中国自然垄断行业规制与改革
摘要
20世纪80年代以来,西方国家对自然垄断行业的管制出现了放松趋势,自然垄断性行业政府管制改革成为国际潮流,其导向是放松管制,在可能展开竞争的领域尽可能多地引入竞争。与此同时,中国自然垄断行业的政府管制也在从计划经济时期的国家垄断向市场经济条件下的现代政府监管转变,虽然改革己取得初步成果,但政府管制存在严重失效现象。
总体上看国外的研究成果和国内的研究多数是从经济学、产业经济学的角度来展开的,以厂商、产业组织和产业结构为研究对象,重在微观层面的规制方法和管制技术的探讨与改进。本文以电力改革为实证分析,从政府管制的制度背景入手,以行政学分析视角,兼用比较、实证的方法,从理论与实践两个层面,对中国自然垄断行业的政府管制问题作了深入研究。
中国自然垄断行业的政府管制,由于形成的内在逻辑、行政垄断主导多种垄断和多种利益的交织而呈现出特异性和复杂性。本文通过对管制过程中政府自身三重角色的冲突与错位、委托——代理关系链的断裂、政企合谋的三维分析表明,“国家经济人”——国家和政府部门作为利益主体参与到经济活动中,逐利分利,从而导致了自然垄断行业的政企不分、行政垄断与行业垄断。“政企同盟”与行政垄断只是政府管制失效的表象,在盘根错节的复杂表象背后,中国自然垄断行业政府管制失效的根本原因在于现代政府监管体系的缺失。产权制度缺失、法治缺失、法律体系滞后是中国现代政府监管体系的制度约束,尤其是法治和产权这两大基本制度的缺失和供给不足,导致了政府管制的路径依赖和管制失效,也使得本应是自上而下的行政性改革的中国自然垄断行业管制改革,实际上演变成企业自下而上的技术性改革。
中国自然垄断行业政府管制的发展方向应该是,从计划经济时代的部门管理走向市场经济时代的现代政府监管,超越“国家经济人”,迈向政府治理体系的现代化。
Since the 1980s, western countries relax the control of the natural monopoly industries. The reforms of the government control of the natural monopoly gradually become an international trend. Its orientation is to relax the control. The government should import the competition as much as possible in the field of competition. At the same time, China’s government control of natural monopoly is also changed from the state monopoly of the planned economy period to modern government management under the market economy conditions. Although the reform has achieved initial results, there are serious failures of government control
Overall, the foreign and domestic research results mostly starts from the point of view of the economics, the industrial economics ,to study manufacturers, industrial organizations ,industrial structure , micro-level of regulation, control methods of technology and improvement. Based on the empirical analysis of electricity reform, the article in-depth studies in the government control issue of natural monopoly industries of China with the background of the government control, using empirical method and comparison in theory and practice of two levels.
The government control of natural monopoly industries of China, due to the formation of the internal logic, a variety of intertwined interests, show a specificity and complexity .the article showed that the national economy-state and government departments as the main interests to participate in the economic activities drives benefit distribution and lead to administrative monopoly, industrial monopolies and government and enterprise linked, through the three-dimensional analysis of the process of the government control of its own triple role of conflict and dislocation, the commission- chain of agents fracture .The enterprise alliance with the government and the government monopoly control is superficial .behind the complex and intertwined idea, the fundamental reason of failure for the government control of natural monopoly industries is the loss of the modern system of government regulation. The loss of the system of government regulation contains lack of system of property rights, the missing of the law and legal system. Especially, the insufficient supply and deficiencies of law and property rights lead to the government regulation and control relying on a path to failure. It also makes a top-down administrative reform of government control of Chinese natural monopoly industrials become a bottom-up enterprise technical reform. The reason for the dislocation and absence of government control is the loss of the law and the interests confusion that the unclear boundaries of property causes.
The direction of government control of China’s natural monopoly industries should be changed from the sector management in the planned economy to the modern government management, beyond the“national economy”,into the modern system of government.
总体上看国外的研究成果和国内的研究多数是从经济学、产业经济学的角度来展开的,以厂商、产业组织和产业结构为研究对象,重在微观层面的规制方法和管制技术的探讨与改进。本文以电力改革为实证分析,从政府管制的制度背景入手,以行政学分析视角,兼用比较、实证的方法,从理论与实践两个层面,对中国自然垄断行业的政府管制问题作了深入研究。
中国自然垄断行业的政府管制,由于形成的内在逻辑、行政垄断主导多种垄断和多种利益的交织而呈现出特异性和复杂性。本文通过对管制过程中政府自身三重角色的冲突与错位、委托——代理关系链的断裂、政企合谋的三维分析表明,“国家经济人”——国家和政府部门作为利益主体参与到经济活动中,逐利分利,从而导致了自然垄断行业的政企不分、行政垄断与行业垄断。“政企同盟”与行政垄断只是政府管制失效的表象,在盘根错节的复杂表象背后,中国自然垄断行业政府管制失效的根本原因在于现代政府监管体系的缺失。产权制度缺失、法治缺失、法律体系滞后是中国现代政府监管体系的制度约束,尤其是法治和产权这两大基本制度的缺失和供给不足,导致了政府管制的路径依赖和管制失效,也使得本应是自上而下的行政性改革的中国自然垄断行业管制改革,实际上演变成企业自下而上的技术性改革。
中国自然垄断行业政府管制的发展方向应该是,从计划经济时代的部门管理走向市场经济时代的现代政府监管,超越“国家经济人”,迈向政府治理体系的现代化。
Since the 1980s, western countries relax the control of the natural monopoly industries. The reforms of the government control of the natural monopoly gradually become an international trend. Its orientation is to relax the control. The government should import the competition as much as possible in the field of competition. At the same time, China’s government control of natural monopoly is also changed from the state monopoly of the planned economy period to modern government management under the market economy conditions. Although the reform has achieved initial results, there are serious failures of government control
Overall, the foreign and domestic research results mostly starts from the point of view of the economics, the industrial economics ,to study manufacturers, industrial organizations ,industrial structure , micro-level of regulation, control methods of technology and improvement. Based on the empirical analysis of electricity reform, the article in-depth studies in the government control issue of natural monopoly industries of China with the background of the government control, using empirical method and comparison in theory and practice of two levels.
The government control of natural monopoly industries of China, due to the formation of the internal logic, a variety of intertwined interests, show a specificity and complexity .the article showed that the national economy-state and government departments as the main interests to participate in the economic activities drives benefit distribution and lead to administrative monopoly, industrial monopolies and government and enterprise linked, through the three-dimensional analysis of the process of the government control of its own triple role of conflict and dislocation, the commission- chain of agents fracture .The enterprise alliance with the government and the government monopoly control is superficial .behind the complex and intertwined idea, the fundamental reason of failure for the government control of natural monopoly industries is the loss of the modern system of government regulation. The loss of the system of government regulation contains lack of system of property rights, the missing of the law and legal system. Especially, the insufficient supply and deficiencies of law and property rights lead to the government regulation and control relying on a path to failure. It also makes a top-down administrative reform of government control of Chinese natural monopoly industrials become a bottom-up enterprise technical reform. The reason for the dislocation and absence of government control is the loss of the law and the interests confusion that the unclear boundaries of property causes.
The direction of government control of China’s natural monopoly industries should be changed from the sector management in the planned economy to the modern government management, beyond the“national economy”,into the modern system of government.
引文
[1]林木西,曹艳秋.自然垄断行业管制的国际比较.经济学动态,2002,(04):54-56
[2] Alfred·E·Kahn.1998.The Economics of Regulation:Principles and Institutions.The MIT Press.
[3] Stigler,G·J,The Theory of Economic Regulation,Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science,2 (Spring 1971),pp3-20.
[4]余晖.政府管制改革的方向.战略管理,2002,(05):58-65
[5]王俊豪.政府管制经济学导论——基本理论及其在政府管制实践中的应用.北京:商务印出管,2002,132
[6]植草益.微观经济学山.朱绍文等译,北京:中国发展出版社,1992,56
[7]潘新兴,陈宏平.政府规制改革的经济学分析.人大复印资料,2003,(04):2-4
[8]于良春等.自然垄断与政府规制——基本理论与政策分析.北京:经济科学出版社,2003,237
[9]黄继忠.论我国现代电力监管体系的构建.中宏数据库,2004,(04):21
[10]刘小兵.政府管制的经济分析.上海:上海财经大学出版社,2004,112
[11] Ross·S.The Economic Theory of Agent:the Principal’s Problem American Economic Review 1973,63
[12]张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学.上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,2004.
[13]夏大慰,史东辉等.政府规制理论——经验与中国的改革.北京:经济科学出版社,2003,200-201
[14] Paul, L·Joskow and Roger,G·Noll, Regulation in Theory and Practice: An Overview, MIT Press,1981
[15]丹尼尔·耶金等.制高点——重建现代世界的政府与市场之争.北京:外文出版社,2000,162
[16]王俊豪.对英国现行政府规制体制的评论.经济科学,I998,(04):23-25
[17]肖兴志.自然垄断产业规制改革模式研究.大连:东北财经大学出版社,2003,80
[18]王俊豪.中国垄断性产业规制机构的设立与规范——以电信产业规制机构为例.东北财经大学发展研究参考,2004,(18):78-79
[19]詹国彬.我国公用事业民营化的现状及其发展趋势透析.经济前沿,2003,(11):25-27
[20]冯飞.垄断性行业改革效率与发展双重目标.中国经济时报,2003,(07):25
[21]李梅,王仕军.行业垄断的弊端及其治理思路.[EB/OL]
[22]冯飞.垄断性行业改革效率与发展双重目标[EB/OL].07/24/2003
[23]王俊豪.中国政府规制体制改革研究.北京:经济科学出版社,1999,25-27
[24]高尚全.加快推进垄断行业改革.[EB/OL]
[25]行政垄断:反还是不反.法制与社会,2007,(11):10-12
[26]胡鞍刚主编.第二次转型:国家制度建设.北京:清华大学出版社,2001,58
[27]余晖.反垄断是一个宪政问题.[EB/OL]
[28]张平.中国电力产业的垄断与政府规制体制的改革.经济评论,2003,(08):47-51
[29]王俊豪.英国政府规制体制改革研究.上海:上海三联书店,1998,79
[30]陈富良.放松规制与强化规制.上海:上海三联书店,2001,278
[31]王俊豪.政府规制经济学导论.上海:商务印书馆,2001,165
[32]任晓红.中国电力市场化进程中的政府规制研究.中国优秀博硕士学位论文全文数据库,2000,80-81
[33]夏大慰,史东辉等.政府规制理论经验与中国的改革.北京:经济科学出版社,2003,89
[34]胡鞍钢.电力体制改革的核心目标是打破垄断.地方电力管理,2001,(04):23-26
[35]胡鞍钢.电力体制改革的核心目标是打破垄断.地方电力管理,2001,(04):23-26
[36]门建辉.自然垄断行业:政府管制与放松管制.经济评论,1999,(01):54-56
[37]张听竹.中国规制与竞争:理论与政策.北京:社会科学文献出版社,2000,237
[38]邵长军,张文泉.论我国电力监管的几个关键性问题.新世纪高校人文社会科学理论创新文集,2004,(04):151-153
[39]齐羽,齐丽雅.电力产业自然垄断的不完全与有效竞争的实现.经济问题探索,2002,(04):57-61
[40]张平.中国电力产业的垄断与政府管制体制的改革.经济评论,2003,(06):110-114
[2] Alfred·E·Kahn.1998.The Economics of Regulation:Principles and Institutions.The MIT Press.
[3] Stigler,G·J,The Theory of Economic Regulation,Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science,2 (Spring 1971),pp3-20.
[4]余晖.政府管制改革的方向.战略管理,2002,(05):58-65
[5]王俊豪.政府管制经济学导论——基本理论及其在政府管制实践中的应用.北京:商务印出管,2002,132
[6]植草益.微观经济学山.朱绍文等译,北京:中国发展出版社,1992,56
[7]潘新兴,陈宏平.政府规制改革的经济学分析.人大复印资料,2003,(04):2-4
[8]于良春等.自然垄断与政府规制——基本理论与政策分析.北京:经济科学出版社,2003,237
[9]黄继忠.论我国现代电力监管体系的构建.中宏数据库,2004,(04):21
[10]刘小兵.政府管制的经济分析.上海:上海财经大学出版社,2004,112
[11] Ross·S.The Economic Theory of Agent:the Principal’s Problem American Economic Review 1973,63
[12]张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学.上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,2004.
[13]夏大慰,史东辉等.政府规制理论——经验与中国的改革.北京:经济科学出版社,2003,200-201
[14] Paul, L·Joskow and Roger,G·Noll, Regulation in Theory and Practice: An Overview, MIT Press,1981
[15]丹尼尔·耶金等.制高点——重建现代世界的政府与市场之争.北京:外文出版社,2000,162
[16]王俊豪.对英国现行政府规制体制的评论.经济科学,I998,(04):23-25
[17]肖兴志.自然垄断产业规制改革模式研究.大连:东北财经大学出版社,2003,80
[18]王俊豪.中国垄断性产业规制机构的设立与规范——以电信产业规制机构为例.东北财经大学发展研究参考,2004,(18):78-79
[19]詹国彬.我国公用事业民营化的现状及其发展趋势透析.经济前沿,2003,(11):25-27
[20]冯飞.垄断性行业改革效率与发展双重目标.中国经济时报,2003,(07):25
[21]李梅,王仕军.行业垄断的弊端及其治理思路.[EB/OL]
[22]冯飞.垄断性行业改革效率与发展双重目标[EB/OL].07/24/2003
[23]王俊豪.中国政府规制体制改革研究.北京:经济科学出版社,1999,25-27
[24]高尚全.加快推进垄断行业改革.[EB/OL]
[25]行政垄断:反还是不反.法制与社会,2007,(11):10-12
[26]胡鞍刚主编.第二次转型:国家制度建设.北京:清华大学出版社,2001,58
[27]余晖.反垄断是一个宪政问题.[EB/OL]
[28]张平.中国电力产业的垄断与政府规制体制的改革.经济评论,2003,(08):47-51
[29]王俊豪.英国政府规制体制改革研究.上海:上海三联书店,1998,79
[30]陈富良.放松规制与强化规制.上海:上海三联书店,2001,278
[31]王俊豪.政府规制经济学导论.上海:商务印书馆,2001,165
[32]任晓红.中国电力市场化进程中的政府规制研究.中国优秀博硕士学位论文全文数据库,2000,80-81
[33]夏大慰,史东辉等.政府规制理论经验与中国的改革.北京:经济科学出版社,2003,89
[34]胡鞍钢.电力体制改革的核心目标是打破垄断.地方电力管理,2001,(04):23-26
[35]胡鞍钢.电力体制改革的核心目标是打破垄断.地方电力管理,2001,(04):23-26
[36]门建辉.自然垄断行业:政府管制与放松管制.经济评论,1999,(01):54-56
[37]张听竹.中国规制与竞争:理论与政策.北京:社会科学文献出版社,2000,237
[38]邵长军,张文泉.论我国电力监管的几个关键性问题.新世纪高校人文社会科学理论创新文集,2004,(04):151-153
[39]齐羽,齐丽雅.电力产业自然垄断的不完全与有效竞争的实现.经济问题探索,2002,(04):57-61
[40]张平.中国电力产业的垄断与政府管制体制的改革.经济评论,2003,(06):110-114