大股东存在下的董事会结构模型研究
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摘要
在市场机制较为有效、成熟的市场经济中,特别是在股权较为分散的英国和美国,董事会制度是公认的重要的内部公司治理机制,而且日益成为公司治理的核心。随着委托代理理论和合同理论的发展,自Hermalin和Weisbach于1998年发表《Endogenously Chosen Boards of Directors and Their Monitoring of the CEO》开始,国外学者最近几年开始对成熟的资本市场中股权较为分散公司的董事会运作理论模型进行大量的研究,至今已成为微观金融领域研究的热点问题。为了解释和确定董事会形成的内部机理及其董事会结构与公司业绩的相关性,国内外学者从不同的角度、选取不同的资本市场进行了研究,研究方向大多集中在经理对董事会的影响、最优董事会结构及董事会治理趋势之间的内在联系等方面,大大推动董事会理论模型的完善与发展。
我国上市公司股权集中度较高,普遍存在大股东,大股东往往会利用自己在股东大会上高投票权控制股东大会,由此控制董事会的组成与结构,因此公司的CEO人选往往是公司大股东意愿的体现,同时公司董事会的组成又较大程度地受到大股东的控制。因此从大股东视角出发,对中国上市公司的董事会结构模型及其运作机理进行研究是很有必要的。相对于大量的董事会方面的实证研究来说,相关的理论模型研究还是非常少,这为本文的研究提供广阔的空间。
本文从深入分析董事会制度及其背景作为研究的出发点,首先基于大股东对小股东利益的侵占动机构建基本模型,刻画在单个大股东存在情况下,我国上市公司的董事会结构特征,并收集1999年-2005年中国上市公司的数据利用计量经济学方法对模型的结果进行了实证检验和评价。其次通过扩展基本模型的假设,在单个大股东的基础上引入多个大股东,构建多个大股东相互制衡作用下的董事会结构模型,利用混合样本和分政策区间的样本对模型进行了实证检验和分析。我国关于董事会结构对公司业绩影响尤其是独立董事比例对公司业绩影响的研究结论并不统一,主要是由于对公司董事会结构的内生性研究不够透彻,因此多数结论并不可靠。最后为了使该方面研究得出可靠的结论,本文对比了四种计量方法实证研究了控制变量内生性之后公司董事会结构对我国上市公司业绩的影响程度。
本文大量的理论模型推导和实证研究工作得到的研究结果包括:(1)当公司存在单个大股东的时候,大股东出于对公司价值的侵占动机,会利用一些途径控制公司董事会,从而使得自己的行为能顺利通过董事会的监督;这些途径主要包括,当大股东比例增加的时候,由其选派的外部董事比例也随之增加,同时内部董事比例也会增加,但是独立董事比例却不受其影响。结合中国的政策,我们发现大股东往往会把独立董事比例压低到政策规定的底线。(2)当公司存在多个大股东的时候,公司董事的组成依赖于大股东之间利益的较量。实证显示,公司董事会中由第一大股东选派的外部董事比例随着第一大股东持股比例的增加而增加,随着第二大股东持股比例的增加而减少;公司中内部董事比例随着第一大股东持股比例的增加而增加,随着第二大股东持股比例的增加而减少;公司董事会中独立董事比例随着第二大股东持股比例的增加而增加;当公司第一大股东和第二大股东都是国有股的时候,由第一大股东选派的外部董事比例更大,内部董事比例也更大,而独立董事的比例更少。(3)使用工具变量法和联立方程计量方法消除变量的内生性之后发现,公司独立董事比例不对公司的业绩造成显著影响。
本文提出一个分析中国上市公司大股东存在下的董事会结构的理论模型框架,从大股东的视角来研究董事会结构问题,从理论上阐释大股东对董事会结构的控制程度,对丰富公司治理理论具有一定的理论意义;本文探讨单个大股东及多个大股东之间存在监督和合谋关系时对公司董事会结构的影响,通过多种方法对比研究控制变量的内生性之后董事会运作对公司业绩的影响程度,并利用中国上市公司的数据对理论模型进行了实证检验,弥补了该方面研究内容的空白,对增强董事会的独立性,提高监管效率,有效保护小股东的利益不受大股东的侵害,促进资本市场的规范化运作具有一定的实践意义。
In a more effective and more mature market economy, Especially in British and American where the ownership are more dispersed, Board of Trustees is recognized as an important internal corporate governance mechanism, and is increasingly becoming the core of corporate governance. Along with the development of principal-agent theory and the contract theory, especially since Hermalin and Weisbach’s paper which named“Endogenously Chosen Boards of Directors and Their Monitoring of the CEO”, published in 1998, foreign scholars have done a lot of studies on the operation model of the Board of Trustees, which aimed at the more mature market and more dispersed ownership. And now this area has become a hot field in micro-finance research. To explain and find the internal mechanism of the formation of the Board of Trustees, and the relevance between the board structure and performance of the company, a lot of studies have been done on different capital markets and from different angles. These studies mainly focus on the direction of the Board of Managers, the intrinsic link between optimal structure of the Board of Trustees and the trends of the Board governance, etc., which greatly promote the perfection and development of theoretical model on Board of Trustees.
The ownership concentration of China's listed companies is relatively high, and existence of large shareholders is a universal phenomenon, large shareholders often use their high voting rights of shareholders to control the General Assembly, and therefore control the composition and structure of its board, so companies’CEOs are often the wills of large shareholders, meanwhile the composition of corporate boards also to a large extent controlled by large shareholders. Therefore, it is necessary to study board structure model and its operation mechanism of China's listed companies from a perspective of major shareholder. Compared to the huge number of empirical studied on the Board of Trustees, the theoretical model is still very small, which provides a broad space for this study.
As a starting point, the study gives an in-depth analysis of the system and background of the Board of Trustees. Firstly, this study uses a model which based on the seize on small shareholders of large shareholders to depict Board structure of the listed company when there is a large share holder, and uses the data of listed companies from 1999 to 2005 in China to empirically examine and value the result of the model. Then, this study continues to expand the original model assumptions, on the basis of the single largest shareholder we introduce a number of large shareholders, and then the study uses the overall data and data separated by policy zone to empirically examine the result of the model. How the structure of the Board affects the performance of the company, especially how the proportion of independent directors affects company performance? The conclusions of the study are not coincident. It is mainly due to the study on the endogeneity of company's board structure is not enough, and therefore many conclusions are not reliable. Lastly, In order to get a reliable conclusion in this area, the study compares four econometric approaches to study the performance of the system of independent directors, especially when the endogenous variables are considered.
In this paper, after a lot of theoretical model derive work and empirical studies, the main findings and conclusions include: (1) When there is a single large shareholder, for the purpose of invading the value of the company, the large shareholder will use some ways to control the Board of Trustees, so as to their actions can pass the oversight of the board smoothly. These ways mainly include: According with the increase of the proportion of shareholders, which the proportion of outside directors appointed by the large shareholder increases, meanwhile, the proportion of internal directors also increase, however, the proportion of independent directors dose not affected -- in light of China's policies, it means that the large shareholder trend to suppress the proportion of independent directors to the of the bottom line prescribed by the policy. (2) When there are a number of large shareholders, the composition of the board is the result of the trial of the major shareholders, the Empirical result Reveals: the proportion of outside directors appointed by the first large shareholder increases by the increase of the first shareholder proportion, and decreases by the increase of the second shareholder proportion; So do the proportion of outside directors; And the proportion of independent directors increases by the increase of the second shareholder proportion; When the first shareholder and the second shareholder both are state-owned, the proportion of outside directors appointed by the first large shareholder is higher, and the proportion of outside directors is higher, but the proportion of independent directors is lower. (3) After I eliminate the endogenous variable with instrument variables and simultaneous equations measurement methods, I find the proportion of independent directors does not have a significant impact to the company’s performance.
The study makes a model framework to study of structure of the Board of Trustees under the existing of large shareholders of listed companies, studies the structure of Board from a view of the existing of large shareholders, and theoretically explains the degree of large shareholder control on board structure, which has some theoretical significance in enriching corporate governance theory. This study discusses the effect of monitoring and colluding relationship between large shareholders on the structure of the company's board, and uses multiple methods to controls the endogeneity of variables to contrastingly study the performance of the operation of the broad, and uses the data of China’s listed companies to empirically examines the result of the model, compensates the blank for the research area, which has certain practical significance in enhancing the Board's independence, improving the efficiency of supervision, protecting the interests of small shareholders from large shareholders, and promoting the standardization of the capital market.
我国上市公司股权集中度较高,普遍存在大股东,大股东往往会利用自己在股东大会上高投票权控制股东大会,由此控制董事会的组成与结构,因此公司的CEO人选往往是公司大股东意愿的体现,同时公司董事会的组成又较大程度地受到大股东的控制。因此从大股东视角出发,对中国上市公司的董事会结构模型及其运作机理进行研究是很有必要的。相对于大量的董事会方面的实证研究来说,相关的理论模型研究还是非常少,这为本文的研究提供广阔的空间。
本文从深入分析董事会制度及其背景作为研究的出发点,首先基于大股东对小股东利益的侵占动机构建基本模型,刻画在单个大股东存在情况下,我国上市公司的董事会结构特征,并收集1999年-2005年中国上市公司的数据利用计量经济学方法对模型的结果进行了实证检验和评价。其次通过扩展基本模型的假设,在单个大股东的基础上引入多个大股东,构建多个大股东相互制衡作用下的董事会结构模型,利用混合样本和分政策区间的样本对模型进行了实证检验和分析。我国关于董事会结构对公司业绩影响尤其是独立董事比例对公司业绩影响的研究结论并不统一,主要是由于对公司董事会结构的内生性研究不够透彻,因此多数结论并不可靠。最后为了使该方面研究得出可靠的结论,本文对比了四种计量方法实证研究了控制变量内生性之后公司董事会结构对我国上市公司业绩的影响程度。
本文大量的理论模型推导和实证研究工作得到的研究结果包括:(1)当公司存在单个大股东的时候,大股东出于对公司价值的侵占动机,会利用一些途径控制公司董事会,从而使得自己的行为能顺利通过董事会的监督;这些途径主要包括,当大股东比例增加的时候,由其选派的外部董事比例也随之增加,同时内部董事比例也会增加,但是独立董事比例却不受其影响。结合中国的政策,我们发现大股东往往会把独立董事比例压低到政策规定的底线。(2)当公司存在多个大股东的时候,公司董事的组成依赖于大股东之间利益的较量。实证显示,公司董事会中由第一大股东选派的外部董事比例随着第一大股东持股比例的增加而增加,随着第二大股东持股比例的增加而减少;公司中内部董事比例随着第一大股东持股比例的增加而增加,随着第二大股东持股比例的增加而减少;公司董事会中独立董事比例随着第二大股东持股比例的增加而增加;当公司第一大股东和第二大股东都是国有股的时候,由第一大股东选派的外部董事比例更大,内部董事比例也更大,而独立董事的比例更少。(3)使用工具变量法和联立方程计量方法消除变量的内生性之后发现,公司独立董事比例不对公司的业绩造成显著影响。
本文提出一个分析中国上市公司大股东存在下的董事会结构的理论模型框架,从大股东的视角来研究董事会结构问题,从理论上阐释大股东对董事会结构的控制程度,对丰富公司治理理论具有一定的理论意义;本文探讨单个大股东及多个大股东之间存在监督和合谋关系时对公司董事会结构的影响,通过多种方法对比研究控制变量的内生性之后董事会运作对公司业绩的影响程度,并利用中国上市公司的数据对理论模型进行了实证检验,弥补了该方面研究内容的空白,对增强董事会的独立性,提高监管效率,有效保护小股东的利益不受大股东的侵害,促进资本市场的规范化运作具有一定的实践意义。
In a more effective and more mature market economy, Especially in British and American where the ownership are more dispersed, Board of Trustees is recognized as an important internal corporate governance mechanism, and is increasingly becoming the core of corporate governance. Along with the development of principal-agent theory and the contract theory, especially since Hermalin and Weisbach’s paper which named“Endogenously Chosen Boards of Directors and Their Monitoring of the CEO”, published in 1998, foreign scholars have done a lot of studies on the operation model of the Board of Trustees, which aimed at the more mature market and more dispersed ownership. And now this area has become a hot field in micro-finance research. To explain and find the internal mechanism of the formation of the Board of Trustees, and the relevance between the board structure and performance of the company, a lot of studies have been done on different capital markets and from different angles. These studies mainly focus on the direction of the Board of Managers, the intrinsic link between optimal structure of the Board of Trustees and the trends of the Board governance, etc., which greatly promote the perfection and development of theoretical model on Board of Trustees.
The ownership concentration of China's listed companies is relatively high, and existence of large shareholders is a universal phenomenon, large shareholders often use their high voting rights of shareholders to control the General Assembly, and therefore control the composition and structure of its board, so companies’CEOs are often the wills of large shareholders, meanwhile the composition of corporate boards also to a large extent controlled by large shareholders. Therefore, it is necessary to study board structure model and its operation mechanism of China's listed companies from a perspective of major shareholder. Compared to the huge number of empirical studied on the Board of Trustees, the theoretical model is still very small, which provides a broad space for this study.
As a starting point, the study gives an in-depth analysis of the system and background of the Board of Trustees. Firstly, this study uses a model which based on the seize on small shareholders of large shareholders to depict Board structure of the listed company when there is a large share holder, and uses the data of listed companies from 1999 to 2005 in China to empirically examine and value the result of the model. Then, this study continues to expand the original model assumptions, on the basis of the single largest shareholder we introduce a number of large shareholders, and then the study uses the overall data and data separated by policy zone to empirically examine the result of the model. How the structure of the Board affects the performance of the company, especially how the proportion of independent directors affects company performance? The conclusions of the study are not coincident. It is mainly due to the study on the endogeneity of company's board structure is not enough, and therefore many conclusions are not reliable. Lastly, In order to get a reliable conclusion in this area, the study compares four econometric approaches to study the performance of the system of independent directors, especially when the endogenous variables are considered.
In this paper, after a lot of theoretical model derive work and empirical studies, the main findings and conclusions include: (1) When there is a single large shareholder, for the purpose of invading the value of the company, the large shareholder will use some ways to control the Board of Trustees, so as to their actions can pass the oversight of the board smoothly. These ways mainly include: According with the increase of the proportion of shareholders, which the proportion of outside directors appointed by the large shareholder increases, meanwhile, the proportion of internal directors also increase, however, the proportion of independent directors dose not affected -- in light of China's policies, it means that the large shareholder trend to suppress the proportion of independent directors to the of the bottom line prescribed by the policy. (2) When there are a number of large shareholders, the composition of the board is the result of the trial of the major shareholders, the Empirical result Reveals: the proportion of outside directors appointed by the first large shareholder increases by the increase of the first shareholder proportion, and decreases by the increase of the second shareholder proportion; So do the proportion of outside directors; And the proportion of independent directors increases by the increase of the second shareholder proportion; When the first shareholder and the second shareholder both are state-owned, the proportion of outside directors appointed by the first large shareholder is higher, and the proportion of outside directors is higher, but the proportion of independent directors is lower. (3) After I eliminate the endogenous variable with instrument variables and simultaneous equations measurement methods, I find the proportion of independent directors does not have a significant impact to the company’s performance.
The study makes a model framework to study of structure of the Board of Trustees under the existing of large shareholders of listed companies, studies the structure of Board from a view of the existing of large shareholders, and theoretically explains the degree of large shareholder control on board structure, which has some theoretical significance in enriching corporate governance theory. This study discusses the effect of monitoring and colluding relationship between large shareholders on the structure of the company's board, and uses multiple methods to controls the endogeneity of variables to contrastingly study the performance of the operation of the broad, and uses the data of China’s listed companies to empirically examines the result of the model, compensates the blank for the research area, which has certain practical significance in enhancing the Board's independence, improving the efficiency of supervision, protecting the interests of small shareholders from large shareholders, and promoting the standardization of the capital market.
引文
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