中国猪肉纵向关联产业价格传递
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摘要
猪肉在城乡居民肉类消费总量中占60%以上,是城乡居民肉类消费、蛋白质的重要来源和食物消费的主要品种,在满足人们身体健康、保障国家食物安全中发挥着重要作用。近年来,我国以猪肉为代表的肉类价格大幅度波动,作为居民日常生活必须品,其价格的不稳定不仅影响居民日常消费的稳定、养殖业健康发展,而且对整个国家宏观经济安全运行产生不利影响。
随着社会分工的深化,养猪业作为提供肉食品的产业,其发展与种植业、畜牧业、加工业、运输、零售等产业的关联关系日益紧密。日益发达的养猪业,一方面表现为养猪业以外的物质和能量进入生猪及猪肉的生产系统,从而打破养猪业部门自身的封闭循环,实现其高效增长；另一方面,还表现在越来越多的猪肉产品需要经过加工之后才能进入居民消费领域,即猪肉纵向产业链条的延长。猪肉产业链条中各个分散、独立的个体形成一定功能与结构的系统,即猪肉纵向产业链,通过垂直职能分工下(种植业→饲料工业→畜禽生产→加工→批发→零售)产业部门成员的关联与协作,共同满足社会对猪肉产品的需求。
猪肉纵向产业关联日益紧密不但提高了猪肉生产能力,与此同时纵向链条中各个产业的波动也必然引起整个养猪业生产稳定与发展。随着生猪生产、猪肉消费方式的不断改进,养猪业与其它产业联系日益紧密,其在分享产业链中各产业带来生产便利同时,也必然不可避免地接受其它产业波动所代来的种种挑战。市场经济给养猪业提供了良好的发展机遇,但与此同时,市场经济所带来的市场风险也是不可忽略的重要方面。
在养猪业价格波动过程中,媒体、学者和消费者普遍注意到这样一种现象,即猪肉零售价格上涨幅度远远高于养殖场(或户)所实际感受到的生猪收购价格上涨幅度；而另一方面,当养猪业各种价格开始大幅回落,相对于猪肉零售价格的下跌幅度,仔猪和生猪价格下跌幅度更大,导致养殖户生产积极性严重受挫。可以说,猪肉产业的发展状况和面临的困境在中国大多数肉类价格波动中具有代表性。
本文首先运用价格传递协整误差修正(PTC-ECM)模型验证生猪收购价格和猪肉零售价格之间是否存在非对称性传递,并针对目前我国生猪养殖布局发生转移使生猪主产区和猪肉主消区发生分离的现实,运用相邻省市间养猪业相对价格方差的方法分析了我国养猪业市场整合情况,从而排除了空间市场发育迟缓造成猪肉纵向产业链价格非对称性传递的原因。继而以纵向产业链价格形成、传递机制和中间层理论作为理论基础,以生猪贩子为例,深入探讨了猪肉纵向产业链中的中间商对猪肉价格形成和传递的作用和影响机制,并廓清了纵向产业链各主体的存在对价格在纵向产业链中传递和福利的影响。本文的分析为采取合理有效的宏观政策稳定肉类价格、确保畜禽养殖业平稳健康发展具有重要理论和现实意义。
围绕上述分析框架,本文采用规范研究和实证研究相结合的方法,主要研究内容如下：
第一章导论,依次论述本文的研究背景、问题提出、研究目标和研究假说、数据来源、研究方法、研究创新点和不足之处。
第二章概念界定与文献综述。主要界定本研究中的相关概念和对国内外的相关研究文献进行总结和梳理。
第三章理论基础和分析框架。在对相关理论进行总结后,提出本文的理论分析框架,主要包括基于价格理论的价格传递协整误差修正(PTC-ECM)模型的构建、相邻省市间养猪业市场整合模型的构建、从纵向产业链视角探讨造成价格非对称性传递的原因；分工逐步深化的条件下,猪肉纵向产业链中的中间商对价格传递的影响、作用机制及其经济绩效。
第四章我国猪肉纵向关联市场价格传递。本章在分析我国养猪业发展现状的基础上,主要关注生猪及猪肉市场流通过程中,价格在生猪养殖场(户)和猪肉零售之间的传递情况,其关键问题是猪肉零售价格对生猪收购价格的冲击是否是对称的,或者正如养殖者所感受到的那样猪肉零售价格和生猪收购价格的波动是非对称的。
第五章中国养猪业市场整合研究。伴随生猪主产区和猪肉主消区的分离,生猪大范围跨地域调运成为现实。中国地域辽阔,地区间市场发育水平、交通设施等存在差异,价格在差异巨大的地区间能否有效传递,不仅关系着市场机制能否引导生猪业产品按照价格规律高效率流动,而且影响价格在纵向产业链中顺利传递,这需要探究我国养猪业市场整合情况。市场整合是衡量养猪业市场流通有效程度和效率的重要指标,整合程度越高市场效率就越有效,就能充分发挥市场机制调节猪肉供需和稳定生猪生产的作用(Robert,2000)。本章运用相对价格方法,选取从生产到消费的玉米、育肥猪配合饲料、仔猪、待宰活猪、猪肉五种商品的价格共同组成养猪业价格体系,分析了中国养猪业市场整合情况。
第六章猪肉纵向产业链结构特性与价格形成机制。伴随分工的逐步深化,纵向关联产业间各主体联系日益紧密,其对产业间价格传递和形成有着不可忽视的作用。本章从产业链视角结合猪肉纵向产业链上下游各主体的结构特性和养猪业的产业特性,分析纵向产业链各个环节产品价格与产量形成机制的有效性,以及外部冲击在纵向产业链之间实现有效传递的机制。在上游是价格接受者,下游是价格价格制定者的特定市场结构下,以养殖场(或户)生猪销售为例,运用农户模型分析市场势力和交易成本对不同规模养殖场(或户)生猪销售价格的影响,剖析生猪价格从养殖场(或户)经由经纪人和贩子到屠宰加工企业之间传递的差异,探究上下游市场势力、交易成本对价格在纵向产业链中传递和形成的影响。
第七章中间商对猪肉纵向产业链价格形成和福利的影响。随着分工的逐步深化,猪肉纵向产业链中交易主体不断增多,且关联日益紧密。不同于新古典经济学,厂商中间层理论(Spulber,1999)认为在完全竞争市场中,中间商具有独立定价权,为了扩大自己的利润,中间商具有扩大对上游要价-下游出价差价的动机。本章以生猪贩子为例,分析拥有独立定价权的中间商对猪肉纵向产业链价格形成、福利分配以及生猪生产、生猪及猪肉价格波动的影响。
第八章结论和政策建议。在对全文进行总结的基础上提出本文相关政策建议。
围绕上述研究内容,本研究得到的主要结论如下：
第一、猪肉零售价格和生猪收购价格之间存在长期均衡关系,长期中价格在猪肉纵向关联产业链中传递是比较完全的；短期中价格在猪肉纵向关联产业中的传递呈现出非对称性特征。猪肉零售价格对生猪收购价格上涨的反应程度显著不同于对其下跌的反应程度,表明生猪屠宰加工和批发零售部门拥有较强的市场控制能力。此外,生猪养殖规模越大、生产越集中,猪肉零售价格对外界冲击的调整速度越快速,揭示了规模养殖场在生产过程和信息收集中可以获得规模经济,并且能够在市场交易中获得有利的市场价格。近年来,我国猪肉市场价格的大幅度波动,除了与生猪养殖部门有关外,产业链中的生猪屠宰及猪肉加工、流通部门市场交涉能力强也是不可忽视的重要方面。
第二、入世以来,我国养猪业要素和商品市场流通中交易成本不断下降,流通效率逐步提高,中国养猪业市场整合程度在调整中逐步提高；我国东、中、西部养猪业市场整合程度也在逐步改善,但三地区间养猪业市场整合程度相互间存在差异。位于生猪主产区的重庆-四川、河北-山东、河北-辽宁和东部发达地区的京津冀省市间养猪业相对价格方差波动幅度位居全国前列,表明养猪业市场价格相互间差异较大,养猪业市场整合程度较低,值得我们探究其内在原因。本文所做的工作为深入研究我国肉类市场整合进程的决定因素提供了起点。将相邻省市间相对价格方差视作市场整合的动态指标,为从地理、市场垄断和经济政策的角度解释养猪业市场整合进程的差异提供了有利的手段。
第三、在猪肉纵向产业链中,生猪养殖环节和收购、屠宰加工、批发零售环节等产业链上下游各主体市场势力的差异,是价格传递出现非对称性的主要原因。当外界冲击时,市场势力较强的主体能够阻止对其不利的价格传递,加快对其有利的传递,从而使价格在猪肉纵向关联市场中的传递表现出非对称性。在特定的市场结构下,散养和分散小规模养殖产生的交易成本过高,降低了其能够获得的有利市场价格,加大生猪生产的不稳定性,加剧了生猪及猪肉价格波动的时间和幅度。通过运用描述性统计和农户模型,证实了市场势力和交易成本是影响生猪销售价格差异的重要因素。交易前的信息成本、交易时的谈判成本以及交易后的执行成本等的差异是造成生猪销售价格差异的主要原因。
第四、由生猪贩子定价机制及其对生猪收购市场社会福利和绩效的影响得知,生猪贩子的收益始终是养殖场(或户)生产剩余价值中截取的一部分。在生猪收购市场上,贩子的出现造成了猪肉产业链上的各主体之间的分配进一步不均,养殖场(或户)处于较低盈利水平甚或亏损状态,加大了生猪生产不稳定的风险,导致生猪及猪肉价格波动的幅度和时间不断被扩大和延续；从交易成本的角度看,尽管贩子的出现增加了分工层级,也增加了交易费用,但实证资料表明,贩子更多地降低了屠宰加工企业与养殖场(或户)直接交易的成本,提高了生猪收购市场的交易效率,即贩子因专业化分工所节省的交易费用总体上大于因分工层级延伸所增加的交易费用。故中间商的存在对猪肉纵向产业链绩效的改进是积极的。
根据以上研究成果,本研究提出从纵向关联产业视角完善现有猪肉价格稳定机制,生猪屠宰、猪肉加工及流通过程等市场主体也应该成为今后稳定生猪及猪肉价格政策的关注重点；规范中间商等强势市场主体的经营行为,逐步改善养殖主体的盈利状况；扩大生猪养殖规模、发展专业合作经济组织,推进覆盖整个猪肉纵向产业链的一体化经营企业,实现生猪养殖业的规模化和集约化,建立生猪生产与猪肉价格市场信息预警体系等政策建议。
Pork,which accounted for 60% in urban and rural residents'total meat consumption,is a main origin of meat,protein and the principal variety of food. It plays a key role in people's health and the food security to our country. In recent years,the large scale fluctuation of the meats price,such as the pork price,affects the resident daily life stability,the animal husbandry healthy development,And it has the adverse effect to the entire national macroeconomic safe operation.
Along with the social division of labor's deepening, the pig-breeding industry,as provides the meat produce, and the related industry's correlational dependence is day by day close, which is the crop production, animal husbandry, processing industry, transportation, retail sales and so on.The development of the pig-breeding industry is day by day rapid,on the one hand its displays that the material and the energy outside the pig-breeding industry enters the live pig and the pork production system, thus breaks the department of its own closed cycle, and realizes highly effective growth; On the other hand, but also displays that more and more pork products need to undergo the processing in order to enter the resident expense domain,namely pork longitudinal industry chain's extension.In the pork industry chain link, each dispersion, independent individual forms certain function and structure system,namely pork longitudinal industry chain, through the vertical function division of labor(crop production-> feed industry-> poultry production-> processing-> wholesale-> retail sales), the longitudinal industrial chain member's connection and the cooperation, satisfy the society demand for the pork product together.
The relates gradually closely of the pork longitudinal industry not only sharpened the pork productivity, but also the fluctuation in the longitudinal chain link industry also inevitably causes the unstable development of the entire pig-breeding industry.Along with the improvement of live pig production and the pork expense,and the relationship closely between the pig-breeding industry and other industries, it while shares the facilitates in industrial chain, also inevitably accepts the challenge of other industrial fluctuation.The market economy has provided the good development opportunity to the pig-breeding industry, but at the same time, the market risk is also an unnegligible aspect.
In the process of the pig-breeding industry's price fluctuations, the media, the scholar and the consumer note that the rise scope of pork retail price is higher than the live pig purchase price,which exceedingly the breeding farm (or household) feel;But on the other hand, when each kind of price of the pig-breeding industry starts to recede largely, the price falling scope of the newborn pig and the live pig is bigger than the pork retail price,it causes the planter's enthusiasm serious attack.It can be said that the condition of the pork industry has the representation in the Chinese majority meats price fluctuations.
This article first confirms whether to have the asymmetrical transmission between the live pig purchase price and the pork retail price,using the price transmission cooperates error correction model(PTC-ECM).The layout shift of the live pig cultivation causes the main production area of the live pig and the area of the pork host disappears to have had the separation.The relative price variance method of the pig-breeding industry between neighboring provinces and cities is utilized to analyze the market conformity situation of the pig-breeding industry,in oder to remove the space slow growth of the market to cause the price asymmetry transmission in the pork longitudinal industry chain. Subsequently taked the longitudinal industrial chain price structure, the transmission mechanism and the intermediate level theory as the rationale, the article has discussed the middle man in the pork longitudinal industry chain to the pork price structure and the transmission function and the influence mechanism. and has cleaned up the existence of various main bodies in the longitudinal industrial chain to the price transmission and welfare's influence. This article aims to stable meats price by the reasonable effective macroscopic policy, and to guarantee that the steady development of the economics has the important theory and the practical significance.
Regarding the above analysis frame, this article uses the method which unifies the standard research and the empirical study, the main research content is as follows:
The first chapter introduction,elaborate this article's research background, the question proposed that in turn, the research aim and the research hypothesis, the data originate, the research technique, the research innovation and the deficiency.
The second chapter concept limits and literature summary. Limits related concepts in this article and carries on to summarizes and combs the domestic and foreign related research literatures.
The third chapter rationale and analysis frame. After carries on the summary to the correlation theories,it proposed theoretical analysis frame, mainly includes:
construction the price transmission cooperates the entire error correction model (PTC-ECM) based on the price theory, construction the pig-breeding industry market conformity model between neighboring provinces and cities, discussion the reason to the price asymmetry transmission from the longitudinal industrial chain angle of view; Under division of labor gradually deepening condition, middle man to price transmission influence, function machine-made and economical achievements in pork longitudinal industry chain.
The fourth chapter, the pork longitudinal connection market price transmission in our country. This chapter analyzes the development present situation of the pig-breeding industry firstly, mainly pays attention to the price transmission situation between the live pig breeding farm (household) and pork retail sales,its key question is that the impact of the pork retail price to the live pig purchase price whether is symmetrical, or just like the planter feels such that the fluctuation of the pork retail price to the live pig purchase price is asymmetrical.
The fifth chapter,the market conformity of pig-breeding industry in China. Follows the live pig main production area and the pork host expense area separation, The wide range transportation of the live pig cross region becomes the reality.China vast in territory,the Marketability level,traffic equipment exist differently.Whether does the price transmit effectively in difference giant interzone, it not only decides that the market mechanism guides the live pig industry product to be mobile according to the price rule highly, moreover the price transmit smoothly in the longitudinal industrial chain. This needs to inquire into the market conformity of the pig-breeding industry.The market conformity measures the distribution efficiency of the pig-breeding industry,the higher the conformity degree is,the more effective the market is.It can display that the market mechanism adjusts the supply and demand of the pork and stabilize the live pig production effectively(Robert,2000).This chapter utilizes the relative price method, selects from the production to the expense corn, nurtures the fat pig mixed feed, the newborn pig, to treat butchers the live pig, the pork five kind of commodity price to compose the pig-breeding industry price system together,it has analyzed the market conformity situation of the pig-breeding industry.
The sixth chapter,the structural property and the price structure mechanism of the pork longitudinal industry chain. Following the division of labor the gradual deepening, the relationship among the various main bodies in the longitudinal industry is gradual close, it has the noticeable function for the price transmition and formation.This chapter union the various main bodies' structural property and the pig-breeding industry industrial characteristic of the upstream and downstream from the industrial chain angle of view in the pork longitudinal industry chain. It analyzes the formation mechanism of each link product price and the output in the longitudinal industrial chain, as well as the exterior impaction realizes the effective transmission in the longitudinal industrial chain.Taked the live pig sale of the breeding farm (or household) as an example, the artcile utilizes the peasant household model to analyze the market influence and the transaction cost to affect the live pig selling price to the different scale breeding farm (either household), it inquired into the live pig price difference by way of the breeding farm (or household) and the peddler to the slaughtering processing industry.And consider that the market influence, the transaction cost analyze the price transmition in the upstream and downstream in the longitudinal industrial chain.
The seventh chapter middle man to the price transmission and welfare's influence in the meats industry chain. Along with the division of labor gradual deepening, the middle man between the joint live pig producer and the pork consumer's marketability main body, increases gradually,in the pork longitudinal industry chain. The growth of middle man not only causes more transaction behaviors between the economic subject, simultaneously the transaction cost also actually increases along with it, the excessively high transaction cost will cause the social resource to have the nonessential consumption (Gary,1993).Therefore,have the middle man increase the transaction cost,or promote to the economical achievements in the pork longitudinal industry chain? This chapter takes the middle man-peddler as an example,it inquired into its influence to the price transmission and welfare in the pork longitudinal industry chain, from the real diagnosis angle, provides some beneficial references for further understanding and management the middle man in the pork longitudinal industry chain.
The eighth chapter conclusion and policy suggestion. It puts forward the related policy proposal of this article on the summary of the full text.
Regarding the above research content, the main conclusion which this research obtains is as follows:
First, it exists the long-term balanced relations between the pork retail price and the live pig purchase price, and the long-term price transmission is quite complete in the pork longitudinal connection industry chain;In the short-term the price transmission presents the asymmetrical characteristics in the pork longitudinal connection industry; The pork retail price is obviously different to the extent of reaction when the live pig purchase price rise, with the extent of reaction which it falls,indicated that the slaughtering processing of the live pig and the department sales of the wholesales and the retail have the strong market control. In addition, the live pig cultivation scale is bigger, the production is more centralized, the pork retail price was faster to the outside impact's governed speed, it has promulgated that the scale breeding farm may obtain the economies of scale in the production processing and the collection of information, and could obtain the advantageous market price in the market transaction. In recent years, the pork market price presented the large scale fluctuation in our country.The market negotiation ability in the live pig slaughtering and the pork processing, circulation department is also the noticeable important aspect,besides the live pig cultivation department.
Second, the transaction cost of the essential factor and commodity in the pig-breeding industry has dropped unceasingly,and its circulation efficiency enhances gradually, since being WTO entry, the market conformity degree of the pig-breeding industry enhances gradually in the adjustment; the market conformity degree of the pig-breeding industry is also improving in the East, the middle, and the western in our country, but the market conformity degree mutually exist different in three interzone. Located at the live pig main production area in the Chongqing-Sichuan, the Hebei-Shandong, the Hebei-Liaoning and the eastern part between the developed area in the Beijing and Tianjin Hebei provinces and cities,the relative price variance margin of fluctuation is situated at the national front row in the pig-breeding industry,indicated that the market price of the pig-breeding industry is mutually different, the market conformity degree of the pig-breeding industry is low, which is worth of inquiring into its immanent cause. This article has provided the beginning for researching the meat market conformity advancement's determining factor. The relative price variance of the neighboring provinces and cities regards as the dynamic target of the market conformity,which explained that the difference of the market conformity has provided the advantageous method for from the geography, the market monopoly and economic policy's angle in the pig-breeding industry.
Third, the market influence's differences of the various main bodies in the pork longitudinal industry chain,such as the purchase, slaughtering processing, wholesale retail sales link, is the primary cause of the price asymmetry transmission, When outside impact, the main body, which have the strong market influence,can prevent to its disadvantageous price transmission, speeds up to its advantageous transmission, thus it causes that the price displays the asymmetry transmission in the pork longitudinal connection market.Through using the descriptive statistics and the peasant household model, it confirmed that the market influence and the transaction cost are the important attribute for the live pig selling price difference. The difference of the information cost before the transaction, the transaction negotiations cost as well as the transaction carriying out the cost and so on are the primary cause for the live pig selling price difference.
Fourth, from the live pig peddler's pricing mechanism and its influence to the social welfare and the achievements of the purchasing the market,it can realize that the live pig peddler's income is an interception part of the breeding farm'(or household's).In the live pig purchasing market,the peddler's appearance caused on to be further uneven among the pork industry chain's various main bodies'assignment. The breeding farm (or household) is at the low profit level and the high condition of which exploits; from the transaction cost's angle that peddler's appearance increased the division of labor level freely, also increased the transaction cost, but the real diagnosis material indicated that the peddler more reduced the direct exchange cost between the slaughtering Processing industry and the breeding farm (or household), enhanced the transaction efficiency of the live pig purchasing market,namely the peddler saved the transaction cost for the special coverage, which was bigger than the transaction cost,which was extended as a whole the division of labor level. Therefore the existence of the middle man is positive to the achievements' improvement of the pork longitudinal industry chain.
According to the above research results, this article proposed the price stabilization mechanism of the meat product from the longitudinal connection industry angle of view.The market main bodies,such as, the live pig slaughtering, pork processing and circuit and so on,should also become the policy attention key of stablizing the live pig and the pork price from now on; It should specify the market behaviors of the strong market main body, improve the profit condition of the cultivation main body gradually; expand the scale of the live pig cultivation, develop the specialized cooperative organization of the live pig,Advance the integration operation of business of coverring the entire pork longitudinal industry chain, realize the formalization and the intensification of raising pigs industrial, establish the price market information early warning system of the live pig production and the pork,and so on.
随着社会分工的深化,养猪业作为提供肉食品的产业,其发展与种植业、畜牧业、加工业、运输、零售等产业的关联关系日益紧密。日益发达的养猪业,一方面表现为养猪业以外的物质和能量进入生猪及猪肉的生产系统,从而打破养猪业部门自身的封闭循环,实现其高效增长；另一方面,还表现在越来越多的猪肉产品需要经过加工之后才能进入居民消费领域,即猪肉纵向产业链条的延长。猪肉产业链条中各个分散、独立的个体形成一定功能与结构的系统,即猪肉纵向产业链,通过垂直职能分工下(种植业→饲料工业→畜禽生产→加工→批发→零售)产业部门成员的关联与协作,共同满足社会对猪肉产品的需求。
猪肉纵向产业关联日益紧密不但提高了猪肉生产能力,与此同时纵向链条中各个产业的波动也必然引起整个养猪业生产稳定与发展。随着生猪生产、猪肉消费方式的不断改进,养猪业与其它产业联系日益紧密,其在分享产业链中各产业带来生产便利同时,也必然不可避免地接受其它产业波动所代来的种种挑战。市场经济给养猪业提供了良好的发展机遇,但与此同时,市场经济所带来的市场风险也是不可忽略的重要方面。
在养猪业价格波动过程中,媒体、学者和消费者普遍注意到这样一种现象,即猪肉零售价格上涨幅度远远高于养殖场(或户)所实际感受到的生猪收购价格上涨幅度；而另一方面,当养猪业各种价格开始大幅回落,相对于猪肉零售价格的下跌幅度,仔猪和生猪价格下跌幅度更大,导致养殖户生产积极性严重受挫。可以说,猪肉产业的发展状况和面临的困境在中国大多数肉类价格波动中具有代表性。
本文首先运用价格传递协整误差修正(PTC-ECM)模型验证生猪收购价格和猪肉零售价格之间是否存在非对称性传递,并针对目前我国生猪养殖布局发生转移使生猪主产区和猪肉主消区发生分离的现实,运用相邻省市间养猪业相对价格方差的方法分析了我国养猪业市场整合情况,从而排除了空间市场发育迟缓造成猪肉纵向产业链价格非对称性传递的原因。继而以纵向产业链价格形成、传递机制和中间层理论作为理论基础,以生猪贩子为例,深入探讨了猪肉纵向产业链中的中间商对猪肉价格形成和传递的作用和影响机制,并廓清了纵向产业链各主体的存在对价格在纵向产业链中传递和福利的影响。本文的分析为采取合理有效的宏观政策稳定肉类价格、确保畜禽养殖业平稳健康发展具有重要理论和现实意义。
围绕上述分析框架,本文采用规范研究和实证研究相结合的方法,主要研究内容如下：
第一章导论,依次论述本文的研究背景、问题提出、研究目标和研究假说、数据来源、研究方法、研究创新点和不足之处。
第二章概念界定与文献综述。主要界定本研究中的相关概念和对国内外的相关研究文献进行总结和梳理。
第三章理论基础和分析框架。在对相关理论进行总结后,提出本文的理论分析框架,主要包括基于价格理论的价格传递协整误差修正(PTC-ECM)模型的构建、相邻省市间养猪业市场整合模型的构建、从纵向产业链视角探讨造成价格非对称性传递的原因；分工逐步深化的条件下,猪肉纵向产业链中的中间商对价格传递的影响、作用机制及其经济绩效。
第四章我国猪肉纵向关联市场价格传递。本章在分析我国养猪业发展现状的基础上,主要关注生猪及猪肉市场流通过程中,价格在生猪养殖场(户)和猪肉零售之间的传递情况,其关键问题是猪肉零售价格对生猪收购价格的冲击是否是对称的,或者正如养殖者所感受到的那样猪肉零售价格和生猪收购价格的波动是非对称的。
第五章中国养猪业市场整合研究。伴随生猪主产区和猪肉主消区的分离,生猪大范围跨地域调运成为现实。中国地域辽阔,地区间市场发育水平、交通设施等存在差异,价格在差异巨大的地区间能否有效传递,不仅关系着市场机制能否引导生猪业产品按照价格规律高效率流动,而且影响价格在纵向产业链中顺利传递,这需要探究我国养猪业市场整合情况。市场整合是衡量养猪业市场流通有效程度和效率的重要指标,整合程度越高市场效率就越有效,就能充分发挥市场机制调节猪肉供需和稳定生猪生产的作用(Robert,2000)。本章运用相对价格方法,选取从生产到消费的玉米、育肥猪配合饲料、仔猪、待宰活猪、猪肉五种商品的价格共同组成养猪业价格体系,分析了中国养猪业市场整合情况。
第六章猪肉纵向产业链结构特性与价格形成机制。伴随分工的逐步深化,纵向关联产业间各主体联系日益紧密,其对产业间价格传递和形成有着不可忽视的作用。本章从产业链视角结合猪肉纵向产业链上下游各主体的结构特性和养猪业的产业特性,分析纵向产业链各个环节产品价格与产量形成机制的有效性,以及外部冲击在纵向产业链之间实现有效传递的机制。在上游是价格接受者,下游是价格价格制定者的特定市场结构下,以养殖场(或户)生猪销售为例,运用农户模型分析市场势力和交易成本对不同规模养殖场(或户)生猪销售价格的影响,剖析生猪价格从养殖场(或户)经由经纪人和贩子到屠宰加工企业之间传递的差异,探究上下游市场势力、交易成本对价格在纵向产业链中传递和形成的影响。
第七章中间商对猪肉纵向产业链价格形成和福利的影响。随着分工的逐步深化,猪肉纵向产业链中交易主体不断增多,且关联日益紧密。不同于新古典经济学,厂商中间层理论(Spulber,1999)认为在完全竞争市场中,中间商具有独立定价权,为了扩大自己的利润,中间商具有扩大对上游要价-下游出价差价的动机。本章以生猪贩子为例,分析拥有独立定价权的中间商对猪肉纵向产业链价格形成、福利分配以及生猪生产、生猪及猪肉价格波动的影响。
第八章结论和政策建议。在对全文进行总结的基础上提出本文相关政策建议。
围绕上述研究内容,本研究得到的主要结论如下：
第一、猪肉零售价格和生猪收购价格之间存在长期均衡关系,长期中价格在猪肉纵向关联产业链中传递是比较完全的；短期中价格在猪肉纵向关联产业中的传递呈现出非对称性特征。猪肉零售价格对生猪收购价格上涨的反应程度显著不同于对其下跌的反应程度,表明生猪屠宰加工和批发零售部门拥有较强的市场控制能力。此外,生猪养殖规模越大、生产越集中,猪肉零售价格对外界冲击的调整速度越快速,揭示了规模养殖场在生产过程和信息收集中可以获得规模经济,并且能够在市场交易中获得有利的市场价格。近年来,我国猪肉市场价格的大幅度波动,除了与生猪养殖部门有关外,产业链中的生猪屠宰及猪肉加工、流通部门市场交涉能力强也是不可忽视的重要方面。
第二、入世以来,我国养猪业要素和商品市场流通中交易成本不断下降,流通效率逐步提高,中国养猪业市场整合程度在调整中逐步提高；我国东、中、西部养猪业市场整合程度也在逐步改善,但三地区间养猪业市场整合程度相互间存在差异。位于生猪主产区的重庆-四川、河北-山东、河北-辽宁和东部发达地区的京津冀省市间养猪业相对价格方差波动幅度位居全国前列,表明养猪业市场价格相互间差异较大,养猪业市场整合程度较低,值得我们探究其内在原因。本文所做的工作为深入研究我国肉类市场整合进程的决定因素提供了起点。将相邻省市间相对价格方差视作市场整合的动态指标,为从地理、市场垄断和经济政策的角度解释养猪业市场整合进程的差异提供了有利的手段。
第三、在猪肉纵向产业链中,生猪养殖环节和收购、屠宰加工、批发零售环节等产业链上下游各主体市场势力的差异,是价格传递出现非对称性的主要原因。当外界冲击时,市场势力较强的主体能够阻止对其不利的价格传递,加快对其有利的传递,从而使价格在猪肉纵向关联市场中的传递表现出非对称性。在特定的市场结构下,散养和分散小规模养殖产生的交易成本过高,降低了其能够获得的有利市场价格,加大生猪生产的不稳定性,加剧了生猪及猪肉价格波动的时间和幅度。通过运用描述性统计和农户模型,证实了市场势力和交易成本是影响生猪销售价格差异的重要因素。交易前的信息成本、交易时的谈判成本以及交易后的执行成本等的差异是造成生猪销售价格差异的主要原因。
第四、由生猪贩子定价机制及其对生猪收购市场社会福利和绩效的影响得知,生猪贩子的收益始终是养殖场(或户)生产剩余价值中截取的一部分。在生猪收购市场上,贩子的出现造成了猪肉产业链上的各主体之间的分配进一步不均,养殖场(或户)处于较低盈利水平甚或亏损状态,加大了生猪生产不稳定的风险,导致生猪及猪肉价格波动的幅度和时间不断被扩大和延续；从交易成本的角度看,尽管贩子的出现增加了分工层级,也增加了交易费用,但实证资料表明,贩子更多地降低了屠宰加工企业与养殖场(或户)直接交易的成本,提高了生猪收购市场的交易效率,即贩子因专业化分工所节省的交易费用总体上大于因分工层级延伸所增加的交易费用。故中间商的存在对猪肉纵向产业链绩效的改进是积极的。
根据以上研究成果,本研究提出从纵向关联产业视角完善现有猪肉价格稳定机制,生猪屠宰、猪肉加工及流通过程等市场主体也应该成为今后稳定生猪及猪肉价格政策的关注重点；规范中间商等强势市场主体的经营行为,逐步改善养殖主体的盈利状况；扩大生猪养殖规模、发展专业合作经济组织,推进覆盖整个猪肉纵向产业链的一体化经营企业,实现生猪养殖业的规模化和集约化,建立生猪生产与猪肉价格市场信息预警体系等政策建议。
Pork,which accounted for 60% in urban and rural residents'total meat consumption,is a main origin of meat,protein and the principal variety of food. It plays a key role in people's health and the food security to our country. In recent years,the large scale fluctuation of the meats price,such as the pork price,affects the resident daily life stability,the animal husbandry healthy development,And it has the adverse effect to the entire national macroeconomic safe operation.
Along with the social division of labor's deepening, the pig-breeding industry,as provides the meat produce, and the related industry's correlational dependence is day by day close, which is the crop production, animal husbandry, processing industry, transportation, retail sales and so on.The development of the pig-breeding industry is day by day rapid,on the one hand its displays that the material and the energy outside the pig-breeding industry enters the live pig and the pork production system, thus breaks the department of its own closed cycle, and realizes highly effective growth; On the other hand, but also displays that more and more pork products need to undergo the processing in order to enter the resident expense domain,namely pork longitudinal industry chain's extension.In the pork industry chain link, each dispersion, independent individual forms certain function and structure system,namely pork longitudinal industry chain, through the vertical function division of labor(crop production-> feed industry-> poultry production-> processing-> wholesale-> retail sales), the longitudinal industrial chain member's connection and the cooperation, satisfy the society demand for the pork product together.
The relates gradually closely of the pork longitudinal industry not only sharpened the pork productivity, but also the fluctuation in the longitudinal chain link industry also inevitably causes the unstable development of the entire pig-breeding industry.Along with the improvement of live pig production and the pork expense,and the relationship closely between the pig-breeding industry and other industries, it while shares the facilitates in industrial chain, also inevitably accepts the challenge of other industrial fluctuation.The market economy has provided the good development opportunity to the pig-breeding industry, but at the same time, the market risk is also an unnegligible aspect.
In the process of the pig-breeding industry's price fluctuations, the media, the scholar and the consumer note that the rise scope of pork retail price is higher than the live pig purchase price,which exceedingly the breeding farm (or household) feel;But on the other hand, when each kind of price of the pig-breeding industry starts to recede largely, the price falling scope of the newborn pig and the live pig is bigger than the pork retail price,it causes the planter's enthusiasm serious attack.It can be said that the condition of the pork industry has the representation in the Chinese majority meats price fluctuations.
This article first confirms whether to have the asymmetrical transmission between the live pig purchase price and the pork retail price,using the price transmission cooperates error correction model(PTC-ECM).The layout shift of the live pig cultivation causes the main production area of the live pig and the area of the pork host disappears to have had the separation.The relative price variance method of the pig-breeding industry between neighboring provinces and cities is utilized to analyze the market conformity situation of the pig-breeding industry,in oder to remove the space slow growth of the market to cause the price asymmetry transmission in the pork longitudinal industry chain. Subsequently taked the longitudinal industrial chain price structure, the transmission mechanism and the intermediate level theory as the rationale, the article has discussed the middle man in the pork longitudinal industry chain to the pork price structure and the transmission function and the influence mechanism. and has cleaned up the existence of various main bodies in the longitudinal industrial chain to the price transmission and welfare's influence. This article aims to stable meats price by the reasonable effective macroscopic policy, and to guarantee that the steady development of the economics has the important theory and the practical significance.
Regarding the above analysis frame, this article uses the method which unifies the standard research and the empirical study, the main research content is as follows:
The first chapter introduction,elaborate this article's research background, the question proposed that in turn, the research aim and the research hypothesis, the data originate, the research technique, the research innovation and the deficiency.
The second chapter concept limits and literature summary. Limits related concepts in this article and carries on to summarizes and combs the domestic and foreign related research literatures.
The third chapter rationale and analysis frame. After carries on the summary to the correlation theories,it proposed theoretical analysis frame, mainly includes:
construction the price transmission cooperates the entire error correction model (PTC-ECM) based on the price theory, construction the pig-breeding industry market conformity model between neighboring provinces and cities, discussion the reason to the price asymmetry transmission from the longitudinal industrial chain angle of view; Under division of labor gradually deepening condition, middle man to price transmission influence, function machine-made and economical achievements in pork longitudinal industry chain.
The fourth chapter, the pork longitudinal connection market price transmission in our country. This chapter analyzes the development present situation of the pig-breeding industry firstly, mainly pays attention to the price transmission situation between the live pig breeding farm (household) and pork retail sales,its key question is that the impact of the pork retail price to the live pig purchase price whether is symmetrical, or just like the planter feels such that the fluctuation of the pork retail price to the live pig purchase price is asymmetrical.
The fifth chapter,the market conformity of pig-breeding industry in China. Follows the live pig main production area and the pork host expense area separation, The wide range transportation of the live pig cross region becomes the reality.China vast in territory,the Marketability level,traffic equipment exist differently.Whether does the price transmit effectively in difference giant interzone, it not only decides that the market mechanism guides the live pig industry product to be mobile according to the price rule highly, moreover the price transmit smoothly in the longitudinal industrial chain. This needs to inquire into the market conformity of the pig-breeding industry.The market conformity measures the distribution efficiency of the pig-breeding industry,the higher the conformity degree is,the more effective the market is.It can display that the market mechanism adjusts the supply and demand of the pork and stabilize the live pig production effectively(Robert,2000).This chapter utilizes the relative price method, selects from the production to the expense corn, nurtures the fat pig mixed feed, the newborn pig, to treat butchers the live pig, the pork five kind of commodity price to compose the pig-breeding industry price system together,it has analyzed the market conformity situation of the pig-breeding industry.
The sixth chapter,the structural property and the price structure mechanism of the pork longitudinal industry chain. Following the division of labor the gradual deepening, the relationship among the various main bodies in the longitudinal industry is gradual close, it has the noticeable function for the price transmition and formation.This chapter union the various main bodies' structural property and the pig-breeding industry industrial characteristic of the upstream and downstream from the industrial chain angle of view in the pork longitudinal industry chain. It analyzes the formation mechanism of each link product price and the output in the longitudinal industrial chain, as well as the exterior impaction realizes the effective transmission in the longitudinal industrial chain.Taked the live pig sale of the breeding farm (or household) as an example, the artcile utilizes the peasant household model to analyze the market influence and the transaction cost to affect the live pig selling price to the different scale breeding farm (either household), it inquired into the live pig price difference by way of the breeding farm (or household) and the peddler to the slaughtering processing industry.And consider that the market influence, the transaction cost analyze the price transmition in the upstream and downstream in the longitudinal industrial chain.
The seventh chapter middle man to the price transmission and welfare's influence in the meats industry chain. Along with the division of labor gradual deepening, the middle man between the joint live pig producer and the pork consumer's marketability main body, increases gradually,in the pork longitudinal industry chain. The growth of middle man not only causes more transaction behaviors between the economic subject, simultaneously the transaction cost also actually increases along with it, the excessively high transaction cost will cause the social resource to have the nonessential consumption (Gary,1993).Therefore,have the middle man increase the transaction cost,or promote to the economical achievements in the pork longitudinal industry chain? This chapter takes the middle man-peddler as an example,it inquired into its influence to the price transmission and welfare in the pork longitudinal industry chain, from the real diagnosis angle, provides some beneficial references for further understanding and management the middle man in the pork longitudinal industry chain.
The eighth chapter conclusion and policy suggestion. It puts forward the related policy proposal of this article on the summary of the full text.
Regarding the above research content, the main conclusion which this research obtains is as follows:
First, it exists the long-term balanced relations between the pork retail price and the live pig purchase price, and the long-term price transmission is quite complete in the pork longitudinal connection industry chain;In the short-term the price transmission presents the asymmetrical characteristics in the pork longitudinal connection industry; The pork retail price is obviously different to the extent of reaction when the live pig purchase price rise, with the extent of reaction which it falls,indicated that the slaughtering processing of the live pig and the department sales of the wholesales and the retail have the strong market control. In addition, the live pig cultivation scale is bigger, the production is more centralized, the pork retail price was faster to the outside impact's governed speed, it has promulgated that the scale breeding farm may obtain the economies of scale in the production processing and the collection of information, and could obtain the advantageous market price in the market transaction. In recent years, the pork market price presented the large scale fluctuation in our country.The market negotiation ability in the live pig slaughtering and the pork processing, circulation department is also the noticeable important aspect,besides the live pig cultivation department.
Second, the transaction cost of the essential factor and commodity in the pig-breeding industry has dropped unceasingly,and its circulation efficiency enhances gradually, since being WTO entry, the market conformity degree of the pig-breeding industry enhances gradually in the adjustment; the market conformity degree of the pig-breeding industry is also improving in the East, the middle, and the western in our country, but the market conformity degree mutually exist different in three interzone. Located at the live pig main production area in the Chongqing-Sichuan, the Hebei-Shandong, the Hebei-Liaoning and the eastern part between the developed area in the Beijing and Tianjin Hebei provinces and cities,the relative price variance margin of fluctuation is situated at the national front row in the pig-breeding industry,indicated that the market price of the pig-breeding industry is mutually different, the market conformity degree of the pig-breeding industry is low, which is worth of inquiring into its immanent cause. This article has provided the beginning for researching the meat market conformity advancement's determining factor. The relative price variance of the neighboring provinces and cities regards as the dynamic target of the market conformity,which explained that the difference of the market conformity has provided the advantageous method for from the geography, the market monopoly and economic policy's angle in the pig-breeding industry.
Third, the market influence's differences of the various main bodies in the pork longitudinal industry chain,such as the purchase, slaughtering processing, wholesale retail sales link, is the primary cause of the price asymmetry transmission, When outside impact, the main body, which have the strong market influence,can prevent to its disadvantageous price transmission, speeds up to its advantageous transmission, thus it causes that the price displays the asymmetry transmission in the pork longitudinal connection market.Through using the descriptive statistics and the peasant household model, it confirmed that the market influence and the transaction cost are the important attribute for the live pig selling price difference. The difference of the information cost before the transaction, the transaction negotiations cost as well as the transaction carriying out the cost and so on are the primary cause for the live pig selling price difference.
Fourth, from the live pig peddler's pricing mechanism and its influence to the social welfare and the achievements of the purchasing the market,it can realize that the live pig peddler's income is an interception part of the breeding farm'(or household's).In the live pig purchasing market,the peddler's appearance caused on to be further uneven among the pork industry chain's various main bodies'assignment. The breeding farm (or household) is at the low profit level and the high condition of which exploits; from the transaction cost's angle that peddler's appearance increased the division of labor level freely, also increased the transaction cost, but the real diagnosis material indicated that the peddler more reduced the direct exchange cost between the slaughtering Processing industry and the breeding farm (or household), enhanced the transaction efficiency of the live pig purchasing market,namely the peddler saved the transaction cost for the special coverage, which was bigger than the transaction cost,which was extended as a whole the division of labor level. Therefore the existence of the middle man is positive to the achievements' improvement of the pork longitudinal industry chain.
According to the above research results, this article proposed the price stabilization mechanism of the meat product from the longitudinal connection industry angle of view.The market main bodies,such as, the live pig slaughtering, pork processing and circuit and so on,should also become the policy attention key of stablizing the live pig and the pork price from now on; It should specify the market behaviors of the strong market main body, improve the profit condition of the cultivation main body gradually; expand the scale of the live pig cultivation, develop the specialized cooperative organization of the live pig,Advance the integration operation of business of coverring the entire pork longitudinal industry chain, realize the formalization and the intensification of raising pigs industrial, establish the price market information early warning system of the live pig production and the pork,and so on.
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