煤炭供应链产品质量协调机制研究
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摘要
供应链成员在生产、检验和纠纷中的煤炭质量协调问题包括主要两个方面。一是在产品生产、质量检验和纠纷处理中成员质量诚信度的识别问题；二是在长期合作中最佳合同参数的设计以及成员选择问题。本文研究构建煤炭供应链成员质量检验可信度识别机制、矿井与经销商合同协调机制、经销商与用户纠纷决策机制三个模型,并由此模型联合组成煤炭供应链的产品质量协调机制,以解决煤炭供应链成员在生产、检验和纠纷中机会主义行为；构建供应链网络成员诚信度演变模型,研究供应链网络成员在长期中质量诚信度的演化趋势,以有助于供应链合作伙伴的选择。各章具体内容如下：
第一章,从煤炭质量计价政策变革、煤炭供应链网络实践背景以及供应链协调发展的理论背景出发,阐述煤炭供应链产品质量供应链协调机制研究的目的与意义。界定煤炭供应链、商品质量的概念与特征。
第二章,从供应链协调、博弈论在供应链应用、供应链网络理论等方面回顾与本文有关的文献,形成本文研究主体。
第三章,借助煤炭供应链成员分布式供给和分布式采购的数据结构,利用统计聚类方法对于煤炭供应链成员产品质量检验信息进行数据挖掘,构建煤炭供应链成员质量检验可信度识别机制。利用该机制尝试识别供应链成员质量检验行为特征,并由质量检验行为可信度研判供应链成员检验的煤炭质量可信度。
第四章,以矿井和经销商期望利润最大化为目标,构建煤炭供应链中的生产商与经销商之间煤炭质量投资、检验投资博弈均衡模型,研究合同参数(低质量产品折价参数、虚报质量等级的处罚参数)等生产商、经销商的质量投资和检验投资的效应；探寻煤炭供应链成员利润之和最大化的合同协调机制。
第五章,借助于质量与价格浮动函数关系,构建煤炭供应链成员质量检验博弈模型,设计供应链成员质量裁决权权重配属的诚信交易激励相容机制——联合决策机制。
第六章,基于煤炭供应链网络的特征,研究俱乐部网络静态稳定条件,博弈演化趋势以及网络效率。
第七章,全文结论总结。给出论文的主要研究成果,展望未来研究方向。
本文创新之处集中在如下几方面：
(1)提出了运用统计方法评价供应链成员质量检验可信度的思路,将随机性质量指标的评价转化为稳定性质量检验行为的评价。将商品的物理质量(质量的“自然属性”)可信度问题转换商品的认知质量(质量的“社会属性”)认知度问题,构建了聚类识别模型,并有效解决质量检验存在的难题。
(2)基于煤炭供应链成员质量检验、隐瞒质量、质量投资等博弈模型分析,设计整个供应链利润之和最大化的合同参数,实现合同协调成员间的质量行为。
(3)在识别供应链成员质量检验可信度指数的基础上,提出并设计了煤炭供应链成员联合决策处理质量纠纷的裁决权配属机制,分配供应链成员质量裁决权权重和质量纠纷成本分摊权重。
(4)研究发现,无论煤炭供应链网络成员的初始诚信度状态,在长期稳定网络节点中,其诚信度必然趋于一个稳定常数。即,在投机收益小于维系网络成本情况下网络成员将完全趋同于诚信状态；在投机收益大于维系网络成本且小于经销商收益情况下俱乐部成员的诚信检验质量的概率将趋同于节点维系网络成本与投机收益的比值。
The agents of coal supply chain have to be faced with two major problems about product quality coordination. The first problem is how to identify the agents'quality inspection believable level, and second is how to design the agents contract parameters and to choice the partners for a coal supply chain. This dissertation develops three models generally standing for the coal supply chain quality coordination mechnism which consists of an identification mechnism for coal supply chian agents'quality inspection believable level, a contract coordination mechnism between producers and a dealer, and a joint-decision mechnism for the supply chian agents quality dispute case. Moreover, the model of the coal supply chian nework agents'credit has been built to reflect the agent credit convegence and to help the dealer chioce the right agents.
The details of each chapter run as follows:
Chapter 1 introduces the background of this special research topic which includes coal quality pricing policy change, coal supply chain practice and development of supply chian coordination theory. Then the importance and purpose of the thesis has summarized. the definitions and characteristics of coal supply chain, and commodity quality management have been given.
Chapter 2 reviews the related literatures on supply chain coordination, application of games theory in supply chain and supply chains network theory. After that, the main body of the dissertation is formed up.
In chapter 3, The paper uses the cluster analysis method to mining coal quality inspection data from different agents to identify the agent behavioral characteristics. Through this identification mechsim, the coal's quality can be determined based upon the quality inspection believable level. Accordingly, the chapter is the foundation of supply chain's coordination.
Chapter 4 builds a model about supply chian agents quality investment and inspection investment to maximize the expect profit of each agent. The parameters of contract between producers and a dealer have been designed through the model.
Chapter 5 builds up a quality inspection game theory model among the agents in the supply chain through the function between the quality and floating price. A joint-decision mechnism has been designed to re-allocating the decision weights of the agents in the supply chain.
Chapter 6 builds up a network model based on the coal supply chain network character and the network theory.
Chapter 7 summaries this dissertation, presents the main result of this research, and gives out the possible research areas in the future.
The main innovations of this dissertation are:
The paper uses statistical method to measure the believable level of quality inspection among the agents of supply chain, using the cluster identification model to transform the random quality index to a stable quality checking behavior issue. In the condition that the coal's nature population character cannot be obtained, the cluster identification model can transform the inner quality issue to the quality recognition issue which is the quality's social attribute. This transforming is consistent with the essential requirements of commodity's quality, also can solve the quality inspection problem.
(2) Based on the analysis of quality checking, quality disguise, and quality investment among the agents of supply chain using the game theory model, the paper designs the optimal contract factors which can maximize the whole supply chain's profits. In this way, the contract can help the agents to increase the quality coordination.
(3) A jiont-decision mechnism has been designed to allocate decision weights and dispute cost weights.. The mechnism make sure the equilibrium strategy will convergence to the real quality level.
(4) This research finds that whatever the agents'initial credit indices are, they will convergence to a constant number in the long stable network node model. In other words, if the speculating profit is smaller than the benefit of keeping the network, the agents are becoming more and more honest; if the speculating profit is larger than the benefit of keeping the network, the participants honest level is convergence to the ratio of network mantaining cost and speculating profit.
第一章,从煤炭质量计价政策变革、煤炭供应链网络实践背景以及供应链协调发展的理论背景出发,阐述煤炭供应链产品质量供应链协调机制研究的目的与意义。界定煤炭供应链、商品质量的概念与特征。
第二章,从供应链协调、博弈论在供应链应用、供应链网络理论等方面回顾与本文有关的文献,形成本文研究主体。
第三章,借助煤炭供应链成员分布式供给和分布式采购的数据结构,利用统计聚类方法对于煤炭供应链成员产品质量检验信息进行数据挖掘,构建煤炭供应链成员质量检验可信度识别机制。利用该机制尝试识别供应链成员质量检验行为特征,并由质量检验行为可信度研判供应链成员检验的煤炭质量可信度。
第四章,以矿井和经销商期望利润最大化为目标,构建煤炭供应链中的生产商与经销商之间煤炭质量投资、检验投资博弈均衡模型,研究合同参数(低质量产品折价参数、虚报质量等级的处罚参数)等生产商、经销商的质量投资和检验投资的效应；探寻煤炭供应链成员利润之和最大化的合同协调机制。
第五章,借助于质量与价格浮动函数关系,构建煤炭供应链成员质量检验博弈模型,设计供应链成员质量裁决权权重配属的诚信交易激励相容机制——联合决策机制。
第六章,基于煤炭供应链网络的特征,研究俱乐部网络静态稳定条件,博弈演化趋势以及网络效率。
第七章,全文结论总结。给出论文的主要研究成果,展望未来研究方向。
本文创新之处集中在如下几方面：
(1)提出了运用统计方法评价供应链成员质量检验可信度的思路,将随机性质量指标的评价转化为稳定性质量检验行为的评价。将商品的物理质量(质量的“自然属性”)可信度问题转换商品的认知质量(质量的“社会属性”)认知度问题,构建了聚类识别模型,并有效解决质量检验存在的难题。
(2)基于煤炭供应链成员质量检验、隐瞒质量、质量投资等博弈模型分析,设计整个供应链利润之和最大化的合同参数,实现合同协调成员间的质量行为。
(3)在识别供应链成员质量检验可信度指数的基础上,提出并设计了煤炭供应链成员联合决策处理质量纠纷的裁决权配属机制,分配供应链成员质量裁决权权重和质量纠纷成本分摊权重。
(4)研究发现,无论煤炭供应链网络成员的初始诚信度状态,在长期稳定网络节点中,其诚信度必然趋于一个稳定常数。即,在投机收益小于维系网络成本情况下网络成员将完全趋同于诚信状态；在投机收益大于维系网络成本且小于经销商收益情况下俱乐部成员的诚信检验质量的概率将趋同于节点维系网络成本与投机收益的比值。
The agents of coal supply chain have to be faced with two major problems about product quality coordination. The first problem is how to identify the agents'quality inspection believable level, and second is how to design the agents contract parameters and to choice the partners for a coal supply chain. This dissertation develops three models generally standing for the coal supply chain quality coordination mechnism which consists of an identification mechnism for coal supply chian agents'quality inspection believable level, a contract coordination mechnism between producers and a dealer, and a joint-decision mechnism for the supply chian agents quality dispute case. Moreover, the model of the coal supply chian nework agents'credit has been built to reflect the agent credit convegence and to help the dealer chioce the right agents.
The details of each chapter run as follows:
Chapter 1 introduces the background of this special research topic which includes coal quality pricing policy change, coal supply chain practice and development of supply chian coordination theory. Then the importance and purpose of the thesis has summarized. the definitions and characteristics of coal supply chain, and commodity quality management have been given.
Chapter 2 reviews the related literatures on supply chain coordination, application of games theory in supply chain and supply chains network theory. After that, the main body of the dissertation is formed up.
In chapter 3, The paper uses the cluster analysis method to mining coal quality inspection data from different agents to identify the agent behavioral characteristics. Through this identification mechsim, the coal's quality can be determined based upon the quality inspection believable level. Accordingly, the chapter is the foundation of supply chain's coordination.
Chapter 4 builds a model about supply chian agents quality investment and inspection investment to maximize the expect profit of each agent. The parameters of contract between producers and a dealer have been designed through the model.
Chapter 5 builds up a quality inspection game theory model among the agents in the supply chain through the function between the quality and floating price. A joint-decision mechnism has been designed to re-allocating the decision weights of the agents in the supply chain.
Chapter 6 builds up a network model based on the coal supply chain network character and the network theory.
Chapter 7 summaries this dissertation, presents the main result of this research, and gives out the possible research areas in the future.
The main innovations of this dissertation are:
The paper uses statistical method to measure the believable level of quality inspection among the agents of supply chain, using the cluster identification model to transform the random quality index to a stable quality checking behavior issue. In the condition that the coal's nature population character cannot be obtained, the cluster identification model can transform the inner quality issue to the quality recognition issue which is the quality's social attribute. This transforming is consistent with the essential requirements of commodity's quality, also can solve the quality inspection problem.
(2) Based on the analysis of quality checking, quality disguise, and quality investment among the agents of supply chain using the game theory model, the paper designs the optimal contract factors which can maximize the whole supply chain's profits. In this way, the contract can help the agents to increase the quality coordination.
(3) A jiont-decision mechnism has been designed to allocate decision weights and dispute cost weights.. The mechnism make sure the equilibrium strategy will convergence to the real quality level.
(4) This research finds that whatever the agents'initial credit indices are, they will convergence to a constant number in the long stable network node model. In other words, if the speculating profit is smaller than the benefit of keeping the network, the agents are becoming more and more honest; if the speculating profit is larger than the benefit of keeping the network, the participants honest level is convergence to the ratio of network mantaining cost and speculating profit.
引文
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