海洋渔业资源管理中ITQ制度交易成本研究
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摘要
二十世纪七十年代以来,随着渔业经济的快速发展,我国海洋渔业资源持续衰退。为了保护渔业资源,我国曾采取了捕捞许可制度等一系列管理措施,但由于种种原因,资源衰退趋势一直未能改变。于是在2000年修订的《中华人民共和国渔业法》中提出实行捕捞限额制度。作为捕捞限额制度的一种,个体可转让配额(ITQ)制度自1973年提出来后就被许多国家所采用,一些国家的实践证明该制度确实能够有效防止捕捞努力的过度增长,保护渔业资源。许多经济学家将其认为是最有效的一种捕捞限额制度,但也有学者指出该制度存在比较高的交易成本,会影响其效率的发挥。国际上对ITQ制度交易成本的研究报道还不多,我国对ITQ制度交易成本的研究则几乎处于空白。
本文从ITQ制度交易成本对其效率的影响、ITQ制度交易成本的分类、我国海洋渔业中ITQ制度交易成本的影响因素、降低我国ITQ制度交易成本的途径等方面对我国海洋渔业资源管理中ITQ制度交易成本进行了研究。
研究指出,尽管ITQ制度会如新古典学者指出的那样是一种相对于传统管理制度来说更有效率的渔业资源管理制度,但该制度的交易成本会使总可捕量的确定、配额分配、配额交易偏离最优水平,监督成本的存在也会导致其效率的损失,而且渔民越多,监督问题引起的内生交易成本也越大。
从交易频率、交易中的不确定性、资产专用性等方面考察我国ITQ制度的交易成本时可以看出,ITQ制度比较适合于大的渔区,由于我国海洋渔业中不确定性比较大、资产专用性比较强,因此我国实施ITQ制度的交易成本会比较高。
从我国渔业、渔区、和渔民的角度探讨该制度交易成本时可以发现,由于捕捞对象许可和捕捞渔具渔法许可、网目尺寸限制和渔获物幼鱼比例检查等制度与ITQ制度的相容性较高,所以有利于该制度的引入。但捕捞渔民多、渔船数量多、渔民文化水平和技能低、渔民转业成本高、海岸线长和海域宽阔导致的作业分散、捕捞业海上交易频繁、兼捕性强等因素会导致ITQ制度交易成本比较高,尤其是配额分配成本和配额分配后制度执行中的监督成本会比较高。而在目前的渔业生产经营体制和渔区的行政管理制度下,渔民的组织化程度比较弱,在此基础上引入ITQ制度的话,会使配额分配成本和制度执行中的监督成本进一步增加。
对我国这样一个渔民众多而且兼捕性很强的国家来说,完全依靠当局加强监督来实施ITQ制度的话将会带来昂贵的监督成本。在结合我国国情的基础上,通过巴罗博弈模型的拓展和修正可以证明,在我国渔业资源管理的ITQ制度中,渔区人与人之间的信任与监督之间存在替代作用,熟识信用(声誉效应)会产生“社会嵌入”,这将有利于降低ITQ制度的监督成本;通过将Itoh委托—代理模
With the development of fisheries economy, marine fisheries resources have been declining since 1970s' in China. Series of management countermeasures, such as fishing permits, have been adopted to protect marine fisheries resources, but this trend of declining has not been changed. So fishing quota system was put forward in Fishing Law of the People's Republic of China, which was amended on October 31, 2000. As a kind of fishing quota system, individual transferable quota (ITQ) system was suggested in 1973 for the first time, and was immediately adopted by many countries since then. Experiences from some counties proved that it is able to correct the over fishing behaviors and to protect marine fisheries resources. Some Economists applauded for it as the most efficient fishing quota system, but some other economists argued that its high transaction costs could cause losses in its efficiency. Studies concentrated on its transaction costs are scarce both domestically and internationally.This thesis explored the influence of transaction costs of ITQ system on its efficiency, the classification of its transaction costs, factors which affect its transaction costs in Chinese situation, and countermeasures can be adopted to cut down its transaction costs in China.The author proved that although ITQ system is more efficient than the traditional systems which were used to protect marine fisheries resources, its transaction costs can distort the total allowable catch, the distribution of individual transferable quotas, and the transaction of ITQ, this kind of distortion can cause losses in its efficiency, and the endogenous transaction costs which are brought forth by the supervision problem increase with the number of fishermen.If the transaction costs of individual transferable quota system in China are studied from Williamson's viewpoint, one can find that this system can be mostly used in large fisheries area(such as Zhou Shan and Sheng Si), and that because of the large uncertainty and intense investment idiosyncrasy of Chinese fisheries, the transaction costs of this system will be very high.If one analyze the transaction costs of individual transferable quota system in China from the characteristics of Chinese fisheries, fishing communities, and fishermen, he will find that such institutions as fishing objective permits, fishing method permits, limit on net size, and check on the young fish component of catches are compatible with ITQ system, and so can reduce the transaction costs of it, but there are lots of fishermen and fishing boats in China, the cultural qualities, institutional awareness, and technology of fishermen are low, the costs of transferring fishermen to other industries are high, the shore of Chinese oceans is long, the areas of these oceans are broad, the frequency of transaction in ocean is high, multi-catches often occur in fisheries in China, so the transaction costs of ITQ system in China will be very high., especially the costs of quota distribution and supervision costs existing after the distribution. Additionally, under current economic system of fisheries and administrative system of fishing community, fishermen are weakly organized, which will increase the quota distribution costs and supervision costs of ITQ system.As for a country with multi-catch fisheries and so many fishermen, China has to bear high supervision costs if she completely depends on fisheries administrative department to carry out ITQ system. "Social embeddedness" of the trust relationship between familiars and reputation effects, and the substitution between trust and supervision can be proved to exist in fishing communities and fisheries in China by developing and tailoring the Barro's model of game theory in financing field to the reality of Chinese fisheries. Quota cooperative team can also be proved to be helpful to reduce the supervision costs of ITQ system in multi-catch fisheries by extending Itoh's principal-agent model to multi-catch fisheries in China.On the basis of these perspectives stated above, the author pointed out that because such fishing community
本文从ITQ制度交易成本对其效率的影响、ITQ制度交易成本的分类、我国海洋渔业中ITQ制度交易成本的影响因素、降低我国ITQ制度交易成本的途径等方面对我国海洋渔业资源管理中ITQ制度交易成本进行了研究。
研究指出,尽管ITQ制度会如新古典学者指出的那样是一种相对于传统管理制度来说更有效率的渔业资源管理制度,但该制度的交易成本会使总可捕量的确定、配额分配、配额交易偏离最优水平,监督成本的存在也会导致其效率的损失,而且渔民越多,监督问题引起的内生交易成本也越大。
从交易频率、交易中的不确定性、资产专用性等方面考察我国ITQ制度的交易成本时可以看出,ITQ制度比较适合于大的渔区,由于我国海洋渔业中不确定性比较大、资产专用性比较强,因此我国实施ITQ制度的交易成本会比较高。
从我国渔业、渔区、和渔民的角度探讨该制度交易成本时可以发现,由于捕捞对象许可和捕捞渔具渔法许可、网目尺寸限制和渔获物幼鱼比例检查等制度与ITQ制度的相容性较高,所以有利于该制度的引入。但捕捞渔民多、渔船数量多、渔民文化水平和技能低、渔民转业成本高、海岸线长和海域宽阔导致的作业分散、捕捞业海上交易频繁、兼捕性强等因素会导致ITQ制度交易成本比较高,尤其是配额分配成本和配额分配后制度执行中的监督成本会比较高。而在目前的渔业生产经营体制和渔区的行政管理制度下,渔民的组织化程度比较弱,在此基础上引入ITQ制度的话,会使配额分配成本和制度执行中的监督成本进一步增加。
对我国这样一个渔民众多而且兼捕性很强的国家来说,完全依靠当局加强监督来实施ITQ制度的话将会带来昂贵的监督成本。在结合我国国情的基础上,通过巴罗博弈模型的拓展和修正可以证明,在我国渔业资源管理的ITQ制度中,渔区人与人之间的信任与监督之间存在替代作用,熟识信用(声誉效应)会产生“社会嵌入”,这将有利于降低ITQ制度的监督成本;通过将Itoh委托—代理模
With the development of fisheries economy, marine fisheries resources have been declining since 1970s' in China. Series of management countermeasures, such as fishing permits, have been adopted to protect marine fisheries resources, but this trend of declining has not been changed. So fishing quota system was put forward in Fishing Law of the People's Republic of China, which was amended on October 31, 2000. As a kind of fishing quota system, individual transferable quota (ITQ) system was suggested in 1973 for the first time, and was immediately adopted by many countries since then. Experiences from some counties proved that it is able to correct the over fishing behaviors and to protect marine fisheries resources. Some Economists applauded for it as the most efficient fishing quota system, but some other economists argued that its high transaction costs could cause losses in its efficiency. Studies concentrated on its transaction costs are scarce both domestically and internationally.This thesis explored the influence of transaction costs of ITQ system on its efficiency, the classification of its transaction costs, factors which affect its transaction costs in Chinese situation, and countermeasures can be adopted to cut down its transaction costs in China.The author proved that although ITQ system is more efficient than the traditional systems which were used to protect marine fisheries resources, its transaction costs can distort the total allowable catch, the distribution of individual transferable quotas, and the transaction of ITQ, this kind of distortion can cause losses in its efficiency, and the endogenous transaction costs which are brought forth by the supervision problem increase with the number of fishermen.If the transaction costs of individual transferable quota system in China are studied from Williamson's viewpoint, one can find that this system can be mostly used in large fisheries area(such as Zhou Shan and Sheng Si), and that because of the large uncertainty and intense investment idiosyncrasy of Chinese fisheries, the transaction costs of this system will be very high.If one analyze the transaction costs of individual transferable quota system in China from the characteristics of Chinese fisheries, fishing communities, and fishermen, he will find that such institutions as fishing objective permits, fishing method permits, limit on net size, and check on the young fish component of catches are compatible with ITQ system, and so can reduce the transaction costs of it, but there are lots of fishermen and fishing boats in China, the cultural qualities, institutional awareness, and technology of fishermen are low, the costs of transferring fishermen to other industries are high, the shore of Chinese oceans is long, the areas of these oceans are broad, the frequency of transaction in ocean is high, multi-catches often occur in fisheries in China, so the transaction costs of ITQ system in China will be very high., especially the costs of quota distribution and supervision costs existing after the distribution. Additionally, under current economic system of fisheries and administrative system of fishing community, fishermen are weakly organized, which will increase the quota distribution costs and supervision costs of ITQ system.As for a country with multi-catch fisheries and so many fishermen, China has to bear high supervision costs if she completely depends on fisheries administrative department to carry out ITQ system. "Social embeddedness" of the trust relationship between familiars and reputation effects, and the substitution between trust and supervision can be proved to exist in fishing communities and fisheries in China by developing and tailoring the Barro's model of game theory in financing field to the reality of Chinese fisheries. Quota cooperative team can also be proved to be helpful to reduce the supervision costs of ITQ system in multi-catch fisheries by extending Itoh's principal-agent model to multi-catch fisheries in China.On the basis of these perspectives stated above, the author pointed out that because such fishing community
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