审计任期、客户重要性与会计稳健性
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摘要
最近几年，我国的审计事业取得了很大的发展，对提高上市公司财务报告的稳健性和防止财务欺诈事件的发生起到了重要作用。但是，在经济利益的诱惑下，会计事务所有可能配合上市公司采取不稳健的会计政策进行盈余操纵，从而侵害广大投资者的利益。从事务所审计的角度看，审计任期和客户重要性是影响会计稳健性的两个非常重要的外部因素。因此，本文的实证研究具有重要的理论意义与实践意义。
本文通过改进的Basu（1997）反向回归模型和Ball and Shivakumar（2005）应计项目和现金流回归模型，采用2006至2010年A股所有符合条件上市公司的面板数据和混合数据，实证研究审计任期和客户重要性对会计稳健性的影响，并对每个计量模型都进行了稳健性检验，确保结论的准确可靠。本文得出的主要结论有：（1）审计任期的增长会对会计稳健性造成不利影响；（2）客户重要程度过高会对会计稳健性造成不利影响。
根据实证研究结论，本文提出两条政策建议：第一，严格限制会计事务所的审计任期，坚持实施会计事务所强制轮换制度；第二，制定相应政策措施，严惩会计事务所配合上市公司实施财务欺诈等违法行为。
Chinese audit work has made great development in recent years. It plays important roles inimproving conservatism of listed companies’ financial report and preventing accounting fraud.With the attraction of economic interest, accounting firm may act in concert with listedcompanies to take non-conservative accounting policy and manipulate earnings, that will invadeinvestors’ interest. From the perspective of auditing, audit term and client importance are two ofthe external factors that can influence accounting conservatism very much. Therefore, empiricalstudies of this paper have important theoretical and practical significance.
We improve Basu(1997) reverse regression model and Ball and Shivakumar(2005) accrueditems and cash flow model, use panel data and pool data of all eligible A-share listed companiesbetween2006and2010. This paper makes empirical studies on the impact of accountingconservatism from audit term and client importance, and makes robustness tests on every modelsto assure the accuracy of conclusions. We draw three main conclusions. First, the longer auditterm is, the low accounting conservatism is. Second, the high client importance is, the lowaccounting conservatism is.
Based empirical conclusions, we draw two policy proposals. First, regulation departmentshould make close restraint on audit term of accounting firm and insist to implement AccountingFirm Compulsory Rotation System. Second, regulation department should make some actions topenalize illegal activities that accounting firm matches up financial fraud of listed companies.
本文通过改进的Basu（1997）反向回归模型和Ball and Shivakumar（2005）应计项目和现金流回归模型，采用2006至2010年A股所有符合条件上市公司的面板数据和混合数据，实证研究审计任期和客户重要性对会计稳健性的影响，并对每个计量模型都进行了稳健性检验，确保结论的准确可靠。本文得出的主要结论有：（1）审计任期的增长会对会计稳健性造成不利影响；（2）客户重要程度过高会对会计稳健性造成不利影响。
根据实证研究结论，本文提出两条政策建议：第一，严格限制会计事务所的审计任期，坚持实施会计事务所强制轮换制度；第二，制定相应政策措施，严惩会计事务所配合上市公司实施财务欺诈等违法行为。
Chinese audit work has made great development in recent years. It plays important roles inimproving conservatism of listed companies’ financial report and preventing accounting fraud.With the attraction of economic interest, accounting firm may act in concert with listedcompanies to take non-conservative accounting policy and manipulate earnings, that will invadeinvestors’ interest. From the perspective of auditing, audit term and client importance are two ofthe external factors that can influence accounting conservatism very much. Therefore, empiricalstudies of this paper have important theoretical and practical significance.
We improve Basu(1997) reverse regression model and Ball and Shivakumar(2005) accrueditems and cash flow model, use panel data and pool data of all eligible A-share listed companiesbetween2006and2010. This paper makes empirical studies on the impact of accountingconservatism from audit term and client importance, and makes robustness tests on every modelsto assure the accuracy of conclusions. We draw three main conclusions. First, the longer auditterm is, the low accounting conservatism is. Second, the high client importance is, the lowaccounting conservatism is.
Based empirical conclusions, we draw two policy proposals. First, regulation departmentshould make close restraint on audit term of accounting firm and insist to implement AccountingFirm Compulsory Rotation System. Second, regulation department should make some actions topenalize illegal activities that accounting firm matches up financial fraud of listed companies.
引文
[1] Basu, S.,1997,“The conservatism principle and the asymmetric timeliness of earnings,” Journal ofAccounting and Economics,24(1):3-37.
[2] Ball, R. and L. Shivakumar,2005,“Earnings equality in UK private firms: comparative loss recognitiontimeliness,” Journal of Accounting and Economics,39:83-128.
[3] Berton L.,1991,“GAO Weighs auditing plan for big banks,” Wall Street Journal (March27): A3.
[4] Carey, P. and R., Simnett,2006,“Audit partner tenure and audit quality,” Accounting Review,81(3):653-676.
[5] Davis, R.L., B.S., Soo and G.M. Trompeter,2002,“Auditor tenure, auditor independence and earningsmanagement,” Working Paper, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA.
[6] Davis, R.L., B.S., Soo and G.M. Trompeter,2009,“Auditor tenure and the ability to meet or beat earningsforecasts,” Contemporary Accounting Research,26(2):517-548.
[7] DeAngelo, L. E.,1981a,“Auditor size and audit quality,” Journal of Accounting and Economics3:183-199.
[8] DeAngelo, L. E.,1981b,“Auditor independence, low balling and disclosure regulation,” The AccountingReview,78(Jul):779-799.
[9] Dunham, K. J.,2002,“Firms that want to switch auditors find it take time, money and faith,” Wall StreetJournal (March15).
[10] Givoly, D. and C. Hayn,2000,“The changing time-series properties of earnings, cash flows and accruals:Has financial reporting become more conservative?” Journal of Accounting and Economics,29(3),287-320.
[11] Ghosh, A. and D. Moon,2003,“Does auditor tenure impair audit quality?” Working Paper, The SecuritiesExchange Commission.
[12] Jenkins, D. and U. Velury,2008,“Does auditor tenure impact the reporting of conservative earnings,”Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,27(2):115-132.
[13] Mautz, R. K. and H. A., Sharaf,1961,“The philosophy of auditing,” American Accounting Association,Monograph No.6. Sarasota, FL.
[14] Palmrose, Z.,1986,“The effect of non-audit service on the pricing of audit services: further evidence,”Journal of Accounting Research,24:405-411.
[15] Palmrose, Z.1991,“Trials of legal disputes involving independent auditors: some empirical evidence,”Journal of Accounting Research (Supplement):149-185.
[16] Petty R. and Cuganesan,1996,“Auditor rotation: framing the debate,” Australian Accountant66(May):40-41.
[17] Myers, J.N, L.A. Myers and T.C. Omer,2003,“Exploring the term of the auditor-client relationship andthe quality of earnings: a case for mandatory auditor rotation,” The Accounting Review,78:779-799.
[18] Myers, J. N., L. A., Myers, Z. V., Palmrose, and S. W. Scholz,2004,“Mandatory auditor rotation:evidence from restatements,” Working paper.
[19] Watts R. L. and J. L. Zimmerman,1983,“Agent problems, auditing, and the theory of the firm: someevidence,” Journal of Law and Economics26:613-633.
[20] Watts, R L.,1993,“A proposal for research on conservatism,” Working Paper, University of Rochester,12-13.
[21] Watts, R L.,2003a,“Conservatism in accounting part Ⅰ: Explanations and implications,” AccountingHorizons,17(3),207-221.
[22]包华瑜.审计客户重要性与审计质量的实证研究[M].硕士学位论文福州大学,2006.
[23]陈关亭.利用说明段变通审计意见的实证分析[M].审计与经济研究,2005(1).
[24]陈晓,李静.地方政府财政行为在提升上市公司业绩中的作用探析[J].会计研究,2001(12).
[25]陈信元,夏立军.审计任期与审计质量:来自中国证券市场的经验证据[J].会计研究,2006(1).
[26]陈旭东,黄登仕.上市公司会计稳健性的时序演进与行业特征研究[J].证券市场导报,2006(4).
[27]江伟,沈艺峰.大股东控制、资产替代与债权人保护[J].财经研究,2005(12).
[26]雷光勇,刘慧龙.大股东控制、融资规模与盈余操纵程度[J].管理世界,2006(1).
[28]李增泉,卢文彬.会计盈余的稳健性:发现与启示[J].会计研究,2003(2).
[29]李建然,陈政芳.审计客户重要性与盈余管理:以五大事务所级别为观察标的[J].会计评论,2004(1).
[30]刘峰,许菲.风险导向型审计、法律风险、审计质量[J].审计研究,2002(2).
[31]刘斌、孙回回、李嘉明.自愿性会计政策变更与非标审计意见的相关性研究——来自1998~2002年深沪上市公司的经验证据[J].财贸研究,2004(3).
[32]刘成立,王晓艳.事务所任期、审计质量与事务所强制轮换[J].财贸研究,2006(6).
[33]刘启亮.事务所任期与审计质量——来自中国证券市场的经验证据[J].审计研究,2006(4).
[34]刘凤委,汪扬.公司治理机制对会计稳健性影响之实证研究[J].上海立信会计学院学报,2006(3).
[35]刘凤委,张人骥,崔磊磊.地区市场化进程、市场分割与公司关联交易行为[J].财经研究,2007(6).
[36]罗党论,唐清泉.市场环境与控股股东掏空行为研究——来自中国上市公司的经验数据[J].会计研究,2007(4).
[37]刘运国,吴小蒙.产权性质、债务融资与会计稳健性——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].中国会计学会年会,2008.
[38]潘克勤.客户重要性和审计质量[J].经济经纬,2007(4).
[39]曲晓辉,邱月华.强制性制度变迁与盈余稳健性——来自深沪证券市场的经验数据[J].会计研究,2007(7).
[40]沈玉清.审计师任期、事务所任期与审计质量[J].管理学报,2008(3).
[41]孙铮,王跃堂.说明段与变更审计意见之实证研究[J]..审计研究资料,1999(6).
[42]孙铮,刘凤委,李增泉.市场化程度、政府干预与企业债务期限结构[J].经济研究,2005(5).
[43]夏立军,杨海斌.从审计意见看审计质量——上市公司2000年度财务报告审计意见实证分析[J].中国注册会计师,2002(10).
[44]修宗峰.大股东与管理当局是利益协同还是代理冲突——基于我国上市公司会计稳健性的证据[J].山西财经大学学报,2007(10).
[45]徐浩萍.会计盈余管理与独立审计质量[J].会计研究,2004(1).
[46]游江利,王圣会.我国上市公司会计盈余的稳健性探讨[J].湖南财经高等专科学校学报,2007(3).
[47]余玉苗,李琳.审计师任期与审计质量之间关系的理论分析[J].经济评论,2003(5).
[48]余劲松,梁红英.法律、股权结构对证券市场参与影响的实证研究[J].财经研究,2006(4).
[49]余怒涛,沈中华,刘孟晖.股权结构与盈余质量——来自沪深股市的证据[J].山西财经大学学报,2008(8).
[50]章立军.上市公司盈余管理与审计质量的相关分析[J].财贸经济,2005(4).
[51]赵春光.中国会计改革与谨慎性的提高[J].世界经济,2004(4).
[52]朱茶芬.会计管制和盈余质量关系的实证研究[J].财贸经济,2006(5)
[53]朱凯.银企关系与会计信息稳健性:中国资本市场的经验数据[M].上海财经大学工作论文,2005.
[2] Ball, R. and L. Shivakumar,2005,“Earnings equality in UK private firms: comparative loss recognitiontimeliness,” Journal of Accounting and Economics,39:83-128.
[3] Berton L.,1991,“GAO Weighs auditing plan for big banks,” Wall Street Journal (March27): A3.
[4] Carey, P. and R., Simnett,2006,“Audit partner tenure and audit quality,” Accounting Review,81(3):653-676.
[5] Davis, R.L., B.S., Soo and G.M. Trompeter,2002,“Auditor tenure, auditor independence and earningsmanagement,” Working Paper, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA.
[6] Davis, R.L., B.S., Soo and G.M. Trompeter,2009,“Auditor tenure and the ability to meet or beat earningsforecasts,” Contemporary Accounting Research,26(2):517-548.
[7] DeAngelo, L. E.,1981a,“Auditor size and audit quality,” Journal of Accounting and Economics3:183-199.
[8] DeAngelo, L. E.,1981b,“Auditor independence, low balling and disclosure regulation,” The AccountingReview,78(Jul):779-799.
[9] Dunham, K. J.,2002,“Firms that want to switch auditors find it take time, money and faith,” Wall StreetJournal (March15).
[10] Givoly, D. and C. Hayn,2000,“The changing time-series properties of earnings, cash flows and accruals:Has financial reporting become more conservative?” Journal of Accounting and Economics,29(3),287-320.
[11] Ghosh, A. and D. Moon,2003,“Does auditor tenure impair audit quality?” Working Paper, The SecuritiesExchange Commission.
[12] Jenkins, D. and U. Velury,2008,“Does auditor tenure impact the reporting of conservative earnings,”Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,27(2):115-132.
[13] Mautz, R. K. and H. A., Sharaf,1961,“The philosophy of auditing,” American Accounting Association,Monograph No.6. Sarasota, FL.
[14] Palmrose, Z.,1986,“The effect of non-audit service on the pricing of audit services: further evidence,”Journal of Accounting Research,24:405-411.
[15] Palmrose, Z.1991,“Trials of legal disputes involving independent auditors: some empirical evidence,”Journal of Accounting Research (Supplement):149-185.
[16] Petty R. and Cuganesan,1996,“Auditor rotation: framing the debate,” Australian Accountant66(May):40-41.
[17] Myers, J.N, L.A. Myers and T.C. Omer,2003,“Exploring the term of the auditor-client relationship andthe quality of earnings: a case for mandatory auditor rotation,” The Accounting Review,78:779-799.
[18] Myers, J. N., L. A., Myers, Z. V., Palmrose, and S. W. Scholz,2004,“Mandatory auditor rotation:evidence from restatements,” Working paper.
[19] Watts R. L. and J. L. Zimmerman,1983,“Agent problems, auditing, and the theory of the firm: someevidence,” Journal of Law and Economics26:613-633.
[20] Watts, R L.,1993,“A proposal for research on conservatism,” Working Paper, University of Rochester,12-13.
[21] Watts, R L.,2003a,“Conservatism in accounting part Ⅰ: Explanations and implications,” AccountingHorizons,17(3),207-221.
[22]包华瑜.审计客户重要性与审计质量的实证研究[M].硕士学位论文福州大学,2006.
[23]陈关亭.利用说明段变通审计意见的实证分析[M].审计与经济研究,2005(1).
[24]陈晓,李静.地方政府财政行为在提升上市公司业绩中的作用探析[J].会计研究,2001(12).
[25]陈信元,夏立军.审计任期与审计质量:来自中国证券市场的经验证据[J].会计研究,2006(1).
[26]陈旭东,黄登仕.上市公司会计稳健性的时序演进与行业特征研究[J].证券市场导报,2006(4).
[27]江伟,沈艺峰.大股东控制、资产替代与债权人保护[J].财经研究,2005(12).
[26]雷光勇,刘慧龙.大股东控制、融资规模与盈余操纵程度[J].管理世界,2006(1).
[28]李增泉,卢文彬.会计盈余的稳健性:发现与启示[J].会计研究,2003(2).
[29]李建然,陈政芳.审计客户重要性与盈余管理:以五大事务所级别为观察标的[J].会计评论,2004(1).
[30]刘峰,许菲.风险导向型审计、法律风险、审计质量[J].审计研究,2002(2).
[31]刘斌、孙回回、李嘉明.自愿性会计政策变更与非标审计意见的相关性研究——来自1998~2002年深沪上市公司的经验证据[J].财贸研究,2004(3).
[32]刘成立,王晓艳.事务所任期、审计质量与事务所强制轮换[J].财贸研究,2006(6).
[33]刘启亮.事务所任期与审计质量——来自中国证券市场的经验证据[J].审计研究,2006(4).
[34]刘凤委,汪扬.公司治理机制对会计稳健性影响之实证研究[J].上海立信会计学院学报,2006(3).
[35]刘凤委,张人骥,崔磊磊.地区市场化进程、市场分割与公司关联交易行为[J].财经研究,2007(6).
[36]罗党论,唐清泉.市场环境与控股股东掏空行为研究——来自中国上市公司的经验数据[J].会计研究,2007(4).
[37]刘运国,吴小蒙.产权性质、债务融资与会计稳健性——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].中国会计学会年会,2008.
[38]潘克勤.客户重要性和审计质量[J].经济经纬,2007(4).
[39]曲晓辉,邱月华.强制性制度变迁与盈余稳健性——来自深沪证券市场的经验数据[J].会计研究,2007(7).
[40]沈玉清.审计师任期、事务所任期与审计质量[J].管理学报,2008(3).
[41]孙铮,王跃堂.说明段与变更审计意见之实证研究[J]..审计研究资料,1999(6).
[42]孙铮,刘凤委,李增泉.市场化程度、政府干预与企业债务期限结构[J].经济研究,2005(5).
[43]夏立军,杨海斌.从审计意见看审计质量——上市公司2000年度财务报告审计意见实证分析[J].中国注册会计师,2002(10).
[44]修宗峰.大股东与管理当局是利益协同还是代理冲突——基于我国上市公司会计稳健性的证据[J].山西财经大学学报,2007(10).
[45]徐浩萍.会计盈余管理与独立审计质量[J].会计研究,2004(1).
[46]游江利,王圣会.我国上市公司会计盈余的稳健性探讨[J].湖南财经高等专科学校学报,2007(3).
[47]余玉苗,李琳.审计师任期与审计质量之间关系的理论分析[J].经济评论,2003(5).
[48]余劲松,梁红英.法律、股权结构对证券市场参与影响的实证研究[J].财经研究,2006(4).
[49]余怒涛,沈中华,刘孟晖.股权结构与盈余质量——来自沪深股市的证据[J].山西财经大学学报,2008(8).
[50]章立军.上市公司盈余管理与审计质量的相关分析[J].财贸经济,2005(4).
[51]赵春光.中国会计改革与谨慎性的提高[J].世界经济,2004(4).
[52]朱茶芬.会计管制和盈余质量关系的实证研究[J].财贸经济,2006(5)
[53]朱凯.银企关系与会计信息稳健性:中国资本市场的经验数据[M].上海财经大学工作论文,2005.