基于所得税差异的上市公司债务融资决策模型
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摘要
中国上市公司大都存在较为严重的委托代理问题,融资决策目标往往不是企业价值最大化,而是大股东利益最大化或经理层利益最大化,因此经典的资本结构理论在解释所得税对中国上市公司融资决策的影响时,存在诸多局限性,同时现有研究较少关注不同形式所得税优惠影响融资决策的机理。理论研究的滞后不利于企业融资决策科学化水平的提高,也不利于政府部门提高税收政策的实施效果。针对上述问题,本文以委托代理冲突为背景,研究所得税影响中国上市公司债务融资决策的路径、机理和效果,并构建考虑所得税差异的债务融资决策模型。
论文首先分析了中国上市公司享有所得税优惠的现状。在讨论中国上市公司享有所得税优惠政策的基础上,对中国上市公司所得税优惠的数量和影响因素进行统计分析和回归分析,并与所得税负担的数量及影响因素进行对比,发现没有享受税率优惠的.上市公司,享受的税基优惠或税额优惠更多；国有控股企业享受的所得税优惠较少；规模大、赢利能力强的上市公司、来自竞争激烈行业和来自高市场化程度地区的上市公司,所享受的所得税优惠与其他公司没有显著差异,但由于这些公司负债水平较低,因此所得税负担较重。
然后研究所得税影响债务融资决策的四条路径：债务融资受益、财务困境成本、财务困境发生概率、税盾过剩所导致的机会成本。在分析中国上市公司的融资决策}I标的基础上,根据自由现金流量假说,分别求解不同融资决策目标下,大股东、经理层等利益主体的收益函数和债务融资受益,发现税率会提高债务融资受益,但在大股东或经理层利益最大化的决策目标下,债务融资受益和债务融资受益对税率的敏感性都低于MM理论的预测；通过多元回归分析发现税率不会对财务困境成本产生显著影响,但税基及税额优惠会对财务困境成本产生负向相关,同时税率会对财务困境发生概率产生正向影响；通过建立求解税盾过剩的条件,以及无法利用的税收优惠数量,发现税基优惠和税额优惠会增大税盾过剩所导致机会成本的期望值。
随后,考虑上述四条路径,求解目标负债水平并进行实证检验。首先考虑税率、债务融资受益、财务困境成本、财务困境发生概率、税盾过剩所导致的机会成本等因素,建立数学模型求解代理人判断的最佳负债水平和财务保守程度。随后进行两方面检验,一是中国上市公司的财务保守程度,：二是融资决策目标对上市公司债务融资决策的影响,发现中国上市公司的债务政策非常保守,目标负债水平主要反映大股东或经理层的意志,同时独立董事制度等公司治理机制能在一定程度上抑制代理人的自利行为。
最后,构建考虑代理冲突与所得税差异的债务融资决策模型,并实证检验所得税与债务政策的关系。发现不同的委托代理环境下,所得税对债务政策的影响程度是不同的；不同形式的所得税优惠对债务政策的影响有不同的特点；所得税对负债水平与财务保守程度的影响也有着重要区别。
与现有研究相比,本文的创新和贡献主要三点。一是建立了委托代理条件下,考虑所得税差异的债务融资决策模型。二是针对所得税税率对债务融资决策的影响,建立了考虑所得税优惠的财务困境理论模型,并进行实证检验,揭示了税率影响债务融资决策的路径。三是针对税基优惠和税额优惠对债务政策的影响,用修正的实际税率度量税基优惠和税额优惠的总体水平,并建立LOGISTIC回归模型进行实证检验,揭示了非税率形式的所得税优惠影响债务政策的特点。
研究结果对于中国上市公司更科学的利用所得税政策,提高融资决策的科学化水平,以及政府部门提高所得税政策实施效果都有着重要的指导意义。
Chinese listed companies are often troubled by agency problem, and their financial goal is often to maximize the benefit of the majority shareholders or that of managerial level rather than the total value of the company.On the other hand the present research paid little attention on the mechanism of tax of different types'influence on the debt financial decision, which lead to the limitation of traditional capital structure theory in explaining the effect of company tax on the financing decision of Chinese listed companies. The lagging of theory research is harmful to scientific financing decision or the effect of tax policy.In order to solve this problem, this paper researches the path, mechanism and effect of tax on debt financing decision, and establishes the financing decision model considering the difference of tax policy.
Firstly, the tax preference of Chinese listed companies'income tax is discussed. After discussing the policy about tax preference of Chinese companies, the tax preference of Chinese listed companies is analyzed and is compared with its tax burden by statistical analysis and regression analysis. It is found that state owned listed companies enjoy less tax preference while the companies without tax rate preference enjoy more tax base preference and tax credit (TBP&TC), and the tax burden rather than the tax preference of listed companies with big scale, high profit level and those from industries of fierce competition or from high level market development regions is high because of their low debt level.
Then, four path of tax affecting the debt financing decision is studied including debt financing benefit, financial distress cost, the probability of financial distress and the opportunity cost of not using tax preferences completely. After analyzing the financial goal of Chinese listed companies, the benefit function and debt financing benefit of different interest groups including the majority shareholders and managerial level based on Free Cash Flow Theory and it is found that high tax rate raises debt financing benefit, and that the financing benefit and the sensitivity of debt financing benefit to tax rate are both lower than the prediction of MM theory. By multi-regression analysis it is found that more tax base preference and tax credit rather than high or low tax rate decrease financial distress cost and by LOGISTIC regression analysis it is found that high tax rate may increase the probability of financial distress.By analyzing the condition of not using tax preferences completely, and the amount of the tax preferences not using,it is found that the opportuninty cost of not using tax preferences can be increased by tax base preference and tax credit.
Also, the target debt level is deduced and tested empirically considering the four path mentioned. First, the optimal debt level judged by the agent and the degree of debt conservatism is deduced by establishing a mathematic model considering tax rate, debt financing benefit, financial distress cost, the probability of financial distress and the opportunity cost of not using tax preferences completely. Then the degree of debt conservatism of Chinese listed companies is appraised and the relationship between debt financing goal and debt financing decisions is tested, which shows that the debt policy of Chinese listed companies is very conservative, and that the target debt level means the desire of the majority shareholders and managerial level, and that some corporate governance mechanism such as independent director mechanism may limit the agents'behavior of self-interest.
Last, the decision model of debt financing considering agency conflicts and tax policy is established and tested empirically. It is found that the effect of tax policy on debt policy is different under different agency conditions, and that effect of different tax preference on debt policy is also different, and that the relationship between tax and debt level and that between tax and the degree of conservation is different.
This paper includes three main innovative work. First, a debt financing model considering tax difference is established under the condition of Principal-agent circumstances.Second, a theory model about financial distress considering tax difference is etablished and empirically tested in order to research the the influence of tax on financial distress, which discovers the path of tax rate's influence on debt financing decision.Third, a LOGISTIC regression model is established with ETRR as the proxy for the level of tax base preference and credit, in order to research the influence of tax base preference and credit on tax, which discovers the characteristics of tax preference except tax rate.
This paper is of great useful for listed companies to use the tax policy and to make financial decision more scientificly, and for government to develop the effect of tax policy.
论文首先分析了中国上市公司享有所得税优惠的现状。在讨论中国上市公司享有所得税优惠政策的基础上,对中国上市公司所得税优惠的数量和影响因素进行统计分析和回归分析,并与所得税负担的数量及影响因素进行对比,发现没有享受税率优惠的.上市公司,享受的税基优惠或税额优惠更多；国有控股企业享受的所得税优惠较少；规模大、赢利能力强的上市公司、来自竞争激烈行业和来自高市场化程度地区的上市公司,所享受的所得税优惠与其他公司没有显著差异,但由于这些公司负债水平较低,因此所得税负担较重。
然后研究所得税影响债务融资决策的四条路径：债务融资受益、财务困境成本、财务困境发生概率、税盾过剩所导致的机会成本。在分析中国上市公司的融资决策}I标的基础上,根据自由现金流量假说,分别求解不同融资决策目标下,大股东、经理层等利益主体的收益函数和债务融资受益,发现税率会提高债务融资受益,但在大股东或经理层利益最大化的决策目标下,债务融资受益和债务融资受益对税率的敏感性都低于MM理论的预测；通过多元回归分析发现税率不会对财务困境成本产生显著影响,但税基及税额优惠会对财务困境成本产生负向相关,同时税率会对财务困境发生概率产生正向影响；通过建立求解税盾过剩的条件,以及无法利用的税收优惠数量,发现税基优惠和税额优惠会增大税盾过剩所导致机会成本的期望值。
随后,考虑上述四条路径,求解目标负债水平并进行实证检验。首先考虑税率、债务融资受益、财务困境成本、财务困境发生概率、税盾过剩所导致的机会成本等因素,建立数学模型求解代理人判断的最佳负债水平和财务保守程度。随后进行两方面检验,一是中国上市公司的财务保守程度,：二是融资决策目标对上市公司债务融资决策的影响,发现中国上市公司的债务政策非常保守,目标负债水平主要反映大股东或经理层的意志,同时独立董事制度等公司治理机制能在一定程度上抑制代理人的自利行为。
最后,构建考虑代理冲突与所得税差异的债务融资决策模型,并实证检验所得税与债务政策的关系。发现不同的委托代理环境下,所得税对债务政策的影响程度是不同的；不同形式的所得税优惠对债务政策的影响有不同的特点；所得税对负债水平与财务保守程度的影响也有着重要区别。
与现有研究相比,本文的创新和贡献主要三点。一是建立了委托代理条件下,考虑所得税差异的债务融资决策模型。二是针对所得税税率对债务融资决策的影响,建立了考虑所得税优惠的财务困境理论模型,并进行实证检验,揭示了税率影响债务融资决策的路径。三是针对税基优惠和税额优惠对债务政策的影响,用修正的实际税率度量税基优惠和税额优惠的总体水平,并建立LOGISTIC回归模型进行实证检验,揭示了非税率形式的所得税优惠影响债务政策的特点。
研究结果对于中国上市公司更科学的利用所得税政策,提高融资决策的科学化水平,以及政府部门提高所得税政策实施效果都有着重要的指导意义。
Chinese listed companies are often troubled by agency problem, and their financial goal is often to maximize the benefit of the majority shareholders or that of managerial level rather than the total value of the company.On the other hand the present research paid little attention on the mechanism of tax of different types'influence on the debt financial decision, which lead to the limitation of traditional capital structure theory in explaining the effect of company tax on the financing decision of Chinese listed companies. The lagging of theory research is harmful to scientific financing decision or the effect of tax policy.In order to solve this problem, this paper researches the path, mechanism and effect of tax on debt financing decision, and establishes the financing decision model considering the difference of tax policy.
Firstly, the tax preference of Chinese listed companies'income tax is discussed. After discussing the policy about tax preference of Chinese companies, the tax preference of Chinese listed companies is analyzed and is compared with its tax burden by statistical analysis and regression analysis. It is found that state owned listed companies enjoy less tax preference while the companies without tax rate preference enjoy more tax base preference and tax credit (TBP&TC), and the tax burden rather than the tax preference of listed companies with big scale, high profit level and those from industries of fierce competition or from high level market development regions is high because of their low debt level.
Then, four path of tax affecting the debt financing decision is studied including debt financing benefit, financial distress cost, the probability of financial distress and the opportunity cost of not using tax preferences completely. After analyzing the financial goal of Chinese listed companies, the benefit function and debt financing benefit of different interest groups including the majority shareholders and managerial level based on Free Cash Flow Theory and it is found that high tax rate raises debt financing benefit, and that the financing benefit and the sensitivity of debt financing benefit to tax rate are both lower than the prediction of MM theory. By multi-regression analysis it is found that more tax base preference and tax credit rather than high or low tax rate decrease financial distress cost and by LOGISTIC regression analysis it is found that high tax rate may increase the probability of financial distress.By analyzing the condition of not using tax preferences completely, and the amount of the tax preferences not using,it is found that the opportuninty cost of not using tax preferences can be increased by tax base preference and tax credit.
Also, the target debt level is deduced and tested empirically considering the four path mentioned. First, the optimal debt level judged by the agent and the degree of debt conservatism is deduced by establishing a mathematic model considering tax rate, debt financing benefit, financial distress cost, the probability of financial distress and the opportunity cost of not using tax preferences completely. Then the degree of debt conservatism of Chinese listed companies is appraised and the relationship between debt financing goal and debt financing decisions is tested, which shows that the debt policy of Chinese listed companies is very conservative, and that the target debt level means the desire of the majority shareholders and managerial level, and that some corporate governance mechanism such as independent director mechanism may limit the agents'behavior of self-interest.
Last, the decision model of debt financing considering agency conflicts and tax policy is established and tested empirically. It is found that the effect of tax policy on debt policy is different under different agency conditions, and that effect of different tax preference on debt policy is also different, and that the relationship between tax and debt level and that between tax and the degree of conservation is different.
This paper includes three main innovative work. First, a debt financing model considering tax difference is established under the condition of Principal-agent circumstances.Second, a theory model about financial distress considering tax difference is etablished and empirically tested in order to research the the influence of tax on financial distress, which discovers the path of tax rate's influence on debt financing decision.Third, a LOGISTIC regression model is established with ETRR as the proxy for the level of tax base preference and credit, in order to research the influence of tax base preference and credit on tax, which discovers the characteristics of tax preference except tax rate.
This paper is of great useful for listed companies to use the tax policy and to make financial decision more scientificly, and for government to develop the effect of tax policy.
引文
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