基于终极产权的债务融资与公司投资行为
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摘要
融资与投资作为企业的两项基本财务活动具有紧密的联系,二者同时是企业价值的决定因素。财务学中的一个中心问题就是探讨投、融资与企业治理绩效之间的关系。其实,负债影响投资行为及投资效果是其对公司绩效发挥作用的主要方式,这一过程也是债权治理的过程。西方学者已就企业债务融资与投资之间的关系进行了众多的研究,并取得了丰硕的成果,但他们的研究均以成熟的市场经济为背景。而我国无论是证券市场,还是上市公司的治理结构,以及企业的历史背景和当前所处的经济环境等都有别于西方企业。因此,其研究结论是否能够用来解释我国上市公司的投资行为,尚有待实证检验。那么,我国企业债务融资结构与投资行为的关系到底又是怎样的呢?
本文在回顾国内外相关研究文献的基础上,以2005-2009年的数据为研究的窗口期间,以沪深A股市场的上市公司为研究对象,从终极控制人之所有权激励、产权性质以及控制权行使方式的角度来考察了债务融资对投资行为的影响。首先,本文通过追溯上市公司的最终控股股东,构建了一个基于终极产权论的代理成本分析框架,在此框架下分析终极产权的各项具体特征及其与代理成本的关系。其次,在终极产权深入分析的基础上,通过构建理论模型分析在不同的终极控制人所控制的上市公司中债务总量、债务期限结构和债务来源对投资行为的影响机理,在此基础上提出本文的研究假设。最后,通过构建面板数据模型对提出理论假设进行了实证检验,得出如下结论：
实证研究结果表明：就我国上市公司整体而言,债务融资能够很好地抑制公司的过度投资行为；另外,从不同的债务结构来看：短期债务、商业信用与公司投资支出存在显著的负相关关系,能有效地约束公司的非效率投资,但长期债务、银行信用几乎不起作用。从终极控制人具体特征方面分析债务融资对公司投资行为的影响时,我们发现：在债务一定的情况下,相比于低分离度公司、政府控股公司、中央政府控股公司、国有实业控股公司以及长代理链公司而言,在高分离度公司、非政府控股公司、地方政府控股公司、国有资产管理机构控股公司和短代理链公司中,债务融资比例、债务结构对公司的公司过度投资的抑制作用更强。
最后为改进企业融资结构,规范我国上市公司投融资行为,提高上市公司的投资效率,促进社会经济资源的优化配置提供政策建议。
Corporate finance and investment have close relationship in the firm. The central issue of Finance is to explore the investment,financing and corporate governance performance relationship. In fact, How the debt affect investment behavior is the way that the debt affect corporate performance.Western scholars have a large number of studies about corporate debt financing and investment relationship and achieve fruitful results. But the background of their research is a mature market economy. In China, the stock market, the governance structure of listed companies, and enterprises is different from Western companies. Therefore, the research conclusions that are to be used to explain the investment behavior of listed companies in China have yet to be empirical test. So debt financing of corporate structure and investment behavior in China will be our Research objectives.
Using the data from 2005 to2009, We will study the impaction that debt financing on investment behavior from the angle of the incentive of ownership, property rights and Exercise of the right. Firstly, we construct the framework of the agency that based on the ultimate property by tracing the ultimate controlling shareholder of listed companies. In this framework, we analysis the relationship between the specific characteristics of the ultimate ownership and the agency cost. Secondly, we will study their relationship in the firms whose have different ultimate controlling shareholders by constructin the theoretical model.Then we put forward the study hypothesis. Finally, we will test the hypothesis by building panel data models.
The empirical results show that:Debt financing could well inhibit the company's over-investment behavior for the whole listed companies in China. In addition,There is a significant negative correlation relationship between short-term debt and investment behavior. So is commercial credit. But long-term debt and bank credit is almost no effect. From the perspective of the specific characteristics of ultimate controlling shareholder, Compared to the low resolution, government holding company, the central government holding companies, state-owned industrial holding companies and long proxy chain company, we find that there is a stronger negative correlation between debt and investment behavior relationship in high resolution, non-government holding company, the central government holding company, state-owned assets management organizations holding company and short proxy chain company.
Finally, we will provide policy recommendations in order to improve the corporate finance structure,standardize the investment and financing behavior of listed companies,improve investment efficiency and promote optimal allocation of economic resources.
本文在回顾国内外相关研究文献的基础上,以2005-2009年的数据为研究的窗口期间,以沪深A股市场的上市公司为研究对象,从终极控制人之所有权激励、产权性质以及控制权行使方式的角度来考察了债务融资对投资行为的影响。首先,本文通过追溯上市公司的最终控股股东,构建了一个基于终极产权论的代理成本分析框架,在此框架下分析终极产权的各项具体特征及其与代理成本的关系。其次,在终极产权深入分析的基础上,通过构建理论模型分析在不同的终极控制人所控制的上市公司中债务总量、债务期限结构和债务来源对投资行为的影响机理,在此基础上提出本文的研究假设。最后,通过构建面板数据模型对提出理论假设进行了实证检验,得出如下结论：
实证研究结果表明：就我国上市公司整体而言,债务融资能够很好地抑制公司的过度投资行为；另外,从不同的债务结构来看：短期债务、商业信用与公司投资支出存在显著的负相关关系,能有效地约束公司的非效率投资,但长期债务、银行信用几乎不起作用。从终极控制人具体特征方面分析债务融资对公司投资行为的影响时,我们发现：在债务一定的情况下,相比于低分离度公司、政府控股公司、中央政府控股公司、国有实业控股公司以及长代理链公司而言,在高分离度公司、非政府控股公司、地方政府控股公司、国有资产管理机构控股公司和短代理链公司中,债务融资比例、债务结构对公司的公司过度投资的抑制作用更强。
最后为改进企业融资结构,规范我国上市公司投融资行为,提高上市公司的投资效率,促进社会经济资源的优化配置提供政策建议。
Corporate finance and investment have close relationship in the firm. The central issue of Finance is to explore the investment,financing and corporate governance performance relationship. In fact, How the debt affect investment behavior is the way that the debt affect corporate performance.Western scholars have a large number of studies about corporate debt financing and investment relationship and achieve fruitful results. But the background of their research is a mature market economy. In China, the stock market, the governance structure of listed companies, and enterprises is different from Western companies. Therefore, the research conclusions that are to be used to explain the investment behavior of listed companies in China have yet to be empirical test. So debt financing of corporate structure and investment behavior in China will be our Research objectives.
Using the data from 2005 to2009, We will study the impaction that debt financing on investment behavior from the angle of the incentive of ownership, property rights and Exercise of the right. Firstly, we construct the framework of the agency that based on the ultimate property by tracing the ultimate controlling shareholder of listed companies. In this framework, we analysis the relationship between the specific characteristics of the ultimate ownership and the agency cost. Secondly, we will study their relationship in the firms whose have different ultimate controlling shareholders by constructin the theoretical model.Then we put forward the study hypothesis. Finally, we will test the hypothesis by building panel data models.
The empirical results show that:Debt financing could well inhibit the company's over-investment behavior for the whole listed companies in China. In addition,There is a significant negative correlation relationship between short-term debt and investment behavior. So is commercial credit. But long-term debt and bank credit is almost no effect. From the perspective of the specific characteristics of ultimate controlling shareholder, Compared to the low resolution, government holding company, the central government holding companies, state-owned industrial holding companies and long proxy chain company, we find that there is a stronger negative correlation between debt and investment behavior relationship in high resolution, non-government holding company, the central government holding company, state-owned assets management organizations holding company and short proxy chain company.
Finally, we will provide policy recommendations in order to improve the corporate finance structure,standardize the investment and financing behavior of listed companies,improve investment efficiency and promote optimal allocation of economic resources.
引文
[1]崔丽,钟长军.2006.负债融资对企业投资行为的影响—基于代理成本理论的实证研究,经济理论研究,(8)：67-69.
[2]范从来,王海龙.2006.上市公司资木结构与公司投资行为之间关系的实证研究.当代财经,(11)：43-47.
[3]林毅夫等.2004.政策性负担、道德风险与预算软约束.经济研究,(2)：17-27.
[4]刘星,杨亦民.2006.融资结构对企业投资行为的影响—来自沪深股市的经验证据.预测,(3)：33-37.
[5]刘孟晖,沈中华,余怒涛.2009.终极产权与公司价值—对中国上市公司激励与壁垒效应的实证检验.华东经济管理,23(1)：62-68.
[6]刘芍佳,孙霈,刘乃全.2003.终极产权论、股权结构与公司绩效.经济研究,(4)：51-63.
[7]梅彤,毛淑珍.2009.终极控制人属性、私人收益动机与非效率投资—基于我国上市公司2004-2006年的经验数据.经济与管理研究,(5)：41-48.
[8]彭程,周孟亮,刘怡.2008.负债融资对企业投资行为的影响—基于股权结构视角的实证研究.湖南农业大学学报(社会科学版),9(3)：53-58.
[9]童盼,陆正匕.2005.负债融资、负债来源与企业投资行为——来自中国上市公司的经验证据.经济研究,(5)：75-84.
[10]童盼,陆止飞.2005.负债融资对企业投资行为影响研究评述与展望.会计研究,(12)：71-75.
[11]王鲁平,毛伟平.2009.银行借款、商业信用与公司投资行为西安交通大学学报(社会科学版),29(1)：6-11.
[12]吴清华,田高良.2008.终极产权、控制方式与审计委员会治理需求—一项基于中国上市公司的实证研究.管理世界,(9)：124-138.
[13]辛清泉,林斌.2006.债务杠杆与企业投资：双重预算软约束视角.财经研究,(7)：73-83.
[14]姚明安,孔莹.2008.财务杠杆对企业投资的影响—股权集中背景下的经验研究.会计研究,(4)：33-40.
[15]杨忠诚,王宗军.2008.基于终极产权论的股权结构与公司绩效研究.华东经济管理,22(2)：86-89.
[16]叶勇,胡培,何伟.2005.上市公司终极控制权、股权结构及公司绩效.管理科学,(4)：58-64.
[17]张栋.2008.控股股东控制、负债融资与企业投资—基于中国上市公司非平衡数据的实证研究.证券市场导报(5)：69-77.
[18]朱磊,潘爱玲.2009.负债对企业非效率投资行为影响的实证研究—来自中国制造业上市公司的面板数据.经济与管理研究,(2)：52-59.
[19]A.Aivazian and Ying G,.2005.The Impact of Leverage on Finn Investment:Canadian Evidence[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,(11):277-291.
[20]Aggarwal R. K, Samwick A. A,2003. Why Do Managers Diversify Their Firms? Journal of Finance 58,71-118.
[21]Barnea Amir, Robert Haugen, Lemma Senbet.1980. A rationale for debt maturity structure and call provisions in the agency theoretic framework. Journal of finance,(35) 1223-1234.
[22]Barclay.M.,Smith.C.,Watts,R..1995."The Determinants of Corporate Leverage and Dividend Policies".Journal of Applied Corporate Finance,(7):4-19.
[23]Berle A,Means,G..1932.The modern corporation and private property[M] Macmillan, NEW York N.Y.MacMillan,123-154.
[24]Dewatripont,M.,Tirole,J. A theory of debt and equity:of securities and manager—shareholder congruence[J]. Journal of Economics,1994,109:1027-1054
[25]Diamond,D. W. Debt maturity structure and I iquidity risk[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics,1991,106:709-739
[26]Donaldson,G. Corporate debt capaci ty.a study of corporate debt policy and the determination of corporate debt capacity[M]. Boston:Harvard University,Graduate School of Business,Division of Research,1961
[27]Fama,E. Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm[J]. Journal of Political Economy,1980,88:288-307
[28]Fama,E.,Jensen,M. Separation of Ownership and Control[J]. Journal of Law and Economics.1983,26:301-325
[29]Firth;M. The impact of institutional stockholders and managerial interests on the capital structures of firms[J]. Managerial and Decision Economics,1995,16:167-175
[30]Fazzari, S., G. Hubbard, B. Peterson,1988. Financing Constraints and Corporate Investment. Brookings papers on Economic Activity 1,141-195.
[31]Garvey,G. T.,Hanka,G. Capital structure and corporate control:the effect of antitakeover statutes on firm leverage[J]. Journal of Finance,1999,54:519-546
[32]Jensen,M.,and Meckling.W,.1976."Theory of the firm:managerial behavior, agency costs and capital structure"'Journal of financial economics,(3):305-360.
[33]Gertner,R.,Scharfstein,D.,&Stein,J. Internal versus external capital markets[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics,1994,109:1211-1230
[34]JensenM..1986. Agency costs of free cash flow,corporate finance,and take-overs [J].American Economic Review,(76):323-329.
[35]LaPorta,R.,F.Lopez-de-Silanes,A.Shleifer.1999.Corporate Owner-ship around the World.Journal of Finance,(54):471-517.
[36]Lang L, Ofek E, Stulz R. Leverage,.1996. investment and firm growth[J].Journal of financial Economics,(40):3-29.
[37]La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny,2002. Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation. The Journal of Finance 57,1147-1170.
[38]Modigliani F, M Miller.1958.The cost of capital, corporation finance and the theory of investment.American Economic Review,(48):261-297.
[39]Myers, S.C., and N.C. Majluf..1984.Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms have Information that Investors do not have?[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,(13):187-221.
[40]Mills, K, Morling, S. and Tease, W..1995.The Influence of Financial Factors on corporate Investment[J], The Australian Economic Review, Quart:50-64.
[41]Mills, K. Morling. S. and Tease, W.1995.The Influence of Financial Factors on corporate InvestmentfJ], The Australian Economic Review, Quart:50-64.
[42]Michael Firth,Chen Lin, Sonia M.L. Wong.2008. Leverage and investment under a state-owned bank lending environment:Evidence from China Journal of Corporate Finance,1-12.
[43]Stulz,R.M. and H. Johnson.1985.An Analysis of Secured Debt[J] Journal of Financial Economics,(14):501-521.
[44]Richardson, S.,2006. Over-investment of Free Cash Flow. Review of Accounting Studies 11, 159-189.
[45]Titman, S.1984."The effect of capital structure on a firm's liquidation decision'" Journal of financial economics,(13):137.
[46]VogtS.1994. The Cash Flow investment Relationship:Evidence from U. S. Manufacturing Finns Financial Management 23,3-20.
[2]范从来,王海龙.2006.上市公司资木结构与公司投资行为之间关系的实证研究.当代财经,(11)：43-47.
[3]林毅夫等.2004.政策性负担、道德风险与预算软约束.经济研究,(2)：17-27.
[4]刘星,杨亦民.2006.融资结构对企业投资行为的影响—来自沪深股市的经验证据.预测,(3)：33-37.
[5]刘孟晖,沈中华,余怒涛.2009.终极产权与公司价值—对中国上市公司激励与壁垒效应的实证检验.华东经济管理,23(1)：62-68.
[6]刘芍佳,孙霈,刘乃全.2003.终极产权论、股权结构与公司绩效.经济研究,(4)：51-63.
[7]梅彤,毛淑珍.2009.终极控制人属性、私人收益动机与非效率投资—基于我国上市公司2004-2006年的经验数据.经济与管理研究,(5)：41-48.
[8]彭程,周孟亮,刘怡.2008.负债融资对企业投资行为的影响—基于股权结构视角的实证研究.湖南农业大学学报(社会科学版),9(3)：53-58.
[9]童盼,陆正匕.2005.负债融资、负债来源与企业投资行为——来自中国上市公司的经验证据.经济研究,(5)：75-84.
[10]童盼,陆止飞.2005.负债融资对企业投资行为影响研究评述与展望.会计研究,(12)：71-75.
[11]王鲁平,毛伟平.2009.银行借款、商业信用与公司投资行为西安交通大学学报(社会科学版),29(1)：6-11.
[12]吴清华,田高良.2008.终极产权、控制方式与审计委员会治理需求—一项基于中国上市公司的实证研究.管理世界,(9)：124-138.
[13]辛清泉,林斌.2006.债务杠杆与企业投资：双重预算软约束视角.财经研究,(7)：73-83.
[14]姚明安,孔莹.2008.财务杠杆对企业投资的影响—股权集中背景下的经验研究.会计研究,(4)：33-40.
[15]杨忠诚,王宗军.2008.基于终极产权论的股权结构与公司绩效研究.华东经济管理,22(2)：86-89.
[16]叶勇,胡培,何伟.2005.上市公司终极控制权、股权结构及公司绩效.管理科学,(4)：58-64.
[17]张栋.2008.控股股东控制、负债融资与企业投资—基于中国上市公司非平衡数据的实证研究.证券市场导报(5)：69-77.
[18]朱磊,潘爱玲.2009.负债对企业非效率投资行为影响的实证研究—来自中国制造业上市公司的面板数据.经济与管理研究,(2)：52-59.
[19]A.Aivazian and Ying G,.2005.The Impact of Leverage on Finn Investment:Canadian Evidence[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,(11):277-291.
[20]Aggarwal R. K, Samwick A. A,2003. Why Do Managers Diversify Their Firms? Journal of Finance 58,71-118.
[21]Barnea Amir, Robert Haugen, Lemma Senbet.1980. A rationale for debt maturity structure and call provisions in the agency theoretic framework. Journal of finance,(35) 1223-1234.
[22]Barclay.M.,Smith.C.,Watts,R..1995."The Determinants of Corporate Leverage and Dividend Policies".Journal of Applied Corporate Finance,(7):4-19.
[23]Berle A,Means,G..1932.The modern corporation and private property[M] Macmillan, NEW York N.Y.MacMillan,123-154.
[24]Dewatripont,M.,Tirole,J. A theory of debt and equity:of securities and manager—shareholder congruence[J]. Journal of Economics,1994,109:1027-1054
[25]Diamond,D. W. Debt maturity structure and I iquidity risk[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics,1991,106:709-739
[26]Donaldson,G. Corporate debt capaci ty.a study of corporate debt policy and the determination of corporate debt capacity[M]. Boston:Harvard University,Graduate School of Business,Division of Research,1961
[27]Fama,E. Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm[J]. Journal of Political Economy,1980,88:288-307
[28]Fama,E.,Jensen,M. Separation of Ownership and Control[J]. Journal of Law and Economics.1983,26:301-325
[29]Firth;M. The impact of institutional stockholders and managerial interests on the capital structures of firms[J]. Managerial and Decision Economics,1995,16:167-175
[30]Fazzari, S., G. Hubbard, B. Peterson,1988. Financing Constraints and Corporate Investment. Brookings papers on Economic Activity 1,141-195.
[31]Garvey,G. T.,Hanka,G. Capital structure and corporate control:the effect of antitakeover statutes on firm leverage[J]. Journal of Finance,1999,54:519-546
[32]Jensen,M.,and Meckling.W,.1976."Theory of the firm:managerial behavior, agency costs and capital structure"'Journal of financial economics,(3):305-360.
[33]Gertner,R.,Scharfstein,D.,&Stein,J. Internal versus external capital markets[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics,1994,109:1211-1230
[34]JensenM..1986. Agency costs of free cash flow,corporate finance,and take-overs [J].American Economic Review,(76):323-329.
[35]LaPorta,R.,F.Lopez-de-Silanes,A.Shleifer.1999.Corporate Owner-ship around the World.Journal of Finance,(54):471-517.
[36]Lang L, Ofek E, Stulz R. Leverage,.1996. investment and firm growth[J].Journal of financial Economics,(40):3-29.
[37]La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny,2002. Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation. The Journal of Finance 57,1147-1170.
[38]Modigliani F, M Miller.1958.The cost of capital, corporation finance and the theory of investment.American Economic Review,(48):261-297.
[39]Myers, S.C., and N.C. Majluf..1984.Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms have Information that Investors do not have?[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,(13):187-221.
[40]Mills, K, Morling, S. and Tease, W..1995.The Influence of Financial Factors on corporate Investment[J], The Australian Economic Review, Quart:50-64.
[41]Mills, K. Morling. S. and Tease, W.1995.The Influence of Financial Factors on corporate InvestmentfJ], The Australian Economic Review, Quart:50-64.
[42]Michael Firth,Chen Lin, Sonia M.L. Wong.2008. Leverage and investment under a state-owned bank lending environment:Evidence from China Journal of Corporate Finance,1-12.
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