中央银行独立性研究
|
摘要
中央银行的独立性是随着各国政治经济不断发展自然演化而成。从本质上讲,中央银行的独立性是实现宏观经济政策有效性的手段或工具,正是从这个意义上,可以看出,中央银行的独立性主要是操作手段或方式的独立性,而不是目标的独立性。本论文对中央银行的独立性问题进行了系统地梳理。从主要经济大国的中央银行的独立性演进历史、中央银行独立性的理论研究、中央银行与财政关系、中央银行具备真正独立性所必备的制度基础及政策协调机制五个方面全面深入地对中央银行的独立性进行了研究。并针对中国人民银行的独立性问题作了开创性研究。首次利用Loungani和Sheets中央银行独立性评估模型对中国人民银行的独立性进行全面的评估和阐述,对提高中国人民银行独立性的二个相关问题:金融安全网的建立和宏观经济协调机制的建立作了深刻地剖析。
具体地,在第一章中,本论文探讨了当今世界主要经济大国的中央银行独立性的演变和发展历程。20世纪初,世界上仅有18家中央银行,其中16家在欧洲,另外两家分别在日本和印度尼西亚。从十九世纪末到20世纪初,各早期中央银行性质与职能演进开始趋于一定形式,这使得中央银行的理论渐呈明晰与确定,并为一般经济学家和金融理论家所认同。但中央银行的职能随着金融体系的演变也随之发生变化,中央银行的职能也受不同经济理论思潮的影响,同时,各国由于政治、经济文化历史的不同,中央银行的职能又有所不同。上世纪九十年代以来,随着经济金融全球化的发展,各国金融体系趋同化发展,各国中央银行的职能也出现趋同的趋势。全球经济金融的一体化促进了各国中央银行的发展,而且都在向着更强的独立性、更高的透明度方向发展。
各国中央银行独立性演变的历史告诉我们,正是由于在经济发展过程中,各国通过经济和金融危机逐步认识到中央银行独立性是提高宏观经济政策有效性的基础,在开放条件下,中央银行独立性得不到提高,将可能发生金融危机。三十年代美国大萧条催生了美联储的独立性。日本上世纪长达十年的经济萧条才换来了全社会认识到中央银行独立性的重要。同样,正是亚洲金融危机,韩国政府才深切感受到提高中央银行独立性的重要。
在第二章中,本论文对中央银行独立性评估方法进行了理论综述。首先,从动态不一致问题、保守的中央银行家方法和“委托代理”方法,探讨为什么中央银行独立性能带来较低的通货膨胀率。其次,研究了对中央银行法定独立性的测度方法主要有四种,分别是Alesina法(Alesina,1989)、GMT法(Grilli,Masciandaro&Tabellini,1991)、CWN法(Cukierman,Webb和Neyapti,1992)和Eijffinger-Schaling法(Eijffinger和Schaling,1993a,1993b)。在此基础上,选择了适合转轨国家的评估中央银行独立性的方法——Loungani和Sheets中央银行独立性评估模型,根据《中国人民银行法》(1995年和2003年),并结合中国人民银行实际操作,对中国人民银行独立性进行了评估。通过对中央银行资产负债表进行横向和纵向的比较,本论文独创性地研究了中国人民银行的独立性问题,论证了我国中央银行的资产负债表存在恶化的趋势,而恶化的中央银行资产负债表不利于维护金融稳定,最终也会加剧目前的通货膨胀预期,这种状况正是源于中央银行独立性的欠缺。最后本章探讨了中国人民银行独立性与通胀率、经济增长率的相关关系。
中央银行与财政部存在紧密的联系。在第三章中,对中央银行和财政关系作了全面阐述。由于财政部在经济方面最能代表政府,国家或政府对中央银行的管理和干预在许多方面都是通过财政部门进行的,所以中央银行与财政部的关系在很大程度上反映了中央银行与政府的关系,是影响中央银行独立性的一个重要因素。
我国中央银行与财政的关系是一个不断发展变化的过程,受经济体制的影响很大。在计划经济时期,我国国力弱,财政收入少,经济发展大多倚仗银行融资,存在弱财政、强金融;随着改革开放、经济不断发展,中央银行与财政的关系越来越趋于理性;1995年《人民银行法》颁布之后,中央银行的独立性在法律保障下不断加强。总体而言,人民银行与财政部的关系可分为三个阶段:一是改革开放之前,人民银行处于从属地位;二是改革开放后至1995年,人民银行与财政部的职能仍有待厘清;三是1995年之后至今,二者的关系进入新阶段。随着我国财政职能逐步转向公共财政,财政实力不断增强,我国中央银行独立性也在不断增强。本章分析了不同时期中央银行与财政的关系。
最后贷款人职能是中央银行最基本的职能之一。中央银行通过履行最后贷款人职能向金融机构提供资金支持,对确保一国金融体系平稳健康发展具有重要意义。第四章实证研究了中国人民银行的最后贷款人实践。总体上看,人民银行发放贷款用于清偿破产或被关闭金融机构的债务,已经超越了一般意义上的最后贷款人职能范畴,事实上承担了隐性存款保险和财政性救助职能。此外,在我国,由于法制不健全,宪政制度不完善,并且银行业在金融业中占主导地位,中央银行如不参与金融监管,就无法对银行行为施加影响,防范金融风险,宏观经济政策效果也不显著。
第五章阐述了货币政策目标、政策有效性与中央银行独立性之间的关系。全面和成功的通货膨胀目标制建立在良好的财政状况、稳定的宏观经济、发达的金融体系、中央银行货币政策的独立性和维持物价稳定的责任、货币政策工具与通货膨胀之间具有明白易懂的传导机制、有可靠的通货膨胀预测方法、建立责任制和信誉所需要的货币政策透明度这些基础之上。尽管货币供应量作为我国货币政策工具功效逐步减弱,但我国货币政策目标过渡到通货膨胀为目标还需要一段时间,其中,尽快提高中央银行独立性是重要前提。
第六章探讨了中央银行独立性与宏观调控协调机制之间的关系,中央银行的独立性不是目的,目的是要提高宏观经济政策的有效性。宏观经济政策的有效性在相当程度上取决于中央银行独立性与宏观经济政策协调机制制度安排之间的平衡。在某种程度上,可以说健全的宏观经济政策协调机制制度安排是中央银行独立性的前提。当前,我国宏观经济运行中存在的深层次矛盾和问题主要有:经济增长不均衡;增长方式仍然以粗放型为主,政府主导特征明显:经济结构、产业结构不合理问题仍然十分突出;经济周期波动明显;企业对宏观调控敏感性不足,等等。宏观调控必须对货币、财政两大宏观政策之间的协调配合予以更多的关注。缺少有效的宏观调控机制,中央银行的独立性也无法影响市场预期,达到中央银行独立性的目的。
第七章对本论文进行了总结,提出了提高我国中央银行独立性所必须采取的四项措施,即在法律上、人事上、职能上、资金预算上的独立性来确保中央银行的独立性。
The independence of central bank is naturally formed according to the development of politics and economy in each country. In essence, the independence of central bank is tool or method to reach macroscopic economic policies efficiency which indicates the independence focuses on operating method rather than objective. This paper discusses independence of central bank systemically and analyzes development history of central bank independence in major developed countries, central bank independence theories, relationship between central bank independence and finance, institutions basics and policies regulation mechanism required in true central bank independence. And the paper does some researches in People's Bank of China independence in which for the first evaluates People's Bank of China independence all-sided by using to use Loungani and Sheets evaluation mode of central bank independence to. The paper also analyses profoundly two connected questions in promoting independence of central bank: establishment of finance security network and macroscopic economic regulating mechanism.
Concretely, the first chapter discusses central bank independence development history in major developed countries. In the early 20~(th) century, there were only 18 central banks in the whole world, among them 16 were in Europe, other two were in Japan and Indonesia. From the late 19th century and early 20th century, quality and function of each central bank were generally developed into certain form, which made central bank theories certain and clear and were reorganized by economists and finance theorists generally. But central bank functions developed according to changes in finance system and also were influenced by different economic theory thoughts. Meanwhile, functions of central banks varied from country to country. Since 90s in the last century, the finance system assimilates each other, which is followed by the assimilation in central banks functions in the world through world's finance globalization. The world's finance and economy globalization accelerates central bank in every county develop to higher independence and diaphaneity.
The development of central bank independence indicates that through the economics and finances crises in course of economy development, every country recognizes that central bank independence is the foundation to promote macroscopic economic policies efficiency, absent of which will lead to finance crises. The Federal Reserve was established as a result of Great Depression in 30s, and ten-year's economic depression made importance of central bank independence known to Japanese. And Korean government also realized the matter by experiencing Asian finance crises.
In the second chapter, the paper discusses evaluation methods of central bank independence. Firstly, discusses reasons why independence of central bank will lead to relatively low inflation rate by analyzing dynamic inconsistent problem, conservative central banker methods and agency by agreement. Secondly, researches four methods of legal independence of central bank estimation: methods of Alesina (Alesina,1989)GMT(Grilli, Masciandaro&Tabellini, 1991), CWN(Cukierman webb and neyapiti,1992)and Eijffinger-Schaling(Eijffinger and Schaling, 1993a, 1993b). And in this basement, chooses modes of Loungani and Sheets which are suitable to transformation countries to evaluate People's Bank of China independence by combining its practical manipulation according to People's Bank of China law. And by transverse and longitudinal analyzes of balance sheet, this paper originally studies People's Bank of China's independence and demonstrates its deterioration trend which will be against finance stability and accelerate present inflation. In the end of this chapter, the paper discusses relations among people's bank of china independence, inflation rate and economic increasing rate.
There exists a close relationship between the central bank and the ministry of finance. Chapter three examines this relationship from all angles. Since the ministry of finance best represents the government in terms of economic affairs, and the state's regulation and interference with the bank is done through the agent of ministry of finance, the relationship between central bank and the ministry of finance largely reflects the relationship between the central bank and the government. That relationship has been diminishing the independence of the central bank.
The relationship between the central bank and the ministry of finance has been in an ever-changing process where economic system poses a great influence to that relationship. In the era of planned economy, due to revenue shortage, economic growth were mostly supported by bank loans, which led to the phenomenon of "a weak ministry of finance, and strong banks". Thanks to the reform-and-opening-up policy and fast and steady economic growth, the relationship between the central bank and the ministry of finance tends to be more and more rationalized. The independence of the central bank has been strengthened ever since the enactment of Law on the People's Bank in 1995.
Generally, the evolution of the relationship between the central bank and the ministry of finance can be divided into the following three stages: (i)prior to the reform-and-opening-up program, the People's Bank (of China) was just a subordinate organ; (ii)the functions of People's Bank and those of the ministry of finance were not well defined until 1995; (iii) the year of 1995 witnessed the relationship entering into a new stage of development and ever since then the relationship has stayed in that new track. Along with a functional switch of finance to public finance and with big fiscal revenue growth, the independence of the China's central bank has been accordingly strengthened. This chapter evaluates the relationship in different time periods between the central bank and the ministry of finance.
One of the fundamental functions of the central bank is to function as the ultimate lender. As the ultimate lender, the central bank financially supports other financial institutions by making loans to them, which is of great significance to the steady development of the finance system.
Chapter four observes the practice of People's Bank of China as the ultimate lender from an empirical perspective. The People's Bank issues loans to repay debts of bankrupt financial institutions or financial institutions having been ordered to be dissolved, but that is beyond the magic a ultimate lender is supposed to make.
Chapter Five illustrates the relationship between monetary policy objective, the effectiveness thereof and the independence of the central bank. The amount of currency supply as a tool of monetary policy functions less and less effectively, but it takes time to transform the monetary policy objective into inflation objective. Promotion of the independence of the central bank, among other things, poses a major premise to that transformation.
Chapter Six explores the relationship between the independence of the central bank and the coordinate mechanism of macro control. The independence of the central bank itself is not a sought goal; instead, the objective aims at the enhancement of efficiency and effectiveness of macro economic policies. The said efficiency and effectiveness can be largely attributed to a balance between independence of the central bank and the coordinate mechanism of macro economic policies. It can be said to some extent that a well-intended coordinate mechanism of macro economic policies is prerequisite for the independence of the central bank. The deep-rooted problems existing in China's macro economy mainly include: unbalanced economic growth, costly and inefficient growth model, government-oriented economic operation, unreasonable economic structure and industrial structure, and etc. Macro control should attach more attention to the coordination between monetary policy and finance policy. Absent effective macro control mechanism, independence of the central bank alone is unable to cast influence over market expectation, which renders that independence meaningless.
Chapter seven summarizes this paper and proposes four approaches to the promotion of the independence of China's central bank, namely, the central bank being a legally independent entity, the central bank being independent regarding human resources, the central bank functioning independently and the center bank being independent in making budgets.
具体地,在第一章中,本论文探讨了当今世界主要经济大国的中央银行独立性的演变和发展历程。20世纪初,世界上仅有18家中央银行,其中16家在欧洲,另外两家分别在日本和印度尼西亚。从十九世纪末到20世纪初,各早期中央银行性质与职能演进开始趋于一定形式,这使得中央银行的理论渐呈明晰与确定,并为一般经济学家和金融理论家所认同。但中央银行的职能随着金融体系的演变也随之发生变化,中央银行的职能也受不同经济理论思潮的影响,同时,各国由于政治、经济文化历史的不同,中央银行的职能又有所不同。上世纪九十年代以来,随着经济金融全球化的发展,各国金融体系趋同化发展,各国中央银行的职能也出现趋同的趋势。全球经济金融的一体化促进了各国中央银行的发展,而且都在向着更强的独立性、更高的透明度方向发展。
各国中央银行独立性演变的历史告诉我们,正是由于在经济发展过程中,各国通过经济和金融危机逐步认识到中央银行独立性是提高宏观经济政策有效性的基础,在开放条件下,中央银行独立性得不到提高,将可能发生金融危机。三十年代美国大萧条催生了美联储的独立性。日本上世纪长达十年的经济萧条才换来了全社会认识到中央银行独立性的重要。同样,正是亚洲金融危机,韩国政府才深切感受到提高中央银行独立性的重要。
在第二章中,本论文对中央银行独立性评估方法进行了理论综述。首先,从动态不一致问题、保守的中央银行家方法和“委托代理”方法,探讨为什么中央银行独立性能带来较低的通货膨胀率。其次,研究了对中央银行法定独立性的测度方法主要有四种,分别是Alesina法(Alesina,1989)、GMT法(Grilli,Masciandaro&Tabellini,1991)、CWN法(Cukierman,Webb和Neyapti,1992)和Eijffinger-Schaling法(Eijffinger和Schaling,1993a,1993b)。在此基础上,选择了适合转轨国家的评估中央银行独立性的方法——Loungani和Sheets中央银行独立性评估模型,根据《中国人民银行法》(1995年和2003年),并结合中国人民银行实际操作,对中国人民银行独立性进行了评估。通过对中央银行资产负债表进行横向和纵向的比较,本论文独创性地研究了中国人民银行的独立性问题,论证了我国中央银行的资产负债表存在恶化的趋势,而恶化的中央银行资产负债表不利于维护金融稳定,最终也会加剧目前的通货膨胀预期,这种状况正是源于中央银行独立性的欠缺。最后本章探讨了中国人民银行独立性与通胀率、经济增长率的相关关系。
中央银行与财政部存在紧密的联系。在第三章中,对中央银行和财政关系作了全面阐述。由于财政部在经济方面最能代表政府,国家或政府对中央银行的管理和干预在许多方面都是通过财政部门进行的,所以中央银行与财政部的关系在很大程度上反映了中央银行与政府的关系,是影响中央银行独立性的一个重要因素。
我国中央银行与财政的关系是一个不断发展变化的过程,受经济体制的影响很大。在计划经济时期,我国国力弱,财政收入少,经济发展大多倚仗银行融资,存在弱财政、强金融;随着改革开放、经济不断发展,中央银行与财政的关系越来越趋于理性;1995年《人民银行法》颁布之后,中央银行的独立性在法律保障下不断加强。总体而言,人民银行与财政部的关系可分为三个阶段:一是改革开放之前,人民银行处于从属地位;二是改革开放后至1995年,人民银行与财政部的职能仍有待厘清;三是1995年之后至今,二者的关系进入新阶段。随着我国财政职能逐步转向公共财政,财政实力不断增强,我国中央银行独立性也在不断增强。本章分析了不同时期中央银行与财政的关系。
最后贷款人职能是中央银行最基本的职能之一。中央银行通过履行最后贷款人职能向金融机构提供资金支持,对确保一国金融体系平稳健康发展具有重要意义。第四章实证研究了中国人民银行的最后贷款人实践。总体上看,人民银行发放贷款用于清偿破产或被关闭金融机构的债务,已经超越了一般意义上的最后贷款人职能范畴,事实上承担了隐性存款保险和财政性救助职能。此外,在我国,由于法制不健全,宪政制度不完善,并且银行业在金融业中占主导地位,中央银行如不参与金融监管,就无法对银行行为施加影响,防范金融风险,宏观经济政策效果也不显著。
第五章阐述了货币政策目标、政策有效性与中央银行独立性之间的关系。全面和成功的通货膨胀目标制建立在良好的财政状况、稳定的宏观经济、发达的金融体系、中央银行货币政策的独立性和维持物价稳定的责任、货币政策工具与通货膨胀之间具有明白易懂的传导机制、有可靠的通货膨胀预测方法、建立责任制和信誉所需要的货币政策透明度这些基础之上。尽管货币供应量作为我国货币政策工具功效逐步减弱,但我国货币政策目标过渡到通货膨胀为目标还需要一段时间,其中,尽快提高中央银行独立性是重要前提。
第六章探讨了中央银行独立性与宏观调控协调机制之间的关系,中央银行的独立性不是目的,目的是要提高宏观经济政策的有效性。宏观经济政策的有效性在相当程度上取决于中央银行独立性与宏观经济政策协调机制制度安排之间的平衡。在某种程度上,可以说健全的宏观经济政策协调机制制度安排是中央银行独立性的前提。当前,我国宏观经济运行中存在的深层次矛盾和问题主要有:经济增长不均衡;增长方式仍然以粗放型为主,政府主导特征明显:经济结构、产业结构不合理问题仍然十分突出;经济周期波动明显;企业对宏观调控敏感性不足,等等。宏观调控必须对货币、财政两大宏观政策之间的协调配合予以更多的关注。缺少有效的宏观调控机制,中央银行的独立性也无法影响市场预期,达到中央银行独立性的目的。
第七章对本论文进行了总结,提出了提高我国中央银行独立性所必须采取的四项措施,即在法律上、人事上、职能上、资金预算上的独立性来确保中央银行的独立性。
The independence of central bank is naturally formed according to the development of politics and economy in each country. In essence, the independence of central bank is tool or method to reach macroscopic economic policies efficiency which indicates the independence focuses on operating method rather than objective. This paper discusses independence of central bank systemically and analyzes development history of central bank independence in major developed countries, central bank independence theories, relationship between central bank independence and finance, institutions basics and policies regulation mechanism required in true central bank independence. And the paper does some researches in People's Bank of China independence in which for the first evaluates People's Bank of China independence all-sided by using to use Loungani and Sheets evaluation mode of central bank independence to. The paper also analyses profoundly two connected questions in promoting independence of central bank: establishment of finance security network and macroscopic economic regulating mechanism.
Concretely, the first chapter discusses central bank independence development history in major developed countries. In the early 20~(th) century, there were only 18 central banks in the whole world, among them 16 were in Europe, other two were in Japan and Indonesia. From the late 19th century and early 20th century, quality and function of each central bank were generally developed into certain form, which made central bank theories certain and clear and were reorganized by economists and finance theorists generally. But central bank functions developed according to changes in finance system and also were influenced by different economic theory thoughts. Meanwhile, functions of central banks varied from country to country. Since 90s in the last century, the finance system assimilates each other, which is followed by the assimilation in central banks functions in the world through world's finance globalization. The world's finance and economy globalization accelerates central bank in every county develop to higher independence and diaphaneity.
The development of central bank independence indicates that through the economics and finances crises in course of economy development, every country recognizes that central bank independence is the foundation to promote macroscopic economic policies efficiency, absent of which will lead to finance crises. The Federal Reserve was established as a result of Great Depression in 30s, and ten-year's economic depression made importance of central bank independence known to Japanese. And Korean government also realized the matter by experiencing Asian finance crises.
In the second chapter, the paper discusses evaluation methods of central bank independence. Firstly, discusses reasons why independence of central bank will lead to relatively low inflation rate by analyzing dynamic inconsistent problem, conservative central banker methods and agency by agreement. Secondly, researches four methods of legal independence of central bank estimation: methods of Alesina (Alesina,1989)GMT(Grilli, Masciandaro&Tabellini, 1991), CWN(Cukierman webb and neyapiti,1992)and Eijffinger-Schaling(Eijffinger and Schaling, 1993a, 1993b). And in this basement, chooses modes of Loungani and Sheets which are suitable to transformation countries to evaluate People's Bank of China independence by combining its practical manipulation according to People's Bank of China law. And by transverse and longitudinal analyzes of balance sheet, this paper originally studies People's Bank of China's independence and demonstrates its deterioration trend which will be against finance stability and accelerate present inflation. In the end of this chapter, the paper discusses relations among people's bank of china independence, inflation rate and economic increasing rate.
There exists a close relationship between the central bank and the ministry of finance. Chapter three examines this relationship from all angles. Since the ministry of finance best represents the government in terms of economic affairs, and the state's regulation and interference with the bank is done through the agent of ministry of finance, the relationship between central bank and the ministry of finance largely reflects the relationship between the central bank and the government. That relationship has been diminishing the independence of the central bank.
The relationship between the central bank and the ministry of finance has been in an ever-changing process where economic system poses a great influence to that relationship. In the era of planned economy, due to revenue shortage, economic growth were mostly supported by bank loans, which led to the phenomenon of "a weak ministry of finance, and strong banks". Thanks to the reform-and-opening-up policy and fast and steady economic growth, the relationship between the central bank and the ministry of finance tends to be more and more rationalized. The independence of the central bank has been strengthened ever since the enactment of Law on the People's Bank in 1995.
Generally, the evolution of the relationship between the central bank and the ministry of finance can be divided into the following three stages: (i)prior to the reform-and-opening-up program, the People's Bank (of China) was just a subordinate organ; (ii)the functions of People's Bank and those of the ministry of finance were not well defined until 1995; (iii) the year of 1995 witnessed the relationship entering into a new stage of development and ever since then the relationship has stayed in that new track. Along with a functional switch of finance to public finance and with big fiscal revenue growth, the independence of the China's central bank has been accordingly strengthened. This chapter evaluates the relationship in different time periods between the central bank and the ministry of finance.
One of the fundamental functions of the central bank is to function as the ultimate lender. As the ultimate lender, the central bank financially supports other financial institutions by making loans to them, which is of great significance to the steady development of the finance system.
Chapter four observes the practice of People's Bank of China as the ultimate lender from an empirical perspective. The People's Bank issues loans to repay debts of bankrupt financial institutions or financial institutions having been ordered to be dissolved, but that is beyond the magic a ultimate lender is supposed to make.
Chapter Five illustrates the relationship between monetary policy objective, the effectiveness thereof and the independence of the central bank. The amount of currency supply as a tool of monetary policy functions less and less effectively, but it takes time to transform the monetary policy objective into inflation objective. Promotion of the independence of the central bank, among other things, poses a major premise to that transformation.
Chapter Six explores the relationship between the independence of the central bank and the coordinate mechanism of macro control. The independence of the central bank itself is not a sought goal; instead, the objective aims at the enhancement of efficiency and effectiveness of macro economic policies. The said efficiency and effectiveness can be largely attributed to a balance between independence of the central bank and the coordinate mechanism of macro economic policies. It can be said to some extent that a well-intended coordinate mechanism of macro economic policies is prerequisite for the independence of the central bank. The deep-rooted problems existing in China's macro economy mainly include: unbalanced economic growth, costly and inefficient growth model, government-oriented economic operation, unreasonable economic structure and industrial structure, and etc. Macro control should attach more attention to the coordination between monetary policy and finance policy. Absent effective macro control mechanism, independence of the central bank alone is unable to cast influence over market expectation, which renders that independence meaningless.
Chapter seven summarizes this paper and proposes four approaches to the promotion of the independence of China's central bank, namely, the central bank being a legally independent entity, the central bank being independent regarding human resources, the central bank functioning independently and the center bank being independent in making budgets.
引文
Akhand, Hafiz A. (1998). Central Bank Independence and Growth: A Sensitivity Analysis. The Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 31, No. 2, 303-317.
Alesina, Alberto and Vittorio Grilli. The European Central Bank: Reshaping Monetary Policy in Europe. In Establishing a Central Bank: Issues in Europe and Lessons from the United States, edited by Matthew Canzoneri, Vittorio Grilli, and Paul Masson, pp. 49-77. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press and CEPR, 1992.
Alesina, Alberto and Lawrence H. Summers. (1993). Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 25, No. 2, 151-162.
Alesina, Alberto and Roberta Gatti. (1995). Independent Central Banks: Low Inflation at No Cost? The American Economic Review, Vol. 85, No. 2, 196-200.
Arnone, Marco and Bernard J. Laurens, Jean-Francois Segalotto, Martin Sommer (2007). IMF Working Paper WP/07/88.
Arnone, Marco and Bernard J. Laurens, Jean-Francois Segalotto (2006). IMF Working Paper WP/06/227.
Bade, R., and M. Parkin, 1977, "Central Bank Laws and Monetary Policies: A Preliminary Investigation, " (London, Ontario, Canada: University of Western Ontario).
Bade, R., and M. Parkin, 1982, "Central Bank Laws and Inflation: A Comparative Analysis," (unpublished; London, Ontario, Canada: University of Western Ontario).
Bade, R., and M. Parkin, 1985, "Central Bank Laws and Monetary Policies," (unpublished; London, Ontario, Canada: University of Western Ontario).
Borrero Alberto Musalem(2001). IMF Working Paper WP/01/19
Barro R. J. and D. B. Gorden (1983), Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy, Journal of Monetory Economics, 12, 101 — 121.
Bernhard, William. (1998). A Political Explanation of Variations in Central Bank Independence. The American Political Science Review, Vol. 92, No. 2, 311-327.
Bleaney, Michael. (1996). Central Bank Independence, Wage-Bargaining Structure, and Macroeconomic Performance in OECD Countries. Oxford Economic Papers, Vol. 48, No. 1, 20-38.
Brentford, Philip. (1998). Constitutional Aspects of the Independence of the European Central Bank. The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 1, 75-116.
Brumm, Harold J. (2000). Inflation and Central Bank Independence: Conventional Wisdom Redux. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 32, No. 4, 807-819.
Campillo, Marta, and Jeffrey A. Miron. Why Does Inflation Differ across Countries? In Reducing Inflation: Motivation and Strategy, edited by Christina D. Romer and David H. Romer, pp. 335-57. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997.
F. Capie and G. Goodhart, Central Banks, Macro Policy, and the Financial System:The Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, Financial History Review, 1995, 2, pp. 145-161.
Cargill, T. F., 1995, "The Statistical Association Between Central Bank Independence and Inflation, " Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, Vol. 193, 159 - 72.
Coleman, William. (2001). Is It Possible That an Independent Central Bank Is Impossible? The Case of the Australian Notes Issue Board, 1920-1924. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 33, No. 3, 729-748.
Crowe Christopher. (2006). IMF Working Paper WP/06/227.
Cukierman, Alex. Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence. The MIT Press, 1992.
Cukierman, Alex. (1994). Central Bank Independence and Monetary Control. The Economic Journal, Vol. 104, No. 427, 1437-1448.
Daniels, Joseph P., Farrokh Nourzad and David D. VanHoose. (2005). Openness, Central Bank Independence, and the Sacrifice Ratio. The Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 37, No. 2,371-379.
Debelle, Guy and Stanley Fischer. How Independent Should a Central Bank Be? Mimeo, MIT, May 1994.
Dolmas, Jim, Gregory W. Huffman and Mark A. Wynne. (2000). Inequality, Inflation, and Central Bank Independence. The Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 33, No. 1, 271-287.
Eggertsson, Gauti and Eric Le Borgne. (2003). A Political Agency Theory of Central Bank Independence, 2003:1-34.
Eijffinger, S. C. W. and Eric Schaling(1993a) .Central Bank Independence:Theory and Evidence, CentER Discussion Pater Series, 9325 ,May, 1—32.
Eijffinger, S. C. W. (1997),Ceneral Bank Independence:Definition and Aspects, Independent Central Bank and Economic Performance, Xi — Xii.
Fischer, Stanley. (1995a). Central-Bank Independence Revisited. The American Economic Review, Vol. 85, No. 2, 201-206.
Fischer, Stanley. (1995b). Modern Central Banking, in Forrest Capie, Stanley Fischer, Charles Goodhart, and Norbert Schnadt, eds., The future of central banking. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp. 262-308.
Franzese, Robert J. (1999). Partially Independent Central Banks, Politically Responsive Governments, and Inflation. American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 43, No. 3, 681-706.
Fuhrer, Jeffrey C. (1997). Central Bank Independence and Inflation Targeting: Monetary Policy Paradigms for the Next Millenium? Federal Reserve Bank of Boston New England Economic Review (January/February 1997), 19-36.
Goodman, John B. (1991). The Politics of Central Bank Independence. Comparative Politics, Vol. 23, No. 3, 329-349.
Grilli, Vittorio, Donato Masciandaro, and Guido Tabellini. (1991). Institution and Policies. Economic Policy(October 1991), 365-92.
Hall, Peter A. and Robert J. Franzese, Jr. (1998). Mixed Signals: Central Bank Independence, Coordinated Wage Bargaining, and European Monetary Union. International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 3, 505-535.
Jacome H. Luis I. (2001). IMF Working Paper WP/01/212.
Jenkins, M. A., 1996, "Central Bank Independence and Inflation Performance: Panacea or Placebo?" Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, Vol. 197, 241-70.
Lin, Xiang. (1999). Central-Bank Independence, Economic Behavior, and Optimal Term Lengths: Comment. The American Economic Review, Vol. 89, No. 4, 1056-1062.
Lohmann, Susanne. (1992). Optimal Commitment in Monetary Policy: Credibility versus Flexibility[J]. American Economic Review, March, 1992, Vol82, Nol:273}286.
Lohmann, Susanne. (1998). Federalism and Central Bank Independence: The Politics of German Monetary Policy, 1957-92. World Politics, Vol. 50, No. 3, 401-446.
Loungani, Prakash and Nathan Sheets. (1997). Central Bank Independence, Inflation, and Growth in Transition Economies. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 29, No. 3, 381-399.
Miller, Geoffrey P. (1998). An Interest-Group Theory of Central Bank Independence. The Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 27, No. 2, 433-453.
Miller, Victoria J. (1997). Debt Structure as an Indicator of Central Bank Independence. Southern Economic Journal, Vol. 64, No. 1, 85-96.
Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini. (1993). Designing Institutions for Monetary Stability. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, December 1993, 39, 53-84.
Posen, Adam S. Why Central Bank Independence Does Not Cause Low Inflation: There Is No Institutional Fix for Politics. In Finance and the International Economy, edited by Richard 0 Brien, pp. 41-65. Oxford: Oxford University Press for the Amex Bank Review, 1993.
Posen, Adam S. Declarations Are Not Enough: Financial Sector Sources of Central Bank Independence. In NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1995, edited by Ben S. Bernanke and Julio J. Rotemberg, pp. 255-95. Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, 1995.
Rogoff, Kenneth. (1985). The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target. Quarterly Journal of Economic 110, 1169-90.
Simmons, Beth A. (1996). Rulers of the Game: Central Bank Independence During the Interwar Years. International Organization, Vol. 50, No. 3, 407-443.
Temple, Jonathan. Central Bank Independence and Inflation: Good News and Bad News. Economics Letters 61 (November 1998), 215-19.
Tompson, William. (1998). The Politics of Central Bank Independence in Russia. Europe-Asia Studies,Vol.50,No.7,1157-1182.
Valila,Timo.T.(1999).Credibility of Central Bank Independence Revisited.IMF Working Paper WP/99/2.
Waller,Christopher J.and Carl E.Walsh.(1996).Central-Bank Independence,Economic Behavior,and Optimal Term Lengths.The American Economic Review,Vol.86,No.5,1139-1153.
Walsh,Carl E.(1995).Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers.American Economic Review,85(1),150-67.
Walsh,Carl E.(1999).Announcements,Inflation Targeting and Central Bank Incentives.Economic,Vol.66,No.262,255-269.
刘锡良、肖龄,2003:“从独立走向合作--中央银行未来发展趋势”,《金融研究》,2003年第10期。
中国人民银行、国际货币基金组织、联合国开发计划署编:《宏观经济管理中的中央银行》,中国金融出版社1990年版。
成思危主编,路线及关键:论中国商业银行的改革,经济科学出版社,2006;
胡海鸥主编,中国金融体制的改革与发展,复旦大学出版社,2004;
刘光第主编,中国经济体制转轨时期的货币政策研究,中国金融出版社,1997;
刘鸿儒著,刘鸿儒论中国金融体制改革,中国金融出版社,2000;
尚福林主编,中国货币信贷政策与制度,中国金融出版社,1995;
谢平著,中国金融制度的选择,上海远东出版社,1996;
谢平著,货币监管与金融改革,三联书店,2004;
谢平,许国平主编,路径选择一金融监管体制改革与央行职能,中国金融出版社,2004;
曾培炎主编,中国投资建设50年,中国计划出版社,1999;
张晓慧著,转轨中的中国金融宏观调控,辽宁人民出版社,1995;
张中华著,中国市场化过程中的地方政府投资行为研究,湖南人民出版社,1997;
赵海宽等编著,银行体制改革,天津人民出版社,1988;
赵海宽,郭田勇著,中国金融体制改革20年,中州古籍出版社,1998;
郑韶,何晓星主编,中国经济体制改革20年大事记1978-1998,上海辞书出版社,1998;
中共中央文献研究室编,新时期经济体制改革重要文献选编,中央文献出版社,1998;
周正庆著,中国货币政策研究,中国金融出版社,1993;
朱纯福著,当代银行体制改革思想,人民出版社,2001;
巴曙松,刘孝红,牛播坤,转型时期中国金融体系中的地方治理与银行改革的互动研究,金融研究,2005年第5期;
王学信,我国国有商业银行发展与期间政府干预行为演变的经济学分析,商业研究,2003年第16期;
吴晓灵,关于中国金融体制改革的几个问题,经济体制比较,1994年第1期;
谢平,关于我国中央银行的独立性问题,金融研究,1994年第4期;
谢平,关于我国中央银行独立性问题的探讨,经济师,1995年第5期;
许式飘,试论我国中央银行宏观调控功能的缺陷及其矫正,浙江财经学院学报,1994年第3期;
闫素仙,论中国中央银行的独立性,天津师范大学学报,2004年第6期;
中国金融体制改革跟踪研究课题组,中国金融体制改革跟踪研究(上),中国金融体制改革,1997年第3期;
中国金融体制改革跟踪研究课题组,中国金融体制改革跟踪研究(下),中国金融体制改革,1997年第4期;
“中国改革与发展报告”专家组,中国改革20年--回顾、反思与展望,中国经济改革研究基金会网站http://www.crcpp.org/crf/index.asp;
周小川,保持金融稳定,防范金融风险,金融研究,2004年第4期;
周小川,完善法律制度,改进金融生态,中国经济50人论坛,2004年12月;
中国人民银行培训中心:《金融风险处置案例》,中国金融出版社,2000版;
青木昌彦等:《政府在东亚经济发展中的作用》,中国经济出版社,1998版;
查理士●恩诺克等:《银行业的稳健与货币政策》,中国金融出版社,1999版;
George.J.Benston:《Perspectives on Safe & Sound Banking:Past,Present and Future》,MIT Press,1986
Alesina, Alberto and Vittorio Grilli. The European Central Bank: Reshaping Monetary Policy in Europe. In Establishing a Central Bank: Issues in Europe and Lessons from the United States, edited by Matthew Canzoneri, Vittorio Grilli, and Paul Masson, pp. 49-77. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press and CEPR, 1992.
Alesina, Alberto and Lawrence H. Summers. (1993). Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 25, No. 2, 151-162.
Alesina, Alberto and Roberta Gatti. (1995). Independent Central Banks: Low Inflation at No Cost? The American Economic Review, Vol. 85, No. 2, 196-200.
Arnone, Marco and Bernard J. Laurens, Jean-Francois Segalotto, Martin Sommer (2007). IMF Working Paper WP/07/88.
Arnone, Marco and Bernard J. Laurens, Jean-Francois Segalotto (2006). IMF Working Paper WP/06/227.
Bade, R., and M. Parkin, 1977, "Central Bank Laws and Monetary Policies: A Preliminary Investigation, " (London, Ontario, Canada: University of Western Ontario).
Bade, R., and M. Parkin, 1982, "Central Bank Laws and Inflation: A Comparative Analysis," (unpublished; London, Ontario, Canada: University of Western Ontario).
Bade, R., and M. Parkin, 1985, "Central Bank Laws and Monetary Policies," (unpublished; London, Ontario, Canada: University of Western Ontario).
Borrero Alberto Musalem(2001). IMF Working Paper WP/01/19
Barro R. J. and D. B. Gorden (1983), Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy, Journal of Monetory Economics, 12, 101 — 121.
Bernhard, William. (1998). A Political Explanation of Variations in Central Bank Independence. The American Political Science Review, Vol. 92, No. 2, 311-327.
Bleaney, Michael. (1996). Central Bank Independence, Wage-Bargaining Structure, and Macroeconomic Performance in OECD Countries. Oxford Economic Papers, Vol. 48, No. 1, 20-38.
Brentford, Philip. (1998). Constitutional Aspects of the Independence of the European Central Bank. The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 1, 75-116.
Brumm, Harold J. (2000). Inflation and Central Bank Independence: Conventional Wisdom Redux. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 32, No. 4, 807-819.
Campillo, Marta, and Jeffrey A. Miron. Why Does Inflation Differ across Countries? In Reducing Inflation: Motivation and Strategy, edited by Christina D. Romer and David H. Romer, pp. 335-57. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997.
F. Capie and G. Goodhart, Central Banks, Macro Policy, and the Financial System:The Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, Financial History Review, 1995, 2, pp. 145-161.
Cargill, T. F., 1995, "The Statistical Association Between Central Bank Independence and Inflation, " Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, Vol. 193, 159 - 72.
Coleman, William. (2001). Is It Possible That an Independent Central Bank Is Impossible? The Case of the Australian Notes Issue Board, 1920-1924. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 33, No. 3, 729-748.
Crowe Christopher. (2006). IMF Working Paper WP/06/227.
Cukierman, Alex. Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence. The MIT Press, 1992.
Cukierman, Alex. (1994). Central Bank Independence and Monetary Control. The Economic Journal, Vol. 104, No. 427, 1437-1448.
Daniels, Joseph P., Farrokh Nourzad and David D. VanHoose. (2005). Openness, Central Bank Independence, and the Sacrifice Ratio. The Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 37, No. 2,371-379.
Debelle, Guy and Stanley Fischer. How Independent Should a Central Bank Be? Mimeo, MIT, May 1994.
Dolmas, Jim, Gregory W. Huffman and Mark A. Wynne. (2000). Inequality, Inflation, and Central Bank Independence. The Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 33, No. 1, 271-287.
Eggertsson, Gauti and Eric Le Borgne. (2003). A Political Agency Theory of Central Bank Independence, 2003:1-34.
Eijffinger, S. C. W. and Eric Schaling(1993a) .Central Bank Independence:Theory and Evidence, CentER Discussion Pater Series, 9325 ,May, 1—32.
Eijffinger, S. C. W. (1997),Ceneral Bank Independence:Definition and Aspects, Independent Central Bank and Economic Performance, Xi — Xii.
Fischer, Stanley. (1995a). Central-Bank Independence Revisited. The American Economic Review, Vol. 85, No. 2, 201-206.
Fischer, Stanley. (1995b). Modern Central Banking, in Forrest Capie, Stanley Fischer, Charles Goodhart, and Norbert Schnadt, eds., The future of central banking. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp. 262-308.
Franzese, Robert J. (1999). Partially Independent Central Banks, Politically Responsive Governments, and Inflation. American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 43, No. 3, 681-706.
Fuhrer, Jeffrey C. (1997). Central Bank Independence and Inflation Targeting: Monetary Policy Paradigms for the Next Millenium? Federal Reserve Bank of Boston New England Economic Review (January/February 1997), 19-36.
Goodman, John B. (1991). The Politics of Central Bank Independence. Comparative Politics, Vol. 23, No. 3, 329-349.
Grilli, Vittorio, Donato Masciandaro, and Guido Tabellini. (1991). Institution and Policies. Economic Policy(October 1991), 365-92.
Hall, Peter A. and Robert J. Franzese, Jr. (1998). Mixed Signals: Central Bank Independence, Coordinated Wage Bargaining, and European Monetary Union. International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 3, 505-535.
Jacome H. Luis I. (2001). IMF Working Paper WP/01/212.
Jenkins, M. A., 1996, "Central Bank Independence and Inflation Performance: Panacea or Placebo?" Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, Vol. 197, 241-70.
Lin, Xiang. (1999). Central-Bank Independence, Economic Behavior, and Optimal Term Lengths: Comment. The American Economic Review, Vol. 89, No. 4, 1056-1062.
Lohmann, Susanne. (1992). Optimal Commitment in Monetary Policy: Credibility versus Flexibility[J]. American Economic Review, March, 1992, Vol82, Nol:273}286.
Lohmann, Susanne. (1998). Federalism and Central Bank Independence: The Politics of German Monetary Policy, 1957-92. World Politics, Vol. 50, No. 3, 401-446.
Loungani, Prakash and Nathan Sheets. (1997). Central Bank Independence, Inflation, and Growth in Transition Economies. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 29, No. 3, 381-399.
Miller, Geoffrey P. (1998). An Interest-Group Theory of Central Bank Independence. The Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 27, No. 2, 433-453.
Miller, Victoria J. (1997). Debt Structure as an Indicator of Central Bank Independence. Southern Economic Journal, Vol. 64, No. 1, 85-96.
Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini. (1993). Designing Institutions for Monetary Stability. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, December 1993, 39, 53-84.
Posen, Adam S. Why Central Bank Independence Does Not Cause Low Inflation: There Is No Institutional Fix for Politics. In Finance and the International Economy, edited by Richard 0 Brien, pp. 41-65. Oxford: Oxford University Press for the Amex Bank Review, 1993.
Posen, Adam S. Declarations Are Not Enough: Financial Sector Sources of Central Bank Independence. In NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1995, edited by Ben S. Bernanke and Julio J. Rotemberg, pp. 255-95. Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, 1995.
Rogoff, Kenneth. (1985). The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target. Quarterly Journal of Economic 110, 1169-90.
Simmons, Beth A. (1996). Rulers of the Game: Central Bank Independence During the Interwar Years. International Organization, Vol. 50, No. 3, 407-443.
Temple, Jonathan. Central Bank Independence and Inflation: Good News and Bad News. Economics Letters 61 (November 1998), 215-19.
Tompson, William. (1998). The Politics of Central Bank Independence in Russia. Europe-Asia Studies,Vol.50,No.7,1157-1182.
Valila,Timo.T.(1999).Credibility of Central Bank Independence Revisited.IMF Working Paper WP/99/2.
Waller,Christopher J.and Carl E.Walsh.(1996).Central-Bank Independence,Economic Behavior,and Optimal Term Lengths.The American Economic Review,Vol.86,No.5,1139-1153.
Walsh,Carl E.(1995).Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers.American Economic Review,85(1),150-67.
Walsh,Carl E.(1999).Announcements,Inflation Targeting and Central Bank Incentives.Economic,Vol.66,No.262,255-269.
刘锡良、肖龄,2003:“从独立走向合作--中央银行未来发展趋势”,《金融研究》,2003年第10期。
中国人民银行、国际货币基金组织、联合国开发计划署编:《宏观经济管理中的中央银行》,中国金融出版社1990年版。
成思危主编,路线及关键:论中国商业银行的改革,经济科学出版社,2006;
胡海鸥主编,中国金融体制的改革与发展,复旦大学出版社,2004;
刘光第主编,中国经济体制转轨时期的货币政策研究,中国金融出版社,1997;
刘鸿儒著,刘鸿儒论中国金融体制改革,中国金融出版社,2000;
尚福林主编,中国货币信贷政策与制度,中国金融出版社,1995;
谢平著,中国金融制度的选择,上海远东出版社,1996;
谢平著,货币监管与金融改革,三联书店,2004;
谢平,许国平主编,路径选择一金融监管体制改革与央行职能,中国金融出版社,2004;
曾培炎主编,中国投资建设50年,中国计划出版社,1999;
张晓慧著,转轨中的中国金融宏观调控,辽宁人民出版社,1995;
张中华著,中国市场化过程中的地方政府投资行为研究,湖南人民出版社,1997;
赵海宽等编著,银行体制改革,天津人民出版社,1988;
赵海宽,郭田勇著,中国金融体制改革20年,中州古籍出版社,1998;
郑韶,何晓星主编,中国经济体制改革20年大事记1978-1998,上海辞书出版社,1998;
中共中央文献研究室编,新时期经济体制改革重要文献选编,中央文献出版社,1998;
周正庆著,中国货币政策研究,中国金融出版社,1993;
朱纯福著,当代银行体制改革思想,人民出版社,2001;
巴曙松,刘孝红,牛播坤,转型时期中国金融体系中的地方治理与银行改革的互动研究,金融研究,2005年第5期;
王学信,我国国有商业银行发展与期间政府干预行为演变的经济学分析,商业研究,2003年第16期;
吴晓灵,关于中国金融体制改革的几个问题,经济体制比较,1994年第1期;
谢平,关于我国中央银行的独立性问题,金融研究,1994年第4期;
谢平,关于我国中央银行独立性问题的探讨,经济师,1995年第5期;
许式飘,试论我国中央银行宏观调控功能的缺陷及其矫正,浙江财经学院学报,1994年第3期;
闫素仙,论中国中央银行的独立性,天津师范大学学报,2004年第6期;
中国金融体制改革跟踪研究课题组,中国金融体制改革跟踪研究(上),中国金融体制改革,1997年第3期;
中国金融体制改革跟踪研究课题组,中国金融体制改革跟踪研究(下),中国金融体制改革,1997年第4期;
“中国改革与发展报告”专家组,中国改革20年--回顾、反思与展望,中国经济改革研究基金会网站http://www.crcpp.org/crf/index.asp;
周小川,保持金融稳定,防范金融风险,金融研究,2004年第4期;
周小川,完善法律制度,改进金融生态,中国经济50人论坛,2004年12月;
中国人民银行培训中心:《金融风险处置案例》,中国金融出版社,2000版;
青木昌彦等:《政府在东亚经济发展中的作用》,中国经济出版社,1998版;
查理士●恩诺克等:《银行业的稳健与货币政策》,中国金融出版社,1999版;
George.J.Benston:《Perspectives on Safe & Sound Banking:Past,Present and Future》,MIT Press,1986