中国投资者利益保护的政治机制和适应机制研究
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摘要
当前,法与金融学在国际上已经成为金融发展理论的前沿研究方向。随着法与金融学的日益兴起,对产权结构、投资者利益保护和金融发展等问题的关注正逐渐成为经济学研究的焦点之一。投资者利益保护法律制度与金融发展存在显著相关性的实证研究已经取得突破性进展,但是在确定其宏观、微观作用机理的层面仍然缺乏深入的剖析。同时,既有研究大多是对发达国家实践的总结,对转轨国家的研究仍很匮乏。本文以转轨经济条件下投资者利益保护的政治机制和适应机制为研究视角,重点考察了在中国的金融发展过程中,投资者利益保护政治机制和适应机制的具体作用机理。
     在对相关概念进行界定和对既有文献进行全面梳理的基础上,本文构建模型说明投资者利益保护的政治机制和适应机制对公司价值提升和金融发展的重要性。随后,本文基于政治机制构建并利用国家效用函数分析我国近三十年金融制度变迁历程,从而得出我国投资者利益保护的政治机制影响显著的结论——国家对产权保护的不同偏好对中国金融发展产生巨大影响。基于适应机制分析了我国的法律传统和历次法律移植,得出我国投资者利益保护的适应机制作用不明显的结论——法律类型变更频繁削弱了中国法律的社会适应力进而对金融产权保护和金融发展产生消极影响。最后,在前文分析投资者利益保护的政治机制和适应机制的基础上,针对中国金融市场严重的非对称产权保护和公司内部人侵吞等投资者利益保护问题,提出国家机会主义退出与法律制度重构、金融产权改革与资本市场开放、主动式执法与被动式执法相结合等对策建议。
     本文的主要贡献在于:突破了法与金融学既有研究片面注重实证而忽略宏微观作用机制的局限,并在该领域进行了大胆尝试;剖析了中国原有法律体系的制度移植过程和特点,对中国法律制度的社会适应力及其影响进行探讨;针对国内金融市场投资者利益保护不力的现状,提出了主动式执法和被动式执法相结合的金融执法模式,具有一定的前瞻性。
At present, law and finance has been internationally at the forefront of research into the financial development theories. With the growing attention to law and finance, research into the structure of property rights, investor protection, financial development and other related issues is gradually becoming one of the focuses of economics research. Though breakthrough progress has been made in the empirical research on the significant correlation between the legal system to protect the interests of investors and financial development, in-depth analysis of the interacting mechanism at macro-and micro-levels is still lacking. While the relevant literature is mostly focused on summarizing the practice in the developed countries, the research into transition countries is still very scarce. From the research perspective of the political mechanism and adaptability mechanism of investor protection under transitional economic conditions, the paper is focused on the investigation into the specific mechanisms of political mechanism and adaptability mechanism of investor protection in the course of China's financial development.
     After defining the related concepts and sorting out the existing literature comprehensively, this paper builds models to illustrate the importance of the political mechanism and adaptability mechanism of investor protection to corporate value enhancement and financial development. Subsequently, the paper is based on the political mechanism to build and use a state utility function to analyze the changing course of China's financial system in the past 30 years, and reaches the conclusion that the influence of political mechanism of investor protection in China was significant—the tremendous impact of the state's biased protection of property rights on China's financial development. Then the paper is based on the adaptability mechanism to analyze China's legal tradition and previous legal transplants, and comes to the conclusion that the influence of the adaptability mechanism of investor protection in China was not obvious—the frequently-changed law type undermined social adaptability in China's law system, and further brought forth a negative impact on the protection of financial property rights and financial development. Finally, on the basis of analysis of the political mechanism and adaptability mechanism of investor protection, aimed against the investor protection issues of China's serious asymmetric protection of property rights and company insiders' misappropriation in financial markets, the paper puts forward several suggestions including withdrawal of state opportunism and reconstruction of law system, reform of financial property rights and capital market opening, and the combination of active and passive law enforcement.
     The main contribution of this paper is: break through the limits that the existing literature on law and finance was focused unilaterally on empirical research and ignored the mechanism at macro-and micro- levels, and has made a bold attempt in the field; analyze the migration processes and characteristics of the China's original legal system, and probe into the social adaptability and impact of China's law system; and, aimed against the current poor situation of investor protection in China's financial markets, put forward a financial law enforcement mode, the combination of active and passive law enforcement, which is forward-looking to some degree.
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