国有控股企业集团（公司）投资与股权治理决策研究
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摘要
国有控股企业集团(公司)投资与股权治理决策研究,是当前我国国有控股企业集团(公司)经营与改革过程中的一个难点问题。既要从定性上研究治理的关键措施,又要从定量上解决治理决策的技术方法问题。直接涉及到我国国有控股企业集团(公司)投资与股权治理的效果问题。
本文研究国有控股企业集团(公司)投资与股权治理决策问题。主要内容如下:首先,在分析国内外有关国有控股企业集团(公司)投资与股权治理决策理论的基础上,应用合作博弈论与非合作博弈论研究了企业集团内特殊关系投资、讨价还价、费用分摊等问题,构建了非平均政策倾向下的动态博弈模型和完全信息的动态博弈决策模型;其次,在此基础上,应用管理控制理论分析了国有控股企业集团(公司)股权控制的特点与方式,提出关于股权及上市子公司的治理措施和母公司对子公司股权的控制手段;强调我国国有企业在公司化改造过程中,通过重组资产组建国有控股公司仍是目前国有公司控股权形成的主要方式之一。再次,对股权和管理目标及人事控制决策进行了深入研究,指出母公司作为上市公司的控股股东和整个集团的最高决策管理者,必须对上市公司的重大经营决策、重要人事任免、投资及收益分配予以控制。但母公司不宜直接干涉其日常经营活动。提出国有控股公司内部关联交易是整个集团协调运作重要内容的观点。最后,应用回归方法进行实证研究,选取实际样本,对股权结构进行了描述性统计分析,对股权构成性质、股权流通性与经营绩效的联系进行了回归分析,从研究我国上市公司股权结构优化问题,提出股权集中适度与持股比例合理配置等措施和建议。
Research on investment and stock right management decision of state-owned holding groups (companies) is currently a hard question in the course of management and reform of such groups or companies because it involves key measures to be taken qualitatively as well as technical approaches quantitatively, which has direct effect on results of investment and stock right management.
This dissertation makes a study of investment and stock right management decision of state-owned holding groups (companies). Its main contents are as follows: firstly, on the basis of analyzing theories regarding this questions both at home and abroad, by means of game theory, this dissertation studies such questions as internal special relationship investment, bargain as well as cost sharing, and produces dynamic gaming model with non-average policy tendency, thus making a completely information-dynamic gaming decision model; secondly, further to this, by analysing characteristics and modes of stock right control in state-owned holding companies in the light of trust-agency theory and management control theories, the dissertation come up with management measures over stock right and and subsidiaries and also with approaches that parent company can use to control subsidiaries, pointing out that in the course of reconstruction of state-owned companies, setting up state-owned holding company by reorganizing assets is still one of the main methods through state-owned companies possess controlling stock right; thirdly, this dissertation analyses sotck right, management target and personnel control decision-making as well, pointing out that as controlling stockholder and supreme decision-maker, parent company must control important decisions, appointing important positions as well as allocation of returns on investment, on the other hand, it not proper for parent company to meddle with routine management activities; fourthly, the dissertation makes an instance study by method of regression, selecting many samples, analyzing stock right structures, offering some suggestions on proper centralization of stock right and on some other issues; lastly, by combining qualitative with quantitative analysis methods, the technical support is sound and the conclusion is profound.
本文研究国有控股企业集团(公司)投资与股权治理决策问题。主要内容如下:首先,在分析国内外有关国有控股企业集团(公司)投资与股权治理决策理论的基础上,应用合作博弈论与非合作博弈论研究了企业集团内特殊关系投资、讨价还价、费用分摊等问题,构建了非平均政策倾向下的动态博弈模型和完全信息的动态博弈决策模型;其次,在此基础上,应用管理控制理论分析了国有控股企业集团(公司)股权控制的特点与方式,提出关于股权及上市子公司的治理措施和母公司对子公司股权的控制手段;强调我国国有企业在公司化改造过程中,通过重组资产组建国有控股公司仍是目前国有公司控股权形成的主要方式之一。再次,对股权和管理目标及人事控制决策进行了深入研究,指出母公司作为上市公司的控股股东和整个集团的最高决策管理者,必须对上市公司的重大经营决策、重要人事任免、投资及收益分配予以控制。但母公司不宜直接干涉其日常经营活动。提出国有控股公司内部关联交易是整个集团协调运作重要内容的观点。最后,应用回归方法进行实证研究,选取实际样本,对股权结构进行了描述性统计分析,对股权构成性质、股权流通性与经营绩效的联系进行了回归分析,从研究我国上市公司股权结构优化问题,提出股权集中适度与持股比例合理配置等措施和建议。
Research on investment and stock right management decision of state-owned holding groups (companies) is currently a hard question in the course of management and reform of such groups or companies because it involves key measures to be taken qualitatively as well as technical approaches quantitatively, which has direct effect on results of investment and stock right management.
This dissertation makes a study of investment and stock right management decision of state-owned holding groups (companies). Its main contents are as follows: firstly, on the basis of analyzing theories regarding this questions both at home and abroad, by means of game theory, this dissertation studies such questions as internal special relationship investment, bargain as well as cost sharing, and produces dynamic gaming model with non-average policy tendency, thus making a completely information-dynamic gaming decision model; secondly, further to this, by analysing characteristics and modes of stock right control in state-owned holding companies in the light of trust-agency theory and management control theories, the dissertation come up with management measures over stock right and and subsidiaries and also with approaches that parent company can use to control subsidiaries, pointing out that in the course of reconstruction of state-owned companies, setting up state-owned holding company by reorganizing assets is still one of the main methods through state-owned companies possess controlling stock right; thirdly, this dissertation analyses sotck right, management target and personnel control decision-making as well, pointing out that as controlling stockholder and supreme decision-maker, parent company must control important decisions, appointing important positions as well as allocation of returns on investment, on the other hand, it not proper for parent company to meddle with routine management activities; fourthly, the dissertation makes an instance study by method of regression, selecting many samples, analyzing stock right structures, offering some suggestions on proper centralization of stock right and on some other issues; lastly, by combining qualitative with quantitative analysis methods, the technical support is sound and the conclusion is profound.
引文
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