基于动态信用农户供应链融资模式研究
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摘要
信贷交易是一种跨时间的价值交换。在交易过程中,借贷双方的信用对减轻未来的不确定性、降低信用风险、保障资金安全、保证信贷交易正常开展等都起到至关重要的作用。作为典型的信用弱势群体,中小企业和农户由于信息非对称及抵押物缺乏,往往面临严重的信贷约束。如何在信息约束与抵押不足的情况下,通过信贷交易治理机制创新,改善信用弱势群体的信用状况,从而缓解其信贷约束?供应链融资为中小企业提供了一种有效的融资解决方案。但是,现有研究并没有对这种融资模式的内在机理、外部效应及其对农户的适用性等问题给出令人满意的解答。本文从动态信用入手,通过对现实各种融资模式的深入剖析,从理论和实证上回答了供应链融资如何解决农户融资难的几个关键性问题：
(1)理论上,供应链融资信用形成机理怎样?在信用能力不足的情况下,供应链融资如何对农户进行授信?在司法制度不完善与信用体系不健全的情况下,如何建立负债履约机制以控制信用风险?信用的基础与条件是什么?
(2)实践中,农户供应链融资的可行模式有哪些?应用效果如何?影响借款农户授信水平的关键因素有哪些?通过对上述问题的研究与回答,本文得出了以下结论：
(1)供应链网络治理是供应链融资动态信用形成的外部条件。在一定的供应链网络治理条件下,可以建立授信准入、结构授信、信用捆绑、团体授信等授信管理机制及贷前甄别、现金流控制、担保替代、贷款再清偿等负债履约机制,将交易主体之间通过交易互动关系所形成的动态信用转换成银行信用,以提高主体的信用等级,并最终达到提高银行授信额度的目标。同时,供应链网络治理可以在一定程度上转变主体的交易特征,以直接或间接提高银行授信额度。
(2)基于担保授信农户供应链融资模式可以显著提高借款农户的授信水平。其中,不同的担保因素组合是影响担保能力以至影响贷款申请人授信水平的关键因素。
(3)基于农产品质押授信农户供应链融资模式可以显著提高借款农户的授信水平。其中,农产品价值控制是影响贷款申请人授信水平的关键因素。
(4)基于订单质押授信农户供应链融资模式可以显著提高借款农户的授信水平。其中,交易伙伴的信用能力、价值控制水平及不同供应链金融教育水平是影响银行信贷员对贷款申请人授信水平的关键因素。
总体而言,本文在有机结合理论研究与实证分析的基础上,对供应链融资信用形成的条件与机理进行了研究,验证了基于担保授信、农产品质押授信及订单质押授信等农户供应链融资模式的可行性、应用效果及关键因素。本文可能在以下几个方面对现有研究作出了贡献：
(1)从供应链视角解决了农户借贷中激励完全相容的难题,证明了在供应链产业组织模式中,供应链的网络治理机制可以替代农户的自我约束,实现激励完全相容约束,从而降低贷款风险和缓解信贷配给。
(2)构筑动态信用理论,证明了在一定的供应链网络治理机制下,可以将交易伙伴在交易互动中形成的动态信用转化为银行信用,为解决农户等信贷群体普遍存在的“授信难”问题提供了一种新的思路。
(3)证明了借贷双方可以在不进行关系专用性投资的情况下,充分利用现有的供应链网络来进行信贷交易治理,为信贷交易治理提供了一种新思路。
(4)证明了供应链融资对农户的适用性,而且通过构筑供应链融资的动态信用理论,对供应链融资的信用基础、信用形成内在机理等理论问题作出了初步解答。
(5)证明了作为农户业务伙伴的供应链核心企业与专业合作社,往往比农村信用社更有信息优势,由其提供第三方信用担保,能较好地起到信号补充作用。
(6)证明了供应链融资可以利用嵌入交易网络的动产质押弥补农户抵押物不足的缺陷,为扩大有效担保范围提供一种有效途径。
(7)证明了不同供应链金融认知水平对授信活动的影响,从供应链金融教育视角,初步探讨了由于某些银行自身方面原因造成信贷约束及银行授信难的可能性,可以为缓解信贷配给提供一种新的视角与思路
Credit transaction is an exchange of value over time. In the transaction, the credit of the borrowers and lenders plays a crucial role in reducing future uncertainty, reducing credit risk, safeguarding safety of funds, guaranteeing credit transactions and other aspects. As the typical credit disadvantaged groups, Small & Midium-sized Enterprises and farmers often face severe credit constraints because of information asymmetry and the lack of collateral. Under the circumstance of information constraints and insufficient collateral, how to improve credit situation of disadvantaged groups through governance mechanism innovation of credit transaction in order to ease its credit constraints? Supply chain financing for SMEs is an effective financing solution. But current researches have not yet given satisfactory answer to the inherent mechanism and the external effects of this financing model, and to the applicability of Supply chain financing for farmers. Starting from the dynamic credit, the dissertation has carried out in-depth analysis of various available financing modells through theoretical and empirical research and illustrates how it solves several critical problems concerning the farmers'financing difficulties.
In theory, what is the formation mechanism of the credit in supply chain financing? In absence of sufficient credit capacity, how to credit farmers in supply chain financing? Under the imperfect judicial system and unsound credit system, how to establish liability performance mechanism in order to control credit risk? What is the basis and conditions for formation of credit?
In practice, which are feasible supply chain financing modells for farmers? How is the application effect? What is the key factors that affect the credit level of the borrowing farmers?
Through research, the dissertation answers these questions and comes to conclutions as follows:
First, supply chain network governance is the external conditions in the formation of supply chain financing dynamic credit. Under certain supply chain network governance, the dynamic credit that formed in the transaction interaction between transactors could be transferred into bank credit through establishment of credit management mechanism(such as access of credit, structure credit, tied credit and group credit),and establishment of compliance mechanisms(such as screening before loans, cash flow control, guaranteed replacement, and re-settlement of loans liabilities) to improve the credit rating, and ultimately improve line of credit. Meanwhile, the supply chain network governance can change the characteristics of the transactors, so that the bank line of credit can be improved directly or indirectly.
Second, farmers'supply chain financing model based on credit guarantee could significantly improve the credit level of borrowing farmers. The combination of different guarantee factors can significantly affect the ability of guarantee as well as the credit level of loan applicants.
Third, farmers'supply chain financing model based on agricultural produce pledge could significantly improve the credit level of borrowing farmers. The value control of the agricultural produce is a key factor that affects the credit level of loan applicants.
Fourth, farmers'supply chain financing model based on purchase-order can significantly improve the credit level of borrowing farmers. The credit capacity of trading partners, the valve control level of trading partners, and the finance education level of supply chain are the key factors that affect credit level of loan applicants.
To sum up, combining theoretical and empirical analysis, the dissertation has conducted a study on the conditions and mechanism of credit's formation in farmers' supply chain financing model, and verify the feasibility, application effect and key factors of supply chain financing modells based on guaranteed credit, agricultural produce quality collateral, purchase-order collateral and so on. The dissertation may contribute to the existing paper in the following aspects:
First, the dissertation has solved the incentive-compatible problem of the farmers from the perspective of the supply chain, proving that supply chain network management system could replace the farmers'constraint of self-restraint to achieve complete incentive-compatible constraint, thereby reducing the credit risk and alleviating credit rationing;
Second, the dissertation has constructed a theory of dynamic credit, proving that the dynamic credit formed in the transaction interaction could be transferred into bank credit through establishment of credit management mechanism and providing a new way to solve the credit difficulties;
Third, the dissertation has proved that even without specific relationship investment, the existing supply chain management network can be fully used by the borrower and the lender for the management of credit transactions, and then provided a new way to manage the credit transactions;
Fourth, the dissertation has proved the applicability of the supply chain financing for farmers, and given preliminary answers to several theoretical questions of supply chain financing about the formation mechanism and the basis and conditions for the formation of credit through constructing dynamic credit theory for supply chain financing;
Fifth, the dissertation has proved that as farmer's supply chain business partners,the core enterprises and the cooperatives have more advantages in information than rural credit cooperatives. By providing third-party credit guarantee, the core enterprises and the cooperatives could play a better role in signal supplement;
Sixth, the dissertation has proved that the pledge of movables embedded in the supply chain network could compensate farmers for the lack of collateral, and then provided a new way to expand the effective scope of the collateral;
Finally, the dissertation has proved that the cognitive level of supply chain financing could significantly affect the credit level of borrowing farmers, preliminarily discussed the possible causes of the bank itself that lead to credit constratints and difficulties in credit by the bank, and provided a new way and perspective to alleviate credit rationing;
(1)理论上,供应链融资信用形成机理怎样?在信用能力不足的情况下,供应链融资如何对农户进行授信?在司法制度不完善与信用体系不健全的情况下,如何建立负债履约机制以控制信用风险?信用的基础与条件是什么?
(2)实践中,农户供应链融资的可行模式有哪些?应用效果如何?影响借款农户授信水平的关键因素有哪些?通过对上述问题的研究与回答,本文得出了以下结论：
(1)供应链网络治理是供应链融资动态信用形成的外部条件。在一定的供应链网络治理条件下,可以建立授信准入、结构授信、信用捆绑、团体授信等授信管理机制及贷前甄别、现金流控制、担保替代、贷款再清偿等负债履约机制,将交易主体之间通过交易互动关系所形成的动态信用转换成银行信用,以提高主体的信用等级,并最终达到提高银行授信额度的目标。同时,供应链网络治理可以在一定程度上转变主体的交易特征,以直接或间接提高银行授信额度。
(2)基于担保授信农户供应链融资模式可以显著提高借款农户的授信水平。其中,不同的担保因素组合是影响担保能力以至影响贷款申请人授信水平的关键因素。
(3)基于农产品质押授信农户供应链融资模式可以显著提高借款农户的授信水平。其中,农产品价值控制是影响贷款申请人授信水平的关键因素。
(4)基于订单质押授信农户供应链融资模式可以显著提高借款农户的授信水平。其中,交易伙伴的信用能力、价值控制水平及不同供应链金融教育水平是影响银行信贷员对贷款申请人授信水平的关键因素。
总体而言,本文在有机结合理论研究与实证分析的基础上,对供应链融资信用形成的条件与机理进行了研究,验证了基于担保授信、农产品质押授信及订单质押授信等农户供应链融资模式的可行性、应用效果及关键因素。本文可能在以下几个方面对现有研究作出了贡献：
(1)从供应链视角解决了农户借贷中激励完全相容的难题,证明了在供应链产业组织模式中,供应链的网络治理机制可以替代农户的自我约束,实现激励完全相容约束,从而降低贷款风险和缓解信贷配给。
(2)构筑动态信用理论,证明了在一定的供应链网络治理机制下,可以将交易伙伴在交易互动中形成的动态信用转化为银行信用,为解决农户等信贷群体普遍存在的“授信难”问题提供了一种新的思路。
(3)证明了借贷双方可以在不进行关系专用性投资的情况下,充分利用现有的供应链网络来进行信贷交易治理,为信贷交易治理提供了一种新思路。
(4)证明了供应链融资对农户的适用性,而且通过构筑供应链融资的动态信用理论,对供应链融资的信用基础、信用形成内在机理等理论问题作出了初步解答。
(5)证明了作为农户业务伙伴的供应链核心企业与专业合作社,往往比农村信用社更有信息优势,由其提供第三方信用担保,能较好地起到信号补充作用。
(6)证明了供应链融资可以利用嵌入交易网络的动产质押弥补农户抵押物不足的缺陷,为扩大有效担保范围提供一种有效途径。
(7)证明了不同供应链金融认知水平对授信活动的影响,从供应链金融教育视角,初步探讨了由于某些银行自身方面原因造成信贷约束及银行授信难的可能性,可以为缓解信贷配给提供一种新的视角与思路
Credit transaction is an exchange of value over time. In the transaction, the credit of the borrowers and lenders plays a crucial role in reducing future uncertainty, reducing credit risk, safeguarding safety of funds, guaranteeing credit transactions and other aspects. As the typical credit disadvantaged groups, Small & Midium-sized Enterprises and farmers often face severe credit constraints because of information asymmetry and the lack of collateral. Under the circumstance of information constraints and insufficient collateral, how to improve credit situation of disadvantaged groups through governance mechanism innovation of credit transaction in order to ease its credit constraints? Supply chain financing for SMEs is an effective financing solution. But current researches have not yet given satisfactory answer to the inherent mechanism and the external effects of this financing model, and to the applicability of Supply chain financing for farmers. Starting from the dynamic credit, the dissertation has carried out in-depth analysis of various available financing modells through theoretical and empirical research and illustrates how it solves several critical problems concerning the farmers'financing difficulties.
In theory, what is the formation mechanism of the credit in supply chain financing? In absence of sufficient credit capacity, how to credit farmers in supply chain financing? Under the imperfect judicial system and unsound credit system, how to establish liability performance mechanism in order to control credit risk? What is the basis and conditions for formation of credit?
In practice, which are feasible supply chain financing modells for farmers? How is the application effect? What is the key factors that affect the credit level of the borrowing farmers?
Through research, the dissertation answers these questions and comes to conclutions as follows:
First, supply chain network governance is the external conditions in the formation of supply chain financing dynamic credit. Under certain supply chain network governance, the dynamic credit that formed in the transaction interaction between transactors could be transferred into bank credit through establishment of credit management mechanism(such as access of credit, structure credit, tied credit and group credit),and establishment of compliance mechanisms(such as screening before loans, cash flow control, guaranteed replacement, and re-settlement of loans liabilities) to improve the credit rating, and ultimately improve line of credit. Meanwhile, the supply chain network governance can change the characteristics of the transactors, so that the bank line of credit can be improved directly or indirectly.
Second, farmers'supply chain financing model based on credit guarantee could significantly improve the credit level of borrowing farmers. The combination of different guarantee factors can significantly affect the ability of guarantee as well as the credit level of loan applicants.
Third, farmers'supply chain financing model based on agricultural produce pledge could significantly improve the credit level of borrowing farmers. The value control of the agricultural produce is a key factor that affects the credit level of loan applicants.
Fourth, farmers'supply chain financing model based on purchase-order can significantly improve the credit level of borrowing farmers. The credit capacity of trading partners, the valve control level of trading partners, and the finance education level of supply chain are the key factors that affect credit level of loan applicants.
To sum up, combining theoretical and empirical analysis, the dissertation has conducted a study on the conditions and mechanism of credit's formation in farmers' supply chain financing model, and verify the feasibility, application effect and key factors of supply chain financing modells based on guaranteed credit, agricultural produce quality collateral, purchase-order collateral and so on. The dissertation may contribute to the existing paper in the following aspects:
First, the dissertation has solved the incentive-compatible problem of the farmers from the perspective of the supply chain, proving that supply chain network management system could replace the farmers'constraint of self-restraint to achieve complete incentive-compatible constraint, thereby reducing the credit risk and alleviating credit rationing;
Second, the dissertation has constructed a theory of dynamic credit, proving that the dynamic credit formed in the transaction interaction could be transferred into bank credit through establishment of credit management mechanism and providing a new way to solve the credit difficulties;
Third, the dissertation has proved that even without specific relationship investment, the existing supply chain management network can be fully used by the borrower and the lender for the management of credit transactions, and then provided a new way to manage the credit transactions;
Fourth, the dissertation has proved the applicability of the supply chain financing for farmers, and given preliminary answers to several theoretical questions of supply chain financing about the formation mechanism and the basis and conditions for the formation of credit through constructing dynamic credit theory for supply chain financing;
Fifth, the dissertation has proved that as farmer's supply chain business partners,the core enterprises and the cooperatives have more advantages in information than rural credit cooperatives. By providing third-party credit guarantee, the core enterprises and the cooperatives could play a better role in signal supplement;
Sixth, the dissertation has proved that the pledge of movables embedded in the supply chain network could compensate farmers for the lack of collateral, and then provided a new way to expand the effective scope of the collateral;
Finally, the dissertation has proved that the cognitive level of supply chain financing could significantly affect the credit level of borrowing farmers, preliminarily discussed the possible causes of the bank itself that lead to credit constratints and difficulties in credit by the bank, and provided a new way and perspective to alleviate credit rationing;
引文
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1谢圣涛.Aberdeen公司供应链金融研究及启示.西南金融,2009(4).
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