金融国有资产管理中的激励约束机制研究
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摘要
在我国,无论是从资产总量、控制机构规模,还是从对国民经济的影响来看,金融国有资产都在国民经济体系中占据着举足轻重的位置。金融国有资产是国家所有的资产。受到国家所有者非人格化特征影响,金融国有资产只有分离所有权和经营权,采用委托代理形式,才能实现市场化经营。这就不可避免地产生了委托代理矛盾。而随着经济的发展,一系列深层次的委托代理矛盾正逐步累积并激化。如何设计科学合理的激励约束机制,激励与约束金融国有资产代理人努力提高金融国有资产的运营效率,完成金融国有资产的委托任务,解决这些委托代理矛盾,成为了目前金融国有资产管理中亟待解决的关键问题之一。本文在金融国有资产管理的框架下,针对金融国有资产管理中的激励约束机制展开了深入系统的研究,研究主要从明确金融国有资产的委托任务,确立其激励约束目标：分析我国金融国有资产的特征,寻找金融国有资产管理中激励约束机制的特点,选择合理的激励约束措施等方面展开,并在此基础上提出了完善我国金融国有资产管理中激励约束机制的具体建议。
论文内容共分为八章。第一章是绪论部分。这一章主要阐述了论题的研究背景、研究意义,并对论文的研究范围、研究内容和研究方法做了介绍和说明。第二章是理论基础部分,主要是对研究中涉及到的相关理论进行了系统的归纳和阐述,并在此基础上提出了论文的研究框架。第三章是对金融国有资产管理中激励约束机制的变迁进行回顾和总结,分析目前存在的问题,并探寻其根源。第四章是对国际上类似的金融类国有及国有控股企业以及私有金融企业的高管激励约束机制进行比较和分析,寻找可以借鉴之处。在上述章节的基础上,第五章分析了金融国有资产的委托任务。通过委托任务进一步明确了激励约束机制的激励约束目标和具体的衡量指标。第六章则是针对我国金融国有资产的实际情况,构建了金融国有资产的委托代理模型。通过对模型的分析,得出了符合我国国情的激励约束机制的特点,并在此基础上,提出研究假设,构造回归模型,利用面板数据进行了实证检验。根据前面章节的分析论证结果,第七章提出了完善金融国有资产管理中激励约束机制的具体建议。第八章是结论和展望,主要阐述了论文的研究结论、不足之处和进一步努力的方向。
本文认为,激励约束机制作用的有效发挥是一系列要素共同作用的结果。这些相互作用的要素包括激励约束主体、激励约束客体、激励约束目标、绩效评价以及具体的激励约束措施,因此,对金融国有资产管理中激励约束机制的研究需要围绕这些要素而展开。此外,金融国有资产是特殊的,这种特殊性源于其国家所有者身份的特殊性和其所处金融行业的特殊性。因此,对金融国有资产管理中激励约束机制的研究,除了需要考虑上述五个要素,还需要考虑金融国有资产特性带来的影响。本文认为,金融国有资产委托任务的多项性是其特性之一。金融国有资产有三项委托任务,依次是金融效率、金融稳定、社会责任。为完成这三项任务,针对代理人的激励约束目标就是,金融类国有及国有控股企业盈利能力和风险控制能力的提高以及社会责任的合理承担。金融国有资产的另一特性是确定性预算软约束。即,金融国有资产代理人确信,在金融类国有及国有控股企业风险失控、陷入财务困境时,国家肯定会实施财政救助。基于这两大特性,本文构建了金融国有资产的委托代理模型,对模型的分析表明,在金融国有资产管理中,金融国有及国有控股企业高管的激励约束机制具有明显区别于其他类型企业的设计要点。因此,囊括了这些设计要点的激励约束机制才能克服金融国有资产委托代理关系带来的一系列矛盾和问题,激励与约束金融国有资产代理人,为提高金融国有资产的运营效率而努力,从而促进金融国有资产的健康发展,为国民经济的持续高速增长提供助力。
The state-owned financial assets are owned by state, existing in financial enterprises. The state-owned financial assets play an impotent role in our national economic system, in terms of total quantities, scale, or the impact of national economy. With the development of economy, the detachment of operating and ownership rights incurs principal-agent relations in the state-owned financial assets, in which a series of deep contradictions and problems are exposed. In order to solve these conflicts, the agents of the state-owned financial assets should design appropriate incentives and restraints to improve the state-owned financial assets'operation efficiency and complete the delegated tasks. Accordingly, in current management system of the state-owned financial assets, that how to design a scientific and reasonable incentive-constraint mechanism has become one of the critical issues.
This dissertation carries out deep and systematic researches on the Incentive-constraint mechanism under the background of the management system of state-owned financial assets. These researches mainly include drawing a clear conclusion on tasks entrusted by the principal of the state-owned financial assets, analyzing the characteristics of incentive-constrain mechanism of the state-owned financial assets, and choosing reasonable incentive and restraint measures. Finally, recommendations to improve our country's incentive-constraint mechanism of the state-owned financial assets have been proposed in details.
The dissertation has eight chapters. The first chapter is the introduction part. This chapter introduces (1) the aim of this dissertation,(2) the theory and practical significance of this dissertation, and (3) the research range, measures, and contents. The second chapter is the theoretical part. In this chapter, the theories related to this study are systematically summarized, and the research framework of the thesis is put forward. The third chapter is about the history of incentive-constraint mechanism in the state-owned financial assets. This chapter analyzes the existing problems and gives its reasons. The fourth chapter draws experiences and lessons from comparisons and analysis of the incentive-constraint mechanism in financial enterprises. In the fifth chapter, the tasks of State-owned financial assets are analyzed, with which the tasks, the targets of the incentive-constraint mechanism are mapped out. The sixth chapter constructs the state-owned financial assets principal-agent model based on our country's situation. According to the analysis of the model, ways to improve the incentive-constraint mechanism have been obtained. On this basis, this chapter puts forward the research hypothesis, constructing a regression model and using panel data to do an empirical test. According to the above conclusions, the seventh chapter introduces several advises to perfect the incentive-constraint mechanism in the management of the state-owned financial assets. The eighth chapter is the conclusions and prospects, mainly explains the research conclusion, and further efforts in the future.
Through these researches, this dissertation identifies that in line with requirements of government, state-owned financial assets have three tasks. They are financial efficiency, financial stability and social responsibility. To complete these tasks, the state-owned financial assets agents need to undertake works include improving financial state-owned enterprise's profit ability, the risk control ability and assuming reasonable social responsibility. Therefore, goals of incenting and constraining state-owned financial assets agents are (1) the profit ability,(2) the control ability, and (3) the social responsibility. It is the unique characteristic of the state-owned financial assets. In addition, the status mentioned above, also produces deterministic soft budget constraint problems, of which the state-owned financial assets agents expect that the government will certainly offer financial aids when the state-owned enterprises fall in financial troubles. This is another unique characteristic of the state-owned financial assets. Based on the two characteristics, this paper establishes incentive-constraint model of the state-owned financial assets. Analysis of the model shows that, under the background of the management of the state-owned financial assets, the design of incentive-restraint mechanism is distinguished from other industries as well as other types of enterprises. Only the incentive-constraint mechanism which includes all these characteristics, can overcome the series of problems produced by the state-owned financial assets' principal-agent relationship, can play sound incentives and constraint to the agent of the state-owned financial assets to improve the operation efficiency, and can promote the healthy development of the state-owned financial assets to assist to the national economy growth.
论文内容共分为八章。第一章是绪论部分。这一章主要阐述了论题的研究背景、研究意义,并对论文的研究范围、研究内容和研究方法做了介绍和说明。第二章是理论基础部分,主要是对研究中涉及到的相关理论进行了系统的归纳和阐述,并在此基础上提出了论文的研究框架。第三章是对金融国有资产管理中激励约束机制的变迁进行回顾和总结,分析目前存在的问题,并探寻其根源。第四章是对国际上类似的金融类国有及国有控股企业以及私有金融企业的高管激励约束机制进行比较和分析,寻找可以借鉴之处。在上述章节的基础上,第五章分析了金融国有资产的委托任务。通过委托任务进一步明确了激励约束机制的激励约束目标和具体的衡量指标。第六章则是针对我国金融国有资产的实际情况,构建了金融国有资产的委托代理模型。通过对模型的分析,得出了符合我国国情的激励约束机制的特点,并在此基础上,提出研究假设,构造回归模型,利用面板数据进行了实证检验。根据前面章节的分析论证结果,第七章提出了完善金融国有资产管理中激励约束机制的具体建议。第八章是结论和展望,主要阐述了论文的研究结论、不足之处和进一步努力的方向。
本文认为,激励约束机制作用的有效发挥是一系列要素共同作用的结果。这些相互作用的要素包括激励约束主体、激励约束客体、激励约束目标、绩效评价以及具体的激励约束措施,因此,对金融国有资产管理中激励约束机制的研究需要围绕这些要素而展开。此外,金融国有资产是特殊的,这种特殊性源于其国家所有者身份的特殊性和其所处金融行业的特殊性。因此,对金融国有资产管理中激励约束机制的研究,除了需要考虑上述五个要素,还需要考虑金融国有资产特性带来的影响。本文认为,金融国有资产委托任务的多项性是其特性之一。金融国有资产有三项委托任务,依次是金融效率、金融稳定、社会责任。为完成这三项任务,针对代理人的激励约束目标就是,金融类国有及国有控股企业盈利能力和风险控制能力的提高以及社会责任的合理承担。金融国有资产的另一特性是确定性预算软约束。即,金融国有资产代理人确信,在金融类国有及国有控股企业风险失控、陷入财务困境时,国家肯定会实施财政救助。基于这两大特性,本文构建了金融国有资产的委托代理模型,对模型的分析表明,在金融国有资产管理中,金融国有及国有控股企业高管的激励约束机制具有明显区别于其他类型企业的设计要点。因此,囊括了这些设计要点的激励约束机制才能克服金融国有资产委托代理关系带来的一系列矛盾和问题,激励与约束金融国有资产代理人,为提高金融国有资产的运营效率而努力,从而促进金融国有资产的健康发展,为国民经济的持续高速增长提供助力。
The state-owned financial assets are owned by state, existing in financial enterprises. The state-owned financial assets play an impotent role in our national economic system, in terms of total quantities, scale, or the impact of national economy. With the development of economy, the detachment of operating and ownership rights incurs principal-agent relations in the state-owned financial assets, in which a series of deep contradictions and problems are exposed. In order to solve these conflicts, the agents of the state-owned financial assets should design appropriate incentives and restraints to improve the state-owned financial assets'operation efficiency and complete the delegated tasks. Accordingly, in current management system of the state-owned financial assets, that how to design a scientific and reasonable incentive-constraint mechanism has become one of the critical issues.
This dissertation carries out deep and systematic researches on the Incentive-constraint mechanism under the background of the management system of state-owned financial assets. These researches mainly include drawing a clear conclusion on tasks entrusted by the principal of the state-owned financial assets, analyzing the characteristics of incentive-constrain mechanism of the state-owned financial assets, and choosing reasonable incentive and restraint measures. Finally, recommendations to improve our country's incentive-constraint mechanism of the state-owned financial assets have been proposed in details.
The dissertation has eight chapters. The first chapter is the introduction part. This chapter introduces (1) the aim of this dissertation,(2) the theory and practical significance of this dissertation, and (3) the research range, measures, and contents. The second chapter is the theoretical part. In this chapter, the theories related to this study are systematically summarized, and the research framework of the thesis is put forward. The third chapter is about the history of incentive-constraint mechanism in the state-owned financial assets. This chapter analyzes the existing problems and gives its reasons. The fourth chapter draws experiences and lessons from comparisons and analysis of the incentive-constraint mechanism in financial enterprises. In the fifth chapter, the tasks of State-owned financial assets are analyzed, with which the tasks, the targets of the incentive-constraint mechanism are mapped out. The sixth chapter constructs the state-owned financial assets principal-agent model based on our country's situation. According to the analysis of the model, ways to improve the incentive-constraint mechanism have been obtained. On this basis, this chapter puts forward the research hypothesis, constructing a regression model and using panel data to do an empirical test. According to the above conclusions, the seventh chapter introduces several advises to perfect the incentive-constraint mechanism in the management of the state-owned financial assets. The eighth chapter is the conclusions and prospects, mainly explains the research conclusion, and further efforts in the future.
Through these researches, this dissertation identifies that in line with requirements of government, state-owned financial assets have three tasks. They are financial efficiency, financial stability and social responsibility. To complete these tasks, the state-owned financial assets agents need to undertake works include improving financial state-owned enterprise's profit ability, the risk control ability and assuming reasonable social responsibility. Therefore, goals of incenting and constraining state-owned financial assets agents are (1) the profit ability,(2) the control ability, and (3) the social responsibility. It is the unique characteristic of the state-owned financial assets. In addition, the status mentioned above, also produces deterministic soft budget constraint problems, of which the state-owned financial assets agents expect that the government will certainly offer financial aids when the state-owned enterprises fall in financial troubles. This is another unique characteristic of the state-owned financial assets. Based on the two characteristics, this paper establishes incentive-constraint model of the state-owned financial assets. Analysis of the model shows that, under the background of the management of the state-owned financial assets, the design of incentive-restraint mechanism is distinguished from other industries as well as other types of enterprises. Only the incentive-constraint mechanism which includes all these characteristics, can overcome the series of problems produced by the state-owned financial assets' principal-agent relationship, can play sound incentives and constraint to the agent of the state-owned financial assets to improve the operation efficiency, and can promote the healthy development of the state-owned financial assets to assist to the national economy growth.
引文
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