基于价值链的动态研发战略投资研究
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摘要
随着市场竞争的日益激烈,不断的创新已经成为决定现代企业生存和发展的关键。作为企业技术创新的源泉,研发投资也逐渐成为现代企业管理的主要内容之一。然而,面对着激烈的市场竞争,企业应当如何有效地进行研发战略投资是困扰现代企业管理者的主要问题之一。对于该问题,国内外学者从不同角度进行了研究,然而现有的研究仍然在两个方面存在着不足,其一,忽视了各种价值关系对企业研发战略投资决策的影响,导致企业之间的价值关系以及企业价值的真正来源未能得到正确认识,由此而对企业制定长期研发战略与价值增值形成不利的影响；其二,仅在静态的框架下讨论企业的研发战略投资问题。而在现实中,企业总是处于一个不断变化的动态环境中,企业之间的价值关系也随着环境的变化而发生改变,在以企业价值最大化为根本目标的前提下,从静态的视角研究企业的研发战略投资问题,难以满足企业的需要。
鉴于现有研究的不足,本文在价值链理论的基础上,利用微分博弈方法,系统地研究了企业的动态研发战略投资问题。
首先,本文基于价值链理论研究了企业之间的价值关系,以及不同价值关系对企业研发战略选择的影响,并对国内78家高科技企业进行了问卷调查,考察了企业选择不同研发战略的真正动因。
其次,本文在不同价值关系的基础上,构建了企业研发战略投资的微分博弈模型,分别从横向价值链和纵向价值链两个方面,研究了不同研发战略下博弈参与方在连续研发投资过程中的博弈过程和博弈策略。并通过线性数值模拟的方法比较了不同研发战略下企业的研发投资水平、企业收益以及社会总价值在整个研发投资过程中的演化情况。
最后,本文将横向企业研发战略投资决策与纵向企业研发投资决策相结合,研究了在价值网络中企业最优的研发战略投资行为,并比较了横向合作研发战略、纵向合作研发战略以及独立研发战略下,企业的各种研发投资行为对企业收益以及社会总价值的影响。
通过对不同研发战略下企业动态研发投资行为的研究,本文得出以下结论：
第一,企业所选择的不同研发战略,是对企业之间的价值创造和价值分配关系进行综合权衡的结果。追求企业之间研发资源和技术知识互补以创造更大的价值是企业进行研发合作的主要动因,而研发合作中广泛存在的机会主义行为则是导致企业选择独立研发战略或选择不同研发战略组织模式的主要原因。
第二,研发合作中的技术互补性会降低企业的研发投资力度,但企业收益和社会总价值并不会因此而减少。而且,随着企业之间技术互补性越强,企业的研发投资力度越小,但企业收益和社会总价值也会越大。
第三,合作中的机会主义行为会降低企业进行研发合作的动力,并且会降低社会总价值。但从研发投资的角度,如果企业之间的研发合作会形成市场垄断,则机会主义行为并不会对企业的研发投资产生影响。相反,如果企业之间的研发合作不能形成市场垄断,那么研发合作机会主义行为会降低企业进行研发投资的积极性。
第四,随着企业研发投资过程的不断演进,企业最优的研发战略会发生变化。然而,如果不考虑交易成本的影响,在长期内,无论是对企业还是对社会,纵向研发合作都能够带来更多的价值。
As the competition of markets is becoming more and more drastic, continuing innovation is believed to be the key for a firm to survive and development. And as the source of technological innovation, Research and Development (R&D) investment is becoming a mainly management content of firms. However, it is an important issue for managers that how to invest in R&D when facing drastic market competition. Domestic and foreign scholars have been studied this issue from different aspects, but there are two aspects be left. The first one is that the previous literatures ignoring the fact that the value relation can affect the firms'R&D investment, leading to the value relations and source of firms'value can not be understood well, which is not conducive for firms'to developing a long-term business strategy and achieve value added. The second one, previous literatures discussed this issue in a static framework. In reality, firms are in a dynamic environment and the value relations among firms always changes. In a dynamic environment, it can not to meet firms' needs of maximizing the value if studied the issues of R&D investment only from a static framework.
Considered the inadequacy of existing literatures, this paper studied the issue of dynamic strategic R&D investment through differential game technology and base on the value chain theory.
Firstly, this paper analyzed the value relationship among different firms base on value chain theory and that how the value relations affect firms R&D strategy. And we investigated 78 High-tech firms to recovery the motivations of why firms'managers choose different R&D strategy in reality.
Secondly, base on different value relations, we present a differential game model and studied the game process and game strategy in the dynamic R&D investment from horizontal value chain and vertical value chain. And we compared the evolution path of quantity of R&D investment, the firms'profit and the total society value through linear numerical simulation.
Finally, integrated the analysis results of horizontal and vertical strategic R&D investment, this paper discussed the issue of R&D investment base on value net, and we analyzed how the firms'R&D investment behavior under horizontal R&D cooperation strategy, vertical R&D cooperation strategy and independent R&D strategy affect the firms'profit and social value.
The main conclusions of this paper as follows:
Firstly, the firms'R&D strategies are trade-off of value creation relation and distribution relation among differential firms. And the main motivation of a firm to cooperate with others in R&D investment is searching for resource and technology complementarities, but the opportunism in R&D cooperation is the main reason for firms to choose independent R&D or differential cooperative government structure.
Secondly, if the R&D cooperation can enhance the firms' technology ability, the firms'R&D investment will decrease but the firms'profit and the social value will increase accordingly. Moreover, the more technology ability if the R&D cooperation can bring to firms, the greater the effect mentioned above is.
Thirdly, the transaction cost of R&D cooperation will reduce the motivation of cooperation and the society value. However, if the R&D cooperation can lead to monopoly, the transaction cost will not affect firms'R&D investment level. But if the R&D cooperation can not lead to monopoly, the transaction will reduce the motivation of R&D investment.
Fourthly, with the R&D investment process evolve, the best R&D strategy of firms will change. When not consider the transaction costs, the cooperative R&D strategy can bring more profit and value to firms and society in long-term investment.
鉴于现有研究的不足,本文在价值链理论的基础上,利用微分博弈方法,系统地研究了企业的动态研发战略投资问题。
首先,本文基于价值链理论研究了企业之间的价值关系,以及不同价值关系对企业研发战略选择的影响,并对国内78家高科技企业进行了问卷调查,考察了企业选择不同研发战略的真正动因。
其次,本文在不同价值关系的基础上,构建了企业研发战略投资的微分博弈模型,分别从横向价值链和纵向价值链两个方面,研究了不同研发战略下博弈参与方在连续研发投资过程中的博弈过程和博弈策略。并通过线性数值模拟的方法比较了不同研发战略下企业的研发投资水平、企业收益以及社会总价值在整个研发投资过程中的演化情况。
最后,本文将横向企业研发战略投资决策与纵向企业研发投资决策相结合,研究了在价值网络中企业最优的研发战略投资行为,并比较了横向合作研发战略、纵向合作研发战略以及独立研发战略下,企业的各种研发投资行为对企业收益以及社会总价值的影响。
通过对不同研发战略下企业动态研发投资行为的研究,本文得出以下结论：
第一,企业所选择的不同研发战略,是对企业之间的价值创造和价值分配关系进行综合权衡的结果。追求企业之间研发资源和技术知识互补以创造更大的价值是企业进行研发合作的主要动因,而研发合作中广泛存在的机会主义行为则是导致企业选择独立研发战略或选择不同研发战略组织模式的主要原因。
第二,研发合作中的技术互补性会降低企业的研发投资力度,但企业收益和社会总价值并不会因此而减少。而且,随着企业之间技术互补性越强,企业的研发投资力度越小,但企业收益和社会总价值也会越大。
第三,合作中的机会主义行为会降低企业进行研发合作的动力,并且会降低社会总价值。但从研发投资的角度,如果企业之间的研发合作会形成市场垄断,则机会主义行为并不会对企业的研发投资产生影响。相反,如果企业之间的研发合作不能形成市场垄断,那么研发合作机会主义行为会降低企业进行研发投资的积极性。
第四,随着企业研发投资过程的不断演进,企业最优的研发战略会发生变化。然而,如果不考虑交易成本的影响,在长期内,无论是对企业还是对社会,纵向研发合作都能够带来更多的价值。
As the competition of markets is becoming more and more drastic, continuing innovation is believed to be the key for a firm to survive and development. And as the source of technological innovation, Research and Development (R&D) investment is becoming a mainly management content of firms. However, it is an important issue for managers that how to invest in R&D when facing drastic market competition. Domestic and foreign scholars have been studied this issue from different aspects, but there are two aspects be left. The first one is that the previous literatures ignoring the fact that the value relation can affect the firms'R&D investment, leading to the value relations and source of firms'value can not be understood well, which is not conducive for firms'to developing a long-term business strategy and achieve value added. The second one, previous literatures discussed this issue in a static framework. In reality, firms are in a dynamic environment and the value relations among firms always changes. In a dynamic environment, it can not to meet firms' needs of maximizing the value if studied the issues of R&D investment only from a static framework.
Considered the inadequacy of existing literatures, this paper studied the issue of dynamic strategic R&D investment through differential game technology and base on the value chain theory.
Firstly, this paper analyzed the value relationship among different firms base on value chain theory and that how the value relations affect firms R&D strategy. And we investigated 78 High-tech firms to recovery the motivations of why firms'managers choose different R&D strategy in reality.
Secondly, base on different value relations, we present a differential game model and studied the game process and game strategy in the dynamic R&D investment from horizontal value chain and vertical value chain. And we compared the evolution path of quantity of R&D investment, the firms'profit and the total society value through linear numerical simulation.
Finally, integrated the analysis results of horizontal and vertical strategic R&D investment, this paper discussed the issue of R&D investment base on value net, and we analyzed how the firms'R&D investment behavior under horizontal R&D cooperation strategy, vertical R&D cooperation strategy and independent R&D strategy affect the firms'profit and social value.
The main conclusions of this paper as follows:
Firstly, the firms'R&D strategies are trade-off of value creation relation and distribution relation among differential firms. And the main motivation of a firm to cooperate with others in R&D investment is searching for resource and technology complementarities, but the opportunism in R&D cooperation is the main reason for firms to choose independent R&D or differential cooperative government structure.
Secondly, if the R&D cooperation can enhance the firms' technology ability, the firms'R&D investment will decrease but the firms'profit and the social value will increase accordingly. Moreover, the more technology ability if the R&D cooperation can bring to firms, the greater the effect mentioned above is.
Thirdly, the transaction cost of R&D cooperation will reduce the motivation of cooperation and the society value. However, if the R&D cooperation can lead to monopoly, the transaction cost will not affect firms'R&D investment level. But if the R&D cooperation can not lead to monopoly, the transaction will reduce the motivation of R&D investment.
Fourthly, with the R&D investment process evolve, the best R&D strategy of firms will change. When not consider the transaction costs, the cooperative R&D strategy can bring more profit and value to firms and society in long-term investment.
引文
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