与贸易相关的知识产权保护摩擦的政治经济学分析
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摘要
伴随着国际经济贸易交往贸易摩擦也不可避免地存在着。但是进入20世纪90年代以来，贸易摩擦呈现出明显的增长。由于知识产权在贸易中的价值的增加，与贸易相关的知识产权保护摩擦在这些贸易摩擦中所占的比重也出现了上升趋势。发达国家在知识产权方面处于绝对优势地位，知识产权对其经济的促进作用也非常重要。因此，发达国家为了维护其知识产权的既得利益，在世界范围内不断加强知识产权保护力度。而另一方面，发展中国家由于其经济发展水平相对落后，加强知识产权保护在短期内会损害模仿式技术创新和福利水平。在这种国际环境下，与贸易相关的知识产权保护摩擦也就必然会产生并将长期存在。如何协调这一矛盾，促进资金和技术的国际流动，促进本国整体经济发展，成为各国都关心的重大课题。
本文首先对现有文献进行了梳理和归纳，发现目前对知识产权保护引起的贸易摩擦的研究比较分散，主要分为这样几部分：从宏观经济学角度对知识产权保护进行研究；从贸易政策的政治经济学的角度对贸易摩擦进行的研究；从国际法学的角度对知识产权摩擦进行的研究。这种研究的领域是分离的，缺乏对知识产权保护摩擦的产生过程的系统分析，理论与现实的结合不够紧密。这为本文提供了进一步的研究视角，也提供了可以利用的研究方法。
在文献研究的基础上，本文基于知识产权保护水平差异的现状，从利益集团的视角出发，系统地研究了知识产权贸易摩擦的诱发机制。利益集团可以通过直接院外活动和间接院外活动的方式影响政府的公共政策，并且对知识产权保护水平的差异也能够施加影响。发达国家政府在利益集团的影响下积极干预知识产权保护，由此形成了不同利益集团、不同国家政府和国际机构之间的知识产权保护摩擦的诱发机制：一种是以多边或双边协定形式表现的制度层面的知识产权保护摩擦发生机制，一种是以产品纠纷形式表现的产品层面的知识产权保护摩擦发生机制。这两种知识产权贸易摩擦的诱发机制可以很好地解释不同类型的知识产权保护摩擦的发生过程。
在知识产权保护摩擦发生机制的分析基础上，本文从理论模型上寻求政府对知识产权保护政策决策过程的解释。对保护待售模型的回顾表明：在结构参数一定的条件下，政府对各行业的保护水平取决于各行业的进口渗透率、进口弹性和该行业能否有效地组织为利益集团。公共政策就是政府与利益集团相互博弈的结果。在保护待售模型基础之上，本文又进一步假设，除了单位商品和一般商品，还存在一种供制造一般商品所需的知识产权，知识产权为生产过程中的无形投入。由此探讨政府在兼顾政治捐献和社会福利水平的条件下如何决定对知识产权的保护政策。研究结论表明：在考虑到知识产权投入的条件下，生产一般产品的产业保护率将不再独立，而是受到知识产权产业保护率的影响；同时，知识产权的保护比率不受其他产业保护率的影响。这一结论可以从政治经济学的角度解释知识产权贸易摩擦的产生。
为了对利益集团的政治因素影响知识产权保护摩擦的理论分析进行检验，接下来本文运用TRIPS协议下发达国家与发展中国家之间的知识产权保护摩擦的案例进行分析，这是制度层面贸易摩擦的表现形式。案例分析的主要结论为：鉴于TRIPS协议在当前国际知识产权保护体系中的核心地位，发展中国家一方面要遵守协议规定的基本义务，另一方面又要利用现有的规则，积极参与国际协议的修改和完善，争取更有利的国际规则。在研究发达国家与发展中国家的知识产权保护摩擦之后后，案例研究进一步扩展到中美之间以3(?)7调查形式表现的知识产权保护摩擦问题，这种摩擦表现为产品层面的贸易摩擦。作为发展中国家，中国要重视产品层面的知识产权保护摩擦，为国内的经济发展清除不必要的障碍。论文的规定，即：学校有权保留并向国家有关部门或机构送交论文的复印件和电子版，允许论文被查阅和借阅。本人授权华中科技大学可以将本学位论文的全部或部分内容编入有关数据库进行检索，可以采用影印、缩印或扫描等复制手段保存和汇编本学位论文。
It is inevitable that trade frictions are in widely existence with growth of internationaleconomic communication. Trade friction has a significant growth since the 1990s.Frictions in trade-related intellectual property rights (IPR) are increasing with the growingimportance of IPR in international trade. Developed countries have an advantage in IPR,and IPR is important in promoting economic growth. Developed countries strengthen IPRaround the world in order to protect its IPR vested interests, while developing countrieswould hurt their technological innovation and welfare from protection of IPR due to theconfine of economic development. Therefore, trade-related IPR generates and would existfor a long time. It is a major issue widely concerned to coordinate this contradiction andpromote international capital and technology flow.
This dissertation first reviews the existing literature. Research on trade frictionscaused by protection of IPR is scattered and could be divided to several parts: research onIPR in the view of macroeconomics, research on trade frictions in the view of politicaleconomy of trade policy, research on frictions of IPR in the view of International Law. Thecurrent research is partial and lacking of system analysis, which provides a uniqueperspective in this paper.
Based on current literature, this dissertation systematically studies the induced regimeof trade frictions on IPR in the view of interest groups. Interest groups could affect publicpolicy by direct and indirect lobbing. Two kinds of induced regimes are formulated owingto active protection of IPR in the interference of interest groups in developed countries.One is regulation-level regime of trade frictions on IPR, in which regulation represents asmultilateral or bilateral agreement; the other is product-level regime of trade frictions onIPR, which represents as dispute on products. These two regimes could neatly interpretdifferent kinds of trade frictions on IPR.
Based on the analysis of induced regime of trade frictions on IPR, this dissertationtries to explain theoretically the policy-making process of IPR protection. Protection forSale Model suggests that industrial protection level in fixed structural parameter dependson industrial import penetration ratio, industrial elasticity of imports and the effectivenessof the industry to organize into interest groups. Public policy is the outcome of interactgame between the government and interest groups. Based on Protection for Sale Model, we further assume that an invisible input, IPR, is necessary to produce goods besidesgeneral input, and discuss how protection policy of IPR is made concerning both politicalcontribution and social welfare. We find that the protection ratio of common industry isinfluenced by the ratio of IPR industry, whereas the latter is independent from the former.
The dissertation analyzes IPR protection in developing countries under TRIPS. Inview of the core status of TRIPS, developing countries should abide by the basicobligations under TRIPS, and participate in improving and perfecting internationalagreements. Then we extend case analysis to 337 investigations between China andAmerica in order to test the trade friction theory. Case analysis demonstrates that Chinamust pay more attentions to product-level trade frictions on IPR protection.
本文首先对现有文献进行了梳理和归纳，发现目前对知识产权保护引起的贸易摩擦的研究比较分散，主要分为这样几部分：从宏观经济学角度对知识产权保护进行研究；从贸易政策的政治经济学的角度对贸易摩擦进行的研究；从国际法学的角度对知识产权摩擦进行的研究。这种研究的领域是分离的，缺乏对知识产权保护摩擦的产生过程的系统分析，理论与现实的结合不够紧密。这为本文提供了进一步的研究视角，也提供了可以利用的研究方法。
在文献研究的基础上，本文基于知识产权保护水平差异的现状，从利益集团的视角出发，系统地研究了知识产权贸易摩擦的诱发机制。利益集团可以通过直接院外活动和间接院外活动的方式影响政府的公共政策，并且对知识产权保护水平的差异也能够施加影响。发达国家政府在利益集团的影响下积极干预知识产权保护，由此形成了不同利益集团、不同国家政府和国际机构之间的知识产权保护摩擦的诱发机制：一种是以多边或双边协定形式表现的制度层面的知识产权保护摩擦发生机制，一种是以产品纠纷形式表现的产品层面的知识产权保护摩擦发生机制。这两种知识产权贸易摩擦的诱发机制可以很好地解释不同类型的知识产权保护摩擦的发生过程。
在知识产权保护摩擦发生机制的分析基础上，本文从理论模型上寻求政府对知识产权保护政策决策过程的解释。对保护待售模型的回顾表明：在结构参数一定的条件下，政府对各行业的保护水平取决于各行业的进口渗透率、进口弹性和该行业能否有效地组织为利益集团。公共政策就是政府与利益集团相互博弈的结果。在保护待售模型基础之上，本文又进一步假设，除了单位商品和一般商品，还存在一种供制造一般商品所需的知识产权，知识产权为生产过程中的无形投入。由此探讨政府在兼顾政治捐献和社会福利水平的条件下如何决定对知识产权的保护政策。研究结论表明：在考虑到知识产权投入的条件下，生产一般产品的产业保护率将不再独立，而是受到知识产权产业保护率的影响；同时，知识产权的保护比率不受其他产业保护率的影响。这一结论可以从政治经济学的角度解释知识产权贸易摩擦的产生。
为了对利益集团的政治因素影响知识产权保护摩擦的理论分析进行检验，接下来本文运用TRIPS协议下发达国家与发展中国家之间的知识产权保护摩擦的案例进行分析，这是制度层面贸易摩擦的表现形式。案例分析的主要结论为：鉴于TRIPS协议在当前国际知识产权保护体系中的核心地位，发展中国家一方面要遵守协议规定的基本义务，另一方面又要利用现有的规则，积极参与国际协议的修改和完善，争取更有利的国际规则。在研究发达国家与发展中国家的知识产权保护摩擦之后后，案例研究进一步扩展到中美之间以3(?)7调查形式表现的知识产权保护摩擦问题，这种摩擦表现为产品层面的贸易摩擦。作为发展中国家，中国要重视产品层面的知识产权保护摩擦，为国内的经济发展清除不必要的障碍。论文的规定，即：学校有权保留并向国家有关部门或机构送交论文的复印件和电子版，允许论文被查阅和借阅。本人授权华中科技大学可以将本学位论文的全部或部分内容编入有关数据库进行检索，可以采用影印、缩印或扫描等复制手段保存和汇编本学位论文。
It is inevitable that trade frictions are in widely existence with growth of internationaleconomic communication. Trade friction has a significant growth since the 1990s.Frictions in trade-related intellectual property rights (IPR) are increasing with the growingimportance of IPR in international trade. Developed countries have an advantage in IPR,and IPR is important in promoting economic growth. Developed countries strengthen IPRaround the world in order to protect its IPR vested interests, while developing countrieswould hurt their technological innovation and welfare from protection of IPR due to theconfine of economic development. Therefore, trade-related IPR generates and would existfor a long time. It is a major issue widely concerned to coordinate this contradiction andpromote international capital and technology flow.
This dissertation first reviews the existing literature. Research on trade frictionscaused by protection of IPR is scattered and could be divided to several parts: research onIPR in the view of macroeconomics, research on trade frictions in the view of politicaleconomy of trade policy, research on frictions of IPR in the view of International Law. Thecurrent research is partial and lacking of system analysis, which provides a uniqueperspective in this paper.
Based on current literature, this dissertation systematically studies the induced regimeof trade frictions on IPR in the view of interest groups. Interest groups could affect publicpolicy by direct and indirect lobbing. Two kinds of induced regimes are formulated owingto active protection of IPR in the interference of interest groups in developed countries.One is regulation-level regime of trade frictions on IPR, in which regulation represents asmultilateral or bilateral agreement; the other is product-level regime of trade frictions onIPR, which represents as dispute on products. These two regimes could neatly interpretdifferent kinds of trade frictions on IPR.
Based on the analysis of induced regime of trade frictions on IPR, this dissertationtries to explain theoretically the policy-making process of IPR protection. Protection forSale Model suggests that industrial protection level in fixed structural parameter dependson industrial import penetration ratio, industrial elasticity of imports and the effectivenessof the industry to organize into interest groups. Public policy is the outcome of interactgame between the government and interest groups. Based on Protection for Sale Model, we further assume that an invisible input, IPR, is necessary to produce goods besidesgeneral input, and discuss how protection policy of IPR is made concerning both politicalcontribution and social welfare. We find that the protection ratio of common industry isinfluenced by the ratio of IPR industry, whereas the latter is independent from the former.
The dissertation analyzes IPR protection in developing countries under TRIPS. Inview of the core status of TRIPS, developing countries should abide by the basicobligations under TRIPS, and participate in improving and perfecting internationalagreements. Then we extend case analysis to 337 investigations between China andAmerica in order to test the trade friction theory. Case analysis demonstrates that Chinamust pay more attentions to product-level trade frictions on IPR protection.
引文
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