成员异质性视角下中国渔民专业合作社治理研究
|
摘要
在传统合作社制度框架下，合作社是基于相同或相似特征社员的联合，所有社员同时作为惠顾者和所有者参与合作社运营。社员的相对同质性和惠顾者与所有者同一的特征，为传统合作社的按惠顾额分配盈余和社员民主管理提供了条件，在客观存在的代理关系上基本保证了代理人与委托人利益的一致性。因此，传统合作社制度框架下的治理结构和治理机制相对简单。
然而，从目前我国渔民专业合作社发展实践来看，成员异质性已成为合作社发展的常态。除了在年龄、受教育程度以及生产规模、生产成本、技术水平、收入状况、社会关系等方面存在的显著差异外，渔民专业合作社的成员异质性还集中表现在要素贡献的异质化、参与动机和参与目的的异质化以及参与角色的异质化三个方面，其中要素禀赋和要素贡献的差异化是合作社成员异质性的本质表现。成员异质性对我国渔民专业合作社的产权安排产生了深远影响，它使合作社社员联合所有的产权制度在实现形式上逐步多样化，在具体的产权安排上，对社员平等出资和社员民主控制赋予了更加丰富的内容，使其不再拘泥于绝对的等额出资和绝对的一人一票，股份合作制成为成员异质性合作社中最为普遍的产权形式。产权是合作社治理的基础，成员异质性合作社变化了的产权安排对合作社治理提出了新的要求。
通过对样本合作社的调研和对案例合作社的深入分析发现，成员异质性渔民专业合作社中，由于社员要素禀赋和要素贡献的差异，合作社社员出现了分层，责权利在不同要素提供者之间的分配格局呈现出明显的差异化特征，稀缺要素所有者普遍掌握了合作社的实际控制权，合作社委托代理关系演化为不同层级要素提供者之间的代理关系。在此背景下，作为一般要素所有者的委托人与掌握稀缺要素的代理人的利益一致性面临挑战，合作社治理衍变为以稀缺要素所有者为核心的“大户治理”、“资本控制”和“稀缺要素所有者治理”，偏离了经典合作社“一人一票”、“按惠顾额分配”和“资本限制”的民主管理的一般要求。论文指出，不能简单地以经典合作社原则和合作社法的具体条目来判断成员异质性合作社治理的科学性，成员异质性渔民专业合作社中向稀缺要素所有者倾斜的治理结构实际上是一种尊重社员要素禀赋和要素贡献差异的有效率的制度设计，它充分调动了稀缺要素所有者的积极性，有利于提高合作社的决策效率和经营绩效，同时也满足了一般渔户的价格改进和技术指导等需求，有利于实现全体社员的帕累托改进。值得注意的是，如果这种制度倾斜超出了一定范围，将不可避免地引发“大农吃小农”、“普通社员边缘化”等问题，并加重“道德风险”、“搭便车”等机会主义行为。
由此得出的结论是，成员异质性合作社治理结构和治理机制应是这样一种制度设计，它能在不伤害稀缺要素所有者社员的积极性的前提下，确保一般社员的利益不被核心社员所侵占。同时，合作社治理的关键问题也不应是对稀缺要素所有者社员权利的绝对削减，而是要通过不断提升一般社员的合作参与度和监督能力，实现对核心社员权利的相对约束和限制。依据上述逻辑，成员异质性渔民专业合作社的治理应以“有效激励、保障公平、提高效率、机构分权与制衡、制度约束与文化凝聚相结合”等五项原则为指导，通过规范合作社的产权基础、优化合作社法人治理结构、构建“能人治社”与民主管理相结合的决策机制、完善合作社激励机制并建立行之有效的约束与监督机制等多项措施，实现合作社治理的科学化。
Under the traditional cooperative framework, cooperative is a union of those whohave the same or similar features, in which all commune members participate aspatrons and owners. The governance structure and mechanism is relative simple dueto its relative homogeneity and the same identity of owners and patrons,which offersconditions for profit distributed among patrons principle and democratic managementof traditional cooperative and guarantees the consistency between principals andagents’ benefits from the perspective of the objective agency relationship.
However, member heterogeneity has become normal from the perspective ofcurrent development practice of fisheries specialized cooperative in China. Except forits own significant differences in age, education, production scale, production cost,technical level, income, social relationship and so on, the members’ heterogeneity offisheries specialized cooperative also featured in its factor contribution, motives,purpose as well as role of participation, in which the heterogenization of factorendowments and factor contribution are the essential manifestation. Memberheterogeneity have made a profound impact on the property arrangements of Chinesefisheries specialized cooperative, which contributes to the diversification ofjointly-owned property right system on the forms of realization.As for the specificproperty right arrangement, member heterogeneity has enriched the content of equalinvestment and democratic control instead of sticking to the principle of eveninvestment and one person one vote, which makes the joint stock cooperative systemthe most general form of property.Property right is the basis of cooperativeadministration, and the transformed property arrangement of the member heterogeneity in cooperative has put forward new requirements for cooperativegovernance.
According to the research of sample cooperative and the further analysis onspecific case, members’ stratification has occurred and a remarkable feature ofdifferentiation has presented in the distribution pattern of responsibility, authority andprofit among different factor providers due to the differences of factor endowmentsand factor contribution in the membership heterogeneous fisheries specializedcooperative. Besides, scarce factor owners usually get the actual control overcooperative and the principal-agent relationship of cooperative has been evolved intothe agency relationship among factor providers of different levels. The consistencybetween principals and agents’ benefits is being challenged while the governance ofcooperative has been evolved into “big-household governance”“capital control”and“scarce factor owners’ governance” that focuses on scarce factor owners, whichdeviates from the general requirements of“one person one vote”,“profits distributedamong patrons” and “capital restriction” for cooperative’s democratic management.Inthe author’s opinion, the scientificity of the governance of membership heterogeneouscooperative cannot be judged simply according to the classical cooperative principleor the specific items of cooperative law. Actually, the governance structure towardsscarce factor owners in membership heterogeneous fisheries specialized cooperativeis an efficient system design, which respect the differences of factor endowments andfactor contribution. It not only mobilizes the enthusiasm of scarce factor owners,improves the decision-making efficiency as well as business performance ofcooperative but also meets general fishermen’s requirements for price improvementand technical guidance, which in favor of realizing the Pareto improvement of allmembers. However, once out of certain limits, the policy support will inevitable causethe problems such as “the strong bullying the weak”,“the marginalization of generalmembers”and increase the opportunistic behaviors including moral risk andfree-riding and so on.
Therefore, the governance structure and mechanism of fisheries specializedcooperative based on member heterogeneity ought to be a system design that keepsthe general members’ benefits from being expropriated by core members. Meanwhile,the key issues of cooperative governance is not absolutely cutting the rights of thescarce factor owners but relatively restricting the rights of core members byimproving the cooperative involvement and supervision capability of generalmembers. Based on above analysis, the governance of heterogeneous fisheriesspecialized cooperative ought to be guided by the principle of effective motivation,improving efficiency, balancing by division of agency and combining institutionalconstraint with cultural cohesion. Moreover, the author puts forward somesuggestions on realizing the scientization of cooperative governance, including theregulation of the property right foundation, optimization of corporate governancestructure, establishment and improvement of effective decision-making, restrictionand supervision as well as incentive mechanism.
然而，从目前我国渔民专业合作社发展实践来看，成员异质性已成为合作社发展的常态。除了在年龄、受教育程度以及生产规模、生产成本、技术水平、收入状况、社会关系等方面存在的显著差异外，渔民专业合作社的成员异质性还集中表现在要素贡献的异质化、参与动机和参与目的的异质化以及参与角色的异质化三个方面，其中要素禀赋和要素贡献的差异化是合作社成员异质性的本质表现。成员异质性对我国渔民专业合作社的产权安排产生了深远影响，它使合作社社员联合所有的产权制度在实现形式上逐步多样化，在具体的产权安排上，对社员平等出资和社员民主控制赋予了更加丰富的内容，使其不再拘泥于绝对的等额出资和绝对的一人一票，股份合作制成为成员异质性合作社中最为普遍的产权形式。产权是合作社治理的基础，成员异质性合作社变化了的产权安排对合作社治理提出了新的要求。
通过对样本合作社的调研和对案例合作社的深入分析发现，成员异质性渔民专业合作社中，由于社员要素禀赋和要素贡献的差异，合作社社员出现了分层，责权利在不同要素提供者之间的分配格局呈现出明显的差异化特征，稀缺要素所有者普遍掌握了合作社的实际控制权，合作社委托代理关系演化为不同层级要素提供者之间的代理关系。在此背景下，作为一般要素所有者的委托人与掌握稀缺要素的代理人的利益一致性面临挑战，合作社治理衍变为以稀缺要素所有者为核心的“大户治理”、“资本控制”和“稀缺要素所有者治理”，偏离了经典合作社“一人一票”、“按惠顾额分配”和“资本限制”的民主管理的一般要求。论文指出，不能简单地以经典合作社原则和合作社法的具体条目来判断成员异质性合作社治理的科学性，成员异质性渔民专业合作社中向稀缺要素所有者倾斜的治理结构实际上是一种尊重社员要素禀赋和要素贡献差异的有效率的制度设计，它充分调动了稀缺要素所有者的积极性，有利于提高合作社的决策效率和经营绩效，同时也满足了一般渔户的价格改进和技术指导等需求，有利于实现全体社员的帕累托改进。值得注意的是，如果这种制度倾斜超出了一定范围，将不可避免地引发“大农吃小农”、“普通社员边缘化”等问题，并加重“道德风险”、“搭便车”等机会主义行为。
由此得出的结论是，成员异质性合作社治理结构和治理机制应是这样一种制度设计，它能在不伤害稀缺要素所有者社员的积极性的前提下，确保一般社员的利益不被核心社员所侵占。同时，合作社治理的关键问题也不应是对稀缺要素所有者社员权利的绝对削减，而是要通过不断提升一般社员的合作参与度和监督能力，实现对核心社员权利的相对约束和限制。依据上述逻辑，成员异质性渔民专业合作社的治理应以“有效激励、保障公平、提高效率、机构分权与制衡、制度约束与文化凝聚相结合”等五项原则为指导，通过规范合作社的产权基础、优化合作社法人治理结构、构建“能人治社”与民主管理相结合的决策机制、完善合作社激励机制并建立行之有效的约束与监督机制等多项措施，实现合作社治理的科学化。
Under the traditional cooperative framework, cooperative is a union of those whohave the same or similar features, in which all commune members participate aspatrons and owners. The governance structure and mechanism is relative simple dueto its relative homogeneity and the same identity of owners and patrons,which offersconditions for profit distributed among patrons principle and democratic managementof traditional cooperative and guarantees the consistency between principals andagents’ benefits from the perspective of the objective agency relationship.
However, member heterogeneity has become normal from the perspective ofcurrent development practice of fisheries specialized cooperative in China. Except forits own significant differences in age, education, production scale, production cost,technical level, income, social relationship and so on, the members’ heterogeneity offisheries specialized cooperative also featured in its factor contribution, motives,purpose as well as role of participation, in which the heterogenization of factorendowments and factor contribution are the essential manifestation. Memberheterogeneity have made a profound impact on the property arrangements of Chinesefisheries specialized cooperative, which contributes to the diversification ofjointly-owned property right system on the forms of realization.As for the specificproperty right arrangement, member heterogeneity has enriched the content of equalinvestment and democratic control instead of sticking to the principle of eveninvestment and one person one vote, which makes the joint stock cooperative systemthe most general form of property.Property right is the basis of cooperativeadministration, and the transformed property arrangement of the member heterogeneity in cooperative has put forward new requirements for cooperativegovernance.
According to the research of sample cooperative and the further analysis onspecific case, members’ stratification has occurred and a remarkable feature ofdifferentiation has presented in the distribution pattern of responsibility, authority andprofit among different factor providers due to the differences of factor endowmentsand factor contribution in the membership heterogeneous fisheries specializedcooperative. Besides, scarce factor owners usually get the actual control overcooperative and the principal-agent relationship of cooperative has been evolved intothe agency relationship among factor providers of different levels. The consistencybetween principals and agents’ benefits is being challenged while the governance ofcooperative has been evolved into “big-household governance”“capital control”and“scarce factor owners’ governance” that focuses on scarce factor owners, whichdeviates from the general requirements of“one person one vote”,“profits distributedamong patrons” and “capital restriction” for cooperative’s democratic management.Inthe author’s opinion, the scientificity of the governance of membership heterogeneouscooperative cannot be judged simply according to the classical cooperative principleor the specific items of cooperative law. Actually, the governance structure towardsscarce factor owners in membership heterogeneous fisheries specialized cooperativeis an efficient system design, which respect the differences of factor endowments andfactor contribution. It not only mobilizes the enthusiasm of scarce factor owners,improves the decision-making efficiency as well as business performance ofcooperative but also meets general fishermen’s requirements for price improvementand technical guidance, which in favor of realizing the Pareto improvement of allmembers. However, once out of certain limits, the policy support will inevitable causethe problems such as “the strong bullying the weak”,“the marginalization of generalmembers”and increase the opportunistic behaviors including moral risk andfree-riding and so on.
Therefore, the governance structure and mechanism of fisheries specializedcooperative based on member heterogeneity ought to be a system design that keepsthe general members’ benefits from being expropriated by core members. Meanwhile,the key issues of cooperative governance is not absolutely cutting the rights of thescarce factor owners but relatively restricting the rights of core members byimproving the cooperative involvement and supervision capability of generalmembers. Based on above analysis, the governance of heterogeneous fisheriesspecialized cooperative ought to be guided by the principle of effective motivation,improving efficiency, balancing by division of agency and combining institutionalconstraint with cultural cohesion. Moreover, the author puts forward somesuggestions on realizing the scientization of cooperative governance, including theregulation of the property right foundation, optimization of corporate governancestructure, establishment and improvement of effective decision-making, restrictionand supervision as well as incentive mechanism.
引文
[1] Nilsson, J., Cooperative principles and practices in Swedish agricultural cooperatives [A]. InMonzon Campos, J. L. et al.(Eds), Markets cooperative principles [C],1994:219-248.
[2] ICA, Statement of the cooperative identity, cited in Cooperative Principles, Theory and History
[R]. University of Wisconsin, Center for Cooperatives, I996.
[3] USDA. The impact of new generation cooperatives on their communities [R]. RBS ResearchReport,1998.
[4] Emelianoff, I. V., Economic theory of cooperation: Economic cooperative organizations [M].Michigan: Edwards Brothers, Inc.1942.
[5] Phillips, R., Economic nature of the cooperative association [J]. Journal of Farm Economics,1953(35):74-87.
[6] Enke, S., Consumer cooperatives and economic efficiency [J]. American Economic Review,1945,35(1):148-155.
[7] Helmberger, P. G.&Hoos, S., Cooperative enterprise and organization theory [J]. Journal ofFarm Economics,1962(44):275-290.
[8] Staatz, J. M., The structural characteristics of farmer cooperatives and their behavioralconsequences [A]. In Royer, J.(Eds), Cooperative theory: new approaches [C]. ACS ServiceReport No.18, USDA, Washington D.C.1987:33-60.
[9] Barton, D. G., What is a cooperative?[A] In Cobia, D. W.(Eds) Cooperatives in Agriculture
[C]. NJ: Prentice-Hall,1989:1-34.
[10] Hansmann, H., The ownership of Enterprise [M]. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press,London,1996.
[11] Hendrikse, G.W.J.&Veerman, C. P., Marketing cooperatives and financialstructure: atransaction costs economics analysis [J]. Agricultural Economics,2001,26(3):205-216
[12] Cook, M. L., Chaddad, F.R.&Iliopoulos, C., Advances in cooperative theory since1990: Areview of agricultural economics literature [A]. In Hendrikse, G.W.J.(Eds): Restructuringagricultural cooperatives [C]. Haveka: Erasmus University Press,2004:65-90.
[13] Nourse, E. G., The place of the cooperative in our national economy: American cooperation1942-1945[A]. Washington D.C.: American Institute of Cooperation,1945/1995:33-39.
[14] Sexton, R. J., Cooperatives and forces shaping agricultural marketing [J]. American Journalof Agricultural Economics,1986,68(5):1167-1172.
[15] Van Dijk,G. Implementing the sixth reason for cooperation: new generation cooperatives inthe agribusiness [A]. In Nilsson J.&Van Dijk, G.(Eds): Strategies and structures in the agro-foodindustries [C]. Van Gorcum: Assen,1997:94-110.
[16] Porter, E K.&Scully, G. W., Economic efficiency in cooperatives [J]. The Journal of Lawand Economics,1987(30):489-512.
[17] Cook, M. L., The future of U. S. agricultural cooperatives: a neo-institutional approach [J].American Journal of Agricultural Economics,1995,77(10):1153-1159.
[18] Fulion, M., The future of Canadian agriculture cooperatives: a property rights approach [J].American Journal of Agricultural Economics,1995,77(5):1144-1152.
[19] Borgen, S. O., Rethinking incentives problems in cooperative organizations [R]. NorwegianAgricultural Economics Institute, Oslo,2003.
[20] Trechter, D. D., Impact of diversification on agricultural cooperatives in Wisconsin,Agribusiness,1996,12(4):385-394.
[21] Lorendahl, B., New cooperatives and local development: a study of six cases in Jamatland,Sweden, Journal of Rural Studies,1996,12(2):143-150.
[22] Van Bekkum, O. F., Van Dijk, G.&Nilsson, J., Agricultural cooperatives at crossroads [A], InVan Bekkum, O. F.&Van Dijk, G.(Eds): Agricultural cooperatives in the European Unian, VanGorcum, Assen,1997:18-28.
[23] Stefanson, N., Fulton, M.&Harris, A., New generation cooperatives: rebuilding ruraleconomies[R].Centre for the Study of Cooperatives, University of Saskatchewan,1995
[24] Zeuli, K., Goreham, G.A.&King, R. et al., Dakota Growers Pasta Company and the City ofCarrington, North Dakota: a case study [R]. A report for the USDA.-Fund for Rural America,1998
[25] Helmberger, P. G., Future roles for agricultural cooperatives [J]. Journal of Farm Economics,1966(48):1427-1435.
[26] Rhodes, V. J., The large agricultural cooperative as a competitor [J]. American Journal ofAgricultural Economics,1983(65):1090-1095.
[27] Royer, J.S., Potential for cooperative involvement in vertical coordination and value-addedactivities [J]. Agribusiness: An International Journal,1995,11(5):473-481.
[28] Ollila, P.&Nilsson, J., The position of agricultural cooperatives in the changing foodindustry of Europe [A]. In Nilsson, J.&Van Dijk, G.(Eds): Strategies and structures in theagro-food industries. Van Gorcum: Assen,1997:131-150.
[29] Sexton, R.J.&Iskow, J., Factors critical to the success or failure of emerging agriculturalcooperatives [R]. Gianini Foundation Information, Series No.88-3, University of California-Davis,1988.
[30] Shaffer, J. D., Thinking about farmers' cooperatives, contracts, and economic coordination[A]. In Royer, J.(Eds): Cooperative theory: new approaches[C]. ACS Service Report No.18,USDA, Washington D.C.,1987:61-86.
[31] Staatz, J. M., Cooperatives: a theoretical perspective on the behavior of farmers [D]. Ph.D.dissertation, Michigan State University,1984.
[32] Vitaliano, P., Cooperative enterprise: an alternative conceptual basis for analyzing a complexinstitution [J]. American Journal of Agriculasral Economics,1983(65):1078-1083.
[33] Nilsson, J., Organization principles for cooperative firms [J]. Scandinavian Journal ofManagement,2001(17):329-356.
[34] Emelianoff, I. V., Economic theory of cooperation: Economic cooperative organizations [M].Michigan: Edwards Brothers, Inc.1942.
[35] Staatz, J. M., Recent developments in the theory of agricultural cooperation [J]. Journal ofAgricultural Cooperation,1987(2):74-95.
[36] Bijman, J.&Hendrikse, G., Cooperatives in chains: institutional restructuring in the Dutchfruit and vegetables industry [J]. Journal on Chains and Network Science,2003,3(2):95-107.
[37] Cook, M. L., The role of management behavior in agricultural cooperatives [J]. Journal ofAgricultural Cooperation,1994(9):42-58.
[38] Van Dijk, G., Implementing the sixth reason for cooperation: new generation cooperatives inthe agribusiness [A]. In Nilsson J.&Van Dijk, G.(Eds): Strategies and structures in the agro-foodindustries [C]. Van Gorcum: Assen,1997:94-110.
[39] Royer, J. S., Cooperative organizational strategies: a neo-institutional digest [J]. Journal ofCooperatives,1999(14):44-67.
[40] Short, H., Keasey, H.&Wright, M. et al. Corporate governance: from accountability toenterprise [J]. Accounting and Business Research,1999,29(4):337-352.
[41] Zusman, P., Constitutional selection of collective choice rules in a cooperative enterprise[J].Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization,1992(17):353-362.
[42] Sexton, R. J., Cooperatives and forces shaping agricultural marketing [J]. American Journalof Agricultural Economics,1986,68(5):1167-1172.
[43] Choi, E. K.&Feinerman, E., Producer cooperatives, input pricing and land allocation [J].Journal of Agricultural Economics,1993,44(2):230-44.
[44] Banerjee, A. D., Mookherjee, D.&Munshi, K. et al., Inequality, control rights, and rentseeking: Sugar cooperative in Maharashtra [J]. Journal of Political Economy,2001,109(1):138-190.
[45] Karantinin, K.&Zago, A., Cooperatives and membership commitment: endogenousmembership in mixed duopsonies [J]. American Journal of Agricultural Economics,2001,83(5):1266-1272.
[46]徐旭初.合作社的本质规定性及其它[J].农村经济,2003(8):38-40.
[47]黄祖辉.中国农民合作组织发展的若干理论与实践问题[J].中国农村经济,2008(11):4-7,26.
[48]徐旭初,吴彬.治理机制对农民专业合作社绩效的影响——基于浙江省526家农民专业合作社的实证分析[J].中国农村经济,2010(5).
[49]梁世夫,王淑霞,易南文.粮食主产区农民专业合作经济组织发展:效应、问题与对策——基于湖南省岳阳市的实证分析[J].农业经济问题,2006(8):69-71.
[50]孙艳华,周力,应瑞瑶.农民专业合作社增收绩效研究——基于江苏省养鸡农户调查数据的分析[J].南京农业大学学报(社会科学版),2007,7(2):22-27.
[51]唐宗焜.合作社功能和社会主义市场经济[J].经济研究,2007(12):11-23.
[52]董进才.专业合作社农民政治参与状况分析[J].农业经济问题,2009(9):45-51.
[53]蔡荣.“合作社+农户”模式:交易费用节约与农户增收效应——基于山东省苹果种植农户问卷调查的实证分析[J].中国农村经济,2011(1):58-65.
[54]刘滨,陈池波,杜辉.农民专业合作社绩效度量的实证分析——来自江西省22个样本合作社的数据[J].农业经济问题,2009(2):90-95.
[55]徐旭初.农民专业合作社绩效评价体系及其验证[J].农业技术经济,2009(4).
[56]于井泉,李燕琼,刘介.农业物流视角下农民合作组织创新及其绩效度量研究[J].物流管理,2009(19).
[57]赵佳荣.农民专业合作社”三重绩效”评价模式研究[J].农业技术经济,2010(2).
[58]伊藤顺一,包宗顺等.农民专业合作社的经济效果分析——以南京市西瓜合作社为例[J].中国农村观察,2011(5):2-12.
[59]黄祖辉.农民合作:必然性、变革态势与启示[J].中国农村经济,2000(8):4-5.
[60]徐旭初.中国农民专业合作经济组织的制度分析[M].经济科学出版社2005,103-123.
[61]黄祖辉,徐旭初,冯冠胜.农民专业合作组织发展的影响因素分析——对浙江省农民专业合作组织发展现状的探讨[J].中国农村经济,2002(3):13-21.
[62]张晓山.有关中国农民专业合作组织发展的几个问题[J].农村经济,2005(1):4-7.
[63]林坚,马彦丽.农业合作社和投资者所有企业的边界——基于交易费用和组织成本角度的分析[J].农业经济问题,2006(3):16-20.
[64]孙亚范.现阶段我国农民合作需求与意愿的实证研究和启示——对江苏农户的实证调查与分析[J].江苏社会科学,2003(1):204-208.
[65]郭红东,蒋文华.影响农户参与专业合作经济组织行为的因素分析——基于对浙江省农户的实证研究[J].中国农村经济,2004(5):10-16,30.
[66]石敏俊,金少胜.中国农民需要合作组织吗?——沿海地区农户参加农民专业合作组织意向研究[J].浙江大学学报(人文社会科学版),2004(5):35-43.
[67]张广胜,周娟等.农民对专业合作社需求的影响因素分析——基于沈阳市200个村的调查[J].农业经济问题,2007(11):68-73.
[68]赵泉民,李怡.关系网络与中国乡村社会的合作经济——基于社会资本视角[J].农业经济问题,2007(8):40-46.
[69]张冬平,丁鹭等.基于Logit模型下农民加入专业合作社的意愿分析[J].河南农业大学学报,2007(3):338-341.
[70]赵佳荣.农户对专业合作社的需求及其影响因素比较——基于湖南省两类地区农户的实证分析[J].中国农村经济,2008(11):18-26.
[71]卢向虎,吕新业.农户参加农民专业合作组织意愿的实证分析——基于7省24市(县)农户的调研数据[J].农业经济问题,2008(1):26-31.
[72]庄海静,徐秀丽.农民参与专业合作社的动机探析——基于对京郊合作社的实地调研[J].农业经济,2010(4):67-68.
[73]王新利,李世武.农民专业合作经济组织的发展分析[J].农业经济问题,2007(3):15-19.
[74]郭庆海.我国农民合作经济组织产业分布差异解析[J].农业经济问题,2007(4):87-90.
[75]王曙光.中国农民合作组织历史演进:一个基于契约—产权视角的分析[J].农业经济问题,2010(11):21-27.
[76]陈柳钦,胡振华.中国农村合作组织的历史变迁[J].农业经济问题,2010(6):53-59.
[77]郭晓鸣,廖祖君.公司领办型合作社的形成机理与制度特征——以四川省邛崃市金利猪业合作社为例[J].中国农村观察,2010(5):48-55.
[78]张晓山.促进以农产品生产专业户为主体的合作社的发展——以浙江省农民专业合作社的发展为例[J].中国农村经济,2004(11):4-10,23.
[79]孔祥智,张小林等.陕、宁、川农民合作经济组织的作用及制约因素调查[J].经济理论与经济管理,2005(6):52-57.
[80]姜长云.我国农民专业合作组织的发展态势[J].经济研究参考,2005(74):5-9,16.
[81]应瑞瑶.农民专业合作社的成长路径——以江苏省泰兴市七贤家禽产销合作社为例[J].中国农村经济.2006(6):18-23.
[82]韩俊,秦中春等.我国农民合作经济组织发展的影响因素分析[J].红旗文稿,2006(15):14-16.
[83]张开华,张清林.农民专业合作社成长的困惑与思考[J].农业经济问题,2007(5):62-66.
[84]郭红东,楼栋等.影响农民专业合作社成长的因素分析——基于浙江省部分农民专业合作社的调查[J].中国农村经济,2009(8):24-31.
[85]孙亚范,王凯.农民生产服务合作社的发展和运行机制分析——基于江苏省的调查[J].农业经济问题,2010(11):28-33.
[86]郝小宝.农民合作经济组织的利益机制与治理结构分析[J].理论导刊,2005(4):51-54.
[87]黄祖辉,徐旭初.基于能力和关系的合作治理——对浙江省农民专业合作社治理结构的解释[J].浙江社会科学,2006(1):60-66.
[88]罗必良.农民合作组织:偷懒、监督及其保障机制[J].中国农村观察,2007(2):26-37.
[89]马彦丽,孟彩英.我国农民专业合作社的双重委托代理关系——兼论存在的问题及改进思路[J].农业经济问题,2008(5):55-60.
[90]孙亚范.农民专业合作经济组织利益机制及影响因素分析——基于江苏省的实证研究[J].农业经济问题,2008(9):48-56.
[91]郭红东,杨海舟等.影响农民专业合作社社员对社长信任的因素分析——基于浙江省部分社员的调查[J].中国农村经济,2008(4):52-60.
[92]王军.合作社治理:文献综述[J].中国农村观察,2010(2):
[93]王军.中国农民专业合作社社员机会主义行为的约束机制分析[J].中国农村观察,2011.5:25-32.
[94]章群,牛忠江.市场与法治:农民专业合作社法人治理中的动态利益平衡[J].河北法学,2011(1):71-78.
[95]崔宝玉.农民专业合作社中的委托代理关系及其治理[J].财经问题研究,2011(2):102-107.
[96]夏春萍,何嘉欣.我国农民专业合作社治理结构优化分析[J].东南学术,2012(4):29-35.
[97]邵兴全.新型农民专业合作社治理结构研究——一种资本控制受约束的治理嵌入共同治理模式的探讨[J].中共成都市委党校学报,2012(3):50-54.
[98]温美荣.社会资本视域下我国农民专业合作社治理机制研究[J].社团管理研究,2012(12):23-26.
[99]黄胜忠,林坚,徐旭初.农民专业合作社治理机制及其绩效实证分析[J].中国农村经济,2008(3).
[100]徐旭初,吴彬.治理机制对农民专业合作社绩效的影响——基于浙江省526家农民专业合作社的实证分析[J].中国农村经济,2010(5):43-55.
[101]韩国明,郭鹏鹏.农民自主成立的合作社与”支部+合作社”治理绩效的比较分析[J].中国农村观察,2011(6):22-30.
[102]林坚,黄胜忠.成员异质性与农民专业合作社的所有权分析[J].农业经济问题,2007(10):12-17.
[103]黄胜忠.转型时期农民专业合作社的组织行为研究——基于成员异质性的视角[M].杭州:浙江大学出版社,2008.
[104]崔宝玉,李晓明.异质性合作社内源型资本供给约束的实证分析——基于浙江临海丰翼合作社的典型案例[J].财贸研究,2008(4):36-42.
[105]王军.公司领办的合作社中公司与农户的关系研究[J].中国农村观察,2009(4):20-25.
[106]帅旭.农民专业合作社的形成及其边界:合作社还是公司?[J].农村金融,2010(2):26-29.
[107]孔祥智,蒋忱忱.成员异质性对合作社治理机制的影响分析——以四川省井研县联合水果合作社为例[J].农村经济,2010(9):8-11.
[108]何安华,邵锋.资源禀赋差异与合作利益分配——辽宁省HS农民专业合作社案例分析[J].江淮论坛,2012(1):11-18.
[109]张靖会.同质性与异质性对农民专业合作社的影响——基于俱乐部理论的研究[J].齐鲁学刊,2012(1):86-90.
[110]杜吟棠,潘劲.我国新型农民合作社的雏形——京郊专业合作组织案例调查及理论探讨[J].管理世界,2000(1):161-168.
[111]苑鹏.中国农村市场化进程中的农民合作组织研究[J].中国社会科学,2001(6):63-73.
[112]刘纯阳.农民合作经济的组织变异:现象及其解释[J].调研世界,2003(8):26-28.
[113]应瑞瑶.合作社的异化与异化的合作社——兼论中国农业合作社的定位[J].江海学刊,2002(6).
[114]徐旭初.农民专业合作:基于组织能力的产权安排——对浙江省农民专业合作社产权安排的一种解释[J].浙江学刊,2006(3).
[115]郭富清.西方国家合作社公司化趋向与我国农民专业合作社法的回应[J].农业经济问题,2007(6).
[116]崔宝玉,李晓明.资本控制下的合作社功能与运行的实证分析[J].农业经济问题,2008(1):40-47.
[117]宫哲元.集体行动逻辑视角下合作社原则的变迁[J].中国农村观察,2008(5):37-41.
[118]徐旭初.合作社文化:概念、图景与思考[J].农业经济问题,2009(11):90-97.
[119]张颖,任大鹏.论农民专业合作社的规范化——从合作社的真伪之辩谈起[J].农业经济问题,2010(4):41-45.
[120]崔宝玉,陈强.资本控制必然导致农民专业合作社功能弱化吗?[J].农业经济问题,2011(2):8-15.
[121]郭晓鸣,曾旭晖.农民合作组织发展与地方政府的角色[J].中国农村经济,2005(6):25-29,36.
[122]国鲁来.农民合作组织发展的促进政策分析[J].中国农村经济,2006(6):4-11,37.
[123]郭勇.在政府服务与农民主体的互动中发展农民组织——基于双峰县农村科技合作社实践的思考[J].农业经济问题,2009(9):37-44.
[124]赵国杰,郭春丽.农民专业合作社生命周期分析与政府角色转换初探[J].农业经济问题,2009(1):76-80.
[125]刘婷.不同环境下农民专业合作社的形成路径探析——基于ANT视角的实证研究[J].农业经济问题,2011(2):16-24.
[126]艾尔巴比著,邱泽奇编译.社会研究方法基础[M].北京:华夏出版社,2002:43.
[127]陆学艺.发展变化中的中国农业、农村与农民[J].中国社会科学院研究生院学报,2006(4):42-48.
[128]万能,原新.1978年以来中国农民的阶层分化：回顾与反思.中国农村观察,2009(4):65-73.
[129]陆学艺.重新认识农民问题——十年来中国农民的变化.社会学研究,1989(6),1-14.
[130]陆学艺,张厚义.农民的分化、问题及其对策.农业经济问题,1990(1),16-21.
[131]邵科.农民专业合作社社员参与行为研究[D].浙江大学博士学位论文,2012.
[132]高强,雷海章.农户分化背景下农村社会结构改革[J].农业经济问题,1998(8):4-8.
[133]陈春生.中国农户的演化逻辑与分类[J].农业经济问题,2007(11):79-84.
[134]李卓鹏.当代中国的农民分化[J].教学与研究,1999(10):52-59.
[135]冯根福.双重委托代理理论:上市公司治理的另一种分析框架——兼论进一步完善中国上市公司治理的新思路[J].经济研究,2004(12):18.
[136] Eliers, C.&Hanf, C. H., Contracts between farmers and farmers processingcooperatives: Aprincipal-agent approach for the potato starch industry [A]. In Galizzi, G.&Venturini, L.(Eds):Vertical Relationship and Coordination in the Food System[C]. Heidelberg, Physica,1999:267-284.
[137]胡剑锋.中国农业产业组织发展演变的制度分析[M].北京:人民出版社,2010.
[138]青木昌彦.对”内部人控制”的控制:转轨经济中公司治理的若干问题[J].改革,1994,(6):11-24.
[139]张春霖.从融资角度分析国有企业的治理结构[J].改革,1995(3):34-46.
[140]张承耀.”内部人控制”问题与中国企业改革[J].改革,1995(3):29-33.
[141]Brunello, G., Graziano, G., Parigi, B.M., CEO turnover in insider-dominated boanls: TheItalian case, Journal of Banking Finance2003(27):1027-1051.
[142]钱颖一.改革中国的公司治理和融资[A].青木昌彦.转轨经济中的公司治理[C].北京:中国经济出版社,1995.
[143]费方域.控制内部人控制——国企改革中的治理机制研究[J].经济研究,1996(6):31-39.
[144]孙国峰.内部人控制是问题吗——对公司治理理论有关内部人控制问题的质疑[J].生产力研究,2004(5):29-31.
[145]潘石.”内部人控制企业”论质疑[J].当代经济研究,1998(1):53-59.
[146]洪浩.论国企改革中的“内部人控制”问题——兼评“内部人控制”理论[J].福建行政学院福建经济管理干部学院学报,2002(4):9-13.
[147]葛扬.经济管理与社会科学前沿研究[M].北京:中国金融出版社,2000.
[148]郝小宝,陈合营.农民专业合作社的内部人控制问题研究[J].
[149] ICA, Statement of the cooperative identity, cited in Cooperative Principles, Theory andHistory [R]. University of Wisconsin, Center for Cooperatives, I996.
[150]彼特布劳著.王春光,谢圣赞译.不平等和异质性[M].北京:中国社会科学出版社,1991.
[151]徐长福.论人性的逻辑异质性[J].吉林大学社会科学学报,2001(5):80-87.
[152]张荣翼.现代性、对话性、异质性——中国当代文论的内在关键词[J].湘潭大学学报:哲学社会科学版,2006,30(5):90-101.
[153]钟陆文.人的异质性假设及其经济学阐释[J].求索,2006(2):9-12.
[154]宋妍,晏鹰.共享资源自发供给的异质性效应分析[J].统计与决策,2011(20):65-67.
[155]邵科,徐旭初.成员异质性对农民专业合作社治理结构的影响——基于浙江省88家合作社的分析[J].西北农林科技大学学报(社会科学版),2008(2):5-9.
[156]马志雄,张银银.异质性成员关系下小农户参与农民专业合作社的行为——基于代理理论的视角[J].南方农村,2011(6):54-57.
[157]赵凯.论农民专业合作社社员的异质性及其定量测定方法[J].华南农业大学学报(社会科学版),2012(4):57-66.
[158]林坚,黄胜忠.成员异质性与农民专业合作社的所有权分析[J].农业经济问题,2007(10).
[159]林坚,黄胜忠.成员异质性与农民专业合作社的所有权分析[J].农业经济问题,2007(10).
[160]黄胜忠,徐旭初.成员异质性与农民专业合作社的组织结构分析[J].南京农业大学学报(社会科学版),2008,8(3):1-7.
[161]韩喜平,李恩.异质性视角下农民专业合作社管理协同研究[J].学习与探索,2011(6):166-168.
[162]王颖.新集体主义——乡村社会的再组织[M].经济管理出版社,197-208
[163] Jean C. Oi,"The Collective Foundation for Rapid Rural Industrialization”, Vermeer, EdwardB., Frank N. Pieke and Woei Lien Chong (eds.), Cooperative and Collective in China’s RuralDevelopment: Between State and Private Interests, Armonk, N.Y.: M.E.Sharpe,1997, p.93.
[164]李姿姿.中国农民专业合作组织研究[M].中央编译出版社,2011, p6.
[165]马林娜,慕永通.渔业共同管理模式初探[J].中国渔业经济,2004.5:33-34.
[166]唐建业,黄硕琳.渔业社区管理在中国的实施探讨[J].海洋通报,2006,25(4):63-67.
[167]高明,高健.中国海洋渔业管理制度优化研究[J].太平洋学报,2008(2):81-85.
[168]李晟,朱颖颖,杨正勇.渔业协会、渔村社区组织及其渔业资源管理功能[J].渔业经济研究,2009(3):29-33.
[169]迟文涛.中国实施渔业社区管理初探[J].2010(3):52-57.
[170] Williamson, O.E. The economic institutions of capitalism[M]. New York: The Free Press,1985.
[171]黄祖辉.农民合作:必然性、变革态势与启示[J].中国农村经济,2000(8)
[172]傅晨.为什么要大力发展合作经济[J].中国合作经济,2005(5)
[173]徐旭初,黄胜忠.走向新合作:浙江省农民专业合作社发展研究[M].科学出版社,2009.
[174]曹锦清.黄河边的中国[M].上海:上海文艺出版社,2000.
[175]徐忠爱.基于契约规制的农村经济组织模式研究[J].经济学家,2010(2):61-69.
[176]周立群,曹利群.农村经济组织形态的演变与创新——山东省莱阳市农业产业化调查报告[J].经济研究,2001(1):69-75,83.
[177]崔宝玉.农民专业合作社治理结构与资本控制[J].改革,2010(10):109-114.
[178]张靖会.农民专业合作社效率研究——基于俱乐部理论视角的分析[D].山东大学博士学位论文.
[179]崔宝玉.农民专业合作社治理结构与资本控制[J].改革,2010(10):109-114.
[180]邵兴全.新型农民专业合作社治理结构研究——一种资本控制受约束的治理嵌入共同治理模式的探讨[J].中共成都市委党校学报,2012(3):50-54.
[181]刘洁.农民专业合作社契约选择与运营绩效的理论分析与实证研究[D].华中农业大学博士学位论文,2011.
[182]温美荣.社会资本视域下我国农民专业合作社治理机制研究[J].理论探讨.2012(12):23-26.
[183]杨瑞龙,杨其静.专用性、专有性与企业制度[J].经济研究,2001(3).
[184]帅旭.农民专业合作社内部治理的均衡性研究[J].金融发展评论,2011(10):109-119.
[185]张满林.我国农民专业合作社治理问题研究[D].北京林业大学博士论文,2009.
[2] ICA, Statement of the cooperative identity, cited in Cooperative Principles, Theory and History
[R]. University of Wisconsin, Center for Cooperatives, I996.
[3] USDA. The impact of new generation cooperatives on their communities [R]. RBS ResearchReport,1998.
[4] Emelianoff, I. V., Economic theory of cooperation: Economic cooperative organizations [M].Michigan: Edwards Brothers, Inc.1942.
[5] Phillips, R., Economic nature of the cooperative association [J]. Journal of Farm Economics,1953(35):74-87.
[6] Enke, S., Consumer cooperatives and economic efficiency [J]. American Economic Review,1945,35(1):148-155.
[7] Helmberger, P. G.&Hoos, S., Cooperative enterprise and organization theory [J]. Journal ofFarm Economics,1962(44):275-290.
[8] Staatz, J. M., The structural characteristics of farmer cooperatives and their behavioralconsequences [A]. In Royer, J.(Eds), Cooperative theory: new approaches [C]. ACS ServiceReport No.18, USDA, Washington D.C.1987:33-60.
[9] Barton, D. G., What is a cooperative?[A] In Cobia, D. W.(Eds) Cooperatives in Agriculture
[C]. NJ: Prentice-Hall,1989:1-34.
[10] Hansmann, H., The ownership of Enterprise [M]. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press,London,1996.
[11] Hendrikse, G.W.J.&Veerman, C. P., Marketing cooperatives and financialstructure: atransaction costs economics analysis [J]. Agricultural Economics,2001,26(3):205-216
[12] Cook, M. L., Chaddad, F.R.&Iliopoulos, C., Advances in cooperative theory since1990: Areview of agricultural economics literature [A]. In Hendrikse, G.W.J.(Eds): Restructuringagricultural cooperatives [C]. Haveka: Erasmus University Press,2004:65-90.
[13] Nourse, E. G., The place of the cooperative in our national economy: American cooperation1942-1945[A]. Washington D.C.: American Institute of Cooperation,1945/1995:33-39.
[14] Sexton, R. J., Cooperatives and forces shaping agricultural marketing [J]. American Journalof Agricultural Economics,1986,68(5):1167-1172.
[15] Van Dijk,G. Implementing the sixth reason for cooperation: new generation cooperatives inthe agribusiness [A]. In Nilsson J.&Van Dijk, G.(Eds): Strategies and structures in the agro-foodindustries [C]. Van Gorcum: Assen,1997:94-110.
[16] Porter, E K.&Scully, G. W., Economic efficiency in cooperatives [J]. The Journal of Lawand Economics,1987(30):489-512.
[17] Cook, M. L., The future of U. S. agricultural cooperatives: a neo-institutional approach [J].American Journal of Agricultural Economics,1995,77(10):1153-1159.
[18] Fulion, M., The future of Canadian agriculture cooperatives: a property rights approach [J].American Journal of Agricultural Economics,1995,77(5):1144-1152.
[19] Borgen, S. O., Rethinking incentives problems in cooperative organizations [R]. NorwegianAgricultural Economics Institute, Oslo,2003.
[20] Trechter, D. D., Impact of diversification on agricultural cooperatives in Wisconsin,Agribusiness,1996,12(4):385-394.
[21] Lorendahl, B., New cooperatives and local development: a study of six cases in Jamatland,Sweden, Journal of Rural Studies,1996,12(2):143-150.
[22] Van Bekkum, O. F., Van Dijk, G.&Nilsson, J., Agricultural cooperatives at crossroads [A], InVan Bekkum, O. F.&Van Dijk, G.(Eds): Agricultural cooperatives in the European Unian, VanGorcum, Assen,1997:18-28.
[23] Stefanson, N., Fulton, M.&Harris, A., New generation cooperatives: rebuilding ruraleconomies[R].Centre for the Study of Cooperatives, University of Saskatchewan,1995
[24] Zeuli, K., Goreham, G.A.&King, R. et al., Dakota Growers Pasta Company and the City ofCarrington, North Dakota: a case study [R]. A report for the USDA.-Fund for Rural America,1998
[25] Helmberger, P. G., Future roles for agricultural cooperatives [J]. Journal of Farm Economics,1966(48):1427-1435.
[26] Rhodes, V. J., The large agricultural cooperative as a competitor [J]. American Journal ofAgricultural Economics,1983(65):1090-1095.
[27] Royer, J.S., Potential for cooperative involvement in vertical coordination and value-addedactivities [J]. Agribusiness: An International Journal,1995,11(5):473-481.
[28] Ollila, P.&Nilsson, J., The position of agricultural cooperatives in the changing foodindustry of Europe [A]. In Nilsson, J.&Van Dijk, G.(Eds): Strategies and structures in theagro-food industries. Van Gorcum: Assen,1997:131-150.
[29] Sexton, R.J.&Iskow, J., Factors critical to the success or failure of emerging agriculturalcooperatives [R]. Gianini Foundation Information, Series No.88-3, University of California-Davis,1988.
[30] Shaffer, J. D., Thinking about farmers' cooperatives, contracts, and economic coordination[A]. In Royer, J.(Eds): Cooperative theory: new approaches[C]. ACS Service Report No.18,USDA, Washington D.C.,1987:61-86.
[31] Staatz, J. M., Cooperatives: a theoretical perspective on the behavior of farmers [D]. Ph.D.dissertation, Michigan State University,1984.
[32] Vitaliano, P., Cooperative enterprise: an alternative conceptual basis for analyzing a complexinstitution [J]. American Journal of Agriculasral Economics,1983(65):1078-1083.
[33] Nilsson, J., Organization principles for cooperative firms [J]. Scandinavian Journal ofManagement,2001(17):329-356.
[34] Emelianoff, I. V., Economic theory of cooperation: Economic cooperative organizations [M].Michigan: Edwards Brothers, Inc.1942.
[35] Staatz, J. M., Recent developments in the theory of agricultural cooperation [J]. Journal ofAgricultural Cooperation,1987(2):74-95.
[36] Bijman, J.&Hendrikse, G., Cooperatives in chains: institutional restructuring in the Dutchfruit and vegetables industry [J]. Journal on Chains and Network Science,2003,3(2):95-107.
[37] Cook, M. L., The role of management behavior in agricultural cooperatives [J]. Journal ofAgricultural Cooperation,1994(9):42-58.
[38] Van Dijk, G., Implementing the sixth reason for cooperation: new generation cooperatives inthe agribusiness [A]. In Nilsson J.&Van Dijk, G.(Eds): Strategies and structures in the agro-foodindustries [C]. Van Gorcum: Assen,1997:94-110.
[39] Royer, J. S., Cooperative organizational strategies: a neo-institutional digest [J]. Journal ofCooperatives,1999(14):44-67.
[40] Short, H., Keasey, H.&Wright, M. et al. Corporate governance: from accountability toenterprise [J]. Accounting and Business Research,1999,29(4):337-352.
[41] Zusman, P., Constitutional selection of collective choice rules in a cooperative enterprise[J].Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization,1992(17):353-362.
[42] Sexton, R. J., Cooperatives and forces shaping agricultural marketing [J]. American Journalof Agricultural Economics,1986,68(5):1167-1172.
[43] Choi, E. K.&Feinerman, E., Producer cooperatives, input pricing and land allocation [J].Journal of Agricultural Economics,1993,44(2):230-44.
[44] Banerjee, A. D., Mookherjee, D.&Munshi, K. et al., Inequality, control rights, and rentseeking: Sugar cooperative in Maharashtra [J]. Journal of Political Economy,2001,109(1):138-190.
[45] Karantinin, K.&Zago, A., Cooperatives and membership commitment: endogenousmembership in mixed duopsonies [J]. American Journal of Agricultural Economics,2001,83(5):1266-1272.
[46]徐旭初.合作社的本质规定性及其它[J].农村经济,2003(8):38-40.
[47]黄祖辉.中国农民合作组织发展的若干理论与实践问题[J].中国农村经济,2008(11):4-7,26.
[48]徐旭初,吴彬.治理机制对农民专业合作社绩效的影响——基于浙江省526家农民专业合作社的实证分析[J].中国农村经济,2010(5).
[49]梁世夫,王淑霞,易南文.粮食主产区农民专业合作经济组织发展:效应、问题与对策——基于湖南省岳阳市的实证分析[J].农业经济问题,2006(8):69-71.
[50]孙艳华,周力,应瑞瑶.农民专业合作社增收绩效研究——基于江苏省养鸡农户调查数据的分析[J].南京农业大学学报(社会科学版),2007,7(2):22-27.
[51]唐宗焜.合作社功能和社会主义市场经济[J].经济研究,2007(12):11-23.
[52]董进才.专业合作社农民政治参与状况分析[J].农业经济问题,2009(9):45-51.
[53]蔡荣.“合作社+农户”模式:交易费用节约与农户增收效应——基于山东省苹果种植农户问卷调查的实证分析[J].中国农村经济,2011(1):58-65.
[54]刘滨,陈池波,杜辉.农民专业合作社绩效度量的实证分析——来自江西省22个样本合作社的数据[J].农业经济问题,2009(2):90-95.
[55]徐旭初.农民专业合作社绩效评价体系及其验证[J].农业技术经济,2009(4).
[56]于井泉,李燕琼,刘介.农业物流视角下农民合作组织创新及其绩效度量研究[J].物流管理,2009(19).
[57]赵佳荣.农民专业合作社”三重绩效”评价模式研究[J].农业技术经济,2010(2).
[58]伊藤顺一,包宗顺等.农民专业合作社的经济效果分析——以南京市西瓜合作社为例[J].中国农村观察,2011(5):2-12.
[59]黄祖辉.农民合作:必然性、变革态势与启示[J].中国农村经济,2000(8):4-5.
[60]徐旭初.中国农民专业合作经济组织的制度分析[M].经济科学出版社2005,103-123.
[61]黄祖辉,徐旭初,冯冠胜.农民专业合作组织发展的影响因素分析——对浙江省农民专业合作组织发展现状的探讨[J].中国农村经济,2002(3):13-21.
[62]张晓山.有关中国农民专业合作组织发展的几个问题[J].农村经济,2005(1):4-7.
[63]林坚,马彦丽.农业合作社和投资者所有企业的边界——基于交易费用和组织成本角度的分析[J].农业经济问题,2006(3):16-20.
[64]孙亚范.现阶段我国农民合作需求与意愿的实证研究和启示——对江苏农户的实证调查与分析[J].江苏社会科学,2003(1):204-208.
[65]郭红东,蒋文华.影响农户参与专业合作经济组织行为的因素分析——基于对浙江省农户的实证研究[J].中国农村经济,2004(5):10-16,30.
[66]石敏俊,金少胜.中国农民需要合作组织吗?——沿海地区农户参加农民专业合作组织意向研究[J].浙江大学学报(人文社会科学版),2004(5):35-43.
[67]张广胜,周娟等.农民对专业合作社需求的影响因素分析——基于沈阳市200个村的调查[J].农业经济问题,2007(11):68-73.
[68]赵泉民,李怡.关系网络与中国乡村社会的合作经济——基于社会资本视角[J].农业经济问题,2007(8):40-46.
[69]张冬平,丁鹭等.基于Logit模型下农民加入专业合作社的意愿分析[J].河南农业大学学报,2007(3):338-341.
[70]赵佳荣.农户对专业合作社的需求及其影响因素比较——基于湖南省两类地区农户的实证分析[J].中国农村经济,2008(11):18-26.
[71]卢向虎,吕新业.农户参加农民专业合作组织意愿的实证分析——基于7省24市(县)农户的调研数据[J].农业经济问题,2008(1):26-31.
[72]庄海静,徐秀丽.农民参与专业合作社的动机探析——基于对京郊合作社的实地调研[J].农业经济,2010(4):67-68.
[73]王新利,李世武.农民专业合作经济组织的发展分析[J].农业经济问题,2007(3):15-19.
[74]郭庆海.我国农民合作经济组织产业分布差异解析[J].农业经济问题,2007(4):87-90.
[75]王曙光.中国农民合作组织历史演进:一个基于契约—产权视角的分析[J].农业经济问题,2010(11):21-27.
[76]陈柳钦,胡振华.中国农村合作组织的历史变迁[J].农业经济问题,2010(6):53-59.
[77]郭晓鸣,廖祖君.公司领办型合作社的形成机理与制度特征——以四川省邛崃市金利猪业合作社为例[J].中国农村观察,2010(5):48-55.
[78]张晓山.促进以农产品生产专业户为主体的合作社的发展——以浙江省农民专业合作社的发展为例[J].中国农村经济,2004(11):4-10,23.
[79]孔祥智,张小林等.陕、宁、川农民合作经济组织的作用及制约因素调查[J].经济理论与经济管理,2005(6):52-57.
[80]姜长云.我国农民专业合作组织的发展态势[J].经济研究参考,2005(74):5-9,16.
[81]应瑞瑶.农民专业合作社的成长路径——以江苏省泰兴市七贤家禽产销合作社为例[J].中国农村经济.2006(6):18-23.
[82]韩俊,秦中春等.我国农民合作经济组织发展的影响因素分析[J].红旗文稿,2006(15):14-16.
[83]张开华,张清林.农民专业合作社成长的困惑与思考[J].农业经济问题,2007(5):62-66.
[84]郭红东,楼栋等.影响农民专业合作社成长的因素分析——基于浙江省部分农民专业合作社的调查[J].中国农村经济,2009(8):24-31.
[85]孙亚范,王凯.农民生产服务合作社的发展和运行机制分析——基于江苏省的调查[J].农业经济问题,2010(11):28-33.
[86]郝小宝.农民合作经济组织的利益机制与治理结构分析[J].理论导刊,2005(4):51-54.
[87]黄祖辉,徐旭初.基于能力和关系的合作治理——对浙江省农民专业合作社治理结构的解释[J].浙江社会科学,2006(1):60-66.
[88]罗必良.农民合作组织:偷懒、监督及其保障机制[J].中国农村观察,2007(2):26-37.
[89]马彦丽,孟彩英.我国农民专业合作社的双重委托代理关系——兼论存在的问题及改进思路[J].农业经济问题,2008(5):55-60.
[90]孙亚范.农民专业合作经济组织利益机制及影响因素分析——基于江苏省的实证研究[J].农业经济问题,2008(9):48-56.
[91]郭红东,杨海舟等.影响农民专业合作社社员对社长信任的因素分析——基于浙江省部分社员的调查[J].中国农村经济,2008(4):52-60.
[92]王军.合作社治理:文献综述[J].中国农村观察,2010(2):
[93]王军.中国农民专业合作社社员机会主义行为的约束机制分析[J].中国农村观察,2011.5:25-32.
[94]章群,牛忠江.市场与法治:农民专业合作社法人治理中的动态利益平衡[J].河北法学,2011(1):71-78.
[95]崔宝玉.农民专业合作社中的委托代理关系及其治理[J].财经问题研究,2011(2):102-107.
[96]夏春萍,何嘉欣.我国农民专业合作社治理结构优化分析[J].东南学术,2012(4):29-35.
[97]邵兴全.新型农民专业合作社治理结构研究——一种资本控制受约束的治理嵌入共同治理模式的探讨[J].中共成都市委党校学报,2012(3):50-54.
[98]温美荣.社会资本视域下我国农民专业合作社治理机制研究[J].社团管理研究,2012(12):23-26.
[99]黄胜忠,林坚,徐旭初.农民专业合作社治理机制及其绩效实证分析[J].中国农村经济,2008(3).
[100]徐旭初,吴彬.治理机制对农民专业合作社绩效的影响——基于浙江省526家农民专业合作社的实证分析[J].中国农村经济,2010(5):43-55.
[101]韩国明,郭鹏鹏.农民自主成立的合作社与”支部+合作社”治理绩效的比较分析[J].中国农村观察,2011(6):22-30.
[102]林坚,黄胜忠.成员异质性与农民专业合作社的所有权分析[J].农业经济问题,2007(10):12-17.
[103]黄胜忠.转型时期农民专业合作社的组织行为研究——基于成员异质性的视角[M].杭州:浙江大学出版社,2008.
[104]崔宝玉,李晓明.异质性合作社内源型资本供给约束的实证分析——基于浙江临海丰翼合作社的典型案例[J].财贸研究,2008(4):36-42.
[105]王军.公司领办的合作社中公司与农户的关系研究[J].中国农村观察,2009(4):20-25.
[106]帅旭.农民专业合作社的形成及其边界:合作社还是公司?[J].农村金融,2010(2):26-29.
[107]孔祥智,蒋忱忱.成员异质性对合作社治理机制的影响分析——以四川省井研县联合水果合作社为例[J].农村经济,2010(9):8-11.
[108]何安华,邵锋.资源禀赋差异与合作利益分配——辽宁省HS农民专业合作社案例分析[J].江淮论坛,2012(1):11-18.
[109]张靖会.同质性与异质性对农民专业合作社的影响——基于俱乐部理论的研究[J].齐鲁学刊,2012(1):86-90.
[110]杜吟棠,潘劲.我国新型农民合作社的雏形——京郊专业合作组织案例调查及理论探讨[J].管理世界,2000(1):161-168.
[111]苑鹏.中国农村市场化进程中的农民合作组织研究[J].中国社会科学,2001(6):63-73.
[112]刘纯阳.农民合作经济的组织变异:现象及其解释[J].调研世界,2003(8):26-28.
[113]应瑞瑶.合作社的异化与异化的合作社——兼论中国农业合作社的定位[J].江海学刊,2002(6).
[114]徐旭初.农民专业合作:基于组织能力的产权安排——对浙江省农民专业合作社产权安排的一种解释[J].浙江学刊,2006(3).
[115]郭富清.西方国家合作社公司化趋向与我国农民专业合作社法的回应[J].农业经济问题,2007(6).
[116]崔宝玉,李晓明.资本控制下的合作社功能与运行的实证分析[J].农业经济问题,2008(1):40-47.
[117]宫哲元.集体行动逻辑视角下合作社原则的变迁[J].中国农村观察,2008(5):37-41.
[118]徐旭初.合作社文化:概念、图景与思考[J].农业经济问题,2009(11):90-97.
[119]张颖,任大鹏.论农民专业合作社的规范化——从合作社的真伪之辩谈起[J].农业经济问题,2010(4):41-45.
[120]崔宝玉,陈强.资本控制必然导致农民专业合作社功能弱化吗?[J].农业经济问题,2011(2):8-15.
[121]郭晓鸣,曾旭晖.农民合作组织发展与地方政府的角色[J].中国农村经济,2005(6):25-29,36.
[122]国鲁来.农民合作组织发展的促进政策分析[J].中国农村经济,2006(6):4-11,37.
[123]郭勇.在政府服务与农民主体的互动中发展农民组织——基于双峰县农村科技合作社实践的思考[J].农业经济问题,2009(9):37-44.
[124]赵国杰,郭春丽.农民专业合作社生命周期分析与政府角色转换初探[J].农业经济问题,2009(1):76-80.
[125]刘婷.不同环境下农民专业合作社的形成路径探析——基于ANT视角的实证研究[J].农业经济问题,2011(2):16-24.
[126]艾尔巴比著,邱泽奇编译.社会研究方法基础[M].北京:华夏出版社,2002:43.
[127]陆学艺.发展变化中的中国农业、农村与农民[J].中国社会科学院研究生院学报,2006(4):42-48.
[128]万能,原新.1978年以来中国农民的阶层分化：回顾与反思.中国农村观察,2009(4):65-73.
[129]陆学艺.重新认识农民问题——十年来中国农民的变化.社会学研究,1989(6),1-14.
[130]陆学艺,张厚义.农民的分化、问题及其对策.农业经济问题,1990(1),16-21.
[131]邵科.农民专业合作社社员参与行为研究[D].浙江大学博士学位论文,2012.
[132]高强,雷海章.农户分化背景下农村社会结构改革[J].农业经济问题,1998(8):4-8.
[133]陈春生.中国农户的演化逻辑与分类[J].农业经济问题,2007(11):79-84.
[134]李卓鹏.当代中国的农民分化[J].教学与研究,1999(10):52-59.
[135]冯根福.双重委托代理理论:上市公司治理的另一种分析框架——兼论进一步完善中国上市公司治理的新思路[J].经济研究,2004(12):18.
[136] Eliers, C.&Hanf, C. H., Contracts between farmers and farmers processingcooperatives: Aprincipal-agent approach for the potato starch industry [A]. In Galizzi, G.&Venturini, L.(Eds):Vertical Relationship and Coordination in the Food System[C]. Heidelberg, Physica,1999:267-284.
[137]胡剑锋.中国农业产业组织发展演变的制度分析[M].北京:人民出版社,2010.
[138]青木昌彦.对”内部人控制”的控制:转轨经济中公司治理的若干问题[J].改革,1994,(6):11-24.
[139]张春霖.从融资角度分析国有企业的治理结构[J].改革,1995(3):34-46.
[140]张承耀.”内部人控制”问题与中国企业改革[J].改革,1995(3):29-33.
[141]Brunello, G., Graziano, G., Parigi, B.M., CEO turnover in insider-dominated boanls: TheItalian case, Journal of Banking Finance2003(27):1027-1051.
[142]钱颖一.改革中国的公司治理和融资[A].青木昌彦.转轨经济中的公司治理[C].北京:中国经济出版社,1995.
[143]费方域.控制内部人控制——国企改革中的治理机制研究[J].经济研究,1996(6):31-39.
[144]孙国峰.内部人控制是问题吗——对公司治理理论有关内部人控制问题的质疑[J].生产力研究,2004(5):29-31.
[145]潘石.”内部人控制企业”论质疑[J].当代经济研究,1998(1):53-59.
[146]洪浩.论国企改革中的“内部人控制”问题——兼评“内部人控制”理论[J].福建行政学院福建经济管理干部学院学报,2002(4):9-13.
[147]葛扬.经济管理与社会科学前沿研究[M].北京:中国金融出版社,2000.
[148]郝小宝,陈合营.农民专业合作社的内部人控制问题研究[J].
[149] ICA, Statement of the cooperative identity, cited in Cooperative Principles, Theory andHistory [R]. University of Wisconsin, Center for Cooperatives, I996.
[150]彼特布劳著.王春光,谢圣赞译.不平等和异质性[M].北京:中国社会科学出版社,1991.
[151]徐长福.论人性的逻辑异质性[J].吉林大学社会科学学报,2001(5):80-87.
[152]张荣翼.现代性、对话性、异质性——中国当代文论的内在关键词[J].湘潭大学学报:哲学社会科学版,2006,30(5):90-101.
[153]钟陆文.人的异质性假设及其经济学阐释[J].求索,2006(2):9-12.
[154]宋妍,晏鹰.共享资源自发供给的异质性效应分析[J].统计与决策,2011(20):65-67.
[155]邵科,徐旭初.成员异质性对农民专业合作社治理结构的影响——基于浙江省88家合作社的分析[J].西北农林科技大学学报(社会科学版),2008(2):5-9.
[156]马志雄,张银银.异质性成员关系下小农户参与农民专业合作社的行为——基于代理理论的视角[J].南方农村,2011(6):54-57.
[157]赵凯.论农民专业合作社社员的异质性及其定量测定方法[J].华南农业大学学报(社会科学版),2012(4):57-66.
[158]林坚,黄胜忠.成员异质性与农民专业合作社的所有权分析[J].农业经济问题,2007(10).
[159]林坚,黄胜忠.成员异质性与农民专业合作社的所有权分析[J].农业经济问题,2007(10).
[160]黄胜忠,徐旭初.成员异质性与农民专业合作社的组织结构分析[J].南京农业大学学报(社会科学版),2008,8(3):1-7.
[161]韩喜平,李恩.异质性视角下农民专业合作社管理协同研究[J].学习与探索,2011(6):166-168.
[162]王颖.新集体主义——乡村社会的再组织[M].经济管理出版社,197-208
[163] Jean C. Oi,"The Collective Foundation for Rapid Rural Industrialization”, Vermeer, EdwardB., Frank N. Pieke and Woei Lien Chong (eds.), Cooperative and Collective in China’s RuralDevelopment: Between State and Private Interests, Armonk, N.Y.: M.E.Sharpe,1997, p.93.
[164]李姿姿.中国农民专业合作组织研究[M].中央编译出版社,2011, p6.
[165]马林娜,慕永通.渔业共同管理模式初探[J].中国渔业经济,2004.5:33-34.
[166]唐建业,黄硕琳.渔业社区管理在中国的实施探讨[J].海洋通报,2006,25(4):63-67.
[167]高明,高健.中国海洋渔业管理制度优化研究[J].太平洋学报,2008(2):81-85.
[168]李晟,朱颖颖,杨正勇.渔业协会、渔村社区组织及其渔业资源管理功能[J].渔业经济研究,2009(3):29-33.
[169]迟文涛.中国实施渔业社区管理初探[J].2010(3):52-57.
[170] Williamson, O.E. The economic institutions of capitalism[M]. New York: The Free Press,1985.
[171]黄祖辉.农民合作:必然性、变革态势与启示[J].中国农村经济,2000(8)
[172]傅晨.为什么要大力发展合作经济[J].中国合作经济,2005(5)
[173]徐旭初,黄胜忠.走向新合作:浙江省农民专业合作社发展研究[M].科学出版社,2009.
[174]曹锦清.黄河边的中国[M].上海:上海文艺出版社,2000.
[175]徐忠爱.基于契约规制的农村经济组织模式研究[J].经济学家,2010(2):61-69.
[176]周立群,曹利群.农村经济组织形态的演变与创新——山东省莱阳市农业产业化调查报告[J].经济研究,2001(1):69-75,83.
[177]崔宝玉.农民专业合作社治理结构与资本控制[J].改革,2010(10):109-114.
[178]张靖会.农民专业合作社效率研究——基于俱乐部理论视角的分析[D].山东大学博士学位论文.
[179]崔宝玉.农民专业合作社治理结构与资本控制[J].改革,2010(10):109-114.
[180]邵兴全.新型农民专业合作社治理结构研究——一种资本控制受约束的治理嵌入共同治理模式的探讨[J].中共成都市委党校学报,2012(3):50-54.
[181]刘洁.农民专业合作社契约选择与运营绩效的理论分析与实证研究[D].华中农业大学博士学位论文,2011.
[182]温美荣.社会资本视域下我国农民专业合作社治理机制研究[J].理论探讨.2012(12):23-26.
[183]杨瑞龙,杨其静.专用性、专有性与企业制度[J].经济研究,2001(3).
[184]帅旭.农民专业合作社内部治理的均衡性研究[J].金融发展评论,2011(10):109-119.
[185]张满林.我国农民专业合作社治理问题研究[D].北京林业大学博士论文,2009.