流域管理体制中的协调管理研究
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摘要
本文的选题来自对“三峡库区及其上游水质保护管理体制”,即“流域管理体制”实践问题的认识及其从理论上进行的探索和分析,文章以流域管理体制为研究对象,以协调管理为视角,从理论和实践两个层面上进行分析和探讨。
以往国内外研究管理体制构建问题,大多是在政治学、公共管理学等理论框架中进行的,多是从政府机构职能划分上进行分析和论述。本文试图从经济学、管理学以及公共管理学等理论的交叉与融合这样一个更为宽泛的视野中研究流域管理体制的构建问题。在相关理论综述的基础上引用了“协调经济学理论”,提出了“协调管理理论”概念和构建体系,并将这两个理论作为本文分析的基础,对于这两个并不成熟的理论做了一定的描述、论述和探索。研究探讨了“制度设计”与“协调管理”的内在关系,提出了“协调管理是管理体制中的核心问题”、“制度设计是实现协调管理的有效途径”等论点和结论。
本文的研究以政府也是“经济人”、政府行为具有“有限理性”为假设前提,对内从政府组织和利益集团的概念和性质分析了政府组织冲突的原因,协调管理对解决政府冲突具有重要意义,提出了内在协调管理问题及解决途径,具体体现在作为“正式规则”的“交流与协商”、“约束与激励”和作为“非正式规则”的“信心与预期”、“习俗与惯例”。而通过制度设计实现协调管理必须解决组织中利益集团(本文界定的组织内的利益集团指政府部门和机构)间的利益冲突问题,组织中的x——无效率问题等。
对外通过对“市场失灵”、“政府失灵”以及“制度失灵”的原因分析,指出了“协调管理失灵”的根本在于“制度的失灵”,制度设计是协调管理得以实现的有效途径。对流域协调管理的外部影响与博弈均衡做了分析。协调是博弈的关键,内部信息交流、惯例形成以及外部选择可以作为提高博弈协调的机制,有效解决对协调管理的外部影响。文章给出了相关均衡模型,并罗列了三个具体的制度模型,即关于非合作的一个最基本的制度——纳什均衡、关于协调的一个最重要的制度——性别战均衡、关于建立长期合作的制度——罗尔斯均衡。建立了政府间的合作博弈模型。本文基于协调管理,从制度的功能维度和管理的协调维度,研究了制度设计与协调管理之间的关系,并探讨了协调思想、协调文化对制度设计的深刻影响。
本文的理论探索是为了解决“三峡库区及其上游水质保护管理体制”这一流域管理体制存在的问题而进行的,本文分析了影响三峡库区及其上游水质保护协调管理的体制性原因,即政府组织利益冲突体现在流域管理缺乏权威,政府部门职责交叉严重使组织产生x——无效率,管理运行缺乏机制,协调管理难以实现,在此分析的基础上得出了“流域水质保护管理体制必须实现统一协调管理的结论”,这既是水的流动性和水体生态系统整体性的客观要求,也是水质保护管理体制中组织间集权和分权的现实需要。
本文在上述探索和论证的基础上还就三峡库区水质保护管理体制的重构给出了具体的设计方案和政策建议。
本文在理论和实践两个层面的探索和分析都还做得很不够,这也成为了笔者今后进一步研究的空间和领域。在理论上对“协调经济学理论”和“协调管理理论”以及其与“制度设计”三者之间的联系,特别是“协调管理理论”这一笔者视重的理论的进一步研究;在实践中对流域统一协调管理的深入研究,尤其是国家精减政府机构即将实行大部委制的改革对流域管理体制深刻影响等的研究,这些都成为了本文的预期和展望。
The selected topic of the paper originates from "the water quality protection management system in the Three Gorges reservoir area and its upstream area", namely the understanding of the practical problems of "watershed management system" and its exploration and analysis theoretically. The paper takes the watershed management system as the research object, the coordination management and institutional design as the principle axis, analyses and discusses them theoretically and practically.
The past studies of the management system construction were mostly carried out in the theoretical frame of politics, public management and so on. And they analyzed and discussed mostly from the function division of the government institution. This paper tries to study the construction problem of watershed management system from a more wide vision, the overlapping and fusion of many theories, such as economics, management, public management and so on. Based on the summary of the relevant theory, the paper quotes "coordination economics", proposes the concept and construction system of "coordination and management theory", puts them as the analysis basement, then makes certain description, discussion and research for the two immature theories. Studies and discusses the internal relationship between "institutional design" and "coordination"; proposes conclusions, such as "coordination management is the key problem of the management system", "institutional design is an effective way to realize coordination" and so on.
The paper considers that the government is also "economic man" and the government behavior has bounded rationality as the hypothesis premise, internally analyzes the reason of the conflict of government organization from the concept and the nature of the government organization and interest groups, points out that coordination management has important meaning for solving the government conflict, puts forward the internal coordination management problems and solutions, which embodies in "communication and negotiation" and "restrain and encouragement" as "formal rules", "confidence and expectation " and "custom and convention" as "informal rules". However, the realization of coordination management through institutional design should solve the interest conflict problem between the interest groups (in the paper the interest group in the organization is the government department and institution) in the organization, x--inefficiency problem in the organization.
Externally, through the analysis on "market failure", "the government failure" and "system failure", the paper points out that "coordination management failure" ultimately lies in "system failure", and institutional design is an effective way to realize coordination management. And, through the analysis on external influences and game equilibrium of watershed coordination management, it points out that coordination is the key to the game, the internal exchange of information, the practice of the formation and external options can work as a mechanism to improve game coordination, which is an effective solution to the external influences of coordination management. Also, it gives the relevant equilibrium model and sets out three concrete system models, namely a most fundamental system about non-coordination—nash equilibrium, a most important system about coordination—sex war equilibrium, about system for building long-term cooperation—rawls equilibrium. It has established the cooperation game modle among the governments. Based on coordination management, this paper studies the internal relationship between institutional design and coordination, and discusses the influence which the coordinated thoughts and coordination culture have on the institutional design from the functional dimension of system and the coordination dimension of management.
The theoretical discussion is carried on for solving the problems in the watershed management system of "the water quality protection management system in the Three Gorges reservoir area and its upstream". The paper analyzes the system reason of the water quality protection coordination management in the Three Gorges reservoir area and its upstream area, namely the interest conflict of the government organization embodies the lack of authority in the watershed management, the severe cross of the government department's duties which make the organization produce x—inefficiency, the lack of mechanism during the management operation, difficult realization of coordination management. Based on the analysis, the paper concludes that "the management system of the basin water quality protection must realize unity coordination management". It is not only the objective requirement of water fluidity and water ecosystem integrity, but also the realistic requirement of centralization and decentralization between organizations in the water quality protection management system.
Based on the above exploration and argumentation, the paper also proposes exact design plans and policy suggestions for the reconstruction of the water quality protection management system of the Three Gorges.
Because the theoretical and practical exploration and analysis are not enough, it becomes further research field for the author afterwards. Theoretical, the relationship among "coordination economics", "the theory of coordination management" and "the theory of institutional design", especially "the theory of coordination management" which the author pays more attention to; practically, the further research for the unity coordination management for the watershed, especially the study on the country's reform of reducing the government institution and executing the big ministries system having profound influence on the watershed management system and so on, which are all the paper's anticipation and expectation.
以往国内外研究管理体制构建问题,大多是在政治学、公共管理学等理论框架中进行的,多是从政府机构职能划分上进行分析和论述。本文试图从经济学、管理学以及公共管理学等理论的交叉与融合这样一个更为宽泛的视野中研究流域管理体制的构建问题。在相关理论综述的基础上引用了“协调经济学理论”,提出了“协调管理理论”概念和构建体系,并将这两个理论作为本文分析的基础,对于这两个并不成熟的理论做了一定的描述、论述和探索。研究探讨了“制度设计”与“协调管理”的内在关系,提出了“协调管理是管理体制中的核心问题”、“制度设计是实现协调管理的有效途径”等论点和结论。
本文的研究以政府也是“经济人”、政府行为具有“有限理性”为假设前提,对内从政府组织和利益集团的概念和性质分析了政府组织冲突的原因,协调管理对解决政府冲突具有重要意义,提出了内在协调管理问题及解决途径,具体体现在作为“正式规则”的“交流与协商”、“约束与激励”和作为“非正式规则”的“信心与预期”、“习俗与惯例”。而通过制度设计实现协调管理必须解决组织中利益集团(本文界定的组织内的利益集团指政府部门和机构)间的利益冲突问题,组织中的x——无效率问题等。
对外通过对“市场失灵”、“政府失灵”以及“制度失灵”的原因分析,指出了“协调管理失灵”的根本在于“制度的失灵”,制度设计是协调管理得以实现的有效途径。对流域协调管理的外部影响与博弈均衡做了分析。协调是博弈的关键,内部信息交流、惯例形成以及外部选择可以作为提高博弈协调的机制,有效解决对协调管理的外部影响。文章给出了相关均衡模型,并罗列了三个具体的制度模型,即关于非合作的一个最基本的制度——纳什均衡、关于协调的一个最重要的制度——性别战均衡、关于建立长期合作的制度——罗尔斯均衡。建立了政府间的合作博弈模型。本文基于协调管理,从制度的功能维度和管理的协调维度,研究了制度设计与协调管理之间的关系,并探讨了协调思想、协调文化对制度设计的深刻影响。
本文的理论探索是为了解决“三峡库区及其上游水质保护管理体制”这一流域管理体制存在的问题而进行的,本文分析了影响三峡库区及其上游水质保护协调管理的体制性原因,即政府组织利益冲突体现在流域管理缺乏权威,政府部门职责交叉严重使组织产生x——无效率,管理运行缺乏机制,协调管理难以实现,在此分析的基础上得出了“流域水质保护管理体制必须实现统一协调管理的结论”,这既是水的流动性和水体生态系统整体性的客观要求,也是水质保护管理体制中组织间集权和分权的现实需要。
本文在上述探索和论证的基础上还就三峡库区水质保护管理体制的重构给出了具体的设计方案和政策建议。
本文在理论和实践两个层面的探索和分析都还做得很不够,这也成为了笔者今后进一步研究的空间和领域。在理论上对“协调经济学理论”和“协调管理理论”以及其与“制度设计”三者之间的联系,特别是“协调管理理论”这一笔者视重的理论的进一步研究;在实践中对流域统一协调管理的深入研究,尤其是国家精减政府机构即将实行大部委制的改革对流域管理体制深刻影响等的研究,这些都成为了本文的预期和展望。
The selected topic of the paper originates from "the water quality protection management system in the Three Gorges reservoir area and its upstream area", namely the understanding of the practical problems of "watershed management system" and its exploration and analysis theoretically. The paper takes the watershed management system as the research object, the coordination management and institutional design as the principle axis, analyses and discusses them theoretically and practically.
The past studies of the management system construction were mostly carried out in the theoretical frame of politics, public management and so on. And they analyzed and discussed mostly from the function division of the government institution. This paper tries to study the construction problem of watershed management system from a more wide vision, the overlapping and fusion of many theories, such as economics, management, public management and so on. Based on the summary of the relevant theory, the paper quotes "coordination economics", proposes the concept and construction system of "coordination and management theory", puts them as the analysis basement, then makes certain description, discussion and research for the two immature theories. Studies and discusses the internal relationship between "institutional design" and "coordination"; proposes conclusions, such as "coordination management is the key problem of the management system", "institutional design is an effective way to realize coordination" and so on.
The paper considers that the government is also "economic man" and the government behavior has bounded rationality as the hypothesis premise, internally analyzes the reason of the conflict of government organization from the concept and the nature of the government organization and interest groups, points out that coordination management has important meaning for solving the government conflict, puts forward the internal coordination management problems and solutions, which embodies in "communication and negotiation" and "restrain and encouragement" as "formal rules", "confidence and expectation " and "custom and convention" as "informal rules". However, the realization of coordination management through institutional design should solve the interest conflict problem between the interest groups (in the paper the interest group in the organization is the government department and institution) in the organization, x--inefficiency problem in the organization.
Externally, through the analysis on "market failure", "the government failure" and "system failure", the paper points out that "coordination management failure" ultimately lies in "system failure", and institutional design is an effective way to realize coordination management. And, through the analysis on external influences and game equilibrium of watershed coordination management, it points out that coordination is the key to the game, the internal exchange of information, the practice of the formation and external options can work as a mechanism to improve game coordination, which is an effective solution to the external influences of coordination management. Also, it gives the relevant equilibrium model and sets out three concrete system models, namely a most fundamental system about non-coordination—nash equilibrium, a most important system about coordination—sex war equilibrium, about system for building long-term cooperation—rawls equilibrium. It has established the cooperation game modle among the governments. Based on coordination management, this paper studies the internal relationship between institutional design and coordination, and discusses the influence which the coordinated thoughts and coordination culture have on the institutional design from the functional dimension of system and the coordination dimension of management.
The theoretical discussion is carried on for solving the problems in the watershed management system of "the water quality protection management system in the Three Gorges reservoir area and its upstream". The paper analyzes the system reason of the water quality protection coordination management in the Three Gorges reservoir area and its upstream area, namely the interest conflict of the government organization embodies the lack of authority in the watershed management, the severe cross of the government department's duties which make the organization produce x—inefficiency, the lack of mechanism during the management operation, difficult realization of coordination management. Based on the analysis, the paper concludes that "the management system of the basin water quality protection must realize unity coordination management". It is not only the objective requirement of water fluidity and water ecosystem integrity, but also the realistic requirement of centralization and decentralization between organizations in the water quality protection management system.
Based on the above exploration and argumentation, the paper also proposes exact design plans and policy suggestions for the reconstruction of the water quality protection management system of the Three Gorges.
Because the theoretical and practical exploration and analysis are not enough, it becomes further research field for the author afterwards. Theoretical, the relationship among "coordination economics", "the theory of coordination management" and "the theory of institutional design", especially "the theory of coordination management" which the author pays more attention to; practically, the further research for the unity coordination management for the watershed, especially the study on the country's reform of reducing the government institution and executing the big ministries system having profound influence on the watershed management system and so on, which are all the paper's anticipation and expectation.
引文
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