西部地区草原生态建设补偿机制及配套政策研究
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摘要
近年来,由于人类不可持续的草原利用,再加上多变的气候加剧了草原生态系统的退化,这对于中国西部地区脆弱的草原生态系统影响尤其突出,草原生态系统服务一直在减少,对人类福祉构成威胁。中国西部地区草原生态建设和保护发挥着巨大的环境效益,然而由于草原生态系统服务具有的公共品属性,传统市场无法实现其经济价值。这就使得依靠草原谋生的牧户一方面受到草原生产力下降的影响,另一方面还要应对不同程度的草原保护举措,牧户利益受损,草原保护动力下降。学界和实践工作者们已经意识到了问题的严重性,从完善草原承包制度、转变生产方式合理利用草原、建立保护区等多个方面进行探讨,试图解决这一问题。论文对中国西部地区草原生态建设补偿机制和配套政策进行研究,以草原生态建设补偿机制是草原生态建设和保护取得成效的关键为出发点,力图达到三个目标:第一,阐释草原生态建设补偿政策的特征和运行现状,说明在特定的社会经济背景下设计生态补偿制度的原因及其设计方式;第二,评价草原生态建设补偿政策的绩效,寻找建立和完善草原生态建设补偿机制的新机制;第三,揭示出草原生态建设补偿政策需要与其他政策一道,来确保草原生态建设和保护的持续发展以及草原生态系统服务供给的改善。
文章的主要研究结果总结如下:
⒈西部地区草原生态建设生产着巨大的环境效益,然而,生态建设所恢复和供给的草原生态系统服务具有公共品属性,导致传统市场无法实现其巨大的经济价值,再加上要求对所供给的服务付费的产权和其他法律手段的缺乏,造成牧户保护草原的动力下降、生态系统服务供给不足。市场失灵和制度缺位,制约了草原资源的优化配置。这一切使得构建科学合理的草原生态建设补偿机制成为必然。
⒉作为一种创新的环境管理政策,生态补偿被广泛用于对土地管理者提供经济激励。建立和完善草原生态建设补偿机制就是鼓励草原管理者采用有利于保护生态系统服务的土地管理实践,激发微观群体自愿参与草原生态建设和保护的积极性,协调草原生态建设和保护中的各种复杂的利益关系和制度安排,解决草原生态系统服务供给不足的问题。
⒊当前草原生态建设补偿缺乏可持续发展的补偿政策,属于“临时性的政策支持”。草原生态建设补偿都是依托草原生态建设工程或项目实施,而且草原生态建设项目规模大、并以范围广泛的草原生态系统服务供给者参与为目标,并采用由中央政府设计项目、对项目投资和地方政府执行的模式。缺乏政策可持续性并造成更大的变数和风险。
⒋补偿标准偏低,而且由于对改变草地利用的机会成本的评估差,为了公平起见而且易于管理,采取统一补贴。实证研究表明,实际上补偿标准统一并不意味着公平,而且实际机会成本要比补偿率或者高或者低,如果低的话,一方面浪费资金,另一方面造成剩余资金的寻租;而高的话,则不足以引致对社会有益的行动。
⒌资源利用者没有参与设计和管理草原生态建设补偿政策和规则。在西部草原生态建设补偿项目中,尽管对牧户实行自主、自愿和直接参与的政策,但补偿标准采取的是单一水平,项目规划上采取了自上而下的规划方式,大多数地方政府对牧户参与进行了组织动员。牧民被排除在利益分享、决策、交易的格局之外,甚至还成为利益牺牲者,生态补偿过程中更多地体现了政府的意志。
⒍通过相关性分析和Tobit模型分析发现:农牧民的文化程度、畜牧业收入、纯收入、自有草场面积、对已实施项目效果的判断和草地保护信念、气候风险认知等因素对其参与草原生态保护建设意愿和投入极显著(p<0.01)正相关;年龄、草场面积、应对项目所造成的变化的能力和对自有草场健康程度的判断等因素与草原生态保护建设意愿和投入显著(p<0.05)正相关。而对草地退化成因认知和草场使用权分别与草原生态保护建设意愿和投入极显著(p<0.01)负相关和显著(p<0.05)负相关。
⒎西部草原生态建设补偿机制是以草原生态建设措施的综合作用为基础,根据作为公共品的草原生态系统服务的受益者范围的不同,将草原生态系统服务划分为全球性的、全国性的和地方性的生态系统服务类型。遵循草原生态建设补偿机制的基本理念和设计原则,基于草原生态建设补偿机制的内涵,从纵横两个方向构建西部草原生态建设补偿机制的基本框架,确定了西部草原生态建设补偿主体和补偿对象、补偿标准以及补偿期限的问题。
⒏西部草原生态建设补偿机制的有效运行有赖于财政、税收、金融等各项配套政策的制定和实施。具体内容包括:一是构建和完善我国草原生态补偿法律体系;二是完善各级政府间纵向财政转移支付制度,构建横向转移支付机制;三是在中央政府和其他利益相关者的帮助和扶持下,也应该探索市场机制,建立受益者付费制度,实现政府干预与市场机制的耦合;四是系统规划和全面监管草原生态建设补偿机制运行;五是深化草原资源产权管理,建立规范的草原产权流转制度土地产权;六是在项目设计和执行过程中赋予当地社区更大的话语权,并给与牧户充分的自主选择权;最后是实行适应性管理,强化项目区域的能力构建。
论文主要创新点包括:
⒈构建了一个分析草原生态建设补偿机制的理论框架论文从制度角度分析草原生态建设补偿机制的设计和运行。围绕着制度设计、相互作用和绩效,构建一个生态补偿机制的发展和有效性的多维度的框架,并把它应用于中国西部地区草原生态建设补偿项目,对草原生态建设与保护工程及政策的实施状况与效果做出一个科学的、客观的和全面的评价。分析结果揭示出政府主导的公共支付机制的有效性需要一定的配套政策支撑,国家在公共品供给中也存在着“失灵”问题。因此,论文提出依据草原生态系统服务的受益范围,从纵向、横向两个方向设计不同层级的制度安排,并引入例如生态系统服务市场、合作管理、适应性管理等,继续发挥国家供给公共品的主导作用。
⒉与以前的研究相比,本文在考察生态补偿制度绩效时,鉴于目前国际社会和国家政策对气候变化对草地退化的潜在影响的关注,研究立足于探讨牧户对于人类活动与自然事件引发草原退化的风险认知和看法,以及这些认知是否影响牧户的草原保护投入。目的是要论证在设计生态补偿机制时,不能单一采用经济激励措施,除了考虑到经济激励影响牧户参与草原保护实践外,更要考虑到牧民的认知和社会经济变量对于参与草原保护的影响,与其他策略相结合来提高草原生态建设补偿机制的有效性。这一结果有助于理解牧户复杂的土地保护决策,并且有助于针对恢复和保护具有高度脆弱性的中国西部草原生态系统服务的补偿政策的设计和完善。
Due to human unsustainable uses of rangeland resources, especially the impact of climate change exacerbates the degradation of rangeland ecosystems. These challenges are particularly acute for those in the highly vulnerable western regions of the China, valuable services provided by rangeland ecosystems have been dwindling in recent decades, posing a threat on people’s well being. Construction and conservation of ecological environment of grasslands in Western China can play a key role in producing environmental benefits, however, the economic characteristics of the ecosystem services being provided, such as non-rivalry and non-excludability, along with the spatial scale at which benefits accrue, all of which result in the inability of conventional markets to internalize ES economic value. The livelihoods of pastoralists in the western regions of the country depend greatly on plants, water, animals and other natural resources found in the rangelands. Pastoralists in these regions are affected by the severity and susceptibility of degradation of ecosystem services, on the one hand, and respond with different level of efforts to conserve their lands, on the other. These challenge their livelihoods and influence their conservation efforts in ecological construction and conservation programs. Realizing the severity of this situation, many scholars and practitioners have carried on extensive discussions on it from several aspects, such as improvement of grassland contract system, rational use of grassland resources and establishment of protected areas, etc. This thesis concentrates on the study of eco-compensation mechanisms and supporting policies of ecological environmental construction of grasslands in western China, and starting from the viewpoint that the eco-compensations of ecological environmental construction of grasslands is the key to the success of the ecological environmental construction of grasslands, the thesis hopes to achieve three main goals: First, to probe into design characteristics and functioning of PES case-study programs, reveal the causes and formats of establishment of PES in the specific social and economic context. Second, to appraise the performance of the eco-compensation mechanism and find new mechanisms to improve the effectiveness of PES programs in achieving environmental objectives. Third, to reveal the necessity of the PES system working together with other policies to achieve the design of successful programs.
Main research results are followings:
⒈Construction and conservation of ecological environment of grasslands in Western China can produce great environmental benefits, however, the economic characteristics of the ecosystem services being provided result in the failures of the free market system. Additionally, due to the absence of property rights or other legal means to require payment for services provided, it results in under-investment in the protection and management of grasslands and the under-provision of ecosystem services. Market and policy failures constrain the optimal reallocation of ecological resources. It makes the establishment and improvement of eco-compensation mechanisms of ecological environmental construction of grasslands in western China inevitable.
⒉As a recent innovative environmental management policy that is attracting much attention in both developed and developing countries, payment for ecosystem services has been widely used in providing an economic incentive to land managers to adopt land use or management practices favorable to the protection of ecosystem services. And the same is true for the establishment and improvement of the eco-compensation mechanisms and supporting policies of ecological environmental construction of grasslands in western China.
⒊As“temporary supporting policies”, they are based on the implementation of ecological construction projects which are targeted to the participation of large spatial scales and a wide range of providers of grassland ecosystem services. PES programs are designed and financed by central government, and PES implementation is delegated to lower levels of governments. All of these make the PES programs in the protection and provision of grassland ecosystem services unsustainable and more changeable.
⒋The low level of compensation is not sufficient to compensate providers for the opportunity cost of foregoing higher-return alternative land users, and the adoption of uniform rate of subsidies to be fair and easy to manage in the PES programs of grassland ecological construction in western China. Empirical studies have shown that same level of compensation does not mean fair, and payments are usually either higher or lower than the cost of ecosystem services provision. The former results in a waste of money and rent-seeking of surplus funds, the latter would not achieve incentives.
⒌Land users do not participate to design and manage PES programs in existence, although they can enter contracts voluntarily, and projects planning take a top-down planning approach. Service providers are excluded from the benefit-sharing, decision-making and trading processes, even becoming victims of interests. The whole processes are more representative of the willingness of governments.
⒍The results of our factors analysis indicate that education level, animal husbandry income, net income, grassland areas, climate risk perception and protection believe variables are strongly positive associated with devotion resources to restoration efforts (p<0.01); Age, capabilities to deal with risks, belief of grassland healthy conditions are positive associated with protection efforts (p<0.05); and the cognition of the causes of grassland degradation and land tenure is strongly (p<0.01) and negative associated with their protection efforts(p<0.05) respectively.
⒎Based on combined effects of ecological construction projects in western grasslands, according to the range of different beneficiaries, the framework of eco-compensation mechanisms of ecological environmental construction of grasslands in western China are constructed by horizontal and vertical mechanisms, and determine
⒏The effective functioning of eco-compensation mechanisms are supported with financial, taxation and other policies in order to support effective grassland ecosystems conservation and ecosystem services provision. First, it should structure the rational ecological compensation system concerning ecological construction. Second, it should improve inter-governmental fiscal transfer payment system. Third, it should explore market system and the establishment of user-financed PES programs. Fourth, it should plan systematically and monitor overall the functioning of PES schemes. Fifth, it should deepen the reform of land tenure. Sixth, it should give local communities greater voice in the process of programs design and implementation. Finally, capacity is extremely important to design consistent schemes and projects and to determine the provision of ES in the long run.
Main innovation points are followings:
⒈Having constructed an analyzing framework of the mechanisms
With the institutional analysis framework, this thesis applies the framework in the context of ecological construction programs in western grasslands for understanding the development and effectiveness of PES schemes. The results reveal that the effectiveness of government-financed PES programs needs to be supported by relevant policies and there exists“government failure”in the public payment schemes to some extent, so the central government should continue to be play a leading role in the supply of public goods, along with the introduction of market for ecosystem services, cooperative management, adaptive management, etc.
⒉Having changed the visual angel of study
A large body of literature has analyzed pastoralists’protection decision-making, in terms of risk perceptions and beliefs of human activities and natural events, the paper emphasizes that PES schemes need to complement existing direct incentives with other policies to achieve the desired goals.
文章的主要研究结果总结如下:
⒈西部地区草原生态建设生产着巨大的环境效益,然而,生态建设所恢复和供给的草原生态系统服务具有公共品属性,导致传统市场无法实现其巨大的经济价值,再加上要求对所供给的服务付费的产权和其他法律手段的缺乏,造成牧户保护草原的动力下降、生态系统服务供给不足。市场失灵和制度缺位,制约了草原资源的优化配置。这一切使得构建科学合理的草原生态建设补偿机制成为必然。
⒉作为一种创新的环境管理政策,生态补偿被广泛用于对土地管理者提供经济激励。建立和完善草原生态建设补偿机制就是鼓励草原管理者采用有利于保护生态系统服务的土地管理实践,激发微观群体自愿参与草原生态建设和保护的积极性,协调草原生态建设和保护中的各种复杂的利益关系和制度安排,解决草原生态系统服务供给不足的问题。
⒊当前草原生态建设补偿缺乏可持续发展的补偿政策,属于“临时性的政策支持”。草原生态建设补偿都是依托草原生态建设工程或项目实施,而且草原生态建设项目规模大、并以范围广泛的草原生态系统服务供给者参与为目标,并采用由中央政府设计项目、对项目投资和地方政府执行的模式。缺乏政策可持续性并造成更大的变数和风险。
⒋补偿标准偏低,而且由于对改变草地利用的机会成本的评估差,为了公平起见而且易于管理,采取统一补贴。实证研究表明,实际上补偿标准统一并不意味着公平,而且实际机会成本要比补偿率或者高或者低,如果低的话,一方面浪费资金,另一方面造成剩余资金的寻租;而高的话,则不足以引致对社会有益的行动。
⒌资源利用者没有参与设计和管理草原生态建设补偿政策和规则。在西部草原生态建设补偿项目中,尽管对牧户实行自主、自愿和直接参与的政策,但补偿标准采取的是单一水平,项目规划上采取了自上而下的规划方式,大多数地方政府对牧户参与进行了组织动员。牧民被排除在利益分享、决策、交易的格局之外,甚至还成为利益牺牲者,生态补偿过程中更多地体现了政府的意志。
⒍通过相关性分析和Tobit模型分析发现:农牧民的文化程度、畜牧业收入、纯收入、自有草场面积、对已实施项目效果的判断和草地保护信念、气候风险认知等因素对其参与草原生态保护建设意愿和投入极显著(p<0.01)正相关;年龄、草场面积、应对项目所造成的变化的能力和对自有草场健康程度的判断等因素与草原生态保护建设意愿和投入显著(p<0.05)正相关。而对草地退化成因认知和草场使用权分别与草原生态保护建设意愿和投入极显著(p<0.01)负相关和显著(p<0.05)负相关。
⒎西部草原生态建设补偿机制是以草原生态建设措施的综合作用为基础,根据作为公共品的草原生态系统服务的受益者范围的不同,将草原生态系统服务划分为全球性的、全国性的和地方性的生态系统服务类型。遵循草原生态建设补偿机制的基本理念和设计原则,基于草原生态建设补偿机制的内涵,从纵横两个方向构建西部草原生态建设补偿机制的基本框架,确定了西部草原生态建设补偿主体和补偿对象、补偿标准以及补偿期限的问题。
⒏西部草原生态建设补偿机制的有效运行有赖于财政、税收、金融等各项配套政策的制定和实施。具体内容包括:一是构建和完善我国草原生态补偿法律体系;二是完善各级政府间纵向财政转移支付制度,构建横向转移支付机制;三是在中央政府和其他利益相关者的帮助和扶持下,也应该探索市场机制,建立受益者付费制度,实现政府干预与市场机制的耦合;四是系统规划和全面监管草原生态建设补偿机制运行;五是深化草原资源产权管理,建立规范的草原产权流转制度土地产权;六是在项目设计和执行过程中赋予当地社区更大的话语权,并给与牧户充分的自主选择权;最后是实行适应性管理,强化项目区域的能力构建。
论文主要创新点包括:
⒈构建了一个分析草原生态建设补偿机制的理论框架论文从制度角度分析草原生态建设补偿机制的设计和运行。围绕着制度设计、相互作用和绩效,构建一个生态补偿机制的发展和有效性的多维度的框架,并把它应用于中国西部地区草原生态建设补偿项目,对草原生态建设与保护工程及政策的实施状况与效果做出一个科学的、客观的和全面的评价。分析结果揭示出政府主导的公共支付机制的有效性需要一定的配套政策支撑,国家在公共品供给中也存在着“失灵”问题。因此,论文提出依据草原生态系统服务的受益范围,从纵向、横向两个方向设计不同层级的制度安排,并引入例如生态系统服务市场、合作管理、适应性管理等,继续发挥国家供给公共品的主导作用。
⒉与以前的研究相比,本文在考察生态补偿制度绩效时,鉴于目前国际社会和国家政策对气候变化对草地退化的潜在影响的关注,研究立足于探讨牧户对于人类活动与自然事件引发草原退化的风险认知和看法,以及这些认知是否影响牧户的草原保护投入。目的是要论证在设计生态补偿机制时,不能单一采用经济激励措施,除了考虑到经济激励影响牧户参与草原保护实践外,更要考虑到牧民的认知和社会经济变量对于参与草原保护的影响,与其他策略相结合来提高草原生态建设补偿机制的有效性。这一结果有助于理解牧户复杂的土地保护决策,并且有助于针对恢复和保护具有高度脆弱性的中国西部草原生态系统服务的补偿政策的设计和完善。
Due to human unsustainable uses of rangeland resources, especially the impact of climate change exacerbates the degradation of rangeland ecosystems. These challenges are particularly acute for those in the highly vulnerable western regions of the China, valuable services provided by rangeland ecosystems have been dwindling in recent decades, posing a threat on people’s well being. Construction and conservation of ecological environment of grasslands in Western China can play a key role in producing environmental benefits, however, the economic characteristics of the ecosystem services being provided, such as non-rivalry and non-excludability, along with the spatial scale at which benefits accrue, all of which result in the inability of conventional markets to internalize ES economic value. The livelihoods of pastoralists in the western regions of the country depend greatly on plants, water, animals and other natural resources found in the rangelands. Pastoralists in these regions are affected by the severity and susceptibility of degradation of ecosystem services, on the one hand, and respond with different level of efforts to conserve their lands, on the other. These challenge their livelihoods and influence their conservation efforts in ecological construction and conservation programs. Realizing the severity of this situation, many scholars and practitioners have carried on extensive discussions on it from several aspects, such as improvement of grassland contract system, rational use of grassland resources and establishment of protected areas, etc. This thesis concentrates on the study of eco-compensation mechanisms and supporting policies of ecological environmental construction of grasslands in western China, and starting from the viewpoint that the eco-compensations of ecological environmental construction of grasslands is the key to the success of the ecological environmental construction of grasslands, the thesis hopes to achieve three main goals: First, to probe into design characteristics and functioning of PES case-study programs, reveal the causes and formats of establishment of PES in the specific social and economic context. Second, to appraise the performance of the eco-compensation mechanism and find new mechanisms to improve the effectiveness of PES programs in achieving environmental objectives. Third, to reveal the necessity of the PES system working together with other policies to achieve the design of successful programs.
Main research results are followings:
⒈Construction and conservation of ecological environment of grasslands in Western China can produce great environmental benefits, however, the economic characteristics of the ecosystem services being provided result in the failures of the free market system. Additionally, due to the absence of property rights or other legal means to require payment for services provided, it results in under-investment in the protection and management of grasslands and the under-provision of ecosystem services. Market and policy failures constrain the optimal reallocation of ecological resources. It makes the establishment and improvement of eco-compensation mechanisms of ecological environmental construction of grasslands in western China inevitable.
⒉As a recent innovative environmental management policy that is attracting much attention in both developed and developing countries, payment for ecosystem services has been widely used in providing an economic incentive to land managers to adopt land use or management practices favorable to the protection of ecosystem services. And the same is true for the establishment and improvement of the eco-compensation mechanisms and supporting policies of ecological environmental construction of grasslands in western China.
⒊As“temporary supporting policies”, they are based on the implementation of ecological construction projects which are targeted to the participation of large spatial scales and a wide range of providers of grassland ecosystem services. PES programs are designed and financed by central government, and PES implementation is delegated to lower levels of governments. All of these make the PES programs in the protection and provision of grassland ecosystem services unsustainable and more changeable.
⒋The low level of compensation is not sufficient to compensate providers for the opportunity cost of foregoing higher-return alternative land users, and the adoption of uniform rate of subsidies to be fair and easy to manage in the PES programs of grassland ecological construction in western China. Empirical studies have shown that same level of compensation does not mean fair, and payments are usually either higher or lower than the cost of ecosystem services provision. The former results in a waste of money and rent-seeking of surplus funds, the latter would not achieve incentives.
⒌Land users do not participate to design and manage PES programs in existence, although they can enter contracts voluntarily, and projects planning take a top-down planning approach. Service providers are excluded from the benefit-sharing, decision-making and trading processes, even becoming victims of interests. The whole processes are more representative of the willingness of governments.
⒍The results of our factors analysis indicate that education level, animal husbandry income, net income, grassland areas, climate risk perception and protection believe variables are strongly positive associated with devotion resources to restoration efforts (p<0.01); Age, capabilities to deal with risks, belief of grassland healthy conditions are positive associated with protection efforts (p<0.05); and the cognition of the causes of grassland degradation and land tenure is strongly (p<0.01) and negative associated with their protection efforts(p<0.05) respectively.
⒎Based on combined effects of ecological construction projects in western grasslands, according to the range of different beneficiaries, the framework of eco-compensation mechanisms of ecological environmental construction of grasslands in western China are constructed by horizontal and vertical mechanisms, and determine
⒏The effective functioning of eco-compensation mechanisms are supported with financial, taxation and other policies in order to support effective grassland ecosystems conservation and ecosystem services provision. First, it should structure the rational ecological compensation system concerning ecological construction. Second, it should improve inter-governmental fiscal transfer payment system. Third, it should explore market system and the establishment of user-financed PES programs. Fourth, it should plan systematically and monitor overall the functioning of PES schemes. Fifth, it should deepen the reform of land tenure. Sixth, it should give local communities greater voice in the process of programs design and implementation. Finally, capacity is extremely important to design consistent schemes and projects and to determine the provision of ES in the long run.
Main innovation points are followings:
⒈Having constructed an analyzing framework of the mechanisms
With the institutional analysis framework, this thesis applies the framework in the context of ecological construction programs in western grasslands for understanding the development and effectiveness of PES schemes. The results reveal that the effectiveness of government-financed PES programs needs to be supported by relevant policies and there exists“government failure”in the public payment schemes to some extent, so the central government should continue to be play a leading role in the supply of public goods, along with the introduction of market for ecosystem services, cooperative management, adaptive management, etc.
⒉Having changed the visual angel of study
A large body of literature has analyzed pastoralists’protection decision-making, in terms of risk perceptions and beliefs of human activities and natural events, the paper emphasizes that PES schemes need to complement existing direct incentives with other policies to achieve the desired goals.
引文
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