风险沟通与公司价值关系研究
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摘要
企业风险管理已经成为公司经营和发展不可或缺的重要组成部分。特别是度过2008年全球金融危机，进入后危机时代，越来越多的公司开始致力于充分发挥企业风险管理对公司运营的积极效果，同时风险管理经理已经成为公司文化和商业实践的重要角色。但风险管理的有效性与公司高级管理层的期望依然不符，同时受到网路迅速发展的影响，公司价值极易受到信息传递的影响，上市公司表现为股票价格的剧烈、频繁波动。这源于公司对风险沟通缺乏充分的认识和有效的利用。“风险沟通”最早出现在社会学和公共管理学领域，《企业风险管理——整合框架》将其作为要素内容出现在企业风险管理领域。然而，学术界关于企业风险管理的研究主要集中在公司治理、风险评估以及企业文化等方面，风险沟通的作用并没有得到足够的重视，难以对企业的风险管理实施提供足够的支持。在这种情况下，准确概括风险沟通内涵，分析风险沟通对公司价值的作用机理，探究风险沟通方式之间的联系，研究不同市场细分方式下的我国上市公司风险沟通与公司价值关系，为上市公司改善企业风险管理提供建议，已成为一个既有价值又急需解决的课题。
论文在总结了企业风险管理的定义、目标、要素组成和兼容框架等的基础上，通过综述国内外多位学者的研究成果，对公司治理、内部控制与风险管理进行了比较，并指出风险沟通所处的位置和作用。进而提出了风险沟通涵义，论述了风险沟通发展的历程。论文采用了理论分析与实证分析相结合、实证分析与规范分析相结合的方法来分析风险沟通与公司价值的影响关系。
论文首先从不对称信息经济学中委托代理模型与信号传递模型引入，以非完全信息模型为基础，通过新的理论假设，推导风险沟通影响公司价值的机理。有效的风险沟通可以减少信息交流中的噪音，影响公司的生产技术参数，通过降低风险暴露系数和公司价值方差，降低公司资本成本、Beta值和影子成本，进而提升公司价值。其次，论文总结了风险沟通的过程，依据过程的四个步骤和信息直观性判断，可以将风险沟通分为隐性与显性两种方式，并分别选取审计师选择和投资者关系管理作为主要指标变量，讨论了实证研究中的计量方法和公司价值的表示方式。
在以上理论模型推导和实证变量选择的基础上，本文主要从三个方面对风险沟通与公司价值关系进行了具体的实证研究。
首先，风险沟通的显性方式与隐性方式对公司价值的影响。本文选取我国上市公司的截面数据，运用结构方程实证检验了理论模型的“有效风险沟通可以提升公司价值”的结论，同时结果显示风险沟通显性方式对隐性方式也存在正向影响。为了进一步探讨两者对公司价值的影响差异，使用我国上市公司面板数据，分别从市场价值、盈利能力和股本扩张能力三个角度进行验证，结果表明风险沟通显性方式对公司价值的影响程度要强于隐性方式。
其次，不同控制权企业的风险沟通与公司价值的关系。选择公司控制程度和控制权性质两个分类标准，采用因子分析处理变量，并重新构建了回归方程，运用我国上市公司面板数据验证了企业目标和股权结构的差异会导致风险沟通的不同效果。控制权越高的公司，显性方式对公司市场价值的影响越显著，而隐性方式只与管理层控制公司的公司价值存在正相关性。地方国有企业的风险沟通显著性较弱，中央国有企业主要受到显性方式的影响。
再次，不同市场化程度企业的风险沟通与公司价值的关系。将市场化指数、政府干预指数和法治水平指数变量引入实证模型，采用逐步回归的方法进行分析。结果显示在政府干预较少的地区，投资者关系管理不佳的公司倾向于选择高质量审计师；投资者关系管理较好的公司则倾向于选择低质量审计师，分别通过风险沟通的显性和隐性方式向投资者传递公司治理的信号。在市场化程度较高、法制水平较高的地区，良好的财务信息披露更有助于提升投资者关系管理的效果；政府干预较多的地区则起到相反的作用。政府干预是影响公司价值最为显著的市场化因素；在政府干预较少的地区，风险沟通可以作为公司价值提升的传导机制和实现途径。
论文最后对全文主要研究结论做了总结，提出了研究启示，并进一步分析了研究的局限性和未来研究的方向。
Enterprise risk management has become an important part of the companyoperation and development. Especially through the2008global financial crisis, afterentering the crisis era, more and more companies began to fully implement efficientand effective enterprise risk management programs, while risk managers are playingan important role in the company's culture and business practices. But theeffectiveness of ERM and the company's senior management's expectations on riskmanagement still does not match, meanwhile, influenced by the rapid development ofthe Internet, the value of the company is vulnerable to the impact of informationtransfer, the listed company's stock price performance fluctuates intensely andfrequently. These stem from a lack of full understanding and effective utilizingcompany’s risk communication.‘Risk communication’ first appeared in the field ofsociology and public administration, and then it appeared in the field of enterprise riskmanagement as an element of ‘Enterprise Risk Management-Integrated Framework’.However, academic research on enterprise risk management mainly focuses oncorporate governance, risk assessment and corporate culture, the role of riskcommunication does not get enough attention, so it is difficult to provide adequatesupport for implementation of enterprise risk management. In this case, summarizingthe exact meaning of risk communication, analyzing the mechanism of riskcommunication affecting the value of the company, discussing relationship amongrisk communication methods, studying the relationship between the company valueand risk communication of China’s listed companies under different market segments,offering recommendations about improvement on listed companies’ risk management,have become valuable and urgent issues need to resolve immediately.
Based on summarizing the basic definition, objectives, elements andcompatible framework of enterprise risk management, this paper compares corporategovernance, internal control and risk management through reviewing the researchresults of a number of scholars at home and abroad, and points out location and roleof risk communication among them. Then put forward the meaning of riskcommunication, and discusses the development process of risk communication. Thispaper uses theoretical analysis and empirical analysis in combination, empirical analysis and normative analysis in combination to analyze the relationship betweenrisk communication and company value.
This paper introduces the principal-agent model and signal transmissionmodel in the asymmetry information economics at the first step, and then gives thederivation of mechanism that how risk communication affects the company's valuebased on the non-complete information model through assumption modification.Effective risk communication can reduce noise in the exchange of information,change the company's production technology parameters, such as reducing riskexpose coefficient and the variance of company value, in order to reduce thecompany's cost of capital, Beta value and the shadow costs, and thus increase thecompany value. After that, the paper summarizes the process of risk communication.Judging based on four steps of process and information intuition, risk communicationcan be divided into implicit method and explicit method. Then this paper selectsauditor choice and investor relationship management as major indicator variables, anddiscusses measurement and representation method of company value in the empiricalresearch.
On the basis of theoretical models derivation and empirical variable selectionmentioned above, this paper implements specific empirical research on relationshipbetween risk communication and company value mainly from three aspects.
Firstly, implicit method and explicit method of risk communication affect thecompany value. Selected cross-section data of listed companies in China, this paperuses the structural equation model to tests the conclusion, which is effective riskcommunication can increase the company value, while empirical research outcomeshows that explicit method has positive effects on implicit method. To furtherinvestigates the difference of effect on company value from implicit method andexplicit method, the paper uses panel data of listed companies in China to study fromthree angles of market value, profitability and capital expansion capabilityrespectively. The result shows that the degree of impact on the company value fromrisk communication explicit method is stronger than implicit method.
Secondly, the relationship between risk communication and company valueof different control rights companies. Selecting the company control degree andcontrol right nature as classification criteria, using factor analysis to process variables,and re-building the regression equation, the paper verifies the differences betweenbusiness goals and ownership structure will lead to different effects of risk communication by using panel data of China’s listed companies. Results indicates thatthe higher the control of the company, the more significant explicit method impact themarket value of the company, while implicit method positively correlated only withcompany value of company controlled by management. The significance of riskcommunication of local state-owned enterprise is weak relatively. Central state-ownedenterprises are mainly influenced by the explicit method.
Thirdly, the relationship between risk communication and company value ofdifferent marketization degrees companies. The paper puts marketization index,government intervention index and law index variables into the empirical model, anduses stepwise regression analysis method. The results shows that in the region withless government intervention, companies with poor investor relations managementtend to choose high-quality auditors; companies with good investor relationsmanagement tend to choose low-quality auditors. These actions can pass corporategovernance signal to investors through risk communication implicit method andexplicit method respectively. The higher degree of marketization and the higher levelsof legal areas, the more good financial disclosures can help to improve investorrelations management effectiveness; more regional government intervention makesopposite effect. Government intervention is the most significant impact factor on thecompany value; in the region with less government intervention, risk communicationis the transmission mechanism and implementation approaches of increasing companyvalue.
The paper gives the main conclusions at the end, meanwhile presents theinsight of the research, analysis of the limitations of the research and directions forfuture research.
论文在总结了企业风险管理的定义、目标、要素组成和兼容框架等的基础上，通过综述国内外多位学者的研究成果，对公司治理、内部控制与风险管理进行了比较，并指出风险沟通所处的位置和作用。进而提出了风险沟通涵义，论述了风险沟通发展的历程。论文采用了理论分析与实证分析相结合、实证分析与规范分析相结合的方法来分析风险沟通与公司价值的影响关系。
论文首先从不对称信息经济学中委托代理模型与信号传递模型引入，以非完全信息模型为基础，通过新的理论假设，推导风险沟通影响公司价值的机理。有效的风险沟通可以减少信息交流中的噪音，影响公司的生产技术参数，通过降低风险暴露系数和公司价值方差，降低公司资本成本、Beta值和影子成本，进而提升公司价值。其次，论文总结了风险沟通的过程，依据过程的四个步骤和信息直观性判断，可以将风险沟通分为隐性与显性两种方式，并分别选取审计师选择和投资者关系管理作为主要指标变量，讨论了实证研究中的计量方法和公司价值的表示方式。
在以上理论模型推导和实证变量选择的基础上，本文主要从三个方面对风险沟通与公司价值关系进行了具体的实证研究。
首先，风险沟通的显性方式与隐性方式对公司价值的影响。本文选取我国上市公司的截面数据，运用结构方程实证检验了理论模型的“有效风险沟通可以提升公司价值”的结论，同时结果显示风险沟通显性方式对隐性方式也存在正向影响。为了进一步探讨两者对公司价值的影响差异，使用我国上市公司面板数据，分别从市场价值、盈利能力和股本扩张能力三个角度进行验证，结果表明风险沟通显性方式对公司价值的影响程度要强于隐性方式。
其次，不同控制权企业的风险沟通与公司价值的关系。选择公司控制程度和控制权性质两个分类标准，采用因子分析处理变量，并重新构建了回归方程，运用我国上市公司面板数据验证了企业目标和股权结构的差异会导致风险沟通的不同效果。控制权越高的公司，显性方式对公司市场价值的影响越显著，而隐性方式只与管理层控制公司的公司价值存在正相关性。地方国有企业的风险沟通显著性较弱，中央国有企业主要受到显性方式的影响。
再次，不同市场化程度企业的风险沟通与公司价值的关系。将市场化指数、政府干预指数和法治水平指数变量引入实证模型，采用逐步回归的方法进行分析。结果显示在政府干预较少的地区，投资者关系管理不佳的公司倾向于选择高质量审计师；投资者关系管理较好的公司则倾向于选择低质量审计师，分别通过风险沟通的显性和隐性方式向投资者传递公司治理的信号。在市场化程度较高、法制水平较高的地区，良好的财务信息披露更有助于提升投资者关系管理的效果；政府干预较多的地区则起到相反的作用。政府干预是影响公司价值最为显著的市场化因素；在政府干预较少的地区，风险沟通可以作为公司价值提升的传导机制和实现途径。
论文最后对全文主要研究结论做了总结，提出了研究启示，并进一步分析了研究的局限性和未来研究的方向。
Enterprise risk management has become an important part of the companyoperation and development. Especially through the2008global financial crisis, afterentering the crisis era, more and more companies began to fully implement efficientand effective enterprise risk management programs, while risk managers are playingan important role in the company's culture and business practices. But theeffectiveness of ERM and the company's senior management's expectations on riskmanagement still does not match, meanwhile, influenced by the rapid development ofthe Internet, the value of the company is vulnerable to the impact of informationtransfer, the listed company's stock price performance fluctuates intensely andfrequently. These stem from a lack of full understanding and effective utilizingcompany’s risk communication.‘Risk communication’ first appeared in the field ofsociology and public administration, and then it appeared in the field of enterprise riskmanagement as an element of ‘Enterprise Risk Management-Integrated Framework’.However, academic research on enterprise risk management mainly focuses oncorporate governance, risk assessment and corporate culture, the role of riskcommunication does not get enough attention, so it is difficult to provide adequatesupport for implementation of enterprise risk management. In this case, summarizingthe exact meaning of risk communication, analyzing the mechanism of riskcommunication affecting the value of the company, discussing relationship amongrisk communication methods, studying the relationship between the company valueand risk communication of China’s listed companies under different market segments,offering recommendations about improvement on listed companies’ risk management,have become valuable and urgent issues need to resolve immediately.
Based on summarizing the basic definition, objectives, elements andcompatible framework of enterprise risk management, this paper compares corporategovernance, internal control and risk management through reviewing the researchresults of a number of scholars at home and abroad, and points out location and roleof risk communication among them. Then put forward the meaning of riskcommunication, and discusses the development process of risk communication. Thispaper uses theoretical analysis and empirical analysis in combination, empirical analysis and normative analysis in combination to analyze the relationship betweenrisk communication and company value.
This paper introduces the principal-agent model and signal transmissionmodel in the asymmetry information economics at the first step, and then gives thederivation of mechanism that how risk communication affects the company's valuebased on the non-complete information model through assumption modification.Effective risk communication can reduce noise in the exchange of information,change the company's production technology parameters, such as reducing riskexpose coefficient and the variance of company value, in order to reduce thecompany's cost of capital, Beta value and the shadow costs, and thus increase thecompany value. After that, the paper summarizes the process of risk communication.Judging based on four steps of process and information intuition, risk communicationcan be divided into implicit method and explicit method. Then this paper selectsauditor choice and investor relationship management as major indicator variables, anddiscusses measurement and representation method of company value in the empiricalresearch.
On the basis of theoretical models derivation and empirical variable selectionmentioned above, this paper implements specific empirical research on relationshipbetween risk communication and company value mainly from three aspects.
Firstly, implicit method and explicit method of risk communication affect thecompany value. Selected cross-section data of listed companies in China, this paperuses the structural equation model to tests the conclusion, which is effective riskcommunication can increase the company value, while empirical research outcomeshows that explicit method has positive effects on implicit method. To furtherinvestigates the difference of effect on company value from implicit method andexplicit method, the paper uses panel data of listed companies in China to study fromthree angles of market value, profitability and capital expansion capabilityrespectively. The result shows that the degree of impact on the company value fromrisk communication explicit method is stronger than implicit method.
Secondly, the relationship between risk communication and company valueof different control rights companies. Selecting the company control degree andcontrol right nature as classification criteria, using factor analysis to process variables,and re-building the regression equation, the paper verifies the differences betweenbusiness goals and ownership structure will lead to different effects of risk communication by using panel data of China’s listed companies. Results indicates thatthe higher the control of the company, the more significant explicit method impact themarket value of the company, while implicit method positively correlated only withcompany value of company controlled by management. The significance of riskcommunication of local state-owned enterprise is weak relatively. Central state-ownedenterprises are mainly influenced by the explicit method.
Thirdly, the relationship between risk communication and company value ofdifferent marketization degrees companies. The paper puts marketization index,government intervention index and law index variables into the empirical model, anduses stepwise regression analysis method. The results shows that in the region withless government intervention, companies with poor investor relations managementtend to choose high-quality auditors; companies with good investor relationsmanagement tend to choose low-quality auditors. These actions can pass corporategovernance signal to investors through risk communication implicit method andexplicit method respectively. The higher degree of marketization and the higher levelsof legal areas, the more good financial disclosures can help to improve investorrelations management effectiveness; more regional government intervention makesopposite effect. Government intervention is the most significant impact factor on thecompany value; in the region with less government intervention, risk communicationis the transmission mechanism and implementation approaches of increasing companyvalue.
The paper gives the main conclusions at the end, meanwhile presents theinsight of the research, analysis of the limitations of the research and directions forfuture research.
引文
2马费成.信息经济学.武汉：武汉大学出版社，1997.
4张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学.上海：上海人民出版社，2004.
16我国对上市公司的净资产收益率有硬性要求。2006年施行的《上市公司证券发行管理办法》第十三条提出：向不特定对象公开募集股份（简称“增发”），还应当符合下列规定：（一）三个会计年度加权平均净资产收益率平均不低于百分之六。扣除非经常性损益后的净利润与扣除前的净利润相比，以低者作为加权平均净资产收益率的计算依据；（二）除金融类企业外，期末不存在持有金额较大的交易性金融资产和可供出售的金融资产、借予他人款项、委托理财等财务性投资的情形；（三）发行价格应不低于公告招股意向书前二十个交易日公司股票均价或前一个交易日的均价。
17根据会计报表，上市公司的每股净资产主要包括股本、资本公积金、盈余公积金和未分配利润四部分内容。根据《公司法》相关规定，股本、资本公积和盈余公积在公司正常经营期内不能随意调整，因此，每股净资产的调整主要是对未分配利润进行调整。
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16我国对上市公司的净资产收益率有硬性要求。2006年施行的《上市公司证券发行管理办法》第十三条提出：向不特定对象公开募集股份（简称“增发”），还应当符合下列规定：（一）三个会计年度加权平均净资产收益率平均不低于百分之六。扣除非经常性损益后的净利润与扣除前的净利润相比，以低者作为加权平均净资产收益率的计算依据；（二）除金融类企业外，期末不存在持有金额较大的交易性金融资产和可供出售的金融资产、借予他人款项、委托理财等财务性投资的情形；（三）发行价格应不低于公告招股意向书前二十个交易日公司股票均价或前一个交易日的均价。
17根据会计报表，上市公司的每股净资产主要包括股本、资本公积金、盈余公积金和未分配利润四部分内容。根据《公司法》相关规定，股本、资本公积和盈余公积在公司正常经营期内不能随意调整，因此，每股净资产的调整主要是对未分配利润进行调整。
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