城镇水务项目特许经营权拍卖机制研究
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摘要
城镇水务是国民经济中最重要的基础设施产业之一,是维系经济社会可持续发展以及协调生活、生产与生态三者之间动态关系的重要保障,是加快城镇化进程整体规划体系的重要组成部分。自2002年底中国开始确立特许经营为城镇水务市场化改革的重要制度以来,城镇水务获得快速发展。但在特许经营过程中,由于特许经营权拍卖机制缺失或不健全,一些城镇水务的特许经营项目开始背离社会福利最大化目标。因此,如何结合城镇水务项目特征和改革目标,分类设计特许经营权拍卖机制,成为现时期摆在政府主管部门面前亟待解决的现实问题,同时也是推动城镇水务快速发展、适应城镇化和工业化进程的客观需求。
基于城镇水务的技术经济特征,在对城镇水务特许经营的现状及其问题进行分析的基础上,本文选择城镇水务BOT项目、TOT项目以及委托运营项目作为研究对象,分别构建参与约束和激励相容约束下的社会福利最大化问题,分类设计不同模式下的城镇水务项目的特许经营权拍卖机制,并验证了机制有效性。同时,分析典型案例,并总结出特许经营权拍卖过程中存在的主要问题。最后,提出城镇水务特许经营权拍卖机制实施的主要措施。特许经营权拍卖机制设计,能够为不同模式城镇水务项目的特许经营权拍卖提供指导,同时能够完善城镇水务项目固有的特许经营权拍卖机制,因此,本文研究具有重要的理论意义和现实意义。
本文主要研究工作如下：
一、分析城镇水务特许经营的客观需求与基本现状
本文在分析城镇水务技术经济特征的基础上,从传统行政授予制度的弊端出发,释析出推行特许经营制度的现实需求。同时,在分析近20年中国城镇水务特许经营项目的基础上,归纳出城镇水务特许经营的三阶段特征,并从法律地位较低、规范性不强、政府规制缺失三个方面对城镇水务项目在特许经营过程中存在的问题进行分析。归根结底,特许经营权拍卖机制缺失或不健全导致一些次优或无效率的企业进入城镇水务行业,降低整个行业的运营效率和服务水平,是现时期城镇水务特许经营项目亟待解决的现实问题。
二、设计城镇水务BOT项目的特许经营权拍卖机制
由于城镇水务主要涉及供水和污水处理两个行业,同时,供水和污水处理BOT项目之间是存在差异的,基于此,本部分设计竞拍(质量,特许经营期)和竞拍(价格,特许经营期)的两类特许经营权拍卖机制,同时验证机制的有效性。其中,对于在特许经营权拍卖前已知价格的新建项目而言,可以通过竞拍(质量,特许经营期)的特许经营权拍卖机制来实现特许经营权的归属；对于在特许经营权拍卖前规定运营企业的最低质量属性,但价格未知的新建项目而言,可以选择竞拍(价格,特许经营期)的机制来实现特许经营权的优化配置。两类特许经营权拍卖机制不仅能够诱导企业真实地披露自身的经营能力,还能够提高城镇水务规制者对水务设施的配置效率。
三、设计城镇水务TOT项目的特许经营权拍卖机制
在考虑城镇供水和污水处理行业之间差异性以及同行业不同项目之间异质性的基础上,本部分基于社会福利最大化目标,考虑竞拍企业的参与约束和激励相容约束,构建竞拍(质量,转让价格)和竞拍(价格)的两类特许经营权拍卖机制,这两类特许经营权拍卖机制不仅能够诱导企业真实披露自身信息,而且能够提高城镇水务规制者对水务设施的配置效率。其中,对于特许经营权拍卖前价格已知的城镇水务TOT项目而言,可以通过竞拍(质量,转让价格)的特许经营权拍卖机制来决定特许经营权的归属；对于特许经营权拍卖前价格未知的城镇水务TOT项目,可以在规定企业竞拍标准的前提下,选择竞拍(价格)的特许经营权拍卖机制,来实现城镇水务TOT项目特许经营权的优化配置。
四、设计城镇水务委托运营项目的特许经营权拍卖机制
基于城镇水务委托运营项目的特点,同时考虑特许经营权拍卖前价格是否已知,本部分分别设计竞拍(质量)以及竞拍(价格)的两类特许经营权拍卖机制,这两类机制能够激励竞拍企业披露真实成本信息和显示自身效率类型,从而能够将项目的特许经营权分配给最有效率的企业。其中,对于在特许经营权拍卖前价格已知的项目,不能将价格作为特许经营权拍卖机制的重要变量,因此可以在一定的条件下,通过竞拍(质量)的特许经营权拍卖机制来决定特许经营权的归属。相反,对于在特许经营权拍卖前尚未确定价格的城镇水务委托运营项目,可以在规定竞拍企业进入条件的基础上,通过竞拍(价格)的特许经营权拍卖机制来决定特许经营权的归属。
相比已有研究成果,本文可能的增量贡献主要有：
第一,分析得出了城镇水务项目特许经营无效运营的重要原因。
相对于传统行政授予制度,特许经营制度具有一定的优势,但在现实中特许经营项目往往通过邀请竞拍、行政授予等方式来选择运营企业,即缺乏竞拍过程,或在特许经营权拍卖机制中忽视特许经营期以及一些关键变量,增加了项目实施过程中的道德风险和逆向选择程度。综上所述,我们分析出尚未应用特许经营权拍卖以及特许经营权拍卖机制缺失或不健全是一些特许经营项目中出现固定回报或变相固定回报、不具备供水或污水处理能力的企业无效率运营的原因。
第二,构建了BOT模式、TOT模式和委托运营模式下的城镇水务项目特许经营权拍卖机制。
本文从城镇水务的技术经济特征出发,选择BOT、TOT以及委托运营模式下的城镇水务项目作为研究对象,基于拍卖理论与机制设计理论,分别构建竞拍(质量,特许经营期)、竞拍(价格,特许经营期)的城镇水务BOT项目特许经营权拍卖机制；竞拍(质量,转让价格)、竞拍(价格)的城镇水务TOT项目特许经营权拍卖机制；竞拍(价格)和竞拍(质量)的城镇水务委托运营项目的特许经营权拍卖机制,同时验证了各类机制的有效性。
第三,优化了传统特许经营权拍卖理论对特许经营企业的选择原则。
早在1968年Demsetz就提出特许经营企业的选择原则,即在满足一定质量标准下依据成本最低原则选择特许经营企业。由于实际项目与经济理论之间存在一定偏离,从而仅以成本最低作为选择基准是有失偏颇的,如城镇水务BOT项目的特许经营权拍卖需要同时决定特许经营期、质量属性、价格或成本。此外,一些已经确定价格的项目,可以依据最高质量来选择特许经营企业。为此,本部分在考虑三种模式城镇水务项目在特许经营权竞拍前是否确定价格的前提下,对每种模式的城镇水务项目设计两类特许经营权拍卖机制,从而优化了以成本最低原则作为选择特许经营企业的传统特许经营权拍卖理论。
Urban water utilities were one of the most important infrastructure industries in the national economy and were important guarantee to maintain the sustainable development and coordinate the dynamic relationship among social, production and ecological and also were important component to speed up urbanization. Since the end of2002, China began to establish the franchise as a market-oriented reform of urban water utilities and urban water utilities had a rapid development. But in the process of franchising, franchise auction mechanism was missing and unsound, which deviated from the target of urban water utilities projects and social welfare maximization. Therefore, it was an important issue to build optimal franchise auction mechanism combining the characteristics and objectives of the reform of urban water utilities projects. At the same time, it was the objective requirements of promoting the rapid development of urban water utilities, adapting to urbanization and the residents'needs.
Based on the technical and economic characteristics of the urban water utilities and in-depth analysis of the present situation and problems of franchise of the urban water utilities, this paper selected BOT projects, TOT projects and commissioned operational projects as research object. This paper built respectively participation constraint and incentive compatibility constraint conditions of maximizing the social welfare issues to solve the franchise auction mechanism and prove the effectiveness of the mechanism. At the same time, this paper analyzed a typical case of urban water utilities and summarized the main problems in the process of franchising. Designing franchise auction mechanism provided important guidance for different projects to select the franchise auction mechanism, while improving and complementing the existing urban water utilities franchise auction mechanism. Therefore, the analysis had important theoretical and practical significance.
In this paper, the researches were as follows:
1. To analyze the objective needs and the basic status of franchise in the urban water utilities.
From the drawbacks of the traditional administrative grant system, the paper released the practical needs of implementing the franchise system based on analysis of technical-economic characteristics of the urban water utilities supply. Meanwhile, on the basis of the analysis of nearly20years franchise project in China urban water utilities, the paper summed up the three-phase characteristics of franchise in urban water utilities and analyzed the lower legal status, normative, and lack of government regulation on franchise business of urban water utilities. Ultimately, the franchise auction mechanism was missing or was not perfect, which resulted a number of sub-optimal or inefficient enterprises to enter the urban water utilities sector, and reduced the operational efficiency and service levels of the urban water utilities industry, which became the real problems to be solved in the process of franchising of urban water utilities.
2. To design the franchise auction mechanism of BOT projects in urban water utilities.
The urban water utilities were mainly related to water supply and sewage treatment industry. Because different parts of BOT project in urban water utilities were different, based on this, this section constructed franchise auction mechanism and solved the participation constraint and incentive compatibility constraint of optimal social welfare, and verified the effectiveness of the mechanism in the bid quality and licensed operating period, and the bids and the licensed operating period. The choice of franchise auction mechanism on BOT projects abided by the following principles:For determining the price of new projects, you can be bid by selecting the quality and franchise operation of the mechanism to determine the ownership of franchise; for determining the lowest quality attributes of new projects, you can choose the price bid and the licensed operation period to achieve the optimal allocation of the franchise.
3. To design the franchise auction mechanism of TOT projects in urban water utilities.
Considering the heterogeneity and the differences of projects between water supply in urban water utilities and wastewater treatment industry, the paper gave full consideration to the participation constraint and incentive compatibility constraints of the bidding companies based on the objective of maximizing social welfare and constructed two mechanisms of the bid quality and transfer prices to resolve the ownership of franchise of the TOT projects of urban water utilities. For the TOT project, which has been determined the unit price of urban water utilities supply, bidding the quality and transferring price mechanism can determine the attribution of a franchise; for the TOT projects, which has not been determined the unit price of urban water utilities supply, determined by the price of urban water utilities supply, can be determined the attribution of franchise bids on the basis of providing bidders and the minimum quality of service enterprises and projects.
4. To design the franchise auction mechanism of commissioned operational projects in urban water utilities.
Considering the different characteristics of the project and the differences of urban water utilities industry, this section for the commissioned operational projects designed to bid for quality, as well as the bids of franchise auction mechanism. Both mechanisms were able to inspire auction companies to disclose the true costs of information and show its efficiency type, which can achieve the goal that the franchise of commissioned operational projects will be assigned to the most efficient enterprises. For the commissioned operational projects of the urban water utilities, which the unit price of services was determined before the franchise auction, can determine the ownership of franchise through bidding the quality. The price can not be as important variables; on the contrary, for the commissioned operational projects of the urban water utilities, which the unit price of services was not determined, can determine the ownership of franchise through bidding unit price of services under the premise of stipulating the minimum auction business conditions and service standards.
Relative to the existing research results, the incremental contribution of this article is as follows:
First, to analyze the inefficiency reasons of franchise project of some urban water utilities.
Franchise auction for the administrative grant system has more advantages, but the reality selected a franchise business by inviting bidders and administrative grant, namely the lack of the auction process, or the franchise auction mechanism ignored the licensed operation period as well as some key variables on the franchising business efficiency. In addition, Franchise auction mechanism was missing or not perfect, and also there was a certain moral hazard and adverse selection in the auction as well as project implementation process. To sum up, the inefficiency reasons of franchise project of some urban water utilities were not yet applied the franchise auction mechanism or the auction mechanism is missing or unsound.
Second, to build the six franchise auction model of urban water utilities fewer than three franchise mode.
This paper selected BOT projects, TOT projects, and commissioned operational projects on the basis of the characteristics of the town water, and respectively build the bid quality and the licensed operating period, the bid and the licensed operating period of the franchise auction mechanism of BOT projects; the bid quality, transfer prices and the bid of TOT projects; and the bid and bid quality of commissioned operational projects in the urban water utilities based on auction theory and mechanism theory.Meanwhile,verified the validity of the different mechanisms in an attempt to provide an important theoretical support for different projects and different modes of franchise auction.
Third, to optimize the choice principles on franchise business in the traditional auction theory franchise.
As early as1968, Demsetz propose a principle of choosing the optional franchise businesses. That is, to meet certain quality standards in accordance with the principle of the lowest-cost. Because there were some differences between the actual project and the economic theory, and thus only the lowest cost as an alternative basis was unfair, such as franchise auction of BOT project in the urban water utilities also decided the licensed operation period, quality attributes prices or costs simultaneously. In addition, the price of some projects have been identified and selected franchise companies based on the highest quality, the choice principles of franchise companies proposed by Demsetz (1968) had some limitations. To this end, this section took into account the heterogeneity of the project and optimized the choice principles of franchise business in the traditional franchise auction theory so that the design of the franchise auction mechanism was more in line with reality, and achieve the most efficient enterprise to get the goal of the franchise.
基于城镇水务的技术经济特征,在对城镇水务特许经营的现状及其问题进行分析的基础上,本文选择城镇水务BOT项目、TOT项目以及委托运营项目作为研究对象,分别构建参与约束和激励相容约束下的社会福利最大化问题,分类设计不同模式下的城镇水务项目的特许经营权拍卖机制,并验证了机制有效性。同时,分析典型案例,并总结出特许经营权拍卖过程中存在的主要问题。最后,提出城镇水务特许经营权拍卖机制实施的主要措施。特许经营权拍卖机制设计,能够为不同模式城镇水务项目的特许经营权拍卖提供指导,同时能够完善城镇水务项目固有的特许经营权拍卖机制,因此,本文研究具有重要的理论意义和现实意义。
本文主要研究工作如下：
一、分析城镇水务特许经营的客观需求与基本现状
本文在分析城镇水务技术经济特征的基础上,从传统行政授予制度的弊端出发,释析出推行特许经营制度的现实需求。同时,在分析近20年中国城镇水务特许经营项目的基础上,归纳出城镇水务特许经营的三阶段特征,并从法律地位较低、规范性不强、政府规制缺失三个方面对城镇水务项目在特许经营过程中存在的问题进行分析。归根结底,特许经营权拍卖机制缺失或不健全导致一些次优或无效率的企业进入城镇水务行业,降低整个行业的运营效率和服务水平,是现时期城镇水务特许经营项目亟待解决的现实问题。
二、设计城镇水务BOT项目的特许经营权拍卖机制
由于城镇水务主要涉及供水和污水处理两个行业,同时,供水和污水处理BOT项目之间是存在差异的,基于此,本部分设计竞拍(质量,特许经营期)和竞拍(价格,特许经营期)的两类特许经营权拍卖机制,同时验证机制的有效性。其中,对于在特许经营权拍卖前已知价格的新建项目而言,可以通过竞拍(质量,特许经营期)的特许经营权拍卖机制来实现特许经营权的归属；对于在特许经营权拍卖前规定运营企业的最低质量属性,但价格未知的新建项目而言,可以选择竞拍(价格,特许经营期)的机制来实现特许经营权的优化配置。两类特许经营权拍卖机制不仅能够诱导企业真实地披露自身的经营能力,还能够提高城镇水务规制者对水务设施的配置效率。
三、设计城镇水务TOT项目的特许经营权拍卖机制
在考虑城镇供水和污水处理行业之间差异性以及同行业不同项目之间异质性的基础上,本部分基于社会福利最大化目标,考虑竞拍企业的参与约束和激励相容约束,构建竞拍(质量,转让价格)和竞拍(价格)的两类特许经营权拍卖机制,这两类特许经营权拍卖机制不仅能够诱导企业真实披露自身信息,而且能够提高城镇水务规制者对水务设施的配置效率。其中,对于特许经营权拍卖前价格已知的城镇水务TOT项目而言,可以通过竞拍(质量,转让价格)的特许经营权拍卖机制来决定特许经营权的归属；对于特许经营权拍卖前价格未知的城镇水务TOT项目,可以在规定企业竞拍标准的前提下,选择竞拍(价格)的特许经营权拍卖机制,来实现城镇水务TOT项目特许经营权的优化配置。
四、设计城镇水务委托运营项目的特许经营权拍卖机制
基于城镇水务委托运营项目的特点,同时考虑特许经营权拍卖前价格是否已知,本部分分别设计竞拍(质量)以及竞拍(价格)的两类特许经营权拍卖机制,这两类机制能够激励竞拍企业披露真实成本信息和显示自身效率类型,从而能够将项目的特许经营权分配给最有效率的企业。其中,对于在特许经营权拍卖前价格已知的项目,不能将价格作为特许经营权拍卖机制的重要变量,因此可以在一定的条件下,通过竞拍(质量)的特许经营权拍卖机制来决定特许经营权的归属。相反,对于在特许经营权拍卖前尚未确定价格的城镇水务委托运营项目,可以在规定竞拍企业进入条件的基础上,通过竞拍(价格)的特许经营权拍卖机制来决定特许经营权的归属。
相比已有研究成果,本文可能的增量贡献主要有：
第一,分析得出了城镇水务项目特许经营无效运营的重要原因。
相对于传统行政授予制度,特许经营制度具有一定的优势,但在现实中特许经营项目往往通过邀请竞拍、行政授予等方式来选择运营企业,即缺乏竞拍过程,或在特许经营权拍卖机制中忽视特许经营期以及一些关键变量,增加了项目实施过程中的道德风险和逆向选择程度。综上所述,我们分析出尚未应用特许经营权拍卖以及特许经营权拍卖机制缺失或不健全是一些特许经营项目中出现固定回报或变相固定回报、不具备供水或污水处理能力的企业无效率运营的原因。
第二,构建了BOT模式、TOT模式和委托运营模式下的城镇水务项目特许经营权拍卖机制。
本文从城镇水务的技术经济特征出发,选择BOT、TOT以及委托运营模式下的城镇水务项目作为研究对象,基于拍卖理论与机制设计理论,分别构建竞拍(质量,特许经营期)、竞拍(价格,特许经营期)的城镇水务BOT项目特许经营权拍卖机制；竞拍(质量,转让价格)、竞拍(价格)的城镇水务TOT项目特许经营权拍卖机制；竞拍(价格)和竞拍(质量)的城镇水务委托运营项目的特许经营权拍卖机制,同时验证了各类机制的有效性。
第三,优化了传统特许经营权拍卖理论对特许经营企业的选择原则。
早在1968年Demsetz就提出特许经营企业的选择原则,即在满足一定质量标准下依据成本最低原则选择特许经营企业。由于实际项目与经济理论之间存在一定偏离,从而仅以成本最低作为选择基准是有失偏颇的,如城镇水务BOT项目的特许经营权拍卖需要同时决定特许经营期、质量属性、价格或成本。此外,一些已经确定价格的项目,可以依据最高质量来选择特许经营企业。为此,本部分在考虑三种模式城镇水务项目在特许经营权竞拍前是否确定价格的前提下,对每种模式的城镇水务项目设计两类特许经营权拍卖机制,从而优化了以成本最低原则作为选择特许经营企业的传统特许经营权拍卖理论。
Urban water utilities were one of the most important infrastructure industries in the national economy and were important guarantee to maintain the sustainable development and coordinate the dynamic relationship among social, production and ecological and also were important component to speed up urbanization. Since the end of2002, China began to establish the franchise as a market-oriented reform of urban water utilities and urban water utilities had a rapid development. But in the process of franchising, franchise auction mechanism was missing and unsound, which deviated from the target of urban water utilities projects and social welfare maximization. Therefore, it was an important issue to build optimal franchise auction mechanism combining the characteristics and objectives of the reform of urban water utilities projects. At the same time, it was the objective requirements of promoting the rapid development of urban water utilities, adapting to urbanization and the residents'needs.
Based on the technical and economic characteristics of the urban water utilities and in-depth analysis of the present situation and problems of franchise of the urban water utilities, this paper selected BOT projects, TOT projects and commissioned operational projects as research object. This paper built respectively participation constraint and incentive compatibility constraint conditions of maximizing the social welfare issues to solve the franchise auction mechanism and prove the effectiveness of the mechanism. At the same time, this paper analyzed a typical case of urban water utilities and summarized the main problems in the process of franchising. Designing franchise auction mechanism provided important guidance for different projects to select the franchise auction mechanism, while improving and complementing the existing urban water utilities franchise auction mechanism. Therefore, the analysis had important theoretical and practical significance.
In this paper, the researches were as follows:
1. To analyze the objective needs and the basic status of franchise in the urban water utilities.
From the drawbacks of the traditional administrative grant system, the paper released the practical needs of implementing the franchise system based on analysis of technical-economic characteristics of the urban water utilities supply. Meanwhile, on the basis of the analysis of nearly20years franchise project in China urban water utilities, the paper summed up the three-phase characteristics of franchise in urban water utilities and analyzed the lower legal status, normative, and lack of government regulation on franchise business of urban water utilities. Ultimately, the franchise auction mechanism was missing or was not perfect, which resulted a number of sub-optimal or inefficient enterprises to enter the urban water utilities sector, and reduced the operational efficiency and service levels of the urban water utilities industry, which became the real problems to be solved in the process of franchising of urban water utilities.
2. To design the franchise auction mechanism of BOT projects in urban water utilities.
The urban water utilities were mainly related to water supply and sewage treatment industry. Because different parts of BOT project in urban water utilities were different, based on this, this section constructed franchise auction mechanism and solved the participation constraint and incentive compatibility constraint of optimal social welfare, and verified the effectiveness of the mechanism in the bid quality and licensed operating period, and the bids and the licensed operating period. The choice of franchise auction mechanism on BOT projects abided by the following principles:For determining the price of new projects, you can be bid by selecting the quality and franchise operation of the mechanism to determine the ownership of franchise; for determining the lowest quality attributes of new projects, you can choose the price bid and the licensed operation period to achieve the optimal allocation of the franchise.
3. To design the franchise auction mechanism of TOT projects in urban water utilities.
Considering the heterogeneity and the differences of projects between water supply in urban water utilities and wastewater treatment industry, the paper gave full consideration to the participation constraint and incentive compatibility constraints of the bidding companies based on the objective of maximizing social welfare and constructed two mechanisms of the bid quality and transfer prices to resolve the ownership of franchise of the TOT projects of urban water utilities. For the TOT project, which has been determined the unit price of urban water utilities supply, bidding the quality and transferring price mechanism can determine the attribution of a franchise; for the TOT projects, which has not been determined the unit price of urban water utilities supply, determined by the price of urban water utilities supply, can be determined the attribution of franchise bids on the basis of providing bidders and the minimum quality of service enterprises and projects.
4. To design the franchise auction mechanism of commissioned operational projects in urban water utilities.
Considering the different characteristics of the project and the differences of urban water utilities industry, this section for the commissioned operational projects designed to bid for quality, as well as the bids of franchise auction mechanism. Both mechanisms were able to inspire auction companies to disclose the true costs of information and show its efficiency type, which can achieve the goal that the franchise of commissioned operational projects will be assigned to the most efficient enterprises. For the commissioned operational projects of the urban water utilities, which the unit price of services was determined before the franchise auction, can determine the ownership of franchise through bidding the quality. The price can not be as important variables; on the contrary, for the commissioned operational projects of the urban water utilities, which the unit price of services was not determined, can determine the ownership of franchise through bidding unit price of services under the premise of stipulating the minimum auction business conditions and service standards.
Relative to the existing research results, the incremental contribution of this article is as follows:
First, to analyze the inefficiency reasons of franchise project of some urban water utilities.
Franchise auction for the administrative grant system has more advantages, but the reality selected a franchise business by inviting bidders and administrative grant, namely the lack of the auction process, or the franchise auction mechanism ignored the licensed operation period as well as some key variables on the franchising business efficiency. In addition, Franchise auction mechanism was missing or not perfect, and also there was a certain moral hazard and adverse selection in the auction as well as project implementation process. To sum up, the inefficiency reasons of franchise project of some urban water utilities were not yet applied the franchise auction mechanism or the auction mechanism is missing or unsound.
Second, to build the six franchise auction model of urban water utilities fewer than three franchise mode.
This paper selected BOT projects, TOT projects, and commissioned operational projects on the basis of the characteristics of the town water, and respectively build the bid quality and the licensed operating period, the bid and the licensed operating period of the franchise auction mechanism of BOT projects; the bid quality, transfer prices and the bid of TOT projects; and the bid and bid quality of commissioned operational projects in the urban water utilities based on auction theory and mechanism theory.Meanwhile,verified the validity of the different mechanisms in an attempt to provide an important theoretical support for different projects and different modes of franchise auction.
Third, to optimize the choice principles on franchise business in the traditional auction theory franchise.
As early as1968, Demsetz propose a principle of choosing the optional franchise businesses. That is, to meet certain quality standards in accordance with the principle of the lowest-cost. Because there were some differences between the actual project and the economic theory, and thus only the lowest cost as an alternative basis was unfair, such as franchise auction of BOT project in the urban water utilities also decided the licensed operation period, quality attributes prices or costs simultaneously. In addition, the price of some projects have been identified and selected franchise companies based on the highest quality, the choice principles of franchise companies proposed by Demsetz (1968) had some limitations. To this end, this section took into account the heterogeneity of the project and optimized the choice principles of franchise business in the traditional franchise auction theory so that the design of the franchise auction mechanism was more in line with reality, and achieve the most efficient enterprise to get the goal of the franchise.
引文
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