营销渠道冲突形成及控制研究
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摘要
在20世纪70年代以前中国的计划经济时期,国家经济封闭运行,计划统领一切,企业只顾生产,不管销售,单一的供应、采购、包销的计划模式,使得市场营销不存在,也没有必要存在,生产效率和经济总量低下、产品自给不足,民众生活贫穷。20世纪70年代以后,伴随着我国始于农村的改革开放,同时也开始了具有划时代意义的我国市场营销的实践。学术界探讨市场营销理论,实业界践行市场营销活动,市场营销快速传播,广泛应用。从全球竞争的趋势来看,企业间的竞争业已转向供应链或渠道链的企业之间的竞争,渠道建设越来越受到企业的重视,各行业的市场巨人如GE、IBM、微软公司等,都纷纷建立合作渠道关系以提高他们的全球地位。在涉农企业领域,如北京的中粮集团,内蒙的蒙牛集团,北京汇源果汁集团,陕西的圣桑绿色食品有限公司等,也都越来越重视其自身的渠道建设,把建设良好的渠道作为其长期发展的核心竞争力之一。
在学术理论研究方面,对渠道的研究也逐渐成为营销理论研究的热点之一,并将其研究的重点集中在渠道结构、渠道行为以及渠道关系三方面。本文所选择的渠道冲突的研究正属于渠道行为和渠道关系的范畴。在渠道冲突的研究方面,学者们更多地从定性的角度集中分析渠道冲突产生的后果和渠道冲突的原因,采用博弈论思想和实证分析的方法对渠道冲突的成因进行定量分析比较少见。在现实操作中,很多企业在渠道冲突管理、维护渠道关系方面缺乏系统科学的处理方法和解决办法。正因为如此,论文探索性地运用博弈论的思想和方法,并从实证的角度集中对渠道冲突的成因进行研究。主要的研究工作和成果包括:
1、对已有国内外学者关于渠道和渠道冲突的研究文献进行广泛查阅和梳理,充分理解和认识“得渠道者,得天下”的真正内涵,认识营销渠道在营销理论和企业营销实践中的重要性,认识渠道冲突对渠道价值链的危害;学习和梳理国内外学者以往对渠道冲突研究的角度、重点、方法、成果和不足,从而选择和确定本论文的研究角度和所使用的研究方法,明确论文的创新点。
2、渠道冲突中的“渠道”归于营销渠道理论,“冲突”归于冲突理论,研究的博弈思想基于博弈理论,从经济学的角度看,渠道成员的行为符合交易费用理论,因此,营销渠道理论、冲突理论、博弈理论和交易成本理论、代理理论、关系营销理论就成为了论文研究的理论依据;另一方面,就渠道冲突本身而言,论文分析了渠道冲突的主要表现、渠道冲突形成的原因、渠道冲突的影响、渠道权力以及渠道冲突的控制等渠道冲突理论。
3、运用博弈思想和方法对渠道冲突进行分析。用静态博弈即囚徒困境模型分析了垂直渠道冲突产生的本质,认识到了渠道冲突对渠道整体收益所造成的损耗,在此基础上,通过制造商占主导地位的动态博弈模型分析,发现制造商利用自己独享的信息侵蚀了零售商的利润,造成了垂直渠道冲突,并进行了以涉农企业为例的验证;根据完全信息静态博弈中的公地悲剧模型所阐述的研究思路,论证了在水平渠道成员个体利益导向下,水平渠道冲突产生的自然性或不可避免性,然后通过Hotelling模型详细分析了水平渠道冲突的产生过程及危害;窜货作为水平渠道冲突的主要表现形式之一,通过建立窜货模型,对水平渠道成员的收益和成本等进行博弈分析,从而对窜货的成因做出了博弈解释。
4、在运用博弈论思想分析渠道冲突形成本质原因即渠道成员间的个体利益导向以及在总结归纳理论部分阐述的渠道冲突成因的基础上,提炼出影响渠道冲突的目标差异、角色差异、预期感知差异、沟通困难、渠道结构、冲突水平及各变量之间关系等主要变量,通过理论推导提出相应假设,构建相互关系之概念模型,采用Likert5级评分法设计量表进行测度,利用针对涉农企业的问卷数据和SPSS应用统计软件,对渠道冲突形成的主要变量进行了实证。
5、针对博弈分析和实证研究对渠道冲突的危害和渠道冲突形成机理与主要原因的分析,在明确渠道冲突控制目标、原则、过程和步骤的基础上,提出了与博弈分析相对应的渠道冲突的控制策略:基于市场控制、基于加价与返利以及基于关系承诺的垂直渠道冲突控制策略;基于渠道管理者控制和基于渠道权力使用的水平渠道冲突控制策略以及基于战略联盟的窜货控制策略。针对实证研究中的主要变量对渠道冲突水平的不同影响,论文同时也提出了相应的控制策略。
6、在以涉农企业为例的情况下,渠道价值链的突出特征在于逆向渠道终端的“农户特性”。逆向渠道的终端是为面粉或食用油加工厂如中粮集团这样的涉农企业提供粮食和油料作物产品的广大农户、果品生产者、牧民等,如果渠道关系融洽,产品价格合理而得以顺利销售的情况下,既保护了消费者的利益,同时更重要的是保护了粮食、油料、畜产品生产者即农民的利益。这也正是本文选择以涉农企业为例,研究渠道冲突并控制冲突的主要目的。
In the time of China's planned economy, national economy operating closure, plans guiding all, enterprises focusing on production regardless of sales, simple supply-purchase- underwriting model resulted in the non-existence of marketing together with low productivity and economic output. After 1970’s, along with China's reform and opening up began in the rural areas, marketing was put into practice in China. The academic study of marketing theory and the business practice of marketing activities lead to wide spread of marketing. From the trend of global competition, competition has already turned into the one of supply chain or channel chain between enterprises. Building of channels has called more and more attention of enterprises, the industry market giants such as GE, IBM, Microsoft, etc., have established channels of cooperation to improve their global position. In the field of agriculture-related enterprises, such as COFCO Beijing, Inner Mongolia Mengniu Group, Beijing Huiyuan Juice Group, Shaanxi Saint-Saens Green Food Co., Ltd., pay more and more attention to their own channel construction, and make the building of good channel as their long-term development of core competitiveness.
In research on academic theories, research on the channel has become the core of marketing theory. And researches focused on the channel structure, channel behavior, and channel relationships. Research on channel conflict belongs to the scope of channel behavior and channel relationships. In the channel conflict research, most of the scholars focused on the causes and consequences of channel conflict from the qualitative point of view, while rarely using Game Theory and empirical analysis to do quantitative analysis. In actual operation, many enterprises lack of systematic scientific approaches and solutions in the channel conflict management and maintenance of channel relations. Because of this, the paper explored to using ideas and methods of game theory, and studied the causes of channel conflict from an empirical perspective. The main research work and results are the following.
1. Organized the existing researches of domestic and foreign scholars on channels and channel conflict, fully understood and knew the real meaning of“having channels, win the world”, understood the importance of channels in marketing theory and practices, recognized the influence of channel conflict on value chain; learned and organized scholars’research on the channel conflict on the point of view, focus, methods, results and insufficient to select and determine the point of this research and the research methods used, and figure out the innovation of this paper.
2.“Channel”in channel conflict attributed to the theory of marketing channels, and "conflict" attributed to the conflict theory. Thoughts of game were based on game theory. From an economics point of view, the behavior of channel members meet the transaction cost theory, therefore, marketing channel theory, conflict theory, game theory and transaction cost theory, agency theory, relationship marketing theory formed the theoretical basis of the thesis. The other hand, for channel conflict itself, the paper analyzed the main performance of channel conflict, the reasons for the formation of channel conflict, the impact of channel conflict, channel power and channel control.
3. Analyzed channel conflict by using game theory. Static game, Prisoner's Dilemma model analyzed the essential of vertical channel conflict, and recognized the loss made by channel conflict to gains of a whole channel. Based on this, through analyzing the manufacturing business dominated dynamic game model, found that manufacturers using exclusive information eroded the profits of retailers, resulting in a vertical channel conflict, and conducted empirical analysis of agriculture-related enterprises as an example of verification. Based on the method expressed by the tragedy of commons model of complete information static game model, demonstrated the inevitability of horizontal channel conflict in the condition of individual interest-orientation of horizontal channel members, then analyzed the production process and harm of the horizontal channel conflict by using Hotelling model. Fleeing-goods is the major manifestation of horizontal channel conflict. This paper conducted game analysis of benefits and costs of horizontal channel members by establishing fleeing-goods model, and explained the cause of fleeing-goods.
4. Based on using game theory to analyze nature of channel conflict, that is the individual interests of member-oriented and summarizing theoretical causes of channel conflict, the paper extracted the major variables affect channel conflict: objective differences, role differences, perceived differences in expectations, communication difficulties, channel structure, the level of conflict and the relationship of the variables. The paper proposed the hypothesis by theoretical analysis, built up the conceptual model of relationship of the variables, measured them with Likert 5-level scores, and carried on the real diagnosis of the main reasons of the channel conflict by using questionnaire data from agriculture-related enterprises and SPSS statistical software.
5. After clarifying control objectives, principles, processes and procedures of channel conflict, the paper proposed a control strategy of channel conflict corresponding to game analysis from game analysis and empirical research on the effects of channel conflict and the formation mechanism. The control strategy is the control strategy of vertical channel conflict based on market-based control, fare increases and rebates, and relationship commitment. The control strategy is the control strategy of horizontal channel conflict based on channel management control and the use of channel power as well as the strategic alliance-based control strategy for fleeing-goods. The paper also put forward correspondent control strategies for different impacts on channel conflict made by the main variables.
6. In the condition of making example of agriculture-related enterprises, a prominent feature of channel value chain is "farmers’characteristics" at the end of a reverse channel. At the end of a reverse channel, there are farmers, fruit producers and herdsmen who provide grain and oil-bearing crops for food groups like COFCO, the agriculture-related enterprises. If the channel relationship is harmonious and price is reasonable, the interests of consumers and more importantly, the interests of food, fuel, livestock producers or farmers are protected. This is the ultimate purpose of this paper choosing agricultural enterprise as an example and studying channel conflict and how to control the conflict.
在学术理论研究方面,对渠道的研究也逐渐成为营销理论研究的热点之一,并将其研究的重点集中在渠道结构、渠道行为以及渠道关系三方面。本文所选择的渠道冲突的研究正属于渠道行为和渠道关系的范畴。在渠道冲突的研究方面,学者们更多地从定性的角度集中分析渠道冲突产生的后果和渠道冲突的原因,采用博弈论思想和实证分析的方法对渠道冲突的成因进行定量分析比较少见。在现实操作中,很多企业在渠道冲突管理、维护渠道关系方面缺乏系统科学的处理方法和解决办法。正因为如此,论文探索性地运用博弈论的思想和方法,并从实证的角度集中对渠道冲突的成因进行研究。主要的研究工作和成果包括:
1、对已有国内外学者关于渠道和渠道冲突的研究文献进行广泛查阅和梳理,充分理解和认识“得渠道者,得天下”的真正内涵,认识营销渠道在营销理论和企业营销实践中的重要性,认识渠道冲突对渠道价值链的危害;学习和梳理国内外学者以往对渠道冲突研究的角度、重点、方法、成果和不足,从而选择和确定本论文的研究角度和所使用的研究方法,明确论文的创新点。
2、渠道冲突中的“渠道”归于营销渠道理论,“冲突”归于冲突理论,研究的博弈思想基于博弈理论,从经济学的角度看,渠道成员的行为符合交易费用理论,因此,营销渠道理论、冲突理论、博弈理论和交易成本理论、代理理论、关系营销理论就成为了论文研究的理论依据;另一方面,就渠道冲突本身而言,论文分析了渠道冲突的主要表现、渠道冲突形成的原因、渠道冲突的影响、渠道权力以及渠道冲突的控制等渠道冲突理论。
3、运用博弈思想和方法对渠道冲突进行分析。用静态博弈即囚徒困境模型分析了垂直渠道冲突产生的本质,认识到了渠道冲突对渠道整体收益所造成的损耗,在此基础上,通过制造商占主导地位的动态博弈模型分析,发现制造商利用自己独享的信息侵蚀了零售商的利润,造成了垂直渠道冲突,并进行了以涉农企业为例的验证;根据完全信息静态博弈中的公地悲剧模型所阐述的研究思路,论证了在水平渠道成员个体利益导向下,水平渠道冲突产生的自然性或不可避免性,然后通过Hotelling模型详细分析了水平渠道冲突的产生过程及危害;窜货作为水平渠道冲突的主要表现形式之一,通过建立窜货模型,对水平渠道成员的收益和成本等进行博弈分析,从而对窜货的成因做出了博弈解释。
4、在运用博弈论思想分析渠道冲突形成本质原因即渠道成员间的个体利益导向以及在总结归纳理论部分阐述的渠道冲突成因的基础上,提炼出影响渠道冲突的目标差异、角色差异、预期感知差异、沟通困难、渠道结构、冲突水平及各变量之间关系等主要变量,通过理论推导提出相应假设,构建相互关系之概念模型,采用Likert5级评分法设计量表进行测度,利用针对涉农企业的问卷数据和SPSS应用统计软件,对渠道冲突形成的主要变量进行了实证。
5、针对博弈分析和实证研究对渠道冲突的危害和渠道冲突形成机理与主要原因的分析,在明确渠道冲突控制目标、原则、过程和步骤的基础上,提出了与博弈分析相对应的渠道冲突的控制策略:基于市场控制、基于加价与返利以及基于关系承诺的垂直渠道冲突控制策略;基于渠道管理者控制和基于渠道权力使用的水平渠道冲突控制策略以及基于战略联盟的窜货控制策略。针对实证研究中的主要变量对渠道冲突水平的不同影响,论文同时也提出了相应的控制策略。
6、在以涉农企业为例的情况下,渠道价值链的突出特征在于逆向渠道终端的“农户特性”。逆向渠道的终端是为面粉或食用油加工厂如中粮集团这样的涉农企业提供粮食和油料作物产品的广大农户、果品生产者、牧民等,如果渠道关系融洽,产品价格合理而得以顺利销售的情况下,既保护了消费者的利益,同时更重要的是保护了粮食、油料、畜产品生产者即农民的利益。这也正是本文选择以涉农企业为例,研究渠道冲突并控制冲突的主要目的。
In the time of China's planned economy, national economy operating closure, plans guiding all, enterprises focusing on production regardless of sales, simple supply-purchase- underwriting model resulted in the non-existence of marketing together with low productivity and economic output. After 1970’s, along with China's reform and opening up began in the rural areas, marketing was put into practice in China. The academic study of marketing theory and the business practice of marketing activities lead to wide spread of marketing. From the trend of global competition, competition has already turned into the one of supply chain or channel chain between enterprises. Building of channels has called more and more attention of enterprises, the industry market giants such as GE, IBM, Microsoft, etc., have established channels of cooperation to improve their global position. In the field of agriculture-related enterprises, such as COFCO Beijing, Inner Mongolia Mengniu Group, Beijing Huiyuan Juice Group, Shaanxi Saint-Saens Green Food Co., Ltd., pay more and more attention to their own channel construction, and make the building of good channel as their long-term development of core competitiveness.
In research on academic theories, research on the channel has become the core of marketing theory. And researches focused on the channel structure, channel behavior, and channel relationships. Research on channel conflict belongs to the scope of channel behavior and channel relationships. In the channel conflict research, most of the scholars focused on the causes and consequences of channel conflict from the qualitative point of view, while rarely using Game Theory and empirical analysis to do quantitative analysis. In actual operation, many enterprises lack of systematic scientific approaches and solutions in the channel conflict management and maintenance of channel relations. Because of this, the paper explored to using ideas and methods of game theory, and studied the causes of channel conflict from an empirical perspective. The main research work and results are the following.
1. Organized the existing researches of domestic and foreign scholars on channels and channel conflict, fully understood and knew the real meaning of“having channels, win the world”, understood the importance of channels in marketing theory and practices, recognized the influence of channel conflict on value chain; learned and organized scholars’research on the channel conflict on the point of view, focus, methods, results and insufficient to select and determine the point of this research and the research methods used, and figure out the innovation of this paper.
2.“Channel”in channel conflict attributed to the theory of marketing channels, and "conflict" attributed to the conflict theory. Thoughts of game were based on game theory. From an economics point of view, the behavior of channel members meet the transaction cost theory, therefore, marketing channel theory, conflict theory, game theory and transaction cost theory, agency theory, relationship marketing theory formed the theoretical basis of the thesis. The other hand, for channel conflict itself, the paper analyzed the main performance of channel conflict, the reasons for the formation of channel conflict, the impact of channel conflict, channel power and channel control.
3. Analyzed channel conflict by using game theory. Static game, Prisoner's Dilemma model analyzed the essential of vertical channel conflict, and recognized the loss made by channel conflict to gains of a whole channel. Based on this, through analyzing the manufacturing business dominated dynamic game model, found that manufacturers using exclusive information eroded the profits of retailers, resulting in a vertical channel conflict, and conducted empirical analysis of agriculture-related enterprises as an example of verification. Based on the method expressed by the tragedy of commons model of complete information static game model, demonstrated the inevitability of horizontal channel conflict in the condition of individual interest-orientation of horizontal channel members, then analyzed the production process and harm of the horizontal channel conflict by using Hotelling model. Fleeing-goods is the major manifestation of horizontal channel conflict. This paper conducted game analysis of benefits and costs of horizontal channel members by establishing fleeing-goods model, and explained the cause of fleeing-goods.
4. Based on using game theory to analyze nature of channel conflict, that is the individual interests of member-oriented and summarizing theoretical causes of channel conflict, the paper extracted the major variables affect channel conflict: objective differences, role differences, perceived differences in expectations, communication difficulties, channel structure, the level of conflict and the relationship of the variables. The paper proposed the hypothesis by theoretical analysis, built up the conceptual model of relationship of the variables, measured them with Likert 5-level scores, and carried on the real diagnosis of the main reasons of the channel conflict by using questionnaire data from agriculture-related enterprises and SPSS statistical software.
5. After clarifying control objectives, principles, processes and procedures of channel conflict, the paper proposed a control strategy of channel conflict corresponding to game analysis from game analysis and empirical research on the effects of channel conflict and the formation mechanism. The control strategy is the control strategy of vertical channel conflict based on market-based control, fare increases and rebates, and relationship commitment. The control strategy is the control strategy of horizontal channel conflict based on channel management control and the use of channel power as well as the strategic alliance-based control strategy for fleeing-goods. The paper also put forward correspondent control strategies for different impacts on channel conflict made by the main variables.
6. In the condition of making example of agriculture-related enterprises, a prominent feature of channel value chain is "farmers’characteristics" at the end of a reverse channel. At the end of a reverse channel, there are farmers, fruit producers and herdsmen who provide grain and oil-bearing crops for food groups like COFCO, the agriculture-related enterprises. If the channel relationship is harmonious and price is reasonable, the interests of consumers and more importantly, the interests of food, fuel, livestock producers or farmers are protected. This is the ultimate purpose of this paper choosing agricultural enterprise as an example and studying channel conflict and how to control the conflict.
引文
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李广.2006.窜货的成因及其对策研究:基于博弈论的视角.技术经济,(6)16~18
李立.2007.AHP在协调营销渠道冲突中的应用研究.经济理论研究,(5)23~25
刘志超,宋新华.2001.市场营销渠道的冲突与管理.企业经济,(4):65~66
穆健康.2008.营销渠道冲突控制的博弈分析.营销谋略,(3):18~20
马芬,林秀群,李德庆.2006.论渠道战略联盟的建立和维持.云南财经大学学报,(4):101~102
[美]伯特.罗森布罗姆著.2002.营销渠道管理.李乃和,奚俊芳等译.北京:机械工业出版社:226~248
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欧阳卓飞.2006.战略联盟:营销渠道关系的理想境界.中南财经政法大学学报,(5):138~140
卜妙金.2001.分销渠道管理.北京:高等教育出版社:153~200
芮明杰.2001.市场营销管理——定位、联盟、策略.上海:复旦大学出版社:265~321
苏东水.2003.管理心理学.上海:复旦大学出版社:450~530
施锡锉著.2000.博弈论.上海:上海财经大学出版社:325~421
田洁,王继平.2006.渠道冲突的动因分析与对策研究.前沿.(3):46~47
万后芬,汤定娜,杨智.2005.市场营销教程(第二版).北京:高等教育出版社:313~382
吴宗正,吴育东.2000.LISREL模式应用于行动电话消费者满意度之研究[硕士学位论文].台北:国立成功大学统计研究所
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王朝辉.2002.营销渠道冲突类别、原因及其解决方法.江苏商论,(9):58~59
王永贵,张炜.2006.关系活动、关系质量和关系收益——基于顾客视角的实证研究.营销科学学报,2(1):14~29
王铁明.2005.分销渠道冲突的成因与协调机制.科技进步与对策,(10):10~13
汪明生等著.2001.冲突管理.北京:九州出版社:7~28
徐蔚琴,谢国娥,曾自信.2001.营销渠道管理.北京:电子工业出版社:55~86
谢智坤.2007.基于博弈思想的营销渠道冲突研究[硕士学位论文].上海:同济大学
肖久灵,郭晓宇.2004.营销渠道冲突的博弈解释.上海管理科学,(3):20~24
肖明超.2005.家乐福vs沃尔玛:激情挑战温情.中外管理,(6):80~84
杨长江,陈伟浩.2005.微观经济学.上海:复旦大学出版社:134~210
杨政.2000.营销渠道成员行为的整合模型.南开管理评论,(4):64~70
[英]伊特韦尔等编.1996.新帕尔格雷夫经济学大辞典.北京:经济科学出版社:492~543
赵龙文,龙艳,何景师.2008.基于博弈论的营销渠道横向冲突研究及其对策分析.商场现代化,(4):23~25
赵文力.2005.企业间横向战略联盟的价值链分析.郑州航空工业管理学院学报,(3):43~46
张继焦,葛存山,帅建淮.2002.分销链管理.北京:物价出版社.24~28
张宏岩.2007.渠道冲突的原因及对策.现代管理.(6):51~56
张传忠.2000.分销管理.武汉:武汉大学出版社:121~127
张闯.2006.营销渠道控制.理论、模型与研究命题.商业经济与管理,(3):32~37
张闯.2006.分销密度与品牌宽度.渠道权力的二重均衡.财经问题研究,(1):28~33
张维迎.2005.博弈论与信息经济学.上海:上海三联书店:145~167
张剑渝,2005.营销渠道-关系视角下的解读.成都:西南财经大学出版社.244~268
张平淡,徐建忠.2007.加价与返利关系的博弈分析.管理前沿,(5):12~18
张文健,孙绍荣.2005.基于行为控制的制度设计研究.科学学研究,(1):97~101.
张灵荧,徐正惠.2003.渠道策略的博弈论思考.商业时代,(3):8~17
章文波,陈红艳.2006.实用数据统计分析及SPSS13.0应用.北京:人民邮电出版社:(2):155~186
庄贵军,周筱莲.2002.权力、冲突与合作.中国工商企业之间渠道行为的实证研究.管理世界,(3).117~124
庄贵军.2000.权力、冲突与合作.西方的渠道行为理论.北京商学院学报,(1):8~11
庄贵军,周筱莲,王桂林编著.2004.营销渠道管理.北京:北京大学出版社:(11):67~89
庄贵军.2004.营销渠道控制.理论与模型.管理学报,1(1):7~9
庄贵军,周筱莲.2006.营销人员对灰色营销的道德评价及其影响.营销科学学报,2(1):29~40
朱广胜,金姐.2005.博弈—开启制度文化的钥匙.中外企业文化,(1):9~12
朱秀君,戚译.2002.从博弈论看营销渠道的冲突与合作.商业经济与管理,(4):14~17
朱玉童.2001.迎接渠道网络的全面革命.销售与市场,(8):21~23
钟子亮.2005.学术研究的博弈论分析.科研管理,(1):135~139
Allen J.Magrath,Kenneth G.Hardy.1988.A Strategic Framework for Manufacturer Reseller Conflict.Marketing Science Institute Report,(3):88~101
Allan J.Magrath,Kenneth G.Hardy.1989.A Strategic Paradigm for Predicting Manufacturer-Reseller Conflict.European Journal of Marketing.23(2):94~108
Assael H.1969.Constructive Role of Interorganizational Conflict.Administrative Science Quarterly.14(12):573~582
Anne T.Coughlan,Luis w.Stem,Adel I.EI-Ansary.1987.营销渠道.第六版.蒋青云,孙一民等译.2003.北京:电子工业出版社:256~289
Browen James.R,DayRalphl.1981.Mearsures of Manifest Con-flict in Distribution Channels.Journal of Marketing Reserch,(8):263~274
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Bert Rosenbloom.1974.Marketing channels.a management view.第六版.李乃和,奚俊芳等译.2003.北京:机械工业出版社:99~121
Bollen, Kenneth.1989.A Structural Equations with Latent variables.New York:Wiley:156~187
Coughlama,Andersone,Stern L.W,etc.2000.Marketing Channels.6th ed.Beijing: Tsinghua University Press:87~102
Emerson,R.1962.Power dependence relations. American Sociological Review.27(12): 31~41
Etgar M.1979.Sources and types of interchannel conflict.Journal of Retailing, 55(1):61~78
Frazier G,Summers J.1986.Perceptions of interfirm power and its use with in distribution channels.Journal of Marketing Research,23(5):169～179
Geyskens I,Steenkamp J E M,Kumar N.1999.Ametaanalysis of satisfaction in marketing channel relationships.Journal of Marketing Research,36(5):223～238
James,Lawrence R.staneley A.milaik & Jeans M.bret.1982.Causal Analysis:Assumption,Models and Data.Los Angeles:Beverly Hills Publication:82~98
Gaski J.E.1984.The Theory of Power and Confliction Channels of Distribution.Journal of Marketing,48(7):9~29
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Loehlin,J.C.1992.Latent variable models:An introduction to factor,path and structural analysis.Hillsdale,NJ:Lawrence Erlbaum:56~89
Louis W.Stern and EI.Ansary.1996.Marketing Channels.London:Prentice Hall Inc:43~58
Marion Peters Angelica.2001.Resolving Conflict in Nonprofit Organization.New York:The Union Institute:39~67
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Mohr J,Nevin J R.1990.Communication strategies in marketing channels:A theoretical perspective.Journal of Marketing,54(3):36～51
M.J.Ecer,B.J.walker.2000.Marketing Theory:Distinguished Contributions.New York:John Wiley & Sons Inc:67~98
Philip Kotlar,Gary Armstrong.2000.Marketing Management.10th ed.Beijing:Tsinghua University Press:350~560
Philip Kotler.2000.Marketing Management.10th ed.London: Prentice Hall Inc:167~198
P.Horsey,K.H.Blanchard.1999.Management of Organizational Behavior: Utilizing human resources.London:Prentice Hall:3-54
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李先国.2005.产生渠道冲突的原因探析.商业经济文荟,(1):52~56
李丽静.2007.论企业分销渠道冲突管理.商场现代化,(7):73~74
李慎恒.2003.分销渠道冲突的成因及对策,经济师,(7):175~176
李广.2006.窜货的成因及其对策研究:基于博弈论的视角.技术经济,(6)16~18
李立.2007.AHP在协调营销渠道冲突中的应用研究.经济理论研究,(5)23~25
刘志超,宋新华.2001.市场营销渠道的冲突与管理.企业经济,(4):65~66
穆健康.2008.营销渠道冲突控制的博弈分析.营销谋略,(3):18~20
马芬,林秀群,李德庆.2006.论渠道战略联盟的建立和维持.云南财经大学学报,(4):101~102
[美]伯特.罗森布罗姆著.2002.营销渠道管理.李乃和,奚俊芳等译.北京:机械工业出版社:226~248
牛全保.2007.营销渠道冲突与合作理论综述.商业时代,(30):30~32
欧阳卓飞.2006.战略联盟:营销渠道关系的理想境界.中南财经政法大学学报,(5):138~140
卜妙金.2001.分销渠道管理.北京:高等教育出版社:153~200
芮明杰.2001.市场营销管理——定位、联盟、策略.上海:复旦大学出版社:265~321
苏东水.2003.管理心理学.上海:复旦大学出版社:450~530
施锡锉著.2000.博弈论.上海:上海财经大学出版社:325~421
田洁,王继平.2006.渠道冲突的动因分析与对策研究.前沿.(3):46~47
万后芬,汤定娜,杨智.2005.市场营销教程(第二版).北京:高等教育出版社:313~382
吴宗正,吴育东.2000.LISREL模式应用于行动电话消费者满意度之研究[硕士学位论文].台北:国立成功大学统计研究所
吴艳娥,陈涛,高华.2005.模糊综合评判法在营销渠道风险评价中的应用.经营之道,(4):25~29
王朝辉.2002.营销渠道冲突类别、原因及其解决方法.江苏商论,(9):58~59
王永贵,张炜.2006.关系活动、关系质量和关系收益——基于顾客视角的实证研究.营销科学学报,2(1):14~29
王铁明.2005.分销渠道冲突的成因与协调机制.科技进步与对策,(10):10~13
汪明生等著.2001.冲突管理.北京:九州出版社:7~28
徐蔚琴,谢国娥,曾自信.2001.营销渠道管理.北京:电子工业出版社:55~86
谢智坤.2007.基于博弈思想的营销渠道冲突研究[硕士学位论文].上海:同济大学
肖久灵,郭晓宇.2004.营销渠道冲突的博弈解释.上海管理科学,(3):20~24
肖明超.2005.家乐福vs沃尔玛:激情挑战温情.中外管理,(6):80~84
杨长江,陈伟浩.2005.微观经济学.上海:复旦大学出版社:134~210
杨政.2000.营销渠道成员行为的整合模型.南开管理评论,(4):64~70
[英]伊特韦尔等编.1996.新帕尔格雷夫经济学大辞典.北京:经济科学出版社:492~543
赵龙文,龙艳,何景师.2008.基于博弈论的营销渠道横向冲突研究及其对策分析.商场现代化,(4):23~25
赵文力.2005.企业间横向战略联盟的价值链分析.郑州航空工业管理学院学报,(3):43~46
张继焦,葛存山,帅建淮.2002.分销链管理.北京:物价出版社.24~28
张宏岩.2007.渠道冲突的原因及对策.现代管理.(6):51~56
张传忠.2000.分销管理.武汉:武汉大学出版社:121~127
张闯.2006.营销渠道控制.理论、模型与研究命题.商业经济与管理,(3):32~37
张闯.2006.分销密度与品牌宽度.渠道权力的二重均衡.财经问题研究,(1):28~33
张维迎.2005.博弈论与信息经济学.上海:上海三联书店:145~167
张剑渝,2005.营销渠道-关系视角下的解读.成都:西南财经大学出版社.244~268
张平淡,徐建忠.2007.加价与返利关系的博弈分析.管理前沿,(5):12~18
张文健,孙绍荣.2005.基于行为控制的制度设计研究.科学学研究,(1):97~101.
张灵荧,徐正惠.2003.渠道策略的博弈论思考.商业时代,(3):8~17
章文波,陈红艳.2006.实用数据统计分析及SPSS13.0应用.北京:人民邮电出版社:(2):155~186
庄贵军,周筱莲.2002.权力、冲突与合作.中国工商企业之间渠道行为的实证研究.管理世界,(3).117~124
庄贵军.2000.权力、冲突与合作.西方的渠道行为理论.北京商学院学报,(1):8~11
庄贵军,周筱莲,王桂林编著.2004.营销渠道管理.北京:北京大学出版社:(11):67~89
庄贵军.2004.营销渠道控制.理论与模型.管理学报,1(1):7~9
庄贵军,周筱莲.2006.营销人员对灰色营销的道德评价及其影响.营销科学学报,2(1):29~40
朱广胜,金姐.2005.博弈—开启制度文化的钥匙.中外企业文化,(1):9~12
朱秀君,戚译.2002.从博弈论看营销渠道的冲突与合作.商业经济与管理,(4):14~17
朱玉童.2001.迎接渠道网络的全面革命.销售与市场,(8):21~23
钟子亮.2005.学术研究的博弈论分析.科研管理,(1):135~139
Allen J.Magrath,Kenneth G.Hardy.1988.A Strategic Framework for Manufacturer Reseller Conflict.Marketing Science Institute Report,(3):88~101
Allan J.Magrath,Kenneth G.Hardy.1989.A Strategic Paradigm for Predicting Manufacturer-Reseller Conflict.European Journal of Marketing.23(2):94~108
Assael H.1969.Constructive Role of Interorganizational Conflict.Administrative Science Quarterly.14(12):573~582
Anne T.Coughlan,Luis w.Stem,Adel I.EI-Ansary.1987.营销渠道.第六版.蒋青云,孙一民等译.2003.北京:电子工业出版社:256~289
Browen James.R,DayRalphl.1981.Mearsures of Manifest Con-flict in Distribution Channels.Journal of Marketing Reserch,(8):263~274
Berman B.1996.Marketing Channels. New York:John Wiley & Sons Inc:126~167
Bert Rosenbloom.1974.Marketing channels.a management view.第六版.李乃和,奚俊芳等译.2003.北京:机械工业出版社:99~121
Bollen, Kenneth.1989.A Structural Equations with Latent variables.New York:Wiley:156~187
Coughlama,Andersone,Stern L.W,etc.2000.Marketing Channels.6th ed.Beijing: Tsinghua University Press:87~102
Emerson,R.1962.Power dependence relations. American Sociological Review.27(12): 31~41
Etgar M.1979.Sources and types of interchannel conflict.Journal of Retailing, 55(1):61~78
Frazier G,Summers J.1986.Perceptions of interfirm power and its use with in distribution channels.Journal of Marketing Research,23(5):169～179
Geyskens I,Steenkamp J E M,Kumar N.1999.Ametaanalysis of satisfaction in marketing channel relationships.Journal of Marketing Research,36(5):223～238
James,Lawrence R.staneley A.milaik & Jeans M.bret.1982.Causal Analysis:Assumption,Models and Data.Los Angeles:Beverly Hills Publication:82~98
Gaski J.E.1984.The Theory of Power and Confliction Channels of Distribution.Journal of Marketing,48(7):9~29
[Louis W.Stern,J David Hunger.1976.An assessment of the functionality of the super or denote goal in reducing conflict.Academy of Management Journal.19(12):591~622
Loehlin,J.C.1992.Latent variable models:An introduction to factor,path and structural analysis.Hillsdale,NJ:Lawrence Erlbaum:56~89
Louis W.Stern and EI.Ansary.1996.Marketing Channels.London:Prentice Hall Inc:43~58
Marion Peters Angelica.2001.Resolving Conflict in Nonprofit Organization.New York:The Union Institute:39~67
Marion Peters Angelica.2001.Resolving Confliction Nonprofit Organization: dissertation.Ohio:The UnionInstitute:39~60
Mohr J,Nevin J R.1990.Communication strategies in marketing channels:A theoretical perspective.Journal of Marketing,54(3):36～51
M.J.Ecer,B.J.walker.2000.Marketing Theory:Distinguished Contributions.New York:John Wiley & Sons Inc:67~98
Philip Kotlar,Gary Armstrong.2000.Marketing Management.10th ed.Beijing:Tsinghua University Press:350~560
Philip Kotler.2000.Marketing Management.10th ed.London: Prentice Hall Inc:167~198
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