电力市场环境下输电网扩容三种理论模型及其在我国的应用研究
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摘要
关于在电力市场环境下应采用什么有效的方法来保证输电网长期扩容项目的规划与投资,以实现整个电力系统的最优扩容规划与投资目标,各国都一直没有定论。本文分析阐述电力市场环境下输电网扩容投资的三种模型方法,并对它们各自的特点及其实用性进行了分析比较。这三种模型方法分别是:长期金融输电权模型方法,激励式监管模型方法和市场力模型方法。长期金融输电权模式是由一个独立的系统操作员通过组织拍卖长期金融输电权来实现输电网最优扩容投资。激励式监管模式是通过让输电公司承担输电网阻塞的全社会成本,来激励输电公司投资输电网扩容。市场力模式则是根据电力市场中发电商可操纵市场的行为来确定输电网最优扩容规划与投资方案。本文分析比较了这三种模型方法各自的优缺点,并根据我国的实际,分析研究了我国在电力市场环境下实现输电网的最优扩容投资的理论和方法及其相关问题。
本文研究了电力市场环境下,什么样的电力市场结构和电网调度管理体制才能够更好的吸引对输电网扩容投资的问题。同时,还结合我国实际,对影响电网经营企业市场地位的政策法规因素、电网扩容资金来源,以及电价机制进行了研究,基于我国电力工业改革的实际情况分析给出了相关的政策建议。论文还对电力市场环境下电源与电网规划的关系问题进行了分析探讨,探讨并给出了协调二者之间关系的若干建议。
本文研究了基于长期金融输电权的输电网扩容模型方法,并提出了具体的操作方案。基于公用事业经济学,该扩容方法让输电网的投资者承担输电网扩容产生的负面的外部影响。为了保证输电网扩容可行,输电网的投资者必须从其它输电权持有者那里买回足够的输电权或者电网调度机构在长期输电权拍卖的时候必须持留一些输电权,以保证输电网的扩容不会损害原来的(或其他的)输电权拥有者的利益。
本文研究了电力市场环境下,如何通过实施激励型监管的手段引导输电网的有效扩容。从理论和实践两方面给出了当输电公司拥有和运营输电网时,如何对该输电公司实施标杆式或者基于价格限额的监管方式,以激励它进行输电网扩容,避免输电阻塞。
本文研究了根据电力市场中发电商可操纵市场的行为来确定输电网最优扩容规划与投资方案,也就是通过分析研究发电市场的结构来确定输电网的最优扩容。并据此分析确定出了一个发电与输电的联合概率分布来计算确定输电网扩容投资项目的净现值。同时,本文提出了一个新的旨在抑制市场力的输电阻塞管理方法,这个方法能确保对所有的输电网使用者公平开放电网,并且对输电价格进行公平定价。
本文还根据以上理论研究成果,基于某省电网扩容投资的实际情况,研究了电网总体规模优化问题。通过对影响电网投资诸多因素的分析,给出了电网总体投资规模的确定方法。同时,结合该省电网实际,设计给出了电网投资优化的具体实施方案建议以及投资效果评估考核办法。为了提高评估的可操作性,根据理论研究,开发了相应的辅助决策支持系统。该研究成果获得了云南省科学技术二等奖。
论文的研究结果表明,通过客观、深入地对厂网分开后输电网扩容规划方法的理论及应用进行研究,也就是在目前厂网分开、发电公司和电网公司成为各自独立的经济实体的情况下,以合理的方式对电网进行扩容,以提高市场运行效率,这些研究成果对电力体制改革具有重要的理论意义和实际应用价值。
It does not have reached a conclusion that what measures should be adopted to ensure the planning and investment of long-term transmission grid expansion project in the electricity power market environment to achieve the optimal expansion planning and investment objective of the entire power system. This paper analyzes three methods of transmission grid expansion investment in the electricity power market environment—long-term financial transmission right method, incentive regulation method and market power method, and then compares their characteristics and practicability. Long-term financial transmission right method is realizing transmission grid optimal expansion investment through organizing long-term financial transmission right auction by an independent system operator. Incentive regulation method is encouraging Transmission Company to invest transmission grid expansion through making Transmission Company undertakes the entire social cost of power transmission network congestion. Market power method is determining the transmission grid optimal expansion planning and investment project according to the action that the power producer can manipulate the market in electricity power market. This text analyzes the advantages and disadvantages of each of these three methods. Studies the theory,methods and related issues of transmission grid optimal expansion investment in electricity power market environment of our nation according to the reality of our country.
This paper studies which kind of electricity power market structure and power network deployment management system can abstract the investment of transmission grid expansion better in electricity power market environment. Meanwhile, this text studies the policies and regulations factors of impacting network enterprise market position, transmission grid expansion funding sources, and price mechanism, and then with the reality of our country, provides police proposals which suit our nation’s electric power industry reform practice. The paper also explores the relationshipbetween power supply and network planning in electricity power market environment, provides the coordinating relation proposals between power supply and network planning.
This text researches transmission grid expansion method which bases on long-term financial transmission right, and brings forward specific operating plans. Based on utility economics, this expansion method allows the investors of transmission network to bear the negative external influences which are produced by transmission grid expansion. To ensure transmission grid expansion is feasible, the investors of transmission network must buy adequate transmission rights from other transmission right-holders or power network deployment organizations must hold some adequate transmission rights when long-term transmission right is auctioned, to ensure that the expansion of transmission grid will not harm the original (or other) transmission right owners’interests.
This text also researches how to guide the effective expansion of transmission grid by implementing the measures of incentive regulation in electricity power market environment. From the theoretical and practical aspects, the paper provides how to implement benchmarking or based on the price cap regulation model to the Transmission Company when the Transmission Company owns and operates transmission grid, and to encourage it to carry out transmission grid expansion to avoid transmission congestion.
This paper studies how to determine the transmission grid optimal expansion planning and investment project according to the action that the power producer can manipulate the market in electricity power market. That is by analyzing and researching the structure of the power generation market to determine the optical expansion of transmission grid. And according to this analysis, the paper determines a joint probability distribution of power generation and transmission to calculate the net present value of investment projects in transmission grid expansion. Meanwhile, the paper proposes a new transmission congestion management approach to curb market power which can ensure fair and open network to all users of the transmission grid, and a fair price for transmission pricing.
According to the above theoretical research results, this paper studies network optimization problem of the overall size based on the practical situation of a certain province transmission grid expansion investment, and gives the methods of confirming network overall investment through analyzing of numerous factors that affect network investment. Meanwhile, designs the concrete executive plan proposals and the effect of investment evaluation assessment methods of network investment optimization combines the network condition of this province. To enhance the maneuverability of assessment, exploit the corresponding aid decision support system according to the theoretical study.
The results show that under the circumstances that generation and grid companies become an independent economic entity, use reasonable manners to expand transmission grid, enhance market operating efficiency through objectively and thoroughly studying on the theory and application of transmission grid expansion programming method after the separation of grid and generation, can achieve optimal economic effect. This paper’s research has important theoretical research meaning and actual using value to the electric system reform.
本文研究了电力市场环境下,什么样的电力市场结构和电网调度管理体制才能够更好的吸引对输电网扩容投资的问题。同时,还结合我国实际,对影响电网经营企业市场地位的政策法规因素、电网扩容资金来源,以及电价机制进行了研究,基于我国电力工业改革的实际情况分析给出了相关的政策建议。论文还对电力市场环境下电源与电网规划的关系问题进行了分析探讨,探讨并给出了协调二者之间关系的若干建议。
本文研究了基于长期金融输电权的输电网扩容模型方法,并提出了具体的操作方案。基于公用事业经济学,该扩容方法让输电网的投资者承担输电网扩容产生的负面的外部影响。为了保证输电网扩容可行,输电网的投资者必须从其它输电权持有者那里买回足够的输电权或者电网调度机构在长期输电权拍卖的时候必须持留一些输电权,以保证输电网的扩容不会损害原来的(或其他的)输电权拥有者的利益。
本文研究了电力市场环境下,如何通过实施激励型监管的手段引导输电网的有效扩容。从理论和实践两方面给出了当输电公司拥有和运营输电网时,如何对该输电公司实施标杆式或者基于价格限额的监管方式,以激励它进行输电网扩容,避免输电阻塞。
本文研究了根据电力市场中发电商可操纵市场的行为来确定输电网最优扩容规划与投资方案,也就是通过分析研究发电市场的结构来确定输电网的最优扩容。并据此分析确定出了一个发电与输电的联合概率分布来计算确定输电网扩容投资项目的净现值。同时,本文提出了一个新的旨在抑制市场力的输电阻塞管理方法,这个方法能确保对所有的输电网使用者公平开放电网,并且对输电价格进行公平定价。
本文还根据以上理论研究成果,基于某省电网扩容投资的实际情况,研究了电网总体规模优化问题。通过对影响电网投资诸多因素的分析,给出了电网总体投资规模的确定方法。同时,结合该省电网实际,设计给出了电网投资优化的具体实施方案建议以及投资效果评估考核办法。为了提高评估的可操作性,根据理论研究,开发了相应的辅助决策支持系统。该研究成果获得了云南省科学技术二等奖。
论文的研究结果表明,通过客观、深入地对厂网分开后输电网扩容规划方法的理论及应用进行研究,也就是在目前厂网分开、发电公司和电网公司成为各自独立的经济实体的情况下,以合理的方式对电网进行扩容,以提高市场运行效率,这些研究成果对电力体制改革具有重要的理论意义和实际应用价值。
It does not have reached a conclusion that what measures should be adopted to ensure the planning and investment of long-term transmission grid expansion project in the electricity power market environment to achieve the optimal expansion planning and investment objective of the entire power system. This paper analyzes three methods of transmission grid expansion investment in the electricity power market environment—long-term financial transmission right method, incentive regulation method and market power method, and then compares their characteristics and practicability. Long-term financial transmission right method is realizing transmission grid optimal expansion investment through organizing long-term financial transmission right auction by an independent system operator. Incentive regulation method is encouraging Transmission Company to invest transmission grid expansion through making Transmission Company undertakes the entire social cost of power transmission network congestion. Market power method is determining the transmission grid optimal expansion planning and investment project according to the action that the power producer can manipulate the market in electricity power market. This text analyzes the advantages and disadvantages of each of these three methods. Studies the theory,methods and related issues of transmission grid optimal expansion investment in electricity power market environment of our nation according to the reality of our country.
This paper studies which kind of electricity power market structure and power network deployment management system can abstract the investment of transmission grid expansion better in electricity power market environment. Meanwhile, this text studies the policies and regulations factors of impacting network enterprise market position, transmission grid expansion funding sources, and price mechanism, and then with the reality of our country, provides police proposals which suit our nation’s electric power industry reform practice. The paper also explores the relationshipbetween power supply and network planning in electricity power market environment, provides the coordinating relation proposals between power supply and network planning.
This text researches transmission grid expansion method which bases on long-term financial transmission right, and brings forward specific operating plans. Based on utility economics, this expansion method allows the investors of transmission network to bear the negative external influences which are produced by transmission grid expansion. To ensure transmission grid expansion is feasible, the investors of transmission network must buy adequate transmission rights from other transmission right-holders or power network deployment organizations must hold some adequate transmission rights when long-term transmission right is auctioned, to ensure that the expansion of transmission grid will not harm the original (or other) transmission right owners’interests.
This text also researches how to guide the effective expansion of transmission grid by implementing the measures of incentive regulation in electricity power market environment. From the theoretical and practical aspects, the paper provides how to implement benchmarking or based on the price cap regulation model to the Transmission Company when the Transmission Company owns and operates transmission grid, and to encourage it to carry out transmission grid expansion to avoid transmission congestion.
This paper studies how to determine the transmission grid optimal expansion planning and investment project according to the action that the power producer can manipulate the market in electricity power market. That is by analyzing and researching the structure of the power generation market to determine the optical expansion of transmission grid. And according to this analysis, the paper determines a joint probability distribution of power generation and transmission to calculate the net present value of investment projects in transmission grid expansion. Meanwhile, the paper proposes a new transmission congestion management approach to curb market power which can ensure fair and open network to all users of the transmission grid, and a fair price for transmission pricing.
According to the above theoretical research results, this paper studies network optimization problem of the overall size based on the practical situation of a certain province transmission grid expansion investment, and gives the methods of confirming network overall investment through analyzing of numerous factors that affect network investment. Meanwhile, designs the concrete executive plan proposals and the effect of investment evaluation assessment methods of network investment optimization combines the network condition of this province. To enhance the maneuverability of assessment, exploit the corresponding aid decision support system according to the theoretical study.
The results show that under the circumstances that generation and grid companies become an independent economic entity, use reasonable manners to expand transmission grid, enhance market operating efficiency through objectively and thoroughly studying on the theory and application of transmission grid expansion programming method after the separation of grid and generation, can achieve optimal economic effect. This paper’s research has important theoretical research meaning and actual using value to the electric system reform.
引文
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