论股东派生诉讼被告的确定
摘要
作为普通法国家的一项天才发明的股东派生诉讼制度,其功能为实现股东对公司经营层的监督,促进公司内部治理结构的完善。股东派生诉讼具有衡平法性质,是对公司“多数原则”的修正,该制度是运用衡平方法矫正公司核心制度安排不合目的性的产物。现行《公司法》引进了股东派生诉讼制度,但对于股东派生诉讼被告、尤其是我国公司法中的“他人”的范围,并没有明确而具体的规定。该制度的衡平法性质、经营监督功能以及诉讼成本和司法的局限性等是确定该种诉讼被告范围的基本考虑因素,决定了应按照功能等值的思路确定股东派生诉讼制度的被告。
本文拟从股东派生诉讼制度的衡平法性质出发,对确定该诉讼被告范围的原则进行了讨论,并对股东派生诉讼中被告可能范围予以了详细分析,进而得出现行《公司法》中的股东派生诉讼被告范围的具体结论,以期对完善我国股东派生诉讼制度有所裨益。
China's current "Company Law" had stipulated the derivative suit. When company's benefit receives the violation, but the company is negligent in or refuses to investigate the responsibility of the Infringers, the derivative suit is one important judicial relief method. And it is also a rather unique method that providing reliefs the responsibility afterward. Its appearance is mainly protects minority shareholder's benefit. And the derivative suit has the positive function to solve the question of management company,to recover the deficiency of majority stock decision principle and to protect company and shareholder's benefit. However, it's a little simple stipulation about the derivative suit in China's New Company. And china's Company law has not made a clear stipulation on the scope of defendant, especial the scope of "others" in derivative suit. In this paper, the author has discussed the scope of defendant. And we obtains conclusion about the scope of defendant after analysis. Paper is divides into three parts.
The first part,the author briefly describes the concept of the derivative suit. Derivative suit is one form of action form that When company's legitimate rights and interests receive the major stockholder or the trustee and so on violation, and the company rejects sues or is negligent in the prosecution, shareholder for company's benefit, but by own name to file the charge, investigates its legal liability. Then the paper introduces the difference and the relation between derivative suit and representative lawsuit. Then the author elaborated the equity nature of the derivative suit very detailed. This article maintains that the derivative suit is a special system. And it is to apply to special circumstances. It is to revise "majority principles" of company. The derivative suit has equity nature. The equity nature of such system's function lies in the communication general justice and the individual justice. So, the derivative suit will only apply to the company's internal controls were improperly control or influence and the individual justice of corporate personality. The system as a bridge links the general justice and individual justice. The essence of the derivative suit is the equity nature. It is very important to consider this factor when constructs and consummates the derivative suit. Understand this point it is directly related to research on other issues. The paper then discussed the role of the system and its limitations. The value of the system is to prevent internal controllers' misconduct and to improve corporate governance. The function of the system is to monitor company operators. However, as a common law countries genius invention of the derivative suit have their own limitations: impact modern company management structure,lawsuit cost uncertainty and the limitation of judiciary.
The second part discusses the basic principles when we determine the scope of the defendant of the system. The author believes that determined the scope of defendants of the derivative suit, the following principles should be followed: Firstly, we should balance between company autonomy and state intervention each other. Adhere to this principle should be to ensure that minority shareholder's rights can be fully protected when majority shareholder abuse of their rights. And we also ensure that to protect corporate autonomy from state intervention. Secondly, encourage proper actions and coordinated action to prevent speculative principle. We should avoid the derivative suit become a "dead letter". Also we must pay attention to the prevention speculative litigation and to avoid litigation wave. To ensure that the companies make their business decision could avoid interference from the system and reasonable to choose their business partners. Thirdly, Learn from advanced foreign experience and coordination with the domestic legal system balance. Face a variety of legislative cases, we should learn from foreign advanced legislative experience with actual conditions in China. Considered the domestic existing system and the Chinese derivative suit present situation, the author thinks the German legislation example to be possible for our country, in determined the shareholder derives when the lawsuit defendant scope uses for reference.
The third part, the author obtains his conclusion after discussion about the scope of defendant of derivative suit. In the modern company management structure the trustee, the supervisor and the higher managements can control company's operation. And they have the opportunity to abuse this kind of control status to violate company benefit. As mentioned above the function of the derivative suit is to monitor company operators. So the system should mainly concentrate the supervised function and the attention in the trustee, the supervisor and the higher managements. Accordingly, the directors, supervisors and senior management personnel are accused shareholder derivative litigation. For the "Company Law" Section 152 "others" understand related to the use of this system. The author thought that here "other people" should explain for "sponsors, liquidators, the controlling shareholder, and the actual control of the company and manages the level benefit with the company identically the facilitating agency which serves for the company". The company's position in the litigation has been a hot discussion. The author thinks that the company should be classified as an independent without the right to request a third person, but can not become the nominal defendant.
Finally, The author obtains the specific conclusions about the scope of defendant of the derivative suit in the "Company Law":"Company directors, supervisors, managers and other senior management staff, as well as sponsors, liquidators, the controlling shareholder, and the actual control of the company and manages the level benefit with the company identically the facilitating agency which serves for the company".
本文拟从股东派生诉讼制度的衡平法性质出发,对确定该诉讼被告范围的原则进行了讨论,并对股东派生诉讼中被告可能范围予以了详细分析,进而得出现行《公司法》中的股东派生诉讼被告范围的具体结论,以期对完善我国股东派生诉讼制度有所裨益。
China's current "Company Law" had stipulated the derivative suit. When company's benefit receives the violation, but the company is negligent in or refuses to investigate the responsibility of the Infringers, the derivative suit is one important judicial relief method. And it is also a rather unique method that providing reliefs the responsibility afterward. Its appearance is mainly protects minority shareholder's benefit. And the derivative suit has the positive function to solve the question of management company,to recover the deficiency of majority stock decision principle and to protect company and shareholder's benefit. However, it's a little simple stipulation about the derivative suit in China's New Company. And china's Company law has not made a clear stipulation on the scope of defendant, especial the scope of "others" in derivative suit. In this paper, the author has discussed the scope of defendant. And we obtains conclusion about the scope of defendant after analysis. Paper is divides into three parts.
The first part,the author briefly describes the concept of the derivative suit. Derivative suit is one form of action form that When company's legitimate rights and interests receive the major stockholder or the trustee and so on violation, and the company rejects sues or is negligent in the prosecution, shareholder for company's benefit, but by own name to file the charge, investigates its legal liability. Then the paper introduces the difference and the relation between derivative suit and representative lawsuit. Then the author elaborated the equity nature of the derivative suit very detailed. This article maintains that the derivative suit is a special system. And it is to apply to special circumstances. It is to revise "majority principles" of company. The derivative suit has equity nature. The equity nature of such system's function lies in the communication general justice and the individual justice. So, the derivative suit will only apply to the company's internal controls were improperly control or influence and the individual justice of corporate personality. The system as a bridge links the general justice and individual justice. The essence of the derivative suit is the equity nature. It is very important to consider this factor when constructs and consummates the derivative suit. Understand this point it is directly related to research on other issues. The paper then discussed the role of the system and its limitations. The value of the system is to prevent internal controllers' misconduct and to improve corporate governance. The function of the system is to monitor company operators. However, as a common law countries genius invention of the derivative suit have their own limitations: impact modern company management structure,lawsuit cost uncertainty and the limitation of judiciary.
The second part discusses the basic principles when we determine the scope of the defendant of the system. The author believes that determined the scope of defendants of the derivative suit, the following principles should be followed: Firstly, we should balance between company autonomy and state intervention each other. Adhere to this principle should be to ensure that minority shareholder's rights can be fully protected when majority shareholder abuse of their rights. And we also ensure that to protect corporate autonomy from state intervention. Secondly, encourage proper actions and coordinated action to prevent speculative principle. We should avoid the derivative suit become a "dead letter". Also we must pay attention to the prevention speculative litigation and to avoid litigation wave. To ensure that the companies make their business decision could avoid interference from the system and reasonable to choose their business partners. Thirdly, Learn from advanced foreign experience and coordination with the domestic legal system balance. Face a variety of legislative cases, we should learn from foreign advanced legislative experience with actual conditions in China. Considered the domestic existing system and the Chinese derivative suit present situation, the author thinks the German legislation example to be possible for our country, in determined the shareholder derives when the lawsuit defendant scope uses for reference.
The third part, the author obtains his conclusion after discussion about the scope of defendant of derivative suit. In the modern company management structure the trustee, the supervisor and the higher managements can control company's operation. And they have the opportunity to abuse this kind of control status to violate company benefit. As mentioned above the function of the derivative suit is to monitor company operators. So the system should mainly concentrate the supervised function and the attention in the trustee, the supervisor and the higher managements. Accordingly, the directors, supervisors and senior management personnel are accused shareholder derivative litigation. For the "Company Law" Section 152 "others" understand related to the use of this system. The author thought that here "other people" should explain for "sponsors, liquidators, the controlling shareholder, and the actual control of the company and manages the level benefit with the company identically the facilitating agency which serves for the company". The company's position in the litigation has been a hot discussion. The author thinks that the company should be classified as an independent without the right to request a third person, but can not become the nominal defendant.
Finally, The author obtains the specific conclusions about the scope of defendant of the derivative suit in the "Company Law":"Company directors, supervisors, managers and other senior management staff, as well as sponsors, liquidators, the controlling shareholder, and the actual control of the company and manages the level benefit with the company identically the facilitating agency which serves for the company".
引文
[1] Roger Meiners,Piercing the veil of Limited liability,(1979) 4 Del. J. Corp. L,p.351.
[2] 段厚省:《略论股东代表诉讼》,《政治与法律》2000 年第 4 期,第33-37 页。
[3] 蔡立东:《论股东派生诉讼中被告的范围》,《当代法学》2007 年第 1期(总第 121 期),第 154 页。
[4] 吴建斌:《股东代表诉讼制度及其在我国的确立和完善》,《南京大学学报(哲学·人文科学·社会科学版)》2000 年第 1 期,第 37 页。
[5] [英]彼得·斯坦,约翰·香得:《西方社会的法律价值》,王献平译,中国人民公安大学出版社 1990 年第 1 版,第 12 页。
[6]徐国栋:《民法基本原则解释》,中国政法大学出版社 1992 年第 1 版,第 138 页。
[7] 蔡立东:《公司治理中的“多数派暴政”问题》,《法制与社会发展(双月刊)》2003 年第 5 期(总第 53 期),第 87 页。
[8] 冯果:《现代公司资本制度比较研究》,武汉大学出版社 2000 年第 1版,第 112 页。
[9] 胡滨、曹顺明:《股东派生诉讼的合理性基础与制度设计》,《法学研究》2004 年第 4 期,第 94 页。
[10] Companies and Securities Advisory Committee, Report on a Statutory Derivative Action, 1993, pp.5-10.
[11] 蔡立东:《论股东派生诉讼中被告的范围》,《当代法学》2007 年第1 期(总第 121 期),第 155 页。
[12] 石少侠:《论股东诉讼与股权保护》,《法制与社会发展》2002 年第2 期,第 61 页。
[13] 蔡立东:《论股东派生诉讼中被告的范围》,《当代法学》2007 年第1 期(总第 121 期),第 156 页。
[14] 沈乐平:《公司治理结构的法律透析》,《经济问题》2003 年第 1 期,第 16 页。
[15] Charlesworth and Morse, Company Law, Sweet&Maxwell Press,14th edition,1991,p.434.
[16] 蔡立东:《公司制度生长的历史逻辑》,《当代法学(第 18 卷)》2004年第 6 期(总第 108 期),第 40 页。
[17] 蔡立东:《公司本质论纲—公司法理论体系逻辑起点解读》,《法制与社会发展(双月刊)》2004 年第 1 期(总第 55 期),第 70 页。
[18] [加拿大]布莱恩 R·柴芬斯:《公司法:理论、结构和运作》,林伟华、魏曼译,法律出版社 2001 年第 1 版,第 504 页。
[19] 王保树:《商事法的理念与理念上的商事法》,王保树主编:《商事法论集》第 1 卷,法律出版社 1997 年第 1 版,第 7 页。
[20] 黄辉:《股东派生诉讼制度研究》,王保树主编:《商事法论集》第7 卷,法律出版社 2002 年第 1 版,第 423 页。
[21] Robert W.Hamilton:《The L aw of Corporations 》,法律出版社 1999 年第 1 版,第 466 页。
[22] 殷盛:《德国股东派生诉讼制度改革介绍——兼与中国大陆股东派生诉讼制度相比较》,http://www.civillaw.com.cn/article/default.asp?id=34187,2008 年 3 月2 日。
[23] 陈计男:《民事诉讼法论(上)》,台湾三民书局 1994 年第 1 版,第93 页。
[24] [日]兼子一、竹下守夫著:《民事诉讼法》,白绿铉译,法律出版社1995 年第 1 版,第 54 页。
[25] 李树成:《派生诉讼法律制度研究》,http://www.jcrb.com/zyw/n253/ca248806.htm,2008 年 3 月 2 日。
[26] 石少侠、蔡立东:《论公司的治理结构》,《社会科学战线》2000 年第 4 期,第 196 页。
[27] 沈乐平:《公司治理结构的法律透析》,《经济问题》2003 年第 1 期,第 37 页。
[28] 蔡元庆:《董事责任的追究和经营判断的原则》,《现代法学》2002年第 4 期,第 42 页。
[29] 贾清林:《股东代表诉讼制度的确立与困境——兼对新〈公司法〉第 152 条的解读》,http://article.chinalawinfo.com/article/user/article_display.asp?ArticleID=35543,2008 年 3 月 2 日。
[30] 蔡立东:《论股东派生诉讼中被告的范围》,《当代法学》2007 年第1 期(总第 121 期),第 158 页。
[31] 蔡立东:《论股东派生诉讼中被告的范围》,《当代法学》2007 年第1 期(总第 121 期),第 158 页。
[32] 胡滨、曹顺明:《股东派生诉讼的合理性基础与制度设计》,《法学研究》2004 年第 4 期,第 96 页。
[33] 蔡立东:《论股东派生诉讼中被告的范围》,《当代法学》2007 年第1 期(总第 121 期),第 158 页。
1.蔡立东:《论股东派生诉讼中被告的范围》,《当代法学》2007 年第 1期(总第 121 期)。
2.段厚省:《略论股东代表诉讼》,《政治与法律》2000 年第 4 期。
3.吴建斌:《股东代表诉讼制度及其在我国的确立和完善》,《南京大学学报(哲学·人文科学·社会科学版)》2000 年第 1 期。
4.胡滨、曹顺明:《股东派生诉讼的合理性基础与制度设计》,《法学研究》2004 年第 4 期。
5.蔡立东:《公司治理中的“多数派暴政”问题》,《法制与社会发展(双月刊)》2003 年第 5 期(总第 53 期)。
6.石少侠:《论股东诉讼与股权保护》,《法制与社会发展》2002 年第 2期。
7.沈乐平:《公司治理结构的法律透析》,《经济问题》2003 年第 1 期。
8.蔡立东:《公司制度生长的历史逻辑》,《当代法学(第 18 卷)》2004年第 6 期(总第 108 期)。
9.蔡立东:《公司本质论纲—公司法理论体系逻辑起点解读》,《法制与社会发展(双月刊)》2004 年第 1 期(总第 55 期)。
10.石少侠、蔡立东:《论公司的治理结构》,《社会科学战线》2000 年第 4 期。
11.蔡元庆:《董事责任的追究和经营判断的原则》,《现代法学》2002年第 4 期。
12.徐纯生:《国外股东代表诉讼当事人制度研究》,《湖南社会科学》2005年第 1 期。
1.冯果:《现代公司资本制度比较研究》,武汉大学出版社 2000 年第 1版。
2.王保树:《商事法的理念与理念上的商事法》,王保树主编:《商事法论集》第 1 卷,法律出版社 1997 年第 1 版。
3.刘俊海:《股份有限公司股东权的保护》,法律出版社 2004 年第 1 版。
4.刘桂清:《公司治理视角中的股东诉讼研究》,中国方正出版社 2005年第 1 版。
5.赵旭东:《新旧公司法比较分析》,人民法院出版社 2005 年第 1 版。
6.江平、李国光:《最新公司法条文释义》,人民法院出版社 2006 年第1 版。
7.徐国栋:《民法基本原则解释》,中国政法大学出版社 1992 年第 1 版。
8.黄辉:《股东派生诉讼制度研究》,王保树主编:《商事法论集》第 7卷,法律出版社 2002 年第 1 版。
9.陈计男:《民事诉讼法论(上)》,台湾三民书局 1994 年第 1 版。
10.[加拿大]布莱恩 R·柴芬斯:《公司法:理论、结构和运作》,林伟华、魏曼译,法律出版社 2001 年第 1 版。
11.[日]兼子一、竹下守夫著:《民事诉讼法》,白绿铉译,法律出版社1995 年第 1 版。
12.Robert W.Hamilton:《The L aw of Corporations 》,法律出版社 1999 年第 1 版。
13.Roger Meiners,Piercing the veil of Limited liability,(1979) 4 Del. J.Corp.L.
1.殷盛:《德国股东派生诉讼制度改革介绍——兼与中国大陆股东派生诉讼制度相比较》,http://www.civillaw.com.cn/article/default.asp?id=34187,2008 年 3 月 2日。
2.李树成:《派生诉讼法律制度研究》,http://www.jcrb.com/zyw/n253/ca248806.htm,2008 年 3 月 2 日。
3.贾清林:《股东代表诉讼制度的确立与困境——兼对新〈公司法〉第152 条的解读》,http://article.chinalawinfo.com/article/user/article_display.asp?ArticleID=35543,2008 年 3 月 2 日。
[2] 段厚省:《略论股东代表诉讼》,《政治与法律》2000 年第 4 期,第33-37 页。
[3] 蔡立东:《论股东派生诉讼中被告的范围》,《当代法学》2007 年第 1期(总第 121 期),第 154 页。
[4] 吴建斌:《股东代表诉讼制度及其在我国的确立和完善》,《南京大学学报(哲学·人文科学·社会科学版)》2000 年第 1 期,第 37 页。
[5] [英]彼得·斯坦,约翰·香得:《西方社会的法律价值》,王献平译,中国人民公安大学出版社 1990 年第 1 版,第 12 页。
[6]徐国栋:《民法基本原则解释》,中国政法大学出版社 1992 年第 1 版,第 138 页。
[7] 蔡立东:《公司治理中的“多数派暴政”问题》,《法制与社会发展(双月刊)》2003 年第 5 期(总第 53 期),第 87 页。
[8] 冯果:《现代公司资本制度比较研究》,武汉大学出版社 2000 年第 1版,第 112 页。
[9] 胡滨、曹顺明:《股东派生诉讼的合理性基础与制度设计》,《法学研究》2004 年第 4 期,第 94 页。
[10] Companies and Securities Advisory Committee, Report on a Statutory Derivative Action, 1993, pp.5-10.
[11] 蔡立东:《论股东派生诉讼中被告的范围》,《当代法学》2007 年第1 期(总第 121 期),第 155 页。
[12] 石少侠:《论股东诉讼与股权保护》,《法制与社会发展》2002 年第2 期,第 61 页。
[13] 蔡立东:《论股东派生诉讼中被告的范围》,《当代法学》2007 年第1 期(总第 121 期),第 156 页。
[14] 沈乐平:《公司治理结构的法律透析》,《经济问题》2003 年第 1 期,第 16 页。
[15] Charlesworth and Morse, Company Law, Sweet&Maxwell Press,14th edition,1991,p.434.
[16] 蔡立东:《公司制度生长的历史逻辑》,《当代法学(第 18 卷)》2004年第 6 期(总第 108 期),第 40 页。
[17] 蔡立东:《公司本质论纲—公司法理论体系逻辑起点解读》,《法制与社会发展(双月刊)》2004 年第 1 期(总第 55 期),第 70 页。
[18] [加拿大]布莱恩 R·柴芬斯:《公司法:理论、结构和运作》,林伟华、魏曼译,法律出版社 2001 年第 1 版,第 504 页。
[19] 王保树:《商事法的理念与理念上的商事法》,王保树主编:《商事法论集》第 1 卷,法律出版社 1997 年第 1 版,第 7 页。
[20] 黄辉:《股东派生诉讼制度研究》,王保树主编:《商事法论集》第7 卷,法律出版社 2002 年第 1 版,第 423 页。
[21] Robert W.Hamilton:《The L aw of Corporations 》,法律出版社 1999 年第 1 版,第 466 页。
[22] 殷盛:《德国股东派生诉讼制度改革介绍——兼与中国大陆股东派生诉讼制度相比较》,http://www.civillaw.com.cn/article/default.asp?id=34187,2008 年 3 月2 日。
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