我国征地冲突治理问题研究
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摘要
在城市化加速推进和社会经济全面转型的背景之下,征地冲突问题已逐渐成为影响我国农村社会稳定和经济发展的重要问题,亟待有效治理,但相比征地冲突对社会经济和稳定所造成的威胁,当前征地冲突治理工作总体上严重不足,治理主体单一、方法简单、效果不佳、效率低下。在此背景下,本文结合国外土地冲突研究最新进展和我国特殊国情,提出了征地冲突治理概念,在我国征地冲突治理主体及手段现状研究基础上,分析了征地冲突治理“零和”逻辑缺陷,重构了征地冲突治理的“共赢”逻辑,对征地冲突治理本质进行再思考,提出征地冲突“关系”治理理论,对征地冲突主体多元化和适合征地冲突治理的若干治理工具进行了深入探讨。
本论文主要结论包括：
(1)征地冲突治理主体应实现多元化
当前我国征地冲突治理是以政府为单一主体的冲突治理,其结果导致征地冲突政府治理失灵。我国征地冲突治理潜在主体包括农民自治组织、农村非治理精英和中立第三方。不同的治理主体在资源禀赋及治理效果上存在差异性,不同主体身份、特征和对于征地冲突治理效果可能具有重要影响。这些结论表明征地冲突治理应实现主体多元化,以便充分利用各治理主体的资源禀赋和治理效果的差异性优势。征地冲突的多元治理必须在一个综合框架下实现。综合框架应包括宏观和微观两个层面,宏观层面以中央政府为治理主体,微观层面则应促进地方政府、农民自治组织和农村非治理精英以及中立第三方的分工与协作。
(2)征地冲突治理应以征地过程中的社会关系为治理对象
当前我国征地冲突治理是以“冲突行为”为对象的治理,这种以行为本身为对象的征地冲突治理存在诸多局限。因此本文试图从农民征地冲突参与行为入手,探索其行为背后的动机与激励,从这一层面上探索征地冲突治理对策。本文在Korf的情景模型基础上,强调宏观的经济社会背景因素对冲突主体参与决策的影响,提出了“背景—情境”模型(Background-Contextual Model,BCM),将其运用到对中国征地冲突中农民参与行为的研究中,并利用结构方程模型,探索农民参与行为的影响因素和作用路径。利用安徽省桐城市城郊农户问卷调查的数据,结构方程模型运算结果表明虽然部分假设在该区域数据条件下并不成立,但农民征地冲突参与行为背后确实存在激励与动机,BCM模型也适用于我国征地冲突的分析。这一结论为征地冲突治理提供了新思路,即征地冲突治理不应再以冲突行为本身为研究对象,而应以征地过程中的社会关系为研究对象。征地冲突的“关系”治理可以从对农村社会干群关系的治理、对征地人员工作方式和工作态度的治理、对征地领域腐败的治理和对征地补偿分配的治理四个方面展开。
(3)征地冲突治理应基于“共赢”逻辑
当前征地冲突治理逻辑具有明显的“零和”特征,“零和”逻辑可能会严重影响征地冲突治理效果,甚至产生相反的效果。征地过程中农民与地方政府“零和”博弈模型的比较静态分析结果表明,在不改变当前征地冲突“零和”博弈格局的前提下,即便中央政府治理征地冲突、维护社会和谐的意愿增加,也可能无法达到减少征地冲突的目标,反而会激励农民和地方政府都增加暴力的投入,从而导致更多的冲突。本文以征地冲突发生率对省级行政区域征地冲突情况进行考量,发现我国征地冲突表现出较强的正空间相关性,存在高冲突发生率地区与高冲突发生率地区相邻,低冲突发生率地区与低冲突发生率地区相邻的空间特征。本文运用回归模型探索我国征地冲突发生率的影响因素,结果表明我国征地冲突发生率与人均耕地面积成反比,与区域城市维护建设资金收入中土地出让金所占比重成正比。征地冲突的这些规律性表明我国征地冲突本质上是现实性的利益冲突,因此,本文提出要引入“共赢”思维作为征地冲突治理的逻辑,即以实现征地过程中各利益相关主体的共赢为指导,对征地冲突问题进行治理。“共赢”逻辑的核心是改征地利益分配的“零和”博弈为“合作”博弈。征地冲突的“共赢”逻辑对我国征地制度改革和征地冲突治理模式选择具有重要启示。
(4)征地冲突治理手段应不断创新
征地冲突治理手段需要不断创新。本文基于BP神经网络,构建了征地冲突后果评价和预警评价模型。本文从人员伤亡、经济损失、社会危害和政治危害四个方面来评价征地冲突后果,从征地项目的具体特征、区域征地管理情况、地方政府及相关部门征地冲突治理能力、待征区域社会基础四个方面进行预警评价。两个模型均表现良好,这表明征地冲突预警模型在征地冲突治理中有广阔应用前景。论文还指出,诉讼外纠纷解决机制(ADR)长期以来一直是我国农村社会冲突治理的主要组成部分,但是当前ADR存在缺陷,不适合治理有地方政府涉入其中的征地冲突,必须进行调整,一个合理的调整方案就是构建征地冲突调解委员会。征地冲突调解委员会成员构成应采用“三三制”。
Land expropriation conflicts (LECs) in China has become one of the most important problems to disturb the stability of rural society and development of economy in the background of accelerated urbanization and comprehencive transformation of social economy. Valid governance of LECs is needed. The governance status of LECs, however, can not match the threats of the problems on the societial economy and stability. The faults of the governance include severely insuffiecient, single governance subjects, simple treatments, low effect and efficiency. Combining the newest results of international land conflicts research and the special situation in China, this dissertation puts forward the notion of governance of LECs, with the analysis of the fault of "Zero-Sum" governance logic, the reconstruction of "Co-Win" logic, the rethinking of the nature of LECs, and the construction of "relationship-governance" theory. At the end of the dissertation, the pluralization of governance subjects and the tools are discussed.
The main conclusions include:
(1) The subject of LECs governance should be pluralised.
The subject of the existing LECs governance is singularized. The truth that government is the only subject leads to the governance dysfunction of government in LECs. The potential subject in LECs governance include the rural autonomy organizations, the non-governing elites and the neutral third parties. Different subjects have otherness in resource gift and governance effect. The identification and charaters may have important influence on governance effect of LECs. These conclusions indicate that the subject of LECs governance should be pluralised to take full advantage of the otherness.
The pluralization of governance subject should be realized in a comprehensive framework, which could be divided into two level, the macro one, in which central government is the main subject, and the micro one, in which local government, rural autonomy organizations and non-governing elites, and neutral third parties are promoted to divide and cooperate.
(2) The object of LECs governance should be the social relationships during the land expropriations.
The existing LECs governance in China chosen the "conflict behavior" to be governace object, which led to several limitations. This dissertation started with the research on participation behaviors of farmers in LECs. Then the governance of LECs is discussed on the level of motivations and stimulations of those behaviors. Based on the Contextual Model of Korf, this dissertation presented the Background-Contextual Model to analyze the farmers'participation behaviors in LECs. The factors and influence route were explored by Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) with the data from questionnaire conducted on farmer families in Tongcheng City, Anhui Province. Though the results of SEM do not prove all those hypothesis inherent in the ECM, there are motivations and stimulations for farmers'participation behaviors in LECs. It's also proven that BCM could analyze LECs in China. These conclusions provide a new way for LECs governance, by indicating that the governance object should be social relationships in land expropriations, not the conflict behavior itself.
The relationship governance could start from the governance on the relationships between cadres and the farmers in rural China, the governance on the manners and attitudes of workers during land expropritions, the governance on curruptions in land expropriations issues, and the governance on the distributions of land expropriation compensations in the village.
(3) The governance of LECs should be based on "Co-Win" logic.
The governance status of LECs has been characterized obviously by the "Zero-Sum" logic, which could lead to serious effects on the governance of LECs, even lead to the opposite ones. The statics comparison analysis of the zero-sum model between farmers and local government during the process of land expropriations show us that without the fundamental change of the zero-sum interest distribution structure in LECs, the strengthen of the governance wishes of central government on LECs may be not able to achieve the aim of reducing LECs, on the contrary, it may encourage the conflict behaviors of farmers and local governors.
By examing the incidence of LECs on provincial scales, the dissertation found that LECs in China are strongly spatial correlated. Regions with high incidence of LECs are neighbored, while the ones with low incidence are neighbored too. A regression model was used to explore the factors of LECs incidence in China, which shown us that the provincial incidences of LECs are proportional to the ratio between land grant fees and regional city maintainance and constuction fund, and inversely proportional to the per capita cultivated land. The regurity of LECs indicates that the nature of LECs in China is realistic interest conflict. Based on that conclusion, "Co-Win" is introduced to be the logic of LECs governance, which means that the governance of LECs should be guided by the principle of achiving the co-win among all the different stakeholders during the land expropriations. The transformation from "Zero-Sum" to "Co-Win" structure of interest distribution during land expropriations is critical to "Co-Win" logic. The "Co-Win" logic will give us important inspirations on the reformation of land expropriation institutions and the choice of governance mode of LECs in China.
(4) Several innovations in governance means should be introduced into LECs governance.
Innovations in governance means is needed immidiately. This dissertation constructed a result evaluation model and a early warning model of LECs, based on BP neural network. Reslt of LECs is evaluated from lost in human, lost in economy, effect on society and polity. Early warning level is evaluatede from special characteristics of the land expropriation project, regional land expropriation management, the LECs governance ability of the local government and its department, and the regional social base. The two model run well, which means that LECs early warning could be introduced into LECs governance.
Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) is always a important part of rural society governance in China. Though it has faults to misfit the governace of those LECs in which local governments involved as important stakeholders, it could be adjusted. A suggestion is LECs Conciliation Committee, which should be organized by trisection.
本论文主要结论包括：
(1)征地冲突治理主体应实现多元化
当前我国征地冲突治理是以政府为单一主体的冲突治理,其结果导致征地冲突政府治理失灵。我国征地冲突治理潜在主体包括农民自治组织、农村非治理精英和中立第三方。不同的治理主体在资源禀赋及治理效果上存在差异性,不同主体身份、特征和对于征地冲突治理效果可能具有重要影响。这些结论表明征地冲突治理应实现主体多元化,以便充分利用各治理主体的资源禀赋和治理效果的差异性优势。征地冲突的多元治理必须在一个综合框架下实现。综合框架应包括宏观和微观两个层面,宏观层面以中央政府为治理主体,微观层面则应促进地方政府、农民自治组织和农村非治理精英以及中立第三方的分工与协作。
(2)征地冲突治理应以征地过程中的社会关系为治理对象
当前我国征地冲突治理是以“冲突行为”为对象的治理,这种以行为本身为对象的征地冲突治理存在诸多局限。因此本文试图从农民征地冲突参与行为入手,探索其行为背后的动机与激励,从这一层面上探索征地冲突治理对策。本文在Korf的情景模型基础上,强调宏观的经济社会背景因素对冲突主体参与决策的影响,提出了“背景—情境”模型(Background-Contextual Model,BCM),将其运用到对中国征地冲突中农民参与行为的研究中,并利用结构方程模型,探索农民参与行为的影响因素和作用路径。利用安徽省桐城市城郊农户问卷调查的数据,结构方程模型运算结果表明虽然部分假设在该区域数据条件下并不成立,但农民征地冲突参与行为背后确实存在激励与动机,BCM模型也适用于我国征地冲突的分析。这一结论为征地冲突治理提供了新思路,即征地冲突治理不应再以冲突行为本身为研究对象,而应以征地过程中的社会关系为研究对象。征地冲突的“关系”治理可以从对农村社会干群关系的治理、对征地人员工作方式和工作态度的治理、对征地领域腐败的治理和对征地补偿分配的治理四个方面展开。
(3)征地冲突治理应基于“共赢”逻辑
当前征地冲突治理逻辑具有明显的“零和”特征,“零和”逻辑可能会严重影响征地冲突治理效果,甚至产生相反的效果。征地过程中农民与地方政府“零和”博弈模型的比较静态分析结果表明,在不改变当前征地冲突“零和”博弈格局的前提下,即便中央政府治理征地冲突、维护社会和谐的意愿增加,也可能无法达到减少征地冲突的目标,反而会激励农民和地方政府都增加暴力的投入,从而导致更多的冲突。本文以征地冲突发生率对省级行政区域征地冲突情况进行考量,发现我国征地冲突表现出较强的正空间相关性,存在高冲突发生率地区与高冲突发生率地区相邻,低冲突发生率地区与低冲突发生率地区相邻的空间特征。本文运用回归模型探索我国征地冲突发生率的影响因素,结果表明我国征地冲突发生率与人均耕地面积成反比,与区域城市维护建设资金收入中土地出让金所占比重成正比。征地冲突的这些规律性表明我国征地冲突本质上是现实性的利益冲突,因此,本文提出要引入“共赢”思维作为征地冲突治理的逻辑,即以实现征地过程中各利益相关主体的共赢为指导,对征地冲突问题进行治理。“共赢”逻辑的核心是改征地利益分配的“零和”博弈为“合作”博弈。征地冲突的“共赢”逻辑对我国征地制度改革和征地冲突治理模式选择具有重要启示。
(4)征地冲突治理手段应不断创新
征地冲突治理手段需要不断创新。本文基于BP神经网络,构建了征地冲突后果评价和预警评价模型。本文从人员伤亡、经济损失、社会危害和政治危害四个方面来评价征地冲突后果,从征地项目的具体特征、区域征地管理情况、地方政府及相关部门征地冲突治理能力、待征区域社会基础四个方面进行预警评价。两个模型均表现良好,这表明征地冲突预警模型在征地冲突治理中有广阔应用前景。论文还指出,诉讼外纠纷解决机制(ADR)长期以来一直是我国农村社会冲突治理的主要组成部分,但是当前ADR存在缺陷,不适合治理有地方政府涉入其中的征地冲突,必须进行调整,一个合理的调整方案就是构建征地冲突调解委员会。征地冲突调解委员会成员构成应采用“三三制”。
Land expropriation conflicts (LECs) in China has become one of the most important problems to disturb the stability of rural society and development of economy in the background of accelerated urbanization and comprehencive transformation of social economy. Valid governance of LECs is needed. The governance status of LECs, however, can not match the threats of the problems on the societial economy and stability. The faults of the governance include severely insuffiecient, single governance subjects, simple treatments, low effect and efficiency. Combining the newest results of international land conflicts research and the special situation in China, this dissertation puts forward the notion of governance of LECs, with the analysis of the fault of "Zero-Sum" governance logic, the reconstruction of "Co-Win" logic, the rethinking of the nature of LECs, and the construction of "relationship-governance" theory. At the end of the dissertation, the pluralization of governance subjects and the tools are discussed.
The main conclusions include:
(1) The subject of LECs governance should be pluralised.
The subject of the existing LECs governance is singularized. The truth that government is the only subject leads to the governance dysfunction of government in LECs. The potential subject in LECs governance include the rural autonomy organizations, the non-governing elites and the neutral third parties. Different subjects have otherness in resource gift and governance effect. The identification and charaters may have important influence on governance effect of LECs. These conclusions indicate that the subject of LECs governance should be pluralised to take full advantage of the otherness.
The pluralization of governance subject should be realized in a comprehensive framework, which could be divided into two level, the macro one, in which central government is the main subject, and the micro one, in which local government, rural autonomy organizations and non-governing elites, and neutral third parties are promoted to divide and cooperate.
(2) The object of LECs governance should be the social relationships during the land expropriations.
The existing LECs governance in China chosen the "conflict behavior" to be governace object, which led to several limitations. This dissertation started with the research on participation behaviors of farmers in LECs. Then the governance of LECs is discussed on the level of motivations and stimulations of those behaviors. Based on the Contextual Model of Korf, this dissertation presented the Background-Contextual Model to analyze the farmers'participation behaviors in LECs. The factors and influence route were explored by Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) with the data from questionnaire conducted on farmer families in Tongcheng City, Anhui Province. Though the results of SEM do not prove all those hypothesis inherent in the ECM, there are motivations and stimulations for farmers'participation behaviors in LECs. It's also proven that BCM could analyze LECs in China. These conclusions provide a new way for LECs governance, by indicating that the governance object should be social relationships in land expropriations, not the conflict behavior itself.
The relationship governance could start from the governance on the relationships between cadres and the farmers in rural China, the governance on the manners and attitudes of workers during land expropritions, the governance on curruptions in land expropriations issues, and the governance on the distributions of land expropriation compensations in the village.
(3) The governance of LECs should be based on "Co-Win" logic.
The governance status of LECs has been characterized obviously by the "Zero-Sum" logic, which could lead to serious effects on the governance of LECs, even lead to the opposite ones. The statics comparison analysis of the zero-sum model between farmers and local government during the process of land expropriations show us that without the fundamental change of the zero-sum interest distribution structure in LECs, the strengthen of the governance wishes of central government on LECs may be not able to achieve the aim of reducing LECs, on the contrary, it may encourage the conflict behaviors of farmers and local governors.
By examing the incidence of LECs on provincial scales, the dissertation found that LECs in China are strongly spatial correlated. Regions with high incidence of LECs are neighbored, while the ones with low incidence are neighbored too. A regression model was used to explore the factors of LECs incidence in China, which shown us that the provincial incidences of LECs are proportional to the ratio between land grant fees and regional city maintainance and constuction fund, and inversely proportional to the per capita cultivated land. The regurity of LECs indicates that the nature of LECs in China is realistic interest conflict. Based on that conclusion, "Co-Win" is introduced to be the logic of LECs governance, which means that the governance of LECs should be guided by the principle of achiving the co-win among all the different stakeholders during the land expropriations. The transformation from "Zero-Sum" to "Co-Win" structure of interest distribution during land expropriations is critical to "Co-Win" logic. The "Co-Win" logic will give us important inspirations on the reformation of land expropriation institutions and the choice of governance mode of LECs in China.
(4) Several innovations in governance means should be introduced into LECs governance.
Innovations in governance means is needed immidiately. This dissertation constructed a result evaluation model and a early warning model of LECs, based on BP neural network. Reslt of LECs is evaluated from lost in human, lost in economy, effect on society and polity. Early warning level is evaluatede from special characteristics of the land expropriation project, regional land expropriation management, the LECs governance ability of the local government and its department, and the regional social base. The two model run well, which means that LECs early warning could be introduced into LECs governance.
Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) is always a important part of rural society governance in China. Though it has faults to misfit the governace of those LECs in which local governments involved as important stakeholders, it could be adjusted. A suggestion is LECs Conciliation Committee, which should be organized by trisection.
引文
①L.J.Alston.G.D.Libecap,B.Mueller.《巴西亚马孙河流域暴力和土地产权制度的变迁》,载J.N.Drobak,J.V.C.Nye编《新制度经济学前沿》,经济科学出版社,2003年第一版,]76页。
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①俞可平.治理与善治[EB/OL].http://www.jswl.cn/course/A1017/kecheng/12-3-5.htm.2010-4-16.
①新华网.国土资源部、监察部查处陕西周至县土地违法问题[EB/OL].http://news.hsw.cn/gb/news/2004-06/04/ content_1057272.htm.2004-6-04/2011-4-17.
②新浪网.河北定州611事件重大进展回放[EB/OL].http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2005-12-16/10127723563s.shtml 2005-12-16/2011-4-17.
①中国法律信息网http://www.law-star.com/cacnew/200706/40009937.htm
②时代周刊,和讯网转载.国土部向圈地说不[EB/OL].http://house.hexun.com/2009-06-25/118997374.html.2009-6-25/2011-4-17.
③新京报,搜房网转载.国土部通报邳州征地案官方拖欠补偿2千万[EB/OL].http://news.gz.soufun.com/ 2010-02-06/3079378.htm.2010-2-06/2011-4-17.
④国土资源部具有以下职能：(1)承担保护与合理利用土地资源、矿产资源、海洋资源等自然资源的责任。(2)承担规范国土资源管理秩序的责任。(3)负责规范国土资源权属管理。(4)承担全国耕地保护的责任,确保规划确定的耕地保有量和基本农田面积不减少。(5)承担及时准确提供全国土地利用各种数据的责任。(6)承担节约集约利用土地资源的责任。(7)承担规范国土资源市场秩序的责任。负责矿产资源开发的管理。(8)负责管理地质勘查行业和矿产资源储量。(9)承担地质环境保护的责任。(10)承担地质灾害预防和治理的责任。(11)依法征收资源收益,规范、监督资金使用,拟订土地、矿产资源参与经济调控的政策措施。(12)推进国土资源科技进步。(13)开展对外合作与交流。(14)承担优化配置国土资源的责任。(15)承办国务院交办的其他事项。其中仅第2项职能适用于对征地过程中地方政府及土地管理部门的失范行为进行监管,第15项职能仅适用于国务院办公厅等部门交办的征地冲突问题治理。职能内容来自国土资源部网站,http://www.mlr.gov.cn/bbgk。
①监察部的主要职能包括：(1)检查国家行政机关在遵守和执行法律、法规和人民政府的决定、命令中的问题；(2)受理对国家行政机关及其公务员和国家行政机关任命的其他人员违反行政纪律行为的控告、检举：(3)调查处理国家行政机关及其公务员和国家行政机关任命的其他人员违反行政纪律的行为；(4)受理国家行政机关公务员和国家行政机关任命的其他人员不服主管行政机关给予处分决定的申诉,以及法律、行政法规规定的其他由监察机关受理的申诉；(5)法律、行政法规规定由监察机关履行的其他职责。引自中华人民共和国监察部网站,http://www.mos.gov.cn/mos/cms/html/3/23/201101/1201.html
②中华人民共和国监察部网站,http://www.mos.gov.cn/mos/cms/html/3/21/201103/2358.html
③公安部具体职责见中华人民共和国公安部网站,http://www.mps.gov.cn/n16/n1282/n3463/index.html
①新华网.征地、拆迁问题成信访工作重点[EB/OL].http://news.xinhuanet.com/mrdx/2007-03/29/content_5911099.htm2007-3-29/2011-4-17.
②中国社会学网.中国社会心态调查报告[EB/OL].http://www.sociology.cass.cn/shxw/shxlx/t20080930_18765.htm.2009-6-26/2011-4-17.
①新浪网.河北定州611事件重大进展回放[EB/OL].http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2005-12-16/10127723563s.shtml. 2005-12-16/2011-4-17.
②南方日报.网帖曝广东化州暴力征地事件省纪委正在核查.http://news.nfdaily.cn/gn/2011-3-17.shtml. 2011-3-16/2011-4-17.
①云南网,搜狐转载.云南昭通发生征地纠纷 村民堵路15人被刑拘[EB/OL].http://news.sohu.com/20081027 /n260263987.shtml.2008-10-27/2011-4-17.
②南京市司法局网站.多措并举标本兼治全力化解征地拆迁矛盾纠纷[EB/OL].http://www.njsfj.gov.cn/www/njsfj /qh-yj-mb_a390904148753.htm.2011-4-17.
①中华人民共和国监察部网站.两会观察：两会代表委员支招征地拆迁难题[EB/OL].http://www.mos.gov.cn/mos /cms/html/3/21/201103/2358.html.2011-3-9/2011-4-17.
②张家港日报.大新镇：村里有纠纷找“老娘舅”[EB/OL].http://www.zjgdaily.com.cn/html/2008-09/16/.htm. 2008-9-16/2011-4-17.
①人民网.砀山县强征农民耕地千余亩引发冲突.rEB/OL].http://unn.people.com.cn/GB/I4748/8280489.html. 2008-11-04/2011-4-17.
②腾讯网.广西柳州市政府强征土地村民舍命捍卫家园[EB/OL].http://news.qq.com/a/20101116/001743.htm. 2010-11-16/2011-4-17.
①刘永东,刘明兴,徐志刚,陶然.中国农民组织发展：治理结构与组织功能——基于6省调查的分析.经济社会体制比较.2008(]).
②赵俊臣.一个新的农民自治组织是怎样建立的——广西金秀瑶族自治县大瑶山国家级自然保护区参与式保护与社区可持续发展试验示范项目民主选举札记.中国选举与自治网,http://www.chinaelections.org/ newsinfo.asp?newsid=122968.
③类似概念见陈潭,刘祖华.精英博弈、亚瘫痪状态与村庄公共治理.管理世界，2004(10).
④百度百科“耆老”词条。http://baike.baidu.com/view/944316.htm
①梁漱溟.《中国文化要义》.上海人民出版社.2005第1版.
①G.邓肯.米切尔.《新社会学词典》.上海译文出版社1987.
①刘义强.构建以社会自治功能为导向的农村社会组织机制[EB/OL].http://www.21gwy.com/ms/llyj/a/3992/763992. html.2010-1-13/2011-5-15.
①网易新闻.浙江象山县石浦镇村民因征地纠纷堵塞公路[EB/OL].http://news.163.com/09/0727/13/5F7TT/ GUM000120GU_2.html.2009-7-27/2010-4-17.
②新浪网.江苏盱眙上访农民被镇政府收信访保证金[EB/OL].http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2010-11-09/ 031121436929.shtml.2010-11-9/2011-4-17.
①网易新闻.清华大学报告：将利益表达与社会稳定一致起来[EB/OL].http://news.163.com/10/0419/07/ 64K96UPC0001124J.html.2010-4-19/2011-4-17.
①中国共产党新闻网.“征地拆迁腐败”为何高烧不退.http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64093/64103/12436627.html
①华夏记者网.征地补偿成为农村腐败重点,村官职务犯罪愈演愈烈http://www.jizhe.cc/news_view.html
②海南高院破解“外嫁女”征地补偿款难题.中国妇女网.http://www.women.org.cn/allnews/1301/19359.html
①云南网.村民不满征地补偿起冲突,昭通工地数量车被焚http://www.ynhouse.com/clientinfo/ view-5c2589c82c0ce7aa012c0faa08783e92-1.html
②南方网.镇政府强行征地引发官民冲突http://www.10yan.com/html/News/xwshwx/2009-2/10/081654603.html
①雅虎新闻.陕西17村民因围堵告诉公路施工现场被公开处理http://news.cn.yahoo.com/newspic/news/9607/
②网易新闻.贵州纳雍叫停“拆迁连坐”制http://news.163.com/09/0802/03/5FMBOPLO000120GR.html
①华夏时报.北京门头沟重点工程征地引发冲突两人被拘.http://news.cnnb.com.cn/system/2006/06/19/ 005128369.shtml
①谭术魁.齐睿.中国征地冲突博弈模型的构建与分析[J].中国土地科学,2010(3)：25-29.
①魏宏森.曾国屏著.《系统论——系统科学哲学》[M].北京：世界图书北京出版社,2010.
①谭术魁《进一步改革我国土地征收制度的几点建议》一文中认为应协商确定土地补偿标准。
②新浪网《代表建议征地补偿价由市场决定》一文称“全国人大代表、广州永晟通信工程有限公司董事长李永忠和全国人大代表、广州三元里村经济联合社副董事长李国强等联名建议,征收农民土地应通过市场挂牌的方式,由市场来决定被征收的农民土地价格”。http://news.sina.com.cn/o/2006-03-09/09378399052s.shtml
③搜狐网转中国经济周刊文《土地纠纷催生征地制度改革》称：应采取市场定价模式对征地制度进行改革,化解征地过程中的利益矛盾。http://news.wuxi.soufun.com/2006-03-07/653904.htm
①湖北省国土资源厅网站.省厅下发通知加强和规范征地管理工作http://www.hblr.gov.cn/structure/zwdt/ gtxwzw_9453_1.htm
①现代快报.苏州征地引发纠纷群众扔砖块袭击警察http://www.s1979.com/aynews/china/2010/0723/53102.shtml
②中国妇女网.海南高院破解“外嫁女”征地补偿款难题http://www.women.org.cn/allnews/1301/19359.html
①郑黎.宁波征地拆迁的“和谐成本”.瞭望新闻周刊,2005年11月28日第48期,50-51.
①广西南宁·邕宁政府网.面对面直白征地拆迁实质倡导征地拆迁宣传新思路.http://www.yongning.gov.cn/ contents/13/22201.html
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②张红涛.态度与行为关系研究现状及发展趋势[J].心理科学进展,2007(1).
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②新浪网.河北定州611事件重大进展回放[EB/OL].http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2005-12-16/10127723563s.shtml 2005-12-16/2011-4-17.
①中国法律信息网http://www.law-star.com/cacnew/200706/40009937.htm
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④国土资源部具有以下职能：(1)承担保护与合理利用土地资源、矿产资源、海洋资源等自然资源的责任。(2)承担规范国土资源管理秩序的责任。(3)负责规范国土资源权属管理。(4)承担全国耕地保护的责任,确保规划确定的耕地保有量和基本农田面积不减少。(5)承担及时准确提供全国土地利用各种数据的责任。(6)承担节约集约利用土地资源的责任。(7)承担规范国土资源市场秩序的责任。负责矿产资源开发的管理。(8)负责管理地质勘查行业和矿产资源储量。(9)承担地质环境保护的责任。(10)承担地质灾害预防和治理的责任。(11)依法征收资源收益,规范、监督资金使用,拟订土地、矿产资源参与经济调控的政策措施。(12)推进国土资源科技进步。(13)开展对外合作与交流。(14)承担优化配置国土资源的责任。(15)承办国务院交办的其他事项。其中仅第2项职能适用于对征地过程中地方政府及土地管理部门的失范行为进行监管,第15项职能仅适用于国务院办公厅等部门交办的征地冲突问题治理。职能内容来自国土资源部网站,http://www.mlr.gov.cn/bbgk。
①监察部的主要职能包括：(1)检查国家行政机关在遵守和执行法律、法规和人民政府的决定、命令中的问题；(2)受理对国家行政机关及其公务员和国家行政机关任命的其他人员违反行政纪律行为的控告、检举：(3)调查处理国家行政机关及其公务员和国家行政机关任命的其他人员违反行政纪律的行为；(4)受理国家行政机关公务员和国家行政机关任命的其他人员不服主管行政机关给予处分决定的申诉,以及法律、行政法规规定的其他由监察机关受理的申诉；(5)法律、行政法规规定由监察机关履行的其他职责。引自中华人民共和国监察部网站,http://www.mos.gov.cn/mos/cms/html/3/23/201101/1201.html
②中华人民共和国监察部网站,http://www.mos.gov.cn/mos/cms/html/3/21/201103/2358.html
③公安部具体职责见中华人民共和国公安部网站,http://www.mps.gov.cn/n16/n1282/n3463/index.html
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②南方日报.网帖曝广东化州暴力征地事件省纪委正在核查.http://news.nfdaily.cn/gn/2011-3-17.shtml. 2011-3-16/2011-4-17.
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②腾讯网.广西柳州市政府强征土地村民舍命捍卫家园[EB/OL].http://news.qq.com/a/20101116/001743.htm. 2010-11-16/2011-4-17.
①刘永东,刘明兴,徐志刚,陶然.中国农民组织发展：治理结构与组织功能——基于6省调查的分析.经济社会体制比较.2008(]).
②赵俊臣.一个新的农民自治组织是怎样建立的——广西金秀瑶族自治县大瑶山国家级自然保护区参与式保护与社区可持续发展试验示范项目民主选举札记.中国选举与自治网,http://www.chinaelections.org/ newsinfo.asp?newsid=122968.
③类似概念见陈潭,刘祖华.精英博弈、亚瘫痪状态与村庄公共治理.管理世界，2004(10).
④百度百科“耆老”词条。http://baike.baidu.com/view/944316.htm
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①网易新闻.浙江象山县石浦镇村民因征地纠纷堵塞公路[EB/OL].http://news.163.com/09/0727/13/5F7TT/ GUM000120GU_2.html.2009-7-27/2010-4-17.
②新浪网.江苏盱眙上访农民被镇政府收信访保证金[EB/OL].http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2010-11-09/ 031121436929.shtml.2010-11-9/2011-4-17.
①网易新闻.清华大学报告：将利益表达与社会稳定一致起来[EB/OL].http://news.163.com/10/0419/07/ 64K96UPC0001124J.html.2010-4-19/2011-4-17.
①中国共产党新闻网.“征地拆迁腐败”为何高烧不退.http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64093/64103/12436627.html
①华夏记者网.征地补偿成为农村腐败重点,村官职务犯罪愈演愈烈http://www.jizhe.cc/news_view.html
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①云南网.村民不满征地补偿起冲突,昭通工地数量车被焚http://www.ynhouse.com/clientinfo/ view-5c2589c82c0ce7aa012c0faa08783e92-1.html
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①雅虎新闻.陕西17村民因围堵告诉公路施工现场被公开处理http://news.cn.yahoo.com/newspic/news/9607/
②网易新闻.贵州纳雍叫停“拆迁连坐”制http://news.163.com/09/0802/03/5FMBOPLO000120GR.html
①华夏时报.北京门头沟重点工程征地引发冲突两人被拘.http://news.cnnb.com.cn/system/2006/06/19/ 005128369.shtml
①谭术魁.齐睿.中国征地冲突博弈模型的构建与分析[J].中国土地科学,2010(3)：25-29.
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①谭术魁《进一步改革我国土地征收制度的几点建议》一文中认为应协商确定土地补偿标准。
②新浪网《代表建议征地补偿价由市场决定》一文称“全国人大代表、广州永晟通信工程有限公司董事长李永忠和全国人大代表、广州三元里村经济联合社副董事长李国强等联名建议,征收农民土地应通过市场挂牌的方式,由市场来决定被征收的农民土地价格”。http://news.sina.com.cn/o/2006-03-09/09378399052s.shtml
③搜狐网转中国经济周刊文《土地纠纷催生征地制度改革》称：应采取市场定价模式对征地制度进行改革,化解征地过程中的利益矛盾。http://news.wuxi.soufun.com/2006-03-07/653904.htm
①湖北省国土资源厅网站.省厅下发通知加强和规范征地管理工作http://www.hblr.gov.cn/structure/zwdt/ gtxwzw_9453_1.htm
①现代快报.苏州征地引发纠纷群众扔砖块袭击警察http://www.s1979.com/aynews/china/2010/0723/53102.shtml
②中国妇女网.海南高院破解“外嫁女”征地补偿款难题http://www.women.org.cn/allnews/1301/19359.html
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