林权抵押贷款信用风险评估研究
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摘要
转变林业发展方式是保持林业平稳较快发展的迫切需求,2003年中共中央国务院颁布《关于加快林业发展的决定》,启动了林权制度改革。林权制度改革催生了林权抵押贷款。信用风险是林权抵押贷款深入开展的重要制约因素,评估林权抵押贷款信用风险,对其本质特征、形成机理及影响因素等有一个清晰和准确的认识,这形成本研究选题初衷。此研究能够为银行等金融机构衡量林权抵押贷款的信用风险水平提供有效工具、发现其潜在的风险并找到规避风险的有效办法,有助于推进林权抵押贷款可持续发展,有利于解决林业融资约束,从而促进林业发展方式转变。另外,此研究充实了信用风险问题研究,深化了林业融资问题研究,具有理论上的启发意义。本研究的分析框架直接受益于以斯蒂格利茨(J.E. Stiglitz)为代表的信息经济学的思想和方法,基于林木资产的视角,对林权抵押贷款信用风险评估展开研究。
本研究通过对宏观与微观两个层面的数据、借鉴担保理论与期权理论,分析林权抵押的经济学原理,揭示林木资产作为抵押物的经济价值,进而为从抵押物风险视角来评价林权抵押贷款信用风险的合理性提供理论依据。使用博弈、信息不对称等理论分别基于森林资源资产价值风险、金融生态、森林资源资产流动性风险视角考察林农违约表现及其形成机理,为确立林权抵押贷款风险指标体系及建立林权抵押贷款信用风险评估模型提供理论依据。通过对文献分析及林权抵押贷款信用风险实际情况调查,列出了林权抵押贷款信用风险可能的影响因素,从金融生态、抵押林木资产安全性、盈利性、流动性视角对其归类并释义这些可能的影响因素。使用对福建省三明市和南平市这两个地区农村信用社信贷员的198份有效调查问卷数据,利用序数回归法,分别基于金融生态、林木资产安全性、盈利性、流动性等不同视角筛选林权抵押贷款信用风险评价指标,以此为基础,建立林权抵押贷款信用综合评估模型。进而提出防范林权抵押贷款信用风险的政策建议。
本研究得到以下主要结论：(1)森林资源资产作为抵押物担保力强,具备了可置信威胁与可执行性,为贷款承诺提供了保证,起到了信用风险的缓释作用。(2)抵押物是林权抵押贷款还款的根本保证,林权抵押贷款的资信来自于抵押林木资产未来经济能力的增长。(3)林木资产风险的存在弱化了林权抵押在贷款中缓释功能。林权抵押贷款的违约类型归纳为理性违约、被迫违约和故意违约三种。林农还贷决策博弈分析表明,林农是否选择违约严格依赖于关于收益函数的假定,只要林农的违约收益高于履约收益,林农就会选择违约。金融生态不完备,加剧了银行与林农之间的信息不对称,使得银行对林木资产真实性与保存性无法准确把握,从而引发借款人故意违约；另外,价值补偿机制缺失引了发借款人理性违约。林农经营的林木资产如果不能正常变现就会导致林农被迫违约。(4)林权抵押贷款信用风险有20个可能影响因素,分别为：森林火灾、森林病虫鼠害、气候地质灾害、森林盗砍、林木价格、森林管护成本、采伐成本、造林成本、审批成本、经营方式、轮伐期、经营树种、立地条件、限额采伐管理制度、林权交易市场成熟度、林地管理政策、天然林资源保护政策、林权登记管理制度、森林保险、森林资产评估。(5)林权抵押贷款信用风险评估指标筛选结果表明,林业生产视角下的林木资产安全性的显著性影响因素是森林火灾、森林病虫鼠害和森林盗砍；金融生态视角下的林木资产安全性的显著性影响因素是林权登记管理制度和林木资产评估；林木资产盈利性显著性影响因素是林木价格和经营方式；林木流动性的显著性影响因素是限额采伐管理制度和林权交易市场成熟度。(6)建立了林权抵押贷款信用综合评估模型——高层类别双对数模型,模型揭示了林权登记管理制度、林木资产评估、森林火灾和森林盗伐对林权抵押贷款信用风险具有显著性影响的因素。
In order to maintain the steady and rapid development of forestry, changing the approach of forestry development becomes absolutely necessary. The decision on accelerating the development of forestry issued by CPC Central Committee and State Council in 2003,which starts the revolution in forestry rights. As a consequence, Forest Right mortgage lending emerged. Credit risk is the main factor that restrict the deepen implement of Forest Right Mortgage Loan, Assessing the credit risk in forest ownership mortgage so as to grasp a clear and accurate understanding of the Essential characteristics、formation mechanism and causes, forms this research's topic.This research topic has its very reality meaning. It provides an effective tool for banks and other financial institutions to measure the credit risk of forest right mortgage loans, and finds effective ways to avoid risks; It also helps to promote the sustainable development of Forest Right Mortgage Loan,and solve the financing constraints of forestry so as to promote the way of forestry development. This study has theoretically inspiration meaning, which enriches the study of credit risk and also fills the gaps in theory.The Analytical framework of this study directly benefits from the methods and idea of information economics led by Joseph Stiglitz expands its content based on the credit risk assessment of Forest Right Mortgage Loan from the view of forest assets risk.
This chapter analyzes Forest Right Mortgage in the aspect of economic, reveals the forest assets'economic value, by the data analysis both on the macro and micro level and using security theory and options theory, thus providing theoretical basis for the rational of Forest Right Mortgage from the view of forest assets risk. This chapter uses game theory, information asymmetry theory, respectively study the contract breach performance of foresters and its formation mechanism, which provides a theoretical basis to the establishment of the Forest Right Mortgage Loan Risk Index System and assessment model. This chapter put forwards the potential factors in credit risk of mortgage loans by a lot of documentary Analysis and practical investigation in the field of banking. This chapter classifies and interprets of these potential factors From the financial ecology, forest mortgage assets security, profitability, perspective of liquidity.This article studies those factors,. Datas of 198 valid questionnaires, which is for loan officer of rural credit cooperatives, come from Nanping and Sanming City of Fujian Province, using Ordinal regression model to select from, in the aspect of the financial ecology, forest assets, security, profitability, liquidity and so on. All above, as the basis, determine the index system of comprehensive evaluation model,and establish an integrated assessment model. Then, this paper puts forward the recommendations for prevention measures of Mortgage loan Credit Risk., as well as the recommendations of prevention for forest ownership mortgage credit risk.
This research comes to the following inclusions (1) The forest resources have stronger security with the Credible threats and enforceable, This provides a guarantee for the loan commitment, and plays an important role in release of credit risk.(2) guaranty is the basic assurance of the repayment of the Forest Right Mortgage Loan. The standing comes from the growth in the value of loan forestry. (3) the existence of forestry risk weaken the function of slowly-releasing mechanism。The type of default of forest right mortgage are as follows, Rational Default, Passive Default, and Deliberately Default. The analysis of the game between the foresters and banks shows that analysis shows that Foresters are strictly dependent on the assumptions of payoff function to choose whether to default or not. If default brings more profits than compliance, foresters will select the default. The incompleteness of financial ecology aggravates the information asymmetry between the foresters and banks. In addition, the lack of the compensation value will result in the rational default of the borrowers. If the forestry cannot be realized in the market normally, the foresters will default deliberately. (4) There are almost 20 factors in forest Right Mortgage Loan Credit Risk as follows,Forest fires, forest pest, climate hazards, forest Pirates of the cut, timber prices, forest management and protection costs, cutting costs, planting costs, processing costs, management methods, rotation, species management, site conditions, limits logging management system, the right to market maturity of forest and forest management policy, natural resource protection policies, the registration management system, forest, forest insurance, assessment of forest assets and so on. (5) The results of the Evaluation Index Selection showed that, from the Perspective of Forestry production, the significance factors which affects the security of forest assets are the forest fires, forest diseases, insects, rodents, and theft of forest cutting; from the Perspective of financial Ecology, the significance factors which affects the security of forest assets are the forest right registration and management system and the assessment of forest assets; the significance factors which affects the profit of forest assets are the timber price and mode of operation. The significance factors which affect the circulation of forest assets are management system of Forest logging and maturity of right trading market. (6) established an integrated assessment model ---- high-level Type double logarithmic model. The model shows that the registration of a forest management system, forest asset valuation, forest fires and illegal logging influence the Credit Risk of Forest Right Mortgage Loan significantly.
本研究通过对宏观与微观两个层面的数据、借鉴担保理论与期权理论,分析林权抵押的经济学原理,揭示林木资产作为抵押物的经济价值,进而为从抵押物风险视角来评价林权抵押贷款信用风险的合理性提供理论依据。使用博弈、信息不对称等理论分别基于森林资源资产价值风险、金融生态、森林资源资产流动性风险视角考察林农违约表现及其形成机理,为确立林权抵押贷款风险指标体系及建立林权抵押贷款信用风险评估模型提供理论依据。通过对文献分析及林权抵押贷款信用风险实际情况调查,列出了林权抵押贷款信用风险可能的影响因素,从金融生态、抵押林木资产安全性、盈利性、流动性视角对其归类并释义这些可能的影响因素。使用对福建省三明市和南平市这两个地区农村信用社信贷员的198份有效调查问卷数据,利用序数回归法,分别基于金融生态、林木资产安全性、盈利性、流动性等不同视角筛选林权抵押贷款信用风险评价指标,以此为基础,建立林权抵押贷款信用综合评估模型。进而提出防范林权抵押贷款信用风险的政策建议。
本研究得到以下主要结论：(1)森林资源资产作为抵押物担保力强,具备了可置信威胁与可执行性,为贷款承诺提供了保证,起到了信用风险的缓释作用。(2)抵押物是林权抵押贷款还款的根本保证,林权抵押贷款的资信来自于抵押林木资产未来经济能力的增长。(3)林木资产风险的存在弱化了林权抵押在贷款中缓释功能。林权抵押贷款的违约类型归纳为理性违约、被迫违约和故意违约三种。林农还贷决策博弈分析表明,林农是否选择违约严格依赖于关于收益函数的假定,只要林农的违约收益高于履约收益,林农就会选择违约。金融生态不完备,加剧了银行与林农之间的信息不对称,使得银行对林木资产真实性与保存性无法准确把握,从而引发借款人故意违约；另外,价值补偿机制缺失引了发借款人理性违约。林农经营的林木资产如果不能正常变现就会导致林农被迫违约。(4)林权抵押贷款信用风险有20个可能影响因素,分别为：森林火灾、森林病虫鼠害、气候地质灾害、森林盗砍、林木价格、森林管护成本、采伐成本、造林成本、审批成本、经营方式、轮伐期、经营树种、立地条件、限额采伐管理制度、林权交易市场成熟度、林地管理政策、天然林资源保护政策、林权登记管理制度、森林保险、森林资产评估。(5)林权抵押贷款信用风险评估指标筛选结果表明,林业生产视角下的林木资产安全性的显著性影响因素是森林火灾、森林病虫鼠害和森林盗砍；金融生态视角下的林木资产安全性的显著性影响因素是林权登记管理制度和林木资产评估；林木资产盈利性显著性影响因素是林木价格和经营方式；林木流动性的显著性影响因素是限额采伐管理制度和林权交易市场成熟度。(6)建立了林权抵押贷款信用综合评估模型——高层类别双对数模型,模型揭示了林权登记管理制度、林木资产评估、森林火灾和森林盗伐对林权抵押贷款信用风险具有显著性影响的因素。
In order to maintain the steady and rapid development of forestry, changing the approach of forestry development becomes absolutely necessary. The decision on accelerating the development of forestry issued by CPC Central Committee and State Council in 2003,which starts the revolution in forestry rights. As a consequence, Forest Right mortgage lending emerged. Credit risk is the main factor that restrict the deepen implement of Forest Right Mortgage Loan, Assessing the credit risk in forest ownership mortgage so as to grasp a clear and accurate understanding of the Essential characteristics、formation mechanism and causes, forms this research's topic.This research topic has its very reality meaning. It provides an effective tool for banks and other financial institutions to measure the credit risk of forest right mortgage loans, and finds effective ways to avoid risks; It also helps to promote the sustainable development of Forest Right Mortgage Loan,and solve the financing constraints of forestry so as to promote the way of forestry development. This study has theoretically inspiration meaning, which enriches the study of credit risk and also fills the gaps in theory.The Analytical framework of this study directly benefits from the methods and idea of information economics led by Joseph Stiglitz expands its content based on the credit risk assessment of Forest Right Mortgage Loan from the view of forest assets risk.
This chapter analyzes Forest Right Mortgage in the aspect of economic, reveals the forest assets'economic value, by the data analysis both on the macro and micro level and using security theory and options theory, thus providing theoretical basis for the rational of Forest Right Mortgage from the view of forest assets risk. This chapter uses game theory, information asymmetry theory, respectively study the contract breach performance of foresters and its formation mechanism, which provides a theoretical basis to the establishment of the Forest Right Mortgage Loan Risk Index System and assessment model. This chapter put forwards the potential factors in credit risk of mortgage loans by a lot of documentary Analysis and practical investigation in the field of banking. This chapter classifies and interprets of these potential factors From the financial ecology, forest mortgage assets security, profitability, perspective of liquidity.This article studies those factors,. Datas of 198 valid questionnaires, which is for loan officer of rural credit cooperatives, come from Nanping and Sanming City of Fujian Province, using Ordinal regression model to select from, in the aspect of the financial ecology, forest assets, security, profitability, liquidity and so on. All above, as the basis, determine the index system of comprehensive evaluation model,and establish an integrated assessment model. Then, this paper puts forward the recommendations for prevention measures of Mortgage loan Credit Risk., as well as the recommendations of prevention for forest ownership mortgage credit risk.
This research comes to the following inclusions (1) The forest resources have stronger security with the Credible threats and enforceable, This provides a guarantee for the loan commitment, and plays an important role in release of credit risk.(2) guaranty is the basic assurance of the repayment of the Forest Right Mortgage Loan. The standing comes from the growth in the value of loan forestry. (3) the existence of forestry risk weaken the function of slowly-releasing mechanism。The type of default of forest right mortgage are as follows, Rational Default, Passive Default, and Deliberately Default. The analysis of the game between the foresters and banks shows that analysis shows that Foresters are strictly dependent on the assumptions of payoff function to choose whether to default or not. If default brings more profits than compliance, foresters will select the default. The incompleteness of financial ecology aggravates the information asymmetry between the foresters and banks. In addition, the lack of the compensation value will result in the rational default of the borrowers. If the forestry cannot be realized in the market normally, the foresters will default deliberately. (4) There are almost 20 factors in forest Right Mortgage Loan Credit Risk as follows,Forest fires, forest pest, climate hazards, forest Pirates of the cut, timber prices, forest management and protection costs, cutting costs, planting costs, processing costs, management methods, rotation, species management, site conditions, limits logging management system, the right to market maturity of forest and forest management policy, natural resource protection policies, the registration management system, forest, forest insurance, assessment of forest assets and so on. (5) The results of the Evaluation Index Selection showed that, from the Perspective of Forestry production, the significance factors which affects the security of forest assets are the forest fires, forest diseases, insects, rodents, and theft of forest cutting; from the Perspective of financial Ecology, the significance factors which affects the security of forest assets are the forest right registration and management system and the assessment of forest assets; the significance factors which affects the profit of forest assets are the timber price and mode of operation. The significance factors which affect the circulation of forest assets are management system of Forest logging and maturity of right trading market. (6) established an integrated assessment model ---- high-level Type double logarithmic model. The model shows that the registration of a forest management system, forest asset valuation, forest fires and illegal logging influence the Credit Risk of Forest Right Mortgage Loan significantly.
引文
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