业上市公司的权益资本成本进行了测算；最后,采用加权平均资本成本法估算出了回报率规制模式下我国输配电企业的准许投资回报率水平。
第六,对我国输配电企业价格规制的远期改革模式-激励性价格规制改革进行了进一步的探讨。首先,在对激励性规制产生的现实环境以及激励性价格规制模型分析的基础上,对完全信息条件下和不对称信息条件下抽租和效率的权衡问题进行了深入研究,并基于此提出不同价格规制模式的成本补偿规则、激励强度及其选择建议；然后,分别将公共资金的高成本、低效的成本审计制度以及较高的规制收买风险等引入激励性价格规制模型中,剖析了我国上述转轨经济特征对激励性价格规制的影响以及相应的解决策略；最后,基于上述分析,提出我国输配电企业激励性价格规制的渐进式改革之路以及相应的价格规制改革模式。
最后,本文提出了我国电力产业价格规制改革应该采取的相关配套措施。
本文含有图17幅,表34个,参考文献116篇。
As the basic energy industry of national economy and social development, the power industry plays an important role in guaranteeing the normal operation of national economy, ensuring national energy security and maintaining sustainable and stable development of economy and society. Because of the natural monopoly characteristics and the basic strategic position, the price regulation of the power industry has been viewed as the core of economic regulation of the government in most countries of the world. At present, the worldwide power industries are ongoing the power system reform and the power market reform taking the theme of "deregulation and introducing competition". In this process, price regulation reform which is the key of power industry reform has become the focus of growing attention. Effective price regulation mechanism is of great significance to optimize power resources allocation, promote the formation of competitive electricity markets, ensure fair distribution of society income, guarantee the simple reproduction as well as expanded reproduction and encourage enterprises to improve efficiency.
Under the impetus of regulation reform of the power industry in the world, since the reform and opening up, a series of adjustment and reform measures of China's electricity price regulation mechanism have been implemented and the cost-plus pricing mode based on the average socail cost has been formed. However, China's electricity price regulation reform is lagging behind compared with developed countries. The price formation mechanism based on market for the competitive fields has not been established and effective means of price regulation for the natural monopoly fields still lack. There is a considerable distance from building market price formation mechanism and incentive regulation modes. The current price regulation mechanism can not meet the need of China's power industry development and power market construction. Therefore, there is an urgent, need to further promote the reform. Based on the above background, this dissertation chooses the price regulation reform of China's power industry as the research object. The author hopes that this research will not only play an active role in promoting the price regulation reform of China's power industry, but also provide a useful reference to other natural monopoly industries'reform.
The main contents of this dissertation include the following:
Firstly, government regulation theory and price regulation theory are systematically summarized. The evolution process of the government regulation theory of natural monopoly and the latest development are reviewed and a detailed analysis of the meanings, targets and patterns of price regulation are conducted, which lay a solid theoretical basis for the full text.
Secondly, China's electricity price regulation reform process is analyzed comprehensively so as to provide the reality foundation for this research. The five stages of price regulation reform are reviewed which include the strict regulation period, the initial reform period, the formation period of cost-based regulation mechanism, the adjustment period and the deepening period; The current electricity price regulation structure is analyzed from both the angle of regulation subject and of regulation object. The current regulation mode is analyzed from both the perspective of tariff level and of tariff structure; then, based on the above, problems of power price regulation are identified.
Thirdly, successful experiences of price regulation reform of foreign power industry are summed up and the price regulation reform paths are put forward both for the field of power production as well as sale and for the field of power transmission as well as distribution. Especially, based on factors impacting the choice of price regulation modes, the price regulation reform path of China's power transmission and distribution field is proposed which is that in the early stage, the rate of return regulation model should be established and in the long-term, incentive price regulation model should be introduced gradually.
Fourthly, the issue of efficient investment of power transmission and distribution enterprises as the main regulated object under the rate of return model is analyzed systematically. The concept of "Efficient Investment" is put forward based on A-J effect and investment practices of power transmission and distribution enterprises firstly; Then, based on the single and the infinitely repeated contractual relationships between the enterprise and the regulator, the single non-cooperative dynamic game model and the infinitely repeated games one are established respectively and according to the game equilibrium outcomes, conditions on how to achieve efficient investment are derived; finally, suggestions on how to encourage enterprises to make efficient investment are proposed.
Fifthly, the determination of permitted return rate level of power transmission and distribution enterprises as the main regulated object under the rate of return model is conducted in-depth study. First, the meaning of permitted return on investment and parameters under the law of the weighted average cost of capital are analyzed; then, the determination of permitted cost of equity capital of China's power transmission and distribution enterprises is studied. Through the analysis and comparison of a variety of calculation methods, and based on foreign practice of calculation of cost of equity capital as well as the status of China's capital market, the Discounted Residual Income Model is proposed for calculating the cost of equity of listed companies of China's power industry; Next, based both on standard of rate of return on net assets and on the Discounted Residual Income Model respectively, the cost of equity capital are calculated. Especially by taking35listed companies of power industry as samples,"Three-Stage" Discounted Residual Income Model is used for the first time to calculate the cost of equity capital; At last, the levels of permitted rate of return on investment of China's power transmission and distribution enterprises are estimated by means of the law of weighted average cost of capital.
Sixthly, incentive price regulation reform of China's power transmission and distribution enterprises in the long term is further explored. First of all, based on the analysis of realistic environment and incentive price regulation model, the trade-off between rent extraction and efficiency under conditions of both complete information and asymmetric information are discussed. And then cost compensation rules, incentive intensity and selection recommendations of different price regulation patterns are raised; Then, the high cost of public funds, inefficient cost audit system as well as higher risk of regulatory capture are introduced into the incentive regulation model respectively, the impacts of these characteristics of China's transition economy on the incentive price regulation are analyzed and the corresponding solutions are proposed; In the end, the gradual reform ways of incentive price regulation and the corresponding price regulation patterns of China's power transmission and distribution enterprises are put forward.
Finally, the related supporting measures for China's electricity price regulation reform are put forward.
This dissertation contains17figures,34tables and116references.
在世界电力产业规制改革浪潮的推动下,改革开放以来,我国电价规制也经历了一系列的调整改革措施,目前已基本形成以社会平均成本为基础的成本加成定价模式。然而,从国外发达国家电价规制改革的经验来看,我国电价规制改革相当滞后,竞争性领域的价格形成缺乏市场化基础,自然垄断领域的价格规制也缺乏有效的手段,距市场化价格形成机制以及激励性价格规制模式的建立都具有相当大的距离。现行的电价规制机制远不能满足我国电力产业发展和电力市场化建设的需要,因此,亟需进一步改革。基于上述背景,本文选择我国电力产业的价格规制改革作为研究对象,希望通过此项研究,不但可以对我国电力产业价格规制的改革起到积极的促进作用,而且也能够对其他自然垄断产业的价格规制改革提供有益参考。
本文的研究内容主要包括以下几个方面：
首先,对政府规制理论以及价格规制理论进行系统的梳理,从而奠定全文研究的理论基础。本文从最基础的政府规制以及价格规制理论出发,通过对自然垄断产业政府规制理论的演进历程、最新发展进行有所取舍的综述和对价格规制的内涵、目标以及模式的深入分析,为全文研究的展开奠定坚实的理论基础。
其次,对我国电价规制改革的历程进行了全面系统的回顾和分析,以确定我国电力产业价格规制改革的现实环境。本文从严格规制时期、规制改革起步时期、基于成本的电价规制形成时期、电价规制改革调整时期以及电价规制改革深化时期等五个阶段全面回顾了我国电价规制改革的历程；从电价规制主体和电价规制客体两个方面解析了我国现行的电价规制结构,从电价水平规制和电价结构规制两个角度剖析了我国现行的电价规制模式；最后,基于上述规制现状,对我国电价规制中存在的问题进行了识别。
第三,总结了国外电力产业价格规制改革的成功经验,并分别提出了我国竞争性发、售电领域以及自然垄断性输、配电领域的价格规制改革路径。特别地,基于影响价格规制改革模式选择的制度性以及产业特征方面的因素分析,提出了我国输、配电价格规制应该采取的渐进式改革思路,也即在改革初期,建立回报率价格规制模式；在改革的中远期,再逐步引入具有激励性的价格规制模式。
第四,对政府的主要规制对象-我国输配电企业在回报率规制模式下的有效投资问题进行了系统分析。首先,基于A-J效应和输配电企业的投资实践提出“有效投资”的概念；然后,基于输配电企业与规制者之间的单次合约关系以及无限次重复合约关系,分别建立了回报率规制模式下的单次非合作动态博弈模型以及无限次重复博弈模型。并基于两种情况下的模型,分别推导出基于博弈均衡实现企业有效投资水平需要满足的条件；最后对如何促进我国输配电企业进行有效投资提出相关对策建议。
第五,对政府的主要规制对象-我国输配电企业在回报率规制模式下准许投资回报率水平的确定进行了深入研究。首先,对准许投资回报率的内涵和加权平均资本成本法下输配电企业各参数的确定进行了分析；然后,深入研究了我国输配电企业准许权益资本成本的确定。通过对权益资本成本各种计算方法的分析和比较,并基于国外输配电企业权益资本成本测算实践以及我国资本市场实际,提出适用于我国资本市场电力产业上市公司的准许权益资本成本计算方法-剩余收益折现模型法；分别基于净资产收益率评价标准和剩余收益折现模型对我国输配电企业的权益资本成本进行测算。特别是通过选取我国电力产业35家上市公司为样本,首次采用“三阶段”剩余收益折现模型对我国电力产业上市公司的权益资本成本进行了测算；最后,采用加权平均资本成本法估算出了回报率规制模式下我国输配电企业的准许投资回报率水平。
第六,对我国输配电企业价格规制的远期改革模式-激励性价格规制改革进行了进一步的探讨。首先,在对激励性规制产生的现实环境以及激励性价格规制模型分析的基础上,对完全信息条件下和不对称信息条件下抽租和效率的权衡问题进行了深入研究,并基于此提出不同价格规制模式的成本补偿规则、激励强度及其选择建议；然后,分别将公共资金的高成本、低效的成本审计制度以及较高的规制收买风险等引入激励性价格规制模型中,剖析了我国上述转轨经济特征对激励性价格规制的影响以及相应的解决策略；最后,基于上述分析,提出我国输配电企业激励性价格规制的渐进式改革之路以及相应的价格规制改革模式。
最后,本文提出了我国电力产业价格规制改革应该采取的相关配套措施。
本文含有图17幅,表34个,参考文献116篇。
As the basic energy industry of national economy and social development, the power industry plays an important role in guaranteeing the normal operation of national economy, ensuring national energy security and maintaining sustainable and stable development of economy and society. Because of the natural monopoly characteristics and the basic strategic position, the price regulation of the power industry has been viewed as the core of economic regulation of the government in most countries of the world. At present, the worldwide power industries are ongoing the power system reform and the power market reform taking the theme of "deregulation and introducing competition". In this process, price regulation reform which is the key of power industry reform has become the focus of growing attention. Effective price regulation mechanism is of great significance to optimize power resources allocation, promote the formation of competitive electricity markets, ensure fair distribution of society income, guarantee the simple reproduction as well as expanded reproduction and encourage enterprises to improve efficiency.
Under the impetus of regulation reform of the power industry in the world, since the reform and opening up, a series of adjustment and reform measures of China's electricity price regulation mechanism have been implemented and the cost-plus pricing mode based on the average socail cost has been formed. However, China's electricity price regulation reform is lagging behind compared with developed countries. The price formation mechanism based on market for the competitive fields has not been established and effective means of price regulation for the natural monopoly fields still lack. There is a considerable distance from building market price formation mechanism and incentive regulation modes. The current price regulation mechanism can not meet the need of China's power industry development and power market construction. Therefore, there is an urgent, need to further promote the reform. Based on the above background, this dissertation chooses the price regulation reform of China's power industry as the research object. The author hopes that this research will not only play an active role in promoting the price regulation reform of China's power industry, but also provide a useful reference to other natural monopoly industries'reform.
The main contents of this dissertation include the following:
Firstly, government regulation theory and price regulation theory are systematically summarized. The evolution process of the government regulation theory of natural monopoly and the latest development are reviewed and a detailed analysis of the meanings, targets and patterns of price regulation are conducted, which lay a solid theoretical basis for the full text.
Secondly, China's electricity price regulation reform process is analyzed comprehensively so as to provide the reality foundation for this research. The five stages of price regulation reform are reviewed which include the strict regulation period, the initial reform period, the formation period of cost-based regulation mechanism, the adjustment period and the deepening period; The current electricity price regulation structure is analyzed from both the angle of regulation subject and of regulation object. The current regulation mode is analyzed from both the perspective of tariff level and of tariff structure; then, based on the above, problems of power price regulation are identified.
Thirdly, successful experiences of price regulation reform of foreign power industry are summed up and the price regulation reform paths are put forward both for the field of power production as well as sale and for the field of power transmission as well as distribution. Especially, based on factors impacting the choice of price regulation modes, the price regulation reform path of China's power transmission and distribution field is proposed which is that in the early stage, the rate of return regulation model should be established and in the long-term, incentive price regulation model should be introduced gradually.
Fourthly, the issue of efficient investment of power transmission and distribution enterprises as the main regulated object under the rate of return model is analyzed systematically. The concept of "Efficient Investment" is put forward based on A-J effect and investment practices of power transmission and distribution enterprises firstly; Then, based on the single and the infinitely repeated contractual relationships between the enterprise and the regulator, the single non-cooperative dynamic game model and the infinitely repeated games one are established respectively and according to the game equilibrium outcomes, conditions on how to achieve efficient investment are derived; finally, suggestions on how to encourage enterprises to make efficient investment are proposed.
Fifthly, the determination of permitted return rate level of power transmission and distribution enterprises as the main regulated object under the rate of return model is conducted in-depth study. First, the meaning of permitted return on investment and parameters under the law of the weighted average cost of capital are analyzed; then, the determination of permitted cost of equity capital of China's power transmission and distribution enterprises is studied. Through the analysis and comparison of a variety of calculation methods, and based on foreign practice of calculation of cost of equity capital as well as the status of China's capital market, the Discounted Residual Income Model is proposed for calculating the cost of equity of listed companies of China's power industry; Next, based both on standard of rate of return on net assets and on the Discounted Residual Income Model respectively, the cost of equity capital are calculated. Especially by taking35listed companies of power industry as samples,"Three-Stage" Discounted Residual Income Model is used for the first time to calculate the cost of equity capital; At last, the levels of permitted rate of return on investment of China's power transmission and distribution enterprises are estimated by means of the law of weighted average cost of capital.
Sixthly, incentive price regulation reform of China's power transmission and distribution enterprises in the long term is further explored. First of all, based on the analysis of realistic environment and incentive price regulation model, the trade-off between rent extraction and efficiency under conditions of both complete information and asymmetric information are discussed. And then cost compensation rules, incentive intensity and selection recommendations of different price regulation patterns are raised; Then, the high cost of public funds, inefficient cost audit system as well as higher risk of regulatory capture are introduced into the incentive regulation model respectively, the impacts of these characteristics of China's transition economy on the incentive price regulation are analyzed and the corresponding solutions are proposed; In the end, the gradual reform ways of incentive price regulation and the corresponding price regulation patterns of China's power transmission and distribution enterprises are put forward.
Finally, the related supporting measures for China's electricity price regulation reform are put forward.
This dissertation contains17figures,34tables and116references.
引文
[1]张昕竹,让·拉丰,A.易斯塔什.网络产业：规制和竞争理论[M].社会科学出版社,2000.
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