武器装备采购的双方治理研究
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摘要
从实践看,各国武器装备采购都面临“拖(进度)、降(指标)、涨(价格)”的现实困境。从经济学视角看,任何交易都需契约进行治理。基于这样的理论和现实背景,本文期望从武器装备采购的契约治理视角来寻求缓解这个困境的基本思路。
本文认为,武器装备采购过程具有持续时间长、不确定性大、风险高、专用性投资大等特点,这些特点使得装备采购过程中会发生威廉姆森所提出的“根本性转变”问题。即,由于武器装备采购过程中存在大量的专用性投资和不确定性,武器装备采购即使可以在事前通过招标机制实现一定程度的竞争,但是一旦完成缔约,武器装备采购就完全转变成为一种双方垄断的交易形式。因此,武器装备采购的治理需要寻求一种与其交易属性相匹配的治理结构。本文遵循这个逻辑,从剖析武器装备采购的交易属性着手,构建武器装备采购的有效治理结构。
武器装备采购是一种的“经常-混合型”交易模式,与这种模式相对应的治理机制是军方和承包商基于长期合作关系的双方治理结构。军方和承包商之间缔结的关系契约是武器装备采购双方治理的基本框架。在此框架下,双方可以就武器装备采购中的价格、进度和质量三个核心要素建立起相应的治理制度安排,分别形成基于贝叶斯动态学习模型的价格治理机制、基于抵押模型的进度治理机制和基于声誉模型质量治理机制。
信任机制在武器装备采购双方治理框架的运行中发挥着重要作用。本文的研究发展了威廉姆森的“契约人”的假设,采用了人性内核分裂模型,认为人虽然具有机会主义动机,但是也具有可信任性的一面。武器装备采购过程中,军方和承包商之间能够建立起良好的信任关系。军方和承包商之间的信任关系是双方治理框架良好运行的基础,是提高武器装备采购效率,降低武器装备采购的治理成本的重要手段。
武器装备采购的双方治理仅仅从经济学的逻辑来分析是不够的,需要引入新经济社会学中的嵌入性结构分析框架。本文从过程和结构两个维度对武器装备采购双方治理过程中的嵌入性机制进行了分析,发现武器装备采购双方治理需要构建武器装备采购过程中经济性因素与社会性因素的互动整合机制,使武器装备采购的双方治理机制具针对性,军方和承包商的合作关系更长久、更具有建设性。
最后,根据理论分析,从双方治理框架的运行、保障和评价三个方面进行了我国武器装备采购双方治理的制度设计。
From the specific practice, every country over the world is facing the practical difficulties of "dragging (progress), down (index), up (price)," during the process of weapons and equipment procurement. From an economic perspective, any transaction needs a contract to govern. Based on this theoretical and practical background, this article expects to seek to the basic ideas of easing the plight of the practical difficulties from the perspective of weapons procurement contract management.
This paper argues that weapons procurement process has continued for a long time, uncertainty, high risk, specific investments and other characteristics, these features make the equipment procurement process will occur in "fundamental change" ,which is issued by Williamson. That is, there are a lot of specific investments and uncertainty in weapons procurement process, even if you can purchase weapons in advance through the tender mechanism to achieve a certain degree of competition, but once complete contracting, procurement of weapons is completely transformed into a transaction of mutually monopoly. Therefore, the weapons procurement management needs to find a management structure to match with the transaction attribute. This paper follows this logic, proceeds to analyze the property of transaction of procurement weapons, and build effective governance structures of weapons procurement.
Weapons procurement is a "regular - hybrid" trading patterns, and the governance mechanisms corresponding to this mode is bilateral governance based on the long-term relationship between the military and contractors. Military and contractor relational contract is the basic framework of governance in weapons procurement. In this framework, the two sides can on the price of weapons procurement, progress and quality of three core elements to establish appropriate institutional arrangements of governance, namely the formation of dynamic Bayesian learning model based on the price control mechanism, based on the progress of the governance model mortgage mechanisms and reputation-based model of quality control mechanisms.
Trust mechanism plays an important role in the governance framework of weapons procurement. This study developed Williamson's assumption of "contract person" and use notion of split core model of human nature, while having the opportunity to motives, but also can be trusted. The military and contractors can build a good relationship of trust during weapons procurement process. The military and contractors’trust relationship is the foundation of the running of the governance structures, also is the important means to improve the weapons procurement efficiency and reduce the cost of weapons procurement.
The bilateral governance structure’analysis just from the perspective of economics is not enough; it needs to introduce the embedded framework in new economic sociology. This paper analyzed the embedded mechanism of bilateral governance structure from the two dimensions of process and structure, and found that the bilateral governance of weapons procurement need the interaction mechanism of integration of economic factors and social factors. It can make the governance mechanisms targeted, cooperation relationships between the military and the contractor longer, more constructive.
Finally, based on theoretical analysis, this paper made our weapons procurement management system design of bilateral governance framework forms the three aspects of operation, guarantees and evaluation.
本文认为,武器装备采购过程具有持续时间长、不确定性大、风险高、专用性投资大等特点,这些特点使得装备采购过程中会发生威廉姆森所提出的“根本性转变”问题。即,由于武器装备采购过程中存在大量的专用性投资和不确定性,武器装备采购即使可以在事前通过招标机制实现一定程度的竞争,但是一旦完成缔约,武器装备采购就完全转变成为一种双方垄断的交易形式。因此,武器装备采购的治理需要寻求一种与其交易属性相匹配的治理结构。本文遵循这个逻辑,从剖析武器装备采购的交易属性着手,构建武器装备采购的有效治理结构。
武器装备采购是一种的“经常-混合型”交易模式,与这种模式相对应的治理机制是军方和承包商基于长期合作关系的双方治理结构。军方和承包商之间缔结的关系契约是武器装备采购双方治理的基本框架。在此框架下,双方可以就武器装备采购中的价格、进度和质量三个核心要素建立起相应的治理制度安排,分别形成基于贝叶斯动态学习模型的价格治理机制、基于抵押模型的进度治理机制和基于声誉模型质量治理机制。
信任机制在武器装备采购双方治理框架的运行中发挥着重要作用。本文的研究发展了威廉姆森的“契约人”的假设,采用了人性内核分裂模型,认为人虽然具有机会主义动机,但是也具有可信任性的一面。武器装备采购过程中,军方和承包商之间能够建立起良好的信任关系。军方和承包商之间的信任关系是双方治理框架良好运行的基础,是提高武器装备采购效率,降低武器装备采购的治理成本的重要手段。
武器装备采购的双方治理仅仅从经济学的逻辑来分析是不够的,需要引入新经济社会学中的嵌入性结构分析框架。本文从过程和结构两个维度对武器装备采购双方治理过程中的嵌入性机制进行了分析,发现武器装备采购双方治理需要构建武器装备采购过程中经济性因素与社会性因素的互动整合机制,使武器装备采购的双方治理机制具针对性,军方和承包商的合作关系更长久、更具有建设性。
最后,根据理论分析,从双方治理框架的运行、保障和评价三个方面进行了我国武器装备采购双方治理的制度设计。
From the specific practice, every country over the world is facing the practical difficulties of "dragging (progress), down (index), up (price)," during the process of weapons and equipment procurement. From an economic perspective, any transaction needs a contract to govern. Based on this theoretical and practical background, this article expects to seek to the basic ideas of easing the plight of the practical difficulties from the perspective of weapons procurement contract management.
This paper argues that weapons procurement process has continued for a long time, uncertainty, high risk, specific investments and other characteristics, these features make the equipment procurement process will occur in "fundamental change" ,which is issued by Williamson. That is, there are a lot of specific investments and uncertainty in weapons procurement process, even if you can purchase weapons in advance through the tender mechanism to achieve a certain degree of competition, but once complete contracting, procurement of weapons is completely transformed into a transaction of mutually monopoly. Therefore, the weapons procurement management needs to find a management structure to match with the transaction attribute. This paper follows this logic, proceeds to analyze the property of transaction of procurement weapons, and build effective governance structures of weapons procurement.
Weapons procurement is a "regular - hybrid" trading patterns, and the governance mechanisms corresponding to this mode is bilateral governance based on the long-term relationship between the military and contractors. Military and contractor relational contract is the basic framework of governance in weapons procurement. In this framework, the two sides can on the price of weapons procurement, progress and quality of three core elements to establish appropriate institutional arrangements of governance, namely the formation of dynamic Bayesian learning model based on the price control mechanism, based on the progress of the governance model mortgage mechanisms and reputation-based model of quality control mechanisms.
Trust mechanism plays an important role in the governance framework of weapons procurement. This study developed Williamson's assumption of "contract person" and use notion of split core model of human nature, while having the opportunity to motives, but also can be trusted. The military and contractors can build a good relationship of trust during weapons procurement process. The military and contractors’trust relationship is the foundation of the running of the governance structures, also is the important means to improve the weapons procurement efficiency and reduce the cost of weapons procurement.
The bilateral governance structure’analysis just from the perspective of economics is not enough; it needs to introduce the embedded framework in new economic sociology. This paper analyzed the embedded mechanism of bilateral governance structure from the two dimensions of process and structure, and found that the bilateral governance of weapons procurement need the interaction mechanism of integration of economic factors and social factors. It can make the governance mechanisms targeted, cooperation relationships between the military and the contractor longer, more constructive.
Finally, based on theoretical analysis, this paper made our weapons procurement management system design of bilateral governance framework forms the three aspects of operation, guarantees and evaluation.
引文
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