我国跨流域调水水权管理准市场模式研究
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摘要
跨流域调水是解决水资源短缺、用水危机的重要举措。由于自然状态下水资源时空分布不均,许多国家都修建了跨流域调水工程,在更加广阔的时空范围内寻求水资源优化配置。据不完全统计,目前世界上已建、在建或拟建的大型跨流域调水工程有160多项,遍布世界各个地区,出现了一些著名的跨流域调水工程。新中国成立后,跨流域调水工程得到了长足发展,已建或在建的跨流域调水工程主要有引滦入津工程、引黄济青工程、引大入秦工程、引碧入连工程、江水北调工程、淠史杭工程、东深工程等。正在建设的南水北调工程是我国有史以来涉及省市最多、调水量最大的跨流域调水工程,在国际上也是屈指可数的巨型调水工程之一。南水北调工程总调水量约为400亿M3,将在调水沿线建设世界上最大的水权交易市场。著名学者胡鞍钢评价说：“这是迄今世界最大的水权交易市场,它的运作标志着中国水权市场的形成。”改革开放以来,为解决缺水城市和地区的水资源紧张状况,我国修建了20多座大型跨流域调水工程。跨流域调水已经成为我国21世纪水利的一大特点。随着我国跨流域调水工程不断增多,水权管理模式研究成为客观、不容回避的问题。
论文认为,我国跨流域调水水权管理准市场模式的选择,意味着相对水权管理行政模式而言,水权管理模式是一个渐变过程,遵循了渐进式经济体制改革的道路。准市场模式有其理论基础、多元目标体系、特定管理样式、明确制度结构及运行机制,形成了一套完整的理论体系。准市场模式的构建,将为整个国家跨流域调水水权管理实践提供可操作的样本,有利于该模式得以更加快捷和有效地推行。准市场模式的关键,是积极开展水权市场建设,促进跨流域调水沿线全面节水和科学用水,实现调水资源优化配置和提高用水效率,解决调水沿线利益纷争、维护社会和谐与发展。论文各部分具体内容如下：
第一章,绪论。对论文涉及的基本概念进行界定,从水权管理模式及其分类研究出发,结合国内外跨流域调水水权管理理论研究与实践状况,做出准市场模式的选择。论文认为,国内外学者尚未专门研究跨流域调水水权管理准市场模式问题。学者们从不同视角展开对水权市场建设、跨流域调水水权管理的研究,缺乏将各要素、各组成部分集合为一种管理模式。与水权运行机制相适应,我国跨流域调水水权管理模式分为：行政模式(准行政模式)、市场模式和准市场模式。传统跨流域调水水权管理行政模式已经屡现弊端,市场模式还只是理想假设,准市场模式是基于理论和现实状况的明智选择。
第二章,跨流域调水水权管理准市场模式的理论基础。论文认为：混合经济理论揭示出政府机制和市场机制都不是完美的、但它们又是不可或缺的,两者都是经济正常运行的必要组成部分。引入市场机制,可以有效提高我国跨流域调水工程的运行效率。混合经济理论提供了跨流域调水管理引入水权市场的合理性。公共物品理论的发展,允许政府和市场联合提供准公共物品。在准公共物品的提供方式上,采取灵活多样的形式,使多元化供给成为准公共物品供给制度改革的必然方向,从而奠定了我国实现跨流域调水管理多元化供给的理论基础。产权理论承认产权可以在不同主体之间流动,产权可交易性是资源得以高效配置的前提和基础。合理的产权制度使稀缺资源得到有效配置,最终引起社会总效用增加。水权是产权理论在水资源领域的体现。我国跨流域调水管理的产权模糊状态,使调水效率降低到有必要变迁的程度。产权理论为我国跨流域调水管理引入市场机制、实现多元化供给指出了具体形式和道路。
第三章,跨流域调水水权管理准市场模式的多元目标。将经济目标、环境目标和社会目标纳入统一的跨流域调水水权管理准市场模式目标体系,并明确这一目标体系的核心要素。论文认为：经济目标是通过水权市场的建立和发展,实现调水资源的最优配置,其中最为核心的要素是构建水权市场主体、客体,建立水权市场运行机制。环境目标指调水资源在满足人们生产、生活用水需求的同时,不对流域水资源承载能力和水环境承载能力产生负面影响,确保跨流域调水水环境安全,即水量安全、水质安全、水环境安全及水战略安全。水权划分中应该包括生态水权,并在水资源规划、水资源管理中实现生态水权；水权交易过程中应该认同水的资源价值和环境价值,体现水权质与量的统一。社会目标力求使跨流域调水沿线的复杂利益关系得到协调,资源配置的最优标准不但要满足效率标准,而且要满足公平标准。公平标准的核心要素是生态补偿机制的建立。因此,跨流域调水水权管理准市场模式与传统模式的重要区别,是单一目标向多元目标的转变。在这个多元目标体系中,经济预期是合理的动机,但建立水权交易市场、提高调水活动的经济效益,不能影响水资源、环境与生态的保护,也不能破坏社会公正的实现；恰当的水权管理体系与制度,为运用市场方式实现多元目标提供了新的契机。
第四章,跨流域调水水权管理准市场模式的模型分析。通过确立我国“跨流域调水水权制度科层模型”,分析我国跨流域调水水权管理体系、制度结构和运行机制；运用博弈论的研究方法,明确水权市场的经济绩效。论文基于查林和王亚华的研究成果,确立了“跨流域调水水权制度科层模型”,指出跨流域调水工程的水权分配,表现出水权的多层次产权属性。水权分布在国有产权、区域产权、集体产权和私有产权不同层级上,各个层次的决策实体有不同的决策内容,每一类产权都受到来自上层各级产权的影响。所有水权层次构成“产权科层”系统,“产权科层”嵌套在“制度科层”之中。跨流域调水水权管理行政模式内部,科层系统中行政方式的使用成本增大,或者利用市场方式的成本减小,已经出现了引入市场的动力。在上级行政部门宏观调配的基础上,水源公司、供水公司、社会团体和私人用户根据各自偏好,通过行政或市场方式取得水权,他们分别是不同层级上的水权持有者。市场机制的引入,解决了资产所有者主体缺位问题,理顺了产权关系。市场作为配置资源的基础,使各层次水权持有者的积极性被充分调动起来,水价起到杠杆调节作用,水资源流向效益最高的地方。水源公司、供水公司有充分的自主权,自主经营、自负盈亏。他们从自身利益出发,会尽可能降低供水成本,提高水资源经营效率。中央政府试图推进水权管理的民主进程,突出用户导向,将自下而上的水权需求与自上而下的水权分配决策相结合,坚持政府的宏观调控。政府在水权初始分配、培育水权市场主体、制定水价、保护生态环境等方面发挥着重要作用。我国跨流域调水水权管理准市场模式的实质,是如何在集权与分权之间寻求有效的结合点。理性政府不会绝对依赖行政手段或任由市场进行资源配置,而是结合本国或本地区实际,使行政配置和市场机制进行不同程度与方式的优化组合。水权市场博弈分析证明了准市场模式的绩效,唯有转变水权制度,即由公共水权制度转向可交易水权制度,才能较好协调我国跨流域调水过程中的经济目标、环境目标和社会目标。
第五章,跨流域调水水权管理准市场模式的构建。在制度科层的各个层面,制度选择遵循交易成本最小化逻辑,使现实世界中多样化的制度选择得到解释；将产权相关制度赋予不同层面的决策实体,可以使调水资源管理决策的交易成本最小化。正是围绕准市场模式产权科层体系的制度结构,论文提出了构建我国跨流域调水水权管理准市场模式的对策。具体包括：(1)水权初始分配制度的改革。在跨流域调水水权市场建设过程中,政府制定合理、有效的分配政策,将水权以一定方式分配给跨流域调水沿线各用水地区。水权民主协商意味着以需定供到以供定需用水观念的变化,有利于调水沿线用水效率的提高、实现用水和谐。(2)水权市场组织制度的建设。为了促进水权市场发展,必须培育多元化的水权市场主体,水源公司、供水公司、用水户协会等都可以依法进行水权交易；水银行是水权交易的中介机构,也是政府主导和推进水权交易的重要平台。(3)水价制度的明晰。水价是调节水权市场的杠杆,不同定价方法在解决实际问题时各有所长。两部制水价在应对跨流域调水问题时更显优势,但在实施过程中还应结合其他定价方法、尤其是完全成本定价方法,对水价综合、灵活的运用。(4)生态补偿制度的完善。博弈分析证明了我国应着手变革生态补偿的方式,将市场补偿作为跨流域调水生态补偿重要组成部分。不但要积极开展横向财政转移支付、设立生态补偿基金,而且要尝试水权生态补偿等新的补偿方式,以此调动人们保护资源环境的积极性,实现经济发展与生态保护相协调的最终目的。(5)水权法律制度的健全。水权市场健康运行和发展,必须明确水权制度的法律内涵、厘定水权交易原则、并完善相关法律体系,从而为水权市场提供约束或保障。准市场模式的构建,既要发挥政府的宏观调控作用,又要积极推进水权市场建设。政府与市场在各自领域之内发挥作用,并相互协调、有效配合。
第六章,跨流域调水水权管理准市场模式的实例分析。选取正在兴建的南水北调工程、已经建成的引滦入津工程,具体分析跨流域调水水权管理准市场模式的实践。对于正在建设的南水北调工程：政府管理从中央到地方分层次展开,水权初始分配将需要筹集的资金总数按比例分摊到沿线地区；各地区在工程建设过程中缴纳所分摊的水资源费,并取得对该工程调水资源使用权。为了推进水权交易市场建设,政府在积极培育水权市场主体的过程中,应高度重视水银行的中介作用,探索与市场方式相适应的生态补偿制度。对于已经建成的引滦入津工程：水权初始分配仍然无偿进行,考虑更多传统的因素。在市场条件不断成熟后,可以尝试投资分摊等机制。水权初始分配完成之后,政府应深化管理体制改革,积极培育水权市场主体,允许供水公司、集团用户、用户,甚至大的用户协会进行水权交易；积极运用价格杠杆,制定综合水价,尽可能按照市场价值规律调节供求关系；积极开展水权生态补偿,使市场补偿成为生态补偿的重要组成部分。
第七章,研究结论与展望。总结研究结论和研究特色,指出主要创新点和研究局限,并对今后的研究进行展望。论文主要创新点是：形成了我国跨流域调水水权管理准市场模式的理论体系；确立了“跨流域调水水权制度科层模型”；通过博弈方法证明了准市场模式的绩效；明晰了水权生态补偿的运作过程。
Interbasin water transfer is an important measure to solve the shortage of water resources and water crisis. Because of the uneven time and space distribution of water resources in natural state, many countries have built the interbasin water transfer projects to seek optimal allocation of water resources in a broader sense of time and space. According to the incomplete statistics, more than160large interbasin water transfer projects have been built, under construction or proposed throughout the various regions of the world, among which there are some famous interbasin water transfer projects. After the foundation of People's Republic of China, interbasin water transfer projects have achieved a considerable growth, and some famous projects have been built or under construction, mainly including Water Diversion Project from Luan River to Tianjin, Water Diversion Project from Yellow River to Qingdao City, Water Diversion Project from Datong River to Qianchuan Basin, Water Diversion Project from Biliu River to Dalian City, Water Diversion Project from Yangtze River to the North Part of Jiangsu Province, Pi-Shi-Hang Irrigation District Project, Water Diversion Project from Dongjiang to Shenzhen and so on. The south-to-north water transfer project, being under construction is the largest water transfer engineering project which, till now, involves the most provinces and cities in China. What's more, it is one of the giant water transfer projects in the world. The total amount of south-to-north water transfer project is approximately40billon cubic meters, and the largest water right transaction market in the world will be built along the water transfer line. Hu Angang, the famous scholar, said:"This is by far the largest water right transaction market in the world, and its operation marks the formation of Chinese water right market." Since reform and opening up, to solve the scarcity of water resources in many cities and regions, China has built more than20large interbasin water transfer projects. Interbasin water transfer has become a feature of water conservancy in the21st century in China. With the rising tide of interbasin water transfer projects in China, research on water right management model has become an objective and unavoidable issue.
The paper concludes that the choice of quasi-market model for water right management in the field of interbasin water transfer in China means that in terms of water right administrative mode, the model of water right management is a continuous process, following the path of gradual economic reform. Quasi-market model has its theoretical basis, multiple—objective system, specific management style, and a clear institutional structure and operational mechanism, forming a complete theoretical system. Construction of quasi-market model, providing operable samples for water right management of interbasin water transfer in the whole country, is beneficial to its implementation more efficiently and more effectively. The keys of quasi-market model are active construction of water right market and promotion of comprehensive water conservation and scientific water-usage along the line of interbasin water transfer so as to achieve an optimal allocation of water resources, improve water usage efficiency, settle interest disputes along the line of water transfer, and maintain social harmony and development. The chapters of this paper are as follows:
Chapter1, Introduction. This chapter defines the basic concepts involved in the paper, and makes the choice of quasi-market model from the prospective of water right management model and its classifications as well as theory and practice of water right management associated with interbasin water transfer situation at home and abroad. The paper suggests that scholars at home and abroad have not been specializing quasi-market model for water right management in the Field of Interbasin water transfer. Scholars from different perspectives set about studying the water right market building and the water right management of interbasin water transfer without taking each part and element as a whole. To suit the operational mechanism of water right, the water right management model of interbasin water transfer in China have been divided into four parts, i.e. administrative model(quasi-administrative model), market model and quasi-market model. Traditional administrative model of interbasin water transfer has shown the disadvantages, on the other hand, market model is just an ideal hypothesis. In this way, quasi-market model based on the theory and reality is a wise choice.
Chapter2, The Theoretical Basis of Quasi-market Model of Water Right Management in the Field of Interbasin Water Transfer. The paper says that mixed economy theory reveals that government and market mechanisms are not perfect, but they are indispensable, both of which are integral to get the economy running. The introduction of market mechanism can effectively improve the efficiency of operation of interbasin water transfer project in China. Mixed economic theory provides the rationality of water right market introduced by the interbasin water transfer management. The development of public goods theory allows the joint supply of quasi-public goods by the government and market. In terms of quasi-public goods supply methods, the flexible forms makes diversified supply a necessity of the reform direction of quasi-public goods supply system, thus laying the theoretical basis of the diversified supply of interbasin water transfer management in China. The property right theory allows that the property right can flow between different subjects. Therefore, transaction of property right is a prerequisite and foundation for an efficient allocation of resources. A reasonable property right system enables the efficient allocation of scarce resources, eventually increases total social utility. Water right is an embodiment of the property right theory in the field of water resources. Fuzzy state of property right of interbasin water transfer management in China, lowering the efficiency of water transfer, makes it necessary to change. The property right theory points out the specific forms and roads for the introduction of market mechanism and the realization of diversified supply of interbasin water transfer management in China.
Chapter3, The multiple-target of Quasi-market Model for Water Right Management in the Field of Chinese Interbasin Water Transfer. It is necessary to incorporate economic objectives, environmental and social objectives into a coherent target system of quasi-market model for water right management in the field of Chinese interbasin Water Transfer and to make clear the core element of the target system. The paper suggests that the economic goal is to achieve an optimal allocation of water resources through the establishment and development of water right market, among which the most important element is the construction of the subject and object of water right market and the establishment of operation mechanism of water right market. Environmental objectives refer that water transfer resources can meet the demands of people in daily life and production, at the same time have no negative impacts on carrying capacity of water resources and water environment, ensuring water environmental safety of interbasin water transfer, that is, safety of water quantity and water quality, safety of water environment and water strategy. The division of water right should include the ecological water right which should be implemented in water resource planning and water resource management. In the process of water right transaction, we should identify resource value and environment value of water, realizing the unity of quality and quantity of water right. Social goals seek to coordinate the complex interests along the line of interbasin water transfer. The best standard of resource allocation is to meet not only efficiency but also equity. The core element of equity is the foundation of ecological compensation mechanism. So, the big difference between traditional model and quasi-market model for water right managemen in the field of interbasin water transfer is the change from a single target to multiple targets. In the multiple—target system, the economy expectancy is a reasonable motive, but the establishment of water right transaction market and the increase of economic benefits of water transfer activities must not affect the protection of water resources, environment and ecology, and undermine the realization of social justice. Appropriate system of water right management provides new ways to achieve multiple—target by way of market.
The fourth chapter, The Model Analysis of the Quasi-market model for water right management in the field of interbasin water transfer. By establishing "the bureaucratic level model for water right of interbasin water transfer", we can analyze the management system, institutional structure and operational mechanism of water right in the field of Chinese interbasin water transfer. With the research method of game theory, we can figure out the economic performance of the water right market. Based on the research findings of Cha Lin and Wang Yahua, in this paper, the writer establishes "the bureaucratic level model for water right of interbasin water transfer" which points out the distribution of the water right in the interbasin water transfer project and displays the nature of multi-level property right of water right. Water right is scattered in property right of different levels, including state-owned property right, district-owned property right, collective property right and private property right. Decision-making entities of different levels have different decision-making responsibilities and property right of each level is under the influence of upper levels of property right. The "bureaucracy of property right" consists of all the property right levels of water right and is embedded in the "system bureaucracy". Inside the management model for the water right of the interbasin water transfer, the increasing administration cost of the bureaucratic system or the decreasing cost of the market method has given rise to the impetus of introducing market mechanism. According to the macroscopic allocation of the superior administrative unit, waterhead companies, water supply companies, social organizations and private users obtain water right through ways of administration or market in line with their preferences. They are the holders of water right in different levels, who are all mobilized by the introduction of the market mechanism which also solves the problem of subject vacancy among asset owners and straightens out the property relations. As the base of resource allocation, the market mobilizes all the water right holders in different levels, thus the water price plays the role of leveraging, which impels the water resource to the most benefited place. Waterhead companies and water supply companies have full autonomy to make their own managerial decisions and take responsibilities for their profits and losses. They will reduce the cost of supplying water and improve the operation efficiency of water resources as far as possible in consideration of their own interests. The central government is trying to promote the democratic process in the management of water right, which highlights the user-orientation, combines the bottom-up demand for water right and the top-down water right allocation, at the same time adheres to the government's macro-control. The government plays an important role in the initial allocation of water right, the cultivation of the market players for the water right, the formulation of water price and the protection of ecological environment. To seek an effective combination between centralization and decentralization is the essence of the quasi-market model for water right management of Chinese interbasin water transfer. A rational government will not rely on administrative means or let the market allocate the resource at its convenience. Instead, it will optimize the combination of the administrative allocation and the market mechanism to various degrees and in different ways with an overall consideration of national or local reality. The game analysis of the water right market demonstrates the performance of the quasi-market model. Therefore, in order to better coordinate the economic goals, environmental goals and social objectives during the interbasin water transfer process of our country, the system of water right must be transformed, specifically, from public system of water right to tradable water right system.
The fifth chapter, The Structure of the Quasi-market Model for Water Right Management in the Field of Interbasin Water Transfer. At all levels of the system bureaucracy, the system follows the logic of minimal transaction cost, which offers explanation for diverse choices of system in real world. Through entrusting systems which are related to property right to different levels of decision-making entities, they will minimize the transaction cost of the management decisions for the transferred water resource. It is based on the system structure of property right bureaucracy of the quasi-market model that the paper presents the countermeasures of building the quasi-market model for the water right management in the field of Chinese interbasin water transfer. Namely, first, the reformation of initial water right allocation. In the constructing process of water right market for interbasin water transfer, the government will formulate a reasonable and effective distribution policy, by which, the water right will be allocated to water use areas along the line of water transfer in certain way. The democratic consultation of water right signifies a change of concept, from demand-decided to supply-decided, which will be conducive to the efficiency and harmony of water use areas along the water transfer line. Second, the establishment of the organizational system for water right market. In order to advance the development of the water right market, a wide range of market players must be cultivated. Waterhead companies, water' supply companies and water consumer associations are able to make water right transactions in conformity with law provisions. Water bank will become the intermediary of water right transactions and also the major platform for the government to lead and promote water right transactions. Third, the clarity of the water pricing system. Water price is a lever to adjust the water right market, and different pricing systems have their own strengths in solving practical problems. The two-part water price has an advantage in response to the problems of interbasin water transfer, but other pricing methods should also be combined with in the implementation process, especially the full-cost pricing method, so as to achieve integrated and flexible use of water price. Fourth, the improvement of the ecological compensation system. The game analysis makes it clear that China should proceed to change the way of ecological compensation and make market compensation an important part of ecological compensation for interbasin water transfer. It should not only actively conduct lateral transfer payment from the exchequer and establish ecological compensation fund, but also try new compensation methods like water right ecological compensation. In this way, it can mobilize people to protect the resources and the environment so as to achieve the ultimate goal of coordinated economic development and ecological protection. Fifth, the improvement of legal system of water right. The healthy operation and development of water right market rely on unambiguous legal connotation of water right system, stipulated trading principles of water right and improvement of relevant legal system, which provide constrains and guarantee for the water right market. To build the quasi-market model, the government's role of macro-control should be fully played while the construction of water right market should also be promoted. The government and the market play roles in their respective fields with effective coordination and cooperation.
The sixth chapter, Case Analysis of Quasi-market Model for Water Right Management in the Field of Interbasin Water Transfer. Take the South-to-North water transfer project which is under construction and the Luan River to Tianjin which has been completed as examples, the dissertation makes a concrete analysis of the practice of the quasi-market model for water right management in the field of interbasin water transfer. With regard to the South-to-North water diversion project under construction, the government's management hierarchically expands from the central to the local. The total number of funds in need is apportioned to the regions along during the initial water right allocation. The regions pay the water resources fee of their part during the constructing process and obtain the right to use the transferred water resource of the project. To promote the construction of water right trading market, the government should attach great importance to the intermediary role of the water bank and to explore the ecological compensation system compatible with the market when actively cultivating water right market players. As to the Luan River to Tianjin Engineering that has already been built, the initial water right allocation is still unpaid, which takes more traditional factors into consideration. When the market condition becomes mature, it can attempt investment apportion and other mechanisms. When the initial allocation of water right is completed, the government should deepen the structural reform of management, allowing water supply companies, group consumers, or large user associations to trade water right. Besides, it should make the best of the price lever so as to formulate an integrated water price, and regulate supply-demand relations in accordance with the law of market value as far as possible. It should also vigorously carry out water right ecological compensation and make market compensation an important part of the ecological compensation.
The seventh chapter, Research Conclusions and Outlook. This part presents a summary of the research findings and specialties, points out the main innovations and research limitations, and also makes prospects for future research. The innovations of this dissertation include:formulating a theoretical framework of quasi-market model for the water right management in the field of Chinese interbasin water transfer, establishing the "bureaucratic model of water right system in the field of interbasin water transfer", demonstrating the performance of quasi-market model through game analysis, and clarifying the operation process of water right ecological compensation.
论文认为,我国跨流域调水水权管理准市场模式的选择,意味着相对水权管理行政模式而言,水权管理模式是一个渐变过程,遵循了渐进式经济体制改革的道路。准市场模式有其理论基础、多元目标体系、特定管理样式、明确制度结构及运行机制,形成了一套完整的理论体系。准市场模式的构建,将为整个国家跨流域调水水权管理实践提供可操作的样本,有利于该模式得以更加快捷和有效地推行。准市场模式的关键,是积极开展水权市场建设,促进跨流域调水沿线全面节水和科学用水,实现调水资源优化配置和提高用水效率,解决调水沿线利益纷争、维护社会和谐与发展。论文各部分具体内容如下：
第一章,绪论。对论文涉及的基本概念进行界定,从水权管理模式及其分类研究出发,结合国内外跨流域调水水权管理理论研究与实践状况,做出准市场模式的选择。论文认为,国内外学者尚未专门研究跨流域调水水权管理准市场模式问题。学者们从不同视角展开对水权市场建设、跨流域调水水权管理的研究,缺乏将各要素、各组成部分集合为一种管理模式。与水权运行机制相适应,我国跨流域调水水权管理模式分为：行政模式(准行政模式)、市场模式和准市场模式。传统跨流域调水水权管理行政模式已经屡现弊端,市场模式还只是理想假设,准市场模式是基于理论和现实状况的明智选择。
第二章,跨流域调水水权管理准市场模式的理论基础。论文认为：混合经济理论揭示出政府机制和市场机制都不是完美的、但它们又是不可或缺的,两者都是经济正常运行的必要组成部分。引入市场机制,可以有效提高我国跨流域调水工程的运行效率。混合经济理论提供了跨流域调水管理引入水权市场的合理性。公共物品理论的发展,允许政府和市场联合提供准公共物品。在准公共物品的提供方式上,采取灵活多样的形式,使多元化供给成为准公共物品供给制度改革的必然方向,从而奠定了我国实现跨流域调水管理多元化供给的理论基础。产权理论承认产权可以在不同主体之间流动,产权可交易性是资源得以高效配置的前提和基础。合理的产权制度使稀缺资源得到有效配置,最终引起社会总效用增加。水权是产权理论在水资源领域的体现。我国跨流域调水管理的产权模糊状态,使调水效率降低到有必要变迁的程度。产权理论为我国跨流域调水管理引入市场机制、实现多元化供给指出了具体形式和道路。
第三章,跨流域调水水权管理准市场模式的多元目标。将经济目标、环境目标和社会目标纳入统一的跨流域调水水权管理准市场模式目标体系,并明确这一目标体系的核心要素。论文认为：经济目标是通过水权市场的建立和发展,实现调水资源的最优配置,其中最为核心的要素是构建水权市场主体、客体,建立水权市场运行机制。环境目标指调水资源在满足人们生产、生活用水需求的同时,不对流域水资源承载能力和水环境承载能力产生负面影响,确保跨流域调水水环境安全,即水量安全、水质安全、水环境安全及水战略安全。水权划分中应该包括生态水权,并在水资源规划、水资源管理中实现生态水权；水权交易过程中应该认同水的资源价值和环境价值,体现水权质与量的统一。社会目标力求使跨流域调水沿线的复杂利益关系得到协调,资源配置的最优标准不但要满足效率标准,而且要满足公平标准。公平标准的核心要素是生态补偿机制的建立。因此,跨流域调水水权管理准市场模式与传统模式的重要区别,是单一目标向多元目标的转变。在这个多元目标体系中,经济预期是合理的动机,但建立水权交易市场、提高调水活动的经济效益,不能影响水资源、环境与生态的保护,也不能破坏社会公正的实现；恰当的水权管理体系与制度,为运用市场方式实现多元目标提供了新的契机。
第四章,跨流域调水水权管理准市场模式的模型分析。通过确立我国“跨流域调水水权制度科层模型”,分析我国跨流域调水水权管理体系、制度结构和运行机制；运用博弈论的研究方法,明确水权市场的经济绩效。论文基于查林和王亚华的研究成果,确立了“跨流域调水水权制度科层模型”,指出跨流域调水工程的水权分配,表现出水权的多层次产权属性。水权分布在国有产权、区域产权、集体产权和私有产权不同层级上,各个层次的决策实体有不同的决策内容,每一类产权都受到来自上层各级产权的影响。所有水权层次构成“产权科层”系统,“产权科层”嵌套在“制度科层”之中。跨流域调水水权管理行政模式内部,科层系统中行政方式的使用成本增大,或者利用市场方式的成本减小,已经出现了引入市场的动力。在上级行政部门宏观调配的基础上,水源公司、供水公司、社会团体和私人用户根据各自偏好,通过行政或市场方式取得水权,他们分别是不同层级上的水权持有者。市场机制的引入,解决了资产所有者主体缺位问题,理顺了产权关系。市场作为配置资源的基础,使各层次水权持有者的积极性被充分调动起来,水价起到杠杆调节作用,水资源流向效益最高的地方。水源公司、供水公司有充分的自主权,自主经营、自负盈亏。他们从自身利益出发,会尽可能降低供水成本,提高水资源经营效率。中央政府试图推进水权管理的民主进程,突出用户导向,将自下而上的水权需求与自上而下的水权分配决策相结合,坚持政府的宏观调控。政府在水权初始分配、培育水权市场主体、制定水价、保护生态环境等方面发挥着重要作用。我国跨流域调水水权管理准市场模式的实质,是如何在集权与分权之间寻求有效的结合点。理性政府不会绝对依赖行政手段或任由市场进行资源配置,而是结合本国或本地区实际,使行政配置和市场机制进行不同程度与方式的优化组合。水权市场博弈分析证明了准市场模式的绩效,唯有转变水权制度,即由公共水权制度转向可交易水权制度,才能较好协调我国跨流域调水过程中的经济目标、环境目标和社会目标。
第五章,跨流域调水水权管理准市场模式的构建。在制度科层的各个层面,制度选择遵循交易成本最小化逻辑,使现实世界中多样化的制度选择得到解释；将产权相关制度赋予不同层面的决策实体,可以使调水资源管理决策的交易成本最小化。正是围绕准市场模式产权科层体系的制度结构,论文提出了构建我国跨流域调水水权管理准市场模式的对策。具体包括：(1)水权初始分配制度的改革。在跨流域调水水权市场建设过程中,政府制定合理、有效的分配政策,将水权以一定方式分配给跨流域调水沿线各用水地区。水权民主协商意味着以需定供到以供定需用水观念的变化,有利于调水沿线用水效率的提高、实现用水和谐。(2)水权市场组织制度的建设。为了促进水权市场发展,必须培育多元化的水权市场主体,水源公司、供水公司、用水户协会等都可以依法进行水权交易；水银行是水权交易的中介机构,也是政府主导和推进水权交易的重要平台。(3)水价制度的明晰。水价是调节水权市场的杠杆,不同定价方法在解决实际问题时各有所长。两部制水价在应对跨流域调水问题时更显优势,但在实施过程中还应结合其他定价方法、尤其是完全成本定价方法,对水价综合、灵活的运用。(4)生态补偿制度的完善。博弈分析证明了我国应着手变革生态补偿的方式,将市场补偿作为跨流域调水生态补偿重要组成部分。不但要积极开展横向财政转移支付、设立生态补偿基金,而且要尝试水权生态补偿等新的补偿方式,以此调动人们保护资源环境的积极性,实现经济发展与生态保护相协调的最终目的。(5)水权法律制度的健全。水权市场健康运行和发展,必须明确水权制度的法律内涵、厘定水权交易原则、并完善相关法律体系,从而为水权市场提供约束或保障。准市场模式的构建,既要发挥政府的宏观调控作用,又要积极推进水权市场建设。政府与市场在各自领域之内发挥作用,并相互协调、有效配合。
第六章,跨流域调水水权管理准市场模式的实例分析。选取正在兴建的南水北调工程、已经建成的引滦入津工程,具体分析跨流域调水水权管理准市场模式的实践。对于正在建设的南水北调工程：政府管理从中央到地方分层次展开,水权初始分配将需要筹集的资金总数按比例分摊到沿线地区；各地区在工程建设过程中缴纳所分摊的水资源费,并取得对该工程调水资源使用权。为了推进水权交易市场建设,政府在积极培育水权市场主体的过程中,应高度重视水银行的中介作用,探索与市场方式相适应的生态补偿制度。对于已经建成的引滦入津工程：水权初始分配仍然无偿进行,考虑更多传统的因素。在市场条件不断成熟后,可以尝试投资分摊等机制。水权初始分配完成之后,政府应深化管理体制改革,积极培育水权市场主体,允许供水公司、集团用户、用户,甚至大的用户协会进行水权交易；积极运用价格杠杆,制定综合水价,尽可能按照市场价值规律调节供求关系；积极开展水权生态补偿,使市场补偿成为生态补偿的重要组成部分。
第七章,研究结论与展望。总结研究结论和研究特色,指出主要创新点和研究局限,并对今后的研究进行展望。论文主要创新点是：形成了我国跨流域调水水权管理准市场模式的理论体系；确立了“跨流域调水水权制度科层模型”；通过博弈方法证明了准市场模式的绩效；明晰了水权生态补偿的运作过程。
Interbasin water transfer is an important measure to solve the shortage of water resources and water crisis. Because of the uneven time and space distribution of water resources in natural state, many countries have built the interbasin water transfer projects to seek optimal allocation of water resources in a broader sense of time and space. According to the incomplete statistics, more than160large interbasin water transfer projects have been built, under construction or proposed throughout the various regions of the world, among which there are some famous interbasin water transfer projects. After the foundation of People's Republic of China, interbasin water transfer projects have achieved a considerable growth, and some famous projects have been built or under construction, mainly including Water Diversion Project from Luan River to Tianjin, Water Diversion Project from Yellow River to Qingdao City, Water Diversion Project from Datong River to Qianchuan Basin, Water Diversion Project from Biliu River to Dalian City, Water Diversion Project from Yangtze River to the North Part of Jiangsu Province, Pi-Shi-Hang Irrigation District Project, Water Diversion Project from Dongjiang to Shenzhen and so on. The south-to-north water transfer project, being under construction is the largest water transfer engineering project which, till now, involves the most provinces and cities in China. What's more, it is one of the giant water transfer projects in the world. The total amount of south-to-north water transfer project is approximately40billon cubic meters, and the largest water right transaction market in the world will be built along the water transfer line. Hu Angang, the famous scholar, said:"This is by far the largest water right transaction market in the world, and its operation marks the formation of Chinese water right market." Since reform and opening up, to solve the scarcity of water resources in many cities and regions, China has built more than20large interbasin water transfer projects. Interbasin water transfer has become a feature of water conservancy in the21st century in China. With the rising tide of interbasin water transfer projects in China, research on water right management model has become an objective and unavoidable issue.
The paper concludes that the choice of quasi-market model for water right management in the field of interbasin water transfer in China means that in terms of water right administrative mode, the model of water right management is a continuous process, following the path of gradual economic reform. Quasi-market model has its theoretical basis, multiple—objective system, specific management style, and a clear institutional structure and operational mechanism, forming a complete theoretical system. Construction of quasi-market model, providing operable samples for water right management of interbasin water transfer in the whole country, is beneficial to its implementation more efficiently and more effectively. The keys of quasi-market model are active construction of water right market and promotion of comprehensive water conservation and scientific water-usage along the line of interbasin water transfer so as to achieve an optimal allocation of water resources, improve water usage efficiency, settle interest disputes along the line of water transfer, and maintain social harmony and development. The chapters of this paper are as follows:
Chapter1, Introduction. This chapter defines the basic concepts involved in the paper, and makes the choice of quasi-market model from the prospective of water right management model and its classifications as well as theory and practice of water right management associated with interbasin water transfer situation at home and abroad. The paper suggests that scholars at home and abroad have not been specializing quasi-market model for water right management in the Field of Interbasin water transfer. Scholars from different perspectives set about studying the water right market building and the water right management of interbasin water transfer without taking each part and element as a whole. To suit the operational mechanism of water right, the water right management model of interbasin water transfer in China have been divided into four parts, i.e. administrative model(quasi-administrative model), market model and quasi-market model. Traditional administrative model of interbasin water transfer has shown the disadvantages, on the other hand, market model is just an ideal hypothesis. In this way, quasi-market model based on the theory and reality is a wise choice.
Chapter2, The Theoretical Basis of Quasi-market Model of Water Right Management in the Field of Interbasin Water Transfer. The paper says that mixed economy theory reveals that government and market mechanisms are not perfect, but they are indispensable, both of which are integral to get the economy running. The introduction of market mechanism can effectively improve the efficiency of operation of interbasin water transfer project in China. Mixed economic theory provides the rationality of water right market introduced by the interbasin water transfer management. The development of public goods theory allows the joint supply of quasi-public goods by the government and market. In terms of quasi-public goods supply methods, the flexible forms makes diversified supply a necessity of the reform direction of quasi-public goods supply system, thus laying the theoretical basis of the diversified supply of interbasin water transfer management in China. The property right theory allows that the property right can flow between different subjects. Therefore, transaction of property right is a prerequisite and foundation for an efficient allocation of resources. A reasonable property right system enables the efficient allocation of scarce resources, eventually increases total social utility. Water right is an embodiment of the property right theory in the field of water resources. Fuzzy state of property right of interbasin water transfer management in China, lowering the efficiency of water transfer, makes it necessary to change. The property right theory points out the specific forms and roads for the introduction of market mechanism and the realization of diversified supply of interbasin water transfer management in China.
Chapter3, The multiple-target of Quasi-market Model for Water Right Management in the Field of Chinese Interbasin Water Transfer. It is necessary to incorporate economic objectives, environmental and social objectives into a coherent target system of quasi-market model for water right management in the field of Chinese interbasin Water Transfer and to make clear the core element of the target system. The paper suggests that the economic goal is to achieve an optimal allocation of water resources through the establishment and development of water right market, among which the most important element is the construction of the subject and object of water right market and the establishment of operation mechanism of water right market. Environmental objectives refer that water transfer resources can meet the demands of people in daily life and production, at the same time have no negative impacts on carrying capacity of water resources and water environment, ensuring water environmental safety of interbasin water transfer, that is, safety of water quantity and water quality, safety of water environment and water strategy. The division of water right should include the ecological water right which should be implemented in water resource planning and water resource management. In the process of water right transaction, we should identify resource value and environment value of water, realizing the unity of quality and quantity of water right. Social goals seek to coordinate the complex interests along the line of interbasin water transfer. The best standard of resource allocation is to meet not only efficiency but also equity. The core element of equity is the foundation of ecological compensation mechanism. So, the big difference between traditional model and quasi-market model for water right managemen in the field of interbasin water transfer is the change from a single target to multiple targets. In the multiple—target system, the economy expectancy is a reasonable motive, but the establishment of water right transaction market and the increase of economic benefits of water transfer activities must not affect the protection of water resources, environment and ecology, and undermine the realization of social justice. Appropriate system of water right management provides new ways to achieve multiple—target by way of market.
The fourth chapter, The Model Analysis of the Quasi-market model for water right management in the field of interbasin water transfer. By establishing "the bureaucratic level model for water right of interbasin water transfer", we can analyze the management system, institutional structure and operational mechanism of water right in the field of Chinese interbasin water transfer. With the research method of game theory, we can figure out the economic performance of the water right market. Based on the research findings of Cha Lin and Wang Yahua, in this paper, the writer establishes "the bureaucratic level model for water right of interbasin water transfer" which points out the distribution of the water right in the interbasin water transfer project and displays the nature of multi-level property right of water right. Water right is scattered in property right of different levels, including state-owned property right, district-owned property right, collective property right and private property right. Decision-making entities of different levels have different decision-making responsibilities and property right of each level is under the influence of upper levels of property right. The "bureaucracy of property right" consists of all the property right levels of water right and is embedded in the "system bureaucracy". Inside the management model for the water right of the interbasin water transfer, the increasing administration cost of the bureaucratic system or the decreasing cost of the market method has given rise to the impetus of introducing market mechanism. According to the macroscopic allocation of the superior administrative unit, waterhead companies, water supply companies, social organizations and private users obtain water right through ways of administration or market in line with their preferences. They are the holders of water right in different levels, who are all mobilized by the introduction of the market mechanism which also solves the problem of subject vacancy among asset owners and straightens out the property relations. As the base of resource allocation, the market mobilizes all the water right holders in different levels, thus the water price plays the role of leveraging, which impels the water resource to the most benefited place. Waterhead companies and water supply companies have full autonomy to make their own managerial decisions and take responsibilities for their profits and losses. They will reduce the cost of supplying water and improve the operation efficiency of water resources as far as possible in consideration of their own interests. The central government is trying to promote the democratic process in the management of water right, which highlights the user-orientation, combines the bottom-up demand for water right and the top-down water right allocation, at the same time adheres to the government's macro-control. The government plays an important role in the initial allocation of water right, the cultivation of the market players for the water right, the formulation of water price and the protection of ecological environment. To seek an effective combination between centralization and decentralization is the essence of the quasi-market model for water right management of Chinese interbasin water transfer. A rational government will not rely on administrative means or let the market allocate the resource at its convenience. Instead, it will optimize the combination of the administrative allocation and the market mechanism to various degrees and in different ways with an overall consideration of national or local reality. The game analysis of the water right market demonstrates the performance of the quasi-market model. Therefore, in order to better coordinate the economic goals, environmental goals and social objectives during the interbasin water transfer process of our country, the system of water right must be transformed, specifically, from public system of water right to tradable water right system.
The fifth chapter, The Structure of the Quasi-market Model for Water Right Management in the Field of Interbasin Water Transfer. At all levels of the system bureaucracy, the system follows the logic of minimal transaction cost, which offers explanation for diverse choices of system in real world. Through entrusting systems which are related to property right to different levels of decision-making entities, they will minimize the transaction cost of the management decisions for the transferred water resource. It is based on the system structure of property right bureaucracy of the quasi-market model that the paper presents the countermeasures of building the quasi-market model for the water right management in the field of Chinese interbasin water transfer. Namely, first, the reformation of initial water right allocation. In the constructing process of water right market for interbasin water transfer, the government will formulate a reasonable and effective distribution policy, by which, the water right will be allocated to water use areas along the line of water transfer in certain way. The democratic consultation of water right signifies a change of concept, from demand-decided to supply-decided, which will be conducive to the efficiency and harmony of water use areas along the water transfer line. Second, the establishment of the organizational system for water right market. In order to advance the development of the water right market, a wide range of market players must be cultivated. Waterhead companies, water' supply companies and water consumer associations are able to make water right transactions in conformity with law provisions. Water bank will become the intermediary of water right transactions and also the major platform for the government to lead and promote water right transactions. Third, the clarity of the water pricing system. Water price is a lever to adjust the water right market, and different pricing systems have their own strengths in solving practical problems. The two-part water price has an advantage in response to the problems of interbasin water transfer, but other pricing methods should also be combined with in the implementation process, especially the full-cost pricing method, so as to achieve integrated and flexible use of water price. Fourth, the improvement of the ecological compensation system. The game analysis makes it clear that China should proceed to change the way of ecological compensation and make market compensation an important part of ecological compensation for interbasin water transfer. It should not only actively conduct lateral transfer payment from the exchequer and establish ecological compensation fund, but also try new compensation methods like water right ecological compensation. In this way, it can mobilize people to protect the resources and the environment so as to achieve the ultimate goal of coordinated economic development and ecological protection. Fifth, the improvement of legal system of water right. The healthy operation and development of water right market rely on unambiguous legal connotation of water right system, stipulated trading principles of water right and improvement of relevant legal system, which provide constrains and guarantee for the water right market. To build the quasi-market model, the government's role of macro-control should be fully played while the construction of water right market should also be promoted. The government and the market play roles in their respective fields with effective coordination and cooperation.
The sixth chapter, Case Analysis of Quasi-market Model for Water Right Management in the Field of Interbasin Water Transfer. Take the South-to-North water transfer project which is under construction and the Luan River to Tianjin which has been completed as examples, the dissertation makes a concrete analysis of the practice of the quasi-market model for water right management in the field of interbasin water transfer. With regard to the South-to-North water diversion project under construction, the government's management hierarchically expands from the central to the local. The total number of funds in need is apportioned to the regions along during the initial water right allocation. The regions pay the water resources fee of their part during the constructing process and obtain the right to use the transferred water resource of the project. To promote the construction of water right trading market, the government should attach great importance to the intermediary role of the water bank and to explore the ecological compensation system compatible with the market when actively cultivating water right market players. As to the Luan River to Tianjin Engineering that has already been built, the initial water right allocation is still unpaid, which takes more traditional factors into consideration. When the market condition becomes mature, it can attempt investment apportion and other mechanisms. When the initial allocation of water right is completed, the government should deepen the structural reform of management, allowing water supply companies, group consumers, or large user associations to trade water right. Besides, it should make the best of the price lever so as to formulate an integrated water price, and regulate supply-demand relations in accordance with the law of market value as far as possible. It should also vigorously carry out water right ecological compensation and make market compensation an important part of the ecological compensation.
The seventh chapter, Research Conclusions and Outlook. This part presents a summary of the research findings and specialties, points out the main innovations and research limitations, and also makes prospects for future research. The innovations of this dissertation include:formulating a theoretical framework of quasi-market model for the water right management in the field of Chinese interbasin water transfer, establishing the "bureaucratic model of water right system in the field of interbasin water transfer", demonstrating the performance of quasi-market model through game analysis, and clarifying the operation process of water right ecological compensation.
引文
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