中国上市商业银行公司治理机制研究
摘要
随着国际经济一体化进程的加快,商业银行面临的竞争压力日益增加。我国商业银行通过改制上市其治理水平已得到提升,但与国际先进商业银行相比还有很大差距。上市商业银行的经营绩效也取得了很大的提升,竞争力也以断增强,但银行绩效提升的主要原因来自经济增长带来的规模效应、垄断性市场结构和利率管制形成的高利差,随着竞争的加剧和利率的市场化改革,上市商业银行提升经营绩效的关键是改进公司治理,通过治理机制的不断完善,提高市场竞争力。这也是本文研究的出发点。中国上市商业银行公司治理的现状如何?国际先进商业银行公司治理的经验如何借鉴?本文试图从公司治理机制的诸多层面如产权结构、股东会、董事会、监事会、管理层等剖析我国上市商业银行公司治理存在的问题,并针对这些问题分析原因提出改进的意见和建议。
本文主要运用现代企业理论、产权理论和公司治理理论,结合商业银行公司治理的特点,首先从我国上市商业银行公司治理的现状出发,对14家上市商业银行公司治理的形成与现状进行分析,总结上市商业银行公司治理的实践,寻找公司治理中存在的问题和不足。其次分析国际商业银行公司治理的几种不同模式,在对比分析的基础上提出构建利益相关者董事会和外部监事会的新型上市商业银行公司治理模式,这也是本文的整体性观点。第三,从公司治理机制角度研究上市商业银行公司治理问题。将股权结构对公司治理机制的影响作为上市商业银行公司治理机制研究的基础,以此为基础展开研究上市商业银行公司治理机制的各个层面:以股东会为核心的股东决策机制,以董事会为重点的董事会制衡机制,以监事会为主体的监督机制,以管理层为主导的约束激励机制,以公共治理和市场约束为主的外部治理机制。
本论文研究的结构及内容如下:
第一章导论经济全球化加剧了商业银行的竞争,而改善公司治理是所有企业面临的共同课题,这是研究上市商业银行公司治理的基本背景。而研究上市商业银行公司治理的目的就在于刨析商业银行公司治理机制的作用机理,分析现实治理中存在的问题,提出有针对性的改进建议。其意义在于通过优化治理机制及治理环境提升上市商业银行公司的治理水平及绩效。
第二章商业银行公司治理基础理论上市商业银行是企业,因此研究其公司治理的基础理论是企业理论。本章首先介绍了企业理论的主要流派交易费用理论、代理理论、管家理论、管理者理论及企业的企业家—契约理论。其次分析了产权理论和超产权理论,以企业理论为基础分析公司治理问题的起源、概念及理论。最后从商业银行的特殊性出发分析商业银行公司治理的特殊性,这是研究上市商业银行公司治理的关键。
第三章中国上市商业银行公司治理机制的现状及问题本章首先分析了14家上市商业银行的历史沿革及现状,并根据上市商业银行年报数据从股权结构、股东会、董事会、监事会等治理机制等方面分析存在的问题:一是股权结构已经多元化,但仍有待优化;二是公司治理结构基本形成,但有效制衡机制尚未建立;三是激励约束机制有待完善;四是治理环境仍需优化;五是治理绩效有待提升。这些问题是以后各章研究的实证基础,同时也是提出改进意见和建议的基础。
第四章上市商业银行公司治理的国际经验本章将商业银行公司治理分为三种不同的类型:日德组织治理模式、英美市场治理模式和东南亚家族治理模式,在比较分析三种不同模式的特征、治理绩效的同时,研究其治理存在的问题,最后在比较分析的基础上提出我国上市商业银行借鉴国际经验的治理模式选择:利益相关者董事会和外部监事会。
第五章中国上市商业银行股权结构与公司治理机制分析本章将上市商业银行的股权结构分为三类:股权分散型、股权集中型和国家所有权型,并引为基础分析三种不同股权结构的公司治理特征。股权结构对公司治理机制的影响主要表现在:股权结构影响代理成本和股东利益保护的程度,而代理权竞争取决于股权结构的安排,银行兼并收购的方式取决于股权结构的类型。本章在分析中国上市商业银行股权结构状况的基础上,运用实证模型分析了上市商业银行股权结构、治理机制与治理绩效的关系,基本结论是:适度的股权分散有利于提升上市商业银行的绩效,非执行董事占比高的商业银行收益率水平较高。根据分析的结论,我国上市商业银行产权结构优化的措施主要是股权多元化、股权流通化、引入机构投资者、规范上市国有商业银行行为等。
第六章中国上市商业银行股东会决策机制改进本章首先界定了上市商业银行股东决策权,股东决策机制是治理机制的起点,因此本章研究股东决策权及股东大会决策机制,并对我国上市商业银行股东会决策的实际情况进行实证分析。本章提出从四个方面改进上市商业银行股东会决策机制:一是保护中小股东的利益的治理机制;二是明确股东大会权限的约束机制;三是建立股东大会的召集的制衡机制;四是建立股东诉讼维权机制。
第七章中国上市商业银行董事会制衡机制选择本章首先董事会规模、构成、会议频率及CEO机制四方面分析董事会的运作机制,这些机制形成了董事会的运作机制。以运作机制为基础从四种机制分析董事会的制衡机制:董事会权利义务制衡机能、功能制衡机制、结构制衡机制和专业服务制衡机制。通过以上研究提出改善董事会制衡机制的措施:建立利益相关者为主的董事会独立运作机制;建立职业化的董事激励机制;发挥独立董事的作用;董事会的自我评估和外部评估。
第八章中国上市商业银行监事会监督机制的形成与实施本章首先从历史和理论的角度分析监事制度的形成与发展,在此基础上根据上市商业银行的实际分析监事会的治理机制,这一机制包括监事会设立机制、独立监督机制和全面监督机制。而完善上市商业银行的监事会的监督机制必须将监督权配置制度化,并在此基础上明确监事会监督的职责,形成外部化、职业化、契约化的监事会监督机制。
第九章中国上市商业银行管理层约束激励机制完善本章分析了商业银行管理层在公司治理机制中的功能,以委托代理关系为基础研究激励约束理论及机制,并将薪酬体系作为激励机制的重点进行研究,还探讨了上市商业银行的股票期权激励。要完善上市商业银行的约束激励机制必须建立考核评价制度,针对不同的激励层次建立多元化的激励机制,强化经理人市场的作用。
第十章中国上市商业银行外部治理机制优化股东会决策机制、董事会制衡机制、监事会监督机制和经理层的约束激励机制是上市商业银行公司治理的主要机制,但这些机制的正常运作需要外部机制的协调配合。本章从法律制度、银行监管、信息披露、公司控制权市场、经理人市场、产品市场等方面研究了优化外部治理机制的措施。
第十一章结束语本研究表明,我国上市商业银行的公司治理机制通过上市已得到明显提升,但在股权结构、治理机制的独立性、有效性方面还需要进行优化。
As the speeding up of the process of international economic integration, commercial banks have faced more and more competitive pressures. Chinese commercial banks have improved their governance levels through their processes of system reorganization and listing, however there are still big gaps between listed Chinese commercial banks and top international commercial banks. Listed commercial banks’operating performances have upgraded, and their competitiveness have enhanced, however the main reason for banks’performance improving rely on scale economy brought by national economic growth, monopolistic market structure and high interest rate difference caused by government interest control. In the process of marketing competition enhancing and interest rates oriented by the market reforming, the key to enhance listed commercial banks’performance should be improving and enhancing their corporate governance. It is important to enhance market competitiveness through continuously improvement of their governance mechanisms. This is also the foundation for writing this paper. How are current conditions of their corporate governance? How do they introduce top international commercial banks’corporate governance experiences? This paper attempts to analyze current existed problems in governance structure of listed Chinese commercial banks from multi dimensions as the property right structure, shareholders’conference, boards of directors, board of supervisors, managers, etc. And it analyzes the reasons for these problems and proposes views and suggestions to optimize them.
This paper, by applying modern enterprise theory, property right theory and corporate governance theory, and linking with commercial bank corporate governance characteristics, firstly analyses the current corporate governance conditions and formation processes of 14 listed Chinese commercial banks. It also sums up their corporate governance practices and experiences problems and deficiencies of listed commercial banks. Then it analyses several corporate governance models of international commercial bank. Based on comparative analysis, it proposes to build a new corporate governance mode organized by stakeholders’board of directors and external board of supervisors of listed commercial banks, which is general point of view of this paper. Thirdly, from the perspective of corporate governance mechanisms, it researches listed commercial banks’corporate governance problems. The paper is based on the point of view that the structure of property rights’impacts on corporate governance mechanisms is the basis for listed commercial banks’corporate governance mechanisms. Based on this view it studies corporate governance mechanisms of listed commercial banks at all levels as: shareholders’conference as the core shareholders of the decision-making mechanism, balancing mechanism of board of directors mainly formed by the board of directors, monitoring mechanism mainly formed by board of supervisors, and restricting and motivating mechanism guided by management staff.
The structure and content of this paper are as follows:
Chapter I Introduction The economic globalization has increased the competition of commercial banks and improving corporate governance is a common issue faced by all enterprises, which is the basic background for improving corporate governance. The purpose to research the corporate governance of listed commercial banks is to analyze corporate governance mechanisms of commercial banks, to reveal the existed problems, and to propose suggestions to solve them. Its significance is located at optimizing the governance mechanisms and governance environment. It will enhance listed commercial banks’standards and performance.
Chapter II Basic theories Because listed commercial banks are enterprises, therefore its basic corporate governance theory should be the theory of the firm. This paper mainly refers to the main schools of theories of firms as transaction cost theory, agent theory, housekeeper theory, managers’theory and entrepreneurs - contract theory. Then it analyses property right theory and the beyond property right theory. It also introduces corporate governance problems’origin, concept and theories based on theory of the firm. Finally it analyses their corporate governance specialties based on the special characteristics of commercial banks, which is the key to corporate governance of listed commercial banks.
Chapter III The status quo and problems of listed commercial banks in corporate governance In this chapter, it firstly analyzes history and status quo of the 14 listed commercial banks. In accordance with the data listed on their annual reports, it analyses their problems of ownership structure, shareholders, boards of directors, board of supervisors and other aspects of governance mechanisms, which provides empirical foundation for the subsequent study.
Chapter IV International experiences of corporate governance of listed commercial banks In this chapter, it divides the types of corporate governance of commercial banks into three ones as, organization governance mode of Japan and Germany, market governance mode of UK and US, and family governance mode of Southeast Asia. While it performs a comparative analysis of the characteristics, governance performance of three different models, it studies their governance problems of listed commercial banks. It finally suggests the governance mode choice of listed Chinese commercial banks by comparative analysis based on introducing international experience.
Chapter V Property right structure and corporate governance mechanism analysis of listed commercial banks In this chapter, it classifies property right structure of listed of commercial banks into three categories as dispersed equity, focused equity and country owned. It also analyzes the characteristics of the three structure of property right corporate governance. The influence of ownership structure on corporate governance mechanism has four main areas: agency costs, protection of interests of shareholders, agent right competition, and mergers and acquisitions. Based on above classifications, this chapter analyzes commercial banks listed on the structure of property rights and corporate governance performance relationship using empirical models. Its basic conclusion is that moderate equity dispersion is in favor of enhancing the performance of listed commercial banks. Based on this analysis, it suggests measures to optimize the structure of property rights of Chinese listed commercial banks.
Chapter VI Optimize decision-making mechanism of shareholders’conference of listed commercial banks The chapter firstly defines type and nature of the rights of shareholders of the commercial banks. The rights of shareholders are the origin and base of listed commercial bank corporate governance. The shareholders’decision-making mechanisms of the listed commercial banks are the starting point for governance mechanism, therefore it is rational to study the mechanism of shareholders from the exercise of decision-making mechanism from the shareholder voting mechanism, shareholders voting rules, votes’calculation rules, voting right exercising etc. On these bases, it analyses general shareholders conference decision-making mechanism of commercial banks and it also studies empirically Chinese general shareholders conference decision-making mechanism of commercial banks. From above analysis, this chapter suggest to improve the shareholders’decision-making mechanisms of listed commercial banks from four aspects: First, a governance mechanism to protect the interests of small and medium-sized shareholders; second, a clearly restricting mechanism bound by the general meeting of shareholders; thirdly, setting up a balancing mechanism to convene the General Assembly of shareholders; fourthly, setting up a litigation for safe guarding shareholders’legal rights.
Chapter VII Board of directors balancing mechanism selection of listed Chinese commercial banks Beginning with the rights and obligations of Board of directors, this chapter firstly studies the relationship between directors and shareholders. Secondly from four aspects as Board of directors’scale, composition, meeting frequency and CEO mechanism, it analyses operating mechanism of the Board of Trustees formation. This mechanism has formed the Board of Directors right balancing mechanism. In order to strengthen the independence of the board of directors, it also studies the restricting mechanism of independent directors. From governance role of an independent board of directors, this chapter proposes standards to judge the independence of directors. In accordance with these standards, it also carries out an empirical study on independent directors of Chinese listed commercial banks. The establishment of standing committee of the board of directors is a fine sign for measuring its professional and detailed development for corporate governance. This chapter also studies specially the functions of standing committee of the board of directors, and also researches it empirically combined with data of listed commercial banks. Through above research, it proposes measures to improve balancing mechanism of the Board of directors as: to guarantee the independence of the board of directors; professionalization of directors; playing role of independent directors; self-assessment and external assessment of the board of directors; setting up the culture of board of directors of listed commercial banks.
Chapter VIII Forming and implementation supervising mechanisms of Supervising Board of listed Chinese commercial banks This chapter firstly of analyses Supervisors regime formation and development from historical and theoretical perspectives, on the basis of above researches and in accordance with the actual condition of the board of supervisors of the governance mechanism of listed commercial banks. The mechanism should include a mechanism for establishing board of supervisors, an independent supervising mechanism and a comprehensive monitoring mechanism. Moreover, the supervising right should be institutionalized to efficient monitor. On the basis of cleared duties of the board of supervisors, it should create an external, professional, and contract-based mechanism for the board of supervisors.
Chapter IX Completing restricting and stimulating mechanism of listed Chinese commercial banks’management staff This chapter analyses the rights and obligations of commercial banks’managers, based on the relationship of principal-agent, it researches basically the theory’s constraints and incentive mechanisms. It designs a restricting and stimulating model for the listed commercial banks in accordance with the principal-agent theory. It also proposes measures for this mechanism according to the established model.
Chapter X Optimizing the external environment of listed commercial banks governance mechanism The decision-making mechanism of shareholders, the board interact and balance mechanism and the board of supervisors’supervising mechanism and managers restricting mechanism are the main mechanisms of listed commercial banks’corporate governance. However the ordinal operating of these mechanisms requires the support of the external environment. This chapter studies how to optimize external environments from the aspects of the legal system, banking supervision, government actions, information disclosure, controlling market by corporations, the managers’market, and product market etc..
Chapter XI Conclusion The relevant studies have shown that the corporate governance of listed Chinese commercial banks has been improved significantly through the process of listing, however it still needs further optimizing itself in the aspects of shareholding structure, and independence and effectiveness of governance mechanism.
本文主要运用现代企业理论、产权理论和公司治理理论,结合商业银行公司治理的特点,首先从我国上市商业银行公司治理的现状出发,对14家上市商业银行公司治理的形成与现状进行分析,总结上市商业银行公司治理的实践,寻找公司治理中存在的问题和不足。其次分析国际商业银行公司治理的几种不同模式,在对比分析的基础上提出构建利益相关者董事会和外部监事会的新型上市商业银行公司治理模式,这也是本文的整体性观点。第三,从公司治理机制角度研究上市商业银行公司治理问题。将股权结构对公司治理机制的影响作为上市商业银行公司治理机制研究的基础,以此为基础展开研究上市商业银行公司治理机制的各个层面:以股东会为核心的股东决策机制,以董事会为重点的董事会制衡机制,以监事会为主体的监督机制,以管理层为主导的约束激励机制,以公共治理和市场约束为主的外部治理机制。
本论文研究的结构及内容如下:
第一章导论经济全球化加剧了商业银行的竞争,而改善公司治理是所有企业面临的共同课题,这是研究上市商业银行公司治理的基本背景。而研究上市商业银行公司治理的目的就在于刨析商业银行公司治理机制的作用机理,分析现实治理中存在的问题,提出有针对性的改进建议。其意义在于通过优化治理机制及治理环境提升上市商业银行公司的治理水平及绩效。
第二章商业银行公司治理基础理论上市商业银行是企业,因此研究其公司治理的基础理论是企业理论。本章首先介绍了企业理论的主要流派交易费用理论、代理理论、管家理论、管理者理论及企业的企业家—契约理论。其次分析了产权理论和超产权理论,以企业理论为基础分析公司治理问题的起源、概念及理论。最后从商业银行的特殊性出发分析商业银行公司治理的特殊性,这是研究上市商业银行公司治理的关键。
第三章中国上市商业银行公司治理机制的现状及问题本章首先分析了14家上市商业银行的历史沿革及现状,并根据上市商业银行年报数据从股权结构、股东会、董事会、监事会等治理机制等方面分析存在的问题:一是股权结构已经多元化,但仍有待优化;二是公司治理结构基本形成,但有效制衡机制尚未建立;三是激励约束机制有待完善;四是治理环境仍需优化;五是治理绩效有待提升。这些问题是以后各章研究的实证基础,同时也是提出改进意见和建议的基础。
第四章上市商业银行公司治理的国际经验本章将商业银行公司治理分为三种不同的类型:日德组织治理模式、英美市场治理模式和东南亚家族治理模式,在比较分析三种不同模式的特征、治理绩效的同时,研究其治理存在的问题,最后在比较分析的基础上提出我国上市商业银行借鉴国际经验的治理模式选择:利益相关者董事会和外部监事会。
第五章中国上市商业银行股权结构与公司治理机制分析本章将上市商业银行的股权结构分为三类:股权分散型、股权集中型和国家所有权型,并引为基础分析三种不同股权结构的公司治理特征。股权结构对公司治理机制的影响主要表现在:股权结构影响代理成本和股东利益保护的程度,而代理权竞争取决于股权结构的安排,银行兼并收购的方式取决于股权结构的类型。本章在分析中国上市商业银行股权结构状况的基础上,运用实证模型分析了上市商业银行股权结构、治理机制与治理绩效的关系,基本结论是:适度的股权分散有利于提升上市商业银行的绩效,非执行董事占比高的商业银行收益率水平较高。根据分析的结论,我国上市商业银行产权结构优化的措施主要是股权多元化、股权流通化、引入机构投资者、规范上市国有商业银行行为等。
第六章中国上市商业银行股东会决策机制改进本章首先界定了上市商业银行股东决策权,股东决策机制是治理机制的起点,因此本章研究股东决策权及股东大会决策机制,并对我国上市商业银行股东会决策的实际情况进行实证分析。本章提出从四个方面改进上市商业银行股东会决策机制:一是保护中小股东的利益的治理机制;二是明确股东大会权限的约束机制;三是建立股东大会的召集的制衡机制;四是建立股东诉讼维权机制。
第七章中国上市商业银行董事会制衡机制选择本章首先董事会规模、构成、会议频率及CEO机制四方面分析董事会的运作机制,这些机制形成了董事会的运作机制。以运作机制为基础从四种机制分析董事会的制衡机制:董事会权利义务制衡机能、功能制衡机制、结构制衡机制和专业服务制衡机制。通过以上研究提出改善董事会制衡机制的措施:建立利益相关者为主的董事会独立运作机制;建立职业化的董事激励机制;发挥独立董事的作用;董事会的自我评估和外部评估。
第八章中国上市商业银行监事会监督机制的形成与实施本章首先从历史和理论的角度分析监事制度的形成与发展,在此基础上根据上市商业银行的实际分析监事会的治理机制,这一机制包括监事会设立机制、独立监督机制和全面监督机制。而完善上市商业银行的监事会的监督机制必须将监督权配置制度化,并在此基础上明确监事会监督的职责,形成外部化、职业化、契约化的监事会监督机制。
第九章中国上市商业银行管理层约束激励机制完善本章分析了商业银行管理层在公司治理机制中的功能,以委托代理关系为基础研究激励约束理论及机制,并将薪酬体系作为激励机制的重点进行研究,还探讨了上市商业银行的股票期权激励。要完善上市商业银行的约束激励机制必须建立考核评价制度,针对不同的激励层次建立多元化的激励机制,强化经理人市场的作用。
第十章中国上市商业银行外部治理机制优化股东会决策机制、董事会制衡机制、监事会监督机制和经理层的约束激励机制是上市商业银行公司治理的主要机制,但这些机制的正常运作需要外部机制的协调配合。本章从法律制度、银行监管、信息披露、公司控制权市场、经理人市场、产品市场等方面研究了优化外部治理机制的措施。
第十一章结束语本研究表明,我国上市商业银行的公司治理机制通过上市已得到明显提升,但在股权结构、治理机制的独立性、有效性方面还需要进行优化。
As the speeding up of the process of international economic integration, commercial banks have faced more and more competitive pressures. Chinese commercial banks have improved their governance levels through their processes of system reorganization and listing, however there are still big gaps between listed Chinese commercial banks and top international commercial banks. Listed commercial banks’operating performances have upgraded, and their competitiveness have enhanced, however the main reason for banks’performance improving rely on scale economy brought by national economic growth, monopolistic market structure and high interest rate difference caused by government interest control. In the process of marketing competition enhancing and interest rates oriented by the market reforming, the key to enhance listed commercial banks’performance should be improving and enhancing their corporate governance. It is important to enhance market competitiveness through continuously improvement of their governance mechanisms. This is also the foundation for writing this paper. How are current conditions of their corporate governance? How do they introduce top international commercial banks’corporate governance experiences? This paper attempts to analyze current existed problems in governance structure of listed Chinese commercial banks from multi dimensions as the property right structure, shareholders’conference, boards of directors, board of supervisors, managers, etc. And it analyzes the reasons for these problems and proposes views and suggestions to optimize them.
This paper, by applying modern enterprise theory, property right theory and corporate governance theory, and linking with commercial bank corporate governance characteristics, firstly analyses the current corporate governance conditions and formation processes of 14 listed Chinese commercial banks. It also sums up their corporate governance practices and experiences problems and deficiencies of listed commercial banks. Then it analyses several corporate governance models of international commercial bank. Based on comparative analysis, it proposes to build a new corporate governance mode organized by stakeholders’board of directors and external board of supervisors of listed commercial banks, which is general point of view of this paper. Thirdly, from the perspective of corporate governance mechanisms, it researches listed commercial banks’corporate governance problems. The paper is based on the point of view that the structure of property rights’impacts on corporate governance mechanisms is the basis for listed commercial banks’corporate governance mechanisms. Based on this view it studies corporate governance mechanisms of listed commercial banks at all levels as: shareholders’conference as the core shareholders of the decision-making mechanism, balancing mechanism of board of directors mainly formed by the board of directors, monitoring mechanism mainly formed by board of supervisors, and restricting and motivating mechanism guided by management staff.
The structure and content of this paper are as follows:
Chapter I Introduction The economic globalization has increased the competition of commercial banks and improving corporate governance is a common issue faced by all enterprises, which is the basic background for improving corporate governance. The purpose to research the corporate governance of listed commercial banks is to analyze corporate governance mechanisms of commercial banks, to reveal the existed problems, and to propose suggestions to solve them. Its significance is located at optimizing the governance mechanisms and governance environment. It will enhance listed commercial banks’standards and performance.
Chapter II Basic theories Because listed commercial banks are enterprises, therefore its basic corporate governance theory should be the theory of the firm. This paper mainly refers to the main schools of theories of firms as transaction cost theory, agent theory, housekeeper theory, managers’theory and entrepreneurs - contract theory. Then it analyses property right theory and the beyond property right theory. It also introduces corporate governance problems’origin, concept and theories based on theory of the firm. Finally it analyses their corporate governance specialties based on the special characteristics of commercial banks, which is the key to corporate governance of listed commercial banks.
Chapter III The status quo and problems of listed commercial banks in corporate governance In this chapter, it firstly analyzes history and status quo of the 14 listed commercial banks. In accordance with the data listed on their annual reports, it analyses their problems of ownership structure, shareholders, boards of directors, board of supervisors and other aspects of governance mechanisms, which provides empirical foundation for the subsequent study.
Chapter IV International experiences of corporate governance of listed commercial banks In this chapter, it divides the types of corporate governance of commercial banks into three ones as, organization governance mode of Japan and Germany, market governance mode of UK and US, and family governance mode of Southeast Asia. While it performs a comparative analysis of the characteristics, governance performance of three different models, it studies their governance problems of listed commercial banks. It finally suggests the governance mode choice of listed Chinese commercial banks by comparative analysis based on introducing international experience.
Chapter V Property right structure and corporate governance mechanism analysis of listed commercial banks In this chapter, it classifies property right structure of listed of commercial banks into three categories as dispersed equity, focused equity and country owned. It also analyzes the characteristics of the three structure of property right corporate governance. The influence of ownership structure on corporate governance mechanism has four main areas: agency costs, protection of interests of shareholders, agent right competition, and mergers and acquisitions. Based on above classifications, this chapter analyzes commercial banks listed on the structure of property rights and corporate governance performance relationship using empirical models. Its basic conclusion is that moderate equity dispersion is in favor of enhancing the performance of listed commercial banks. Based on this analysis, it suggests measures to optimize the structure of property rights of Chinese listed commercial banks.
Chapter VI Optimize decision-making mechanism of shareholders’conference of listed commercial banks The chapter firstly defines type and nature of the rights of shareholders of the commercial banks. The rights of shareholders are the origin and base of listed commercial bank corporate governance. The shareholders’decision-making mechanisms of the listed commercial banks are the starting point for governance mechanism, therefore it is rational to study the mechanism of shareholders from the exercise of decision-making mechanism from the shareholder voting mechanism, shareholders voting rules, votes’calculation rules, voting right exercising etc. On these bases, it analyses general shareholders conference decision-making mechanism of commercial banks and it also studies empirically Chinese general shareholders conference decision-making mechanism of commercial banks. From above analysis, this chapter suggest to improve the shareholders’decision-making mechanisms of listed commercial banks from four aspects: First, a governance mechanism to protect the interests of small and medium-sized shareholders; second, a clearly restricting mechanism bound by the general meeting of shareholders; thirdly, setting up a balancing mechanism to convene the General Assembly of shareholders; fourthly, setting up a litigation for safe guarding shareholders’legal rights.
Chapter VII Board of directors balancing mechanism selection of listed Chinese commercial banks Beginning with the rights and obligations of Board of directors, this chapter firstly studies the relationship between directors and shareholders. Secondly from four aspects as Board of directors’scale, composition, meeting frequency and CEO mechanism, it analyses operating mechanism of the Board of Trustees formation. This mechanism has formed the Board of Directors right balancing mechanism. In order to strengthen the independence of the board of directors, it also studies the restricting mechanism of independent directors. From governance role of an independent board of directors, this chapter proposes standards to judge the independence of directors. In accordance with these standards, it also carries out an empirical study on independent directors of Chinese listed commercial banks. The establishment of standing committee of the board of directors is a fine sign for measuring its professional and detailed development for corporate governance. This chapter also studies specially the functions of standing committee of the board of directors, and also researches it empirically combined with data of listed commercial banks. Through above research, it proposes measures to improve balancing mechanism of the Board of directors as: to guarantee the independence of the board of directors; professionalization of directors; playing role of independent directors; self-assessment and external assessment of the board of directors; setting up the culture of board of directors of listed commercial banks.
Chapter VIII Forming and implementation supervising mechanisms of Supervising Board of listed Chinese commercial banks This chapter firstly of analyses Supervisors regime formation and development from historical and theoretical perspectives, on the basis of above researches and in accordance with the actual condition of the board of supervisors of the governance mechanism of listed commercial banks. The mechanism should include a mechanism for establishing board of supervisors, an independent supervising mechanism and a comprehensive monitoring mechanism. Moreover, the supervising right should be institutionalized to efficient monitor. On the basis of cleared duties of the board of supervisors, it should create an external, professional, and contract-based mechanism for the board of supervisors.
Chapter IX Completing restricting and stimulating mechanism of listed Chinese commercial banks’management staff This chapter analyses the rights and obligations of commercial banks’managers, based on the relationship of principal-agent, it researches basically the theory’s constraints and incentive mechanisms. It designs a restricting and stimulating model for the listed commercial banks in accordance with the principal-agent theory. It also proposes measures for this mechanism according to the established model.
Chapter X Optimizing the external environment of listed commercial banks governance mechanism The decision-making mechanism of shareholders, the board interact and balance mechanism and the board of supervisors’supervising mechanism and managers restricting mechanism are the main mechanisms of listed commercial banks’corporate governance. However the ordinal operating of these mechanisms requires the support of the external environment. This chapter studies how to optimize external environments from the aspects of the legal system, banking supervision, government actions, information disclosure, controlling market by corporations, the managers’market, and product market etc..
Chapter XI Conclusion The relevant studies have shown that the corporate governance of listed Chinese commercial banks has been improved significantly through the process of listing, however it still needs further optimizing itself in the aspects of shareholding structure, and independence and effectiveness of governance mechanism.
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