董事会特征、关联担保与公司绩效的实证研究
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摘要
受2008年美国金融危机及2011年温州引爆企业主“跑路潮”事件的影响,国内许多公司受到重创,因为资金链的断裂而陷入了经营困境,急需要筹集资金来摆脱困境。一家公司如果出现问题,通常就会使担保资金链上的其他公司也受到严重的影响。这种由于公司间的互相担保生成的担保圈,涉及范围越来越广,涉及资金的数额也越来越大,从而引起了社会广泛的关注,引起了人们关于对外担保问题的思考。对外担保可分为关联担保与非关联担保,本文主要研究上市公司为控股股东等关联方提供的担保。影响关联担保发生的根源之一是上市公司治理结构的缺陷,董事会作为上市公司内部治理结构的核心要素,它的特征影响着公司的运营、财务状况及关联担保的决策,从而影响公司绩效。
在这样一个大背景下,分析董事会特征、关联担保、公司绩效的关系存在一定的必要性和亟需性。本文主要通过理论和实证相结合的方法来进行研究三者之间的关系。
在理论研究方面,首先对包含董事会特征与公司绩效、董事会特征与关联担保、关联担保与公司绩效三方面的国内外文献进行了梳理,并且对其发表了评论,指出研究方向;然后对董事会特征、关联担保、公司绩效三者的概念进行了阐述;最后对三者的关系进行了剖析,提出了相关假设。
在实证研究方面,借助了实证计量经济学、会计研究、统计学相关工具,选取2008-2010年我国A股沪市上市公司为研究样本,将变量进行划分,因变量——公司绩效以总资产净利润率ROA作为衡量指标,解释变量——董事会规模、董事长更迭、前三名董事成员薪酬、董事会成员持股比例、董事长与CEO双重任,中介变量——关联担保发生与否、关联担保发生程度(关联担保额/净资产),分别建立了两个多元回归模型,检验分析了上市公司董事会特征、关联担保与公司绩效三者之间的相关关系。实证研究结果表明:第一,董事会规模与公司绩效呈倒U型结构,即董事会规模以9人为分界点,当规模小于9人时,自变量——董事会规模与因变量——公司绩效存在显著正相关关系;当规模大于9人时,两者关系存在显著负相关关系。第二,公司绩效随着前三名董事成员的薪酬增加而显著增加;董事会成员持股比例、董事长与CEO双重任与公司绩效存在不显著的正相关;另外,董事长更迭与公司绩效存在显著正相关,与理论假设不一致。第三,关联担保发生与否、关联担保发生程度都与公司绩效呈显著负相关关系;另外,关联担保发生与否、关联担保发生程度在董事会特征与公司绩效关系之间分别起到了中介效应,使董事会规模、董事长与CEO双重任两个变量的显著性增强。
最后,本文根据理论分析和实证分析的结果分别从董事会层面和关联担保层面共提出了五点建议:第一,合理确定董事会规模,且实行董事长与CEO两职分离;第二,创新董事激励,强化董事约束;第三,创建关联担保风险责任机制;第四,设计合理的担保退出机制,减少承担的违约风险;第五,上市公司要加强公司的担保信息披露。另外还分析了本文的三点不足,展望了三个未来研究方向。
Affected by the 2008 U.S. financial crisis and 2011 Wenzhou tipping business owner "running boom", many domestic firms was destroyed, because of the broken capital chain, many companies got into the management predicament, there badly needs to raise enough money, getting rid of capital difficulties. If a company has problems, it usually makes other companies in security capital chain also have been seriously affected. The security ring, generated due to mutual security between companies, coverage of increasingly widespread, the amount of money involved is also growing, thus giving rise to widespread concern in the community, has raised on the question of external security thinking. External security is divided into associated security and associated non-secured, this text lays emphasis on the former aspect. Defects of governance structure of listed companies is one of causes of associated security, board, as core elements of the governance structure of listed companies, its characteristics influence the company's operations, financial situation and the external security decision-making, thus affecting the company performance.
In such a context, there is a necessity and urgent need to analyze the relationship between Board characteristics, associated security and company performance. The article mainly through a combination of theoretical and empirical approaches to research on relationship between the three.
In theoretical research, First of all, the text explains the concept of board characteristics, associated security and company performance; and then, the text generalizes related documents at home and abroad, makes comments about them, and points out research directions. Finally, through the principal-agent theory, balanced view and non-equilibrium view theory, options principle, stakeholder theory, the text analyzes the relationships between the three.
In terms of empirical research, with the help of empirical econometric research, statistics, accounting tools, the text selects 2008-2010 a-shares in Shanghai Stock Exchange listed companies in China as study sample, divides the variables, dependent variable—company performance is measured by ROA as evaluating index, explanatory variables—scale of the board、alternation of chairman、compensation of the first three members of the Board、Board stakes、dual-task of CEO and Chairman, mediator variable—in according to associated security happen or not、associated security level(security amount/net assets), respectively, the text creates two multivariate regression model, the test analyzes the relationship between characteristics of Board、associated security and corporate performance of listed companies. The empirical results reveal that: 1.Board size and performance are inverted u-shaped structure, namely, 9 is the boundary point of the scale of the board, when the board is less than 9, independent variables—scale of the board and dependent variable—corporate performance have significant positive correlation; when the board is more than 9, they have significant negative correlation. 2. Corporate performance should be significantly increased as the top three Directors of pay increases; there is not significant positive correlation among Board stakes、dual-task of CEO and Chairman、and corporate performance; Besides, there is significant positive correlation between alternation of chairman and corporate performance, which is not consistent with the theoretical assumptions. 3. There is significantly negative relationship between associated security happen or not and associated security level; Besides, associated security happen or not and associated security level play a mediating role between Board characteristics and Corporation performance respectively, which makes the scale of the board and dual-task of CEO and Chairman significantly enhanced.
Finally, the article submits five proposals based on theoretical analysis and empirical analysis: Firstly, optimize the structure of the Board, enhance the independence of the Board; Secondly, innovate incentives of Directors, enhance director constraint; Thirdly, create associated security risk liability system; Fourth, design reasonable security withdrawal mechanism, reduce its commitment of default risk; strengthen the security information disclosure of listed company. Besides, the text analyzes three weaknesses of itself and looks forward to three future research directions.
在这样一个大背景下,分析董事会特征、关联担保、公司绩效的关系存在一定的必要性和亟需性。本文主要通过理论和实证相结合的方法来进行研究三者之间的关系。
在理论研究方面,首先对包含董事会特征与公司绩效、董事会特征与关联担保、关联担保与公司绩效三方面的国内外文献进行了梳理,并且对其发表了评论,指出研究方向;然后对董事会特征、关联担保、公司绩效三者的概念进行了阐述;最后对三者的关系进行了剖析,提出了相关假设。
在实证研究方面,借助了实证计量经济学、会计研究、统计学相关工具,选取2008-2010年我国A股沪市上市公司为研究样本,将变量进行划分,因变量——公司绩效以总资产净利润率ROA作为衡量指标,解释变量——董事会规模、董事长更迭、前三名董事成员薪酬、董事会成员持股比例、董事长与CEO双重任,中介变量——关联担保发生与否、关联担保发生程度(关联担保额/净资产),分别建立了两个多元回归模型,检验分析了上市公司董事会特征、关联担保与公司绩效三者之间的相关关系。实证研究结果表明:第一,董事会规模与公司绩效呈倒U型结构,即董事会规模以9人为分界点,当规模小于9人时,自变量——董事会规模与因变量——公司绩效存在显著正相关关系;当规模大于9人时,两者关系存在显著负相关关系。第二,公司绩效随着前三名董事成员的薪酬增加而显著增加;董事会成员持股比例、董事长与CEO双重任与公司绩效存在不显著的正相关;另外,董事长更迭与公司绩效存在显著正相关,与理论假设不一致。第三,关联担保发生与否、关联担保发生程度都与公司绩效呈显著负相关关系;另外,关联担保发生与否、关联担保发生程度在董事会特征与公司绩效关系之间分别起到了中介效应,使董事会规模、董事长与CEO双重任两个变量的显著性增强。
最后,本文根据理论分析和实证分析的结果分别从董事会层面和关联担保层面共提出了五点建议:第一,合理确定董事会规模,且实行董事长与CEO两职分离;第二,创新董事激励,强化董事约束;第三,创建关联担保风险责任机制;第四,设计合理的担保退出机制,减少承担的违约风险;第五,上市公司要加强公司的担保信息披露。另外还分析了本文的三点不足,展望了三个未来研究方向。
Affected by the 2008 U.S. financial crisis and 2011 Wenzhou tipping business owner "running boom", many domestic firms was destroyed, because of the broken capital chain, many companies got into the management predicament, there badly needs to raise enough money, getting rid of capital difficulties. If a company has problems, it usually makes other companies in security capital chain also have been seriously affected. The security ring, generated due to mutual security between companies, coverage of increasingly widespread, the amount of money involved is also growing, thus giving rise to widespread concern in the community, has raised on the question of external security thinking. External security is divided into associated security and associated non-secured, this text lays emphasis on the former aspect. Defects of governance structure of listed companies is one of causes of associated security, board, as core elements of the governance structure of listed companies, its characteristics influence the company's operations, financial situation and the external security decision-making, thus affecting the company performance.
In such a context, there is a necessity and urgent need to analyze the relationship between Board characteristics, associated security and company performance. The article mainly through a combination of theoretical and empirical approaches to research on relationship between the three.
In theoretical research, First of all, the text explains the concept of board characteristics, associated security and company performance; and then, the text generalizes related documents at home and abroad, makes comments about them, and points out research directions. Finally, through the principal-agent theory, balanced view and non-equilibrium view theory, options principle, stakeholder theory, the text analyzes the relationships between the three.
In terms of empirical research, with the help of empirical econometric research, statistics, accounting tools, the text selects 2008-2010 a-shares in Shanghai Stock Exchange listed companies in China as study sample, divides the variables, dependent variable—company performance is measured by ROA as evaluating index, explanatory variables—scale of the board、alternation of chairman、compensation of the first three members of the Board、Board stakes、dual-task of CEO and Chairman, mediator variable—in according to associated security happen or not、associated security level(security amount/net assets), respectively, the text creates two multivariate regression model, the test analyzes the relationship between characteristics of Board、associated security and corporate performance of listed companies. The empirical results reveal that: 1.Board size and performance are inverted u-shaped structure, namely, 9 is the boundary point of the scale of the board, when the board is less than 9, independent variables—scale of the board and dependent variable—corporate performance have significant positive correlation; when the board is more than 9, they have significant negative correlation. 2. Corporate performance should be significantly increased as the top three Directors of pay increases; there is not significant positive correlation among Board stakes、dual-task of CEO and Chairman、and corporate performance; Besides, there is significant positive correlation between alternation of chairman and corporate performance, which is not consistent with the theoretical assumptions. 3. There is significantly negative relationship between associated security happen or not and associated security level; Besides, associated security happen or not and associated security level play a mediating role between Board characteristics and Corporation performance respectively, which makes the scale of the board and dual-task of CEO and Chairman significantly enhanced.
Finally, the article submits five proposals based on theoretical analysis and empirical analysis: Firstly, optimize the structure of the Board, enhance the independence of the Board; Secondly, innovate incentives of Directors, enhance director constraint; Thirdly, create associated security risk liability system; Fourth, design reasonable security withdrawal mechanism, reduce its commitment of default risk; strengthen the security information disclosure of listed company. Besides, the text analyzes three weaknesses of itself and looks forward to three future research directions.
引文
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②Anwer S.Ahmeda,Scott Duellmanb.Accounting conservatism and board of director characteristics:An empirical analysis[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2007,(2):411-437.
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①饶育蕾,贺曦,李湘平.关联交易与中小投资者利益的侵占——来自中国上市公司关联交易的证据[J].统计与决策,2007,(3):91-94.
②王德武,钟富胜.公司治理、关联担保与公司价值研究[J].财会月刊,2008,(12):87-102.
③许慧.股权结构、董事会与关联担保[J].经济与管理(月刊),2009,(6):55-76.
④钟晓丽.上市公司董事会特征、对外担保与公司价值[D].江苏:苏州大学,2010.
①Henk Berkman , Rebel A.Coleand , LawrenceJ.Fu . Expropriation through loan guarantees to related parties:evidence from China[J].Journal of Banking and Finance,2007,(4):1203-1231.
②汪子文.上市公司担保行为及其对企业财务状况影响研究[D].湖南:湖南大学,2006.
③郑建明,范黎波,朱媚.关联担保、隧道效应与公司价值[J].中国工业经济,2007,(5),64-70.
④郑妤.关联担保对我国上市公司价值影响的实证研究[D].广州:暨南大学,2008年.
①潘丽洁.担保与民营上市公司绩效关系研究[D].浙江:浙江大学,2009.
②Klein.Firm performance and board committee structure[J].Journal of Law and Economics,1998,(4):879-901.
①Dong-Sung Cho and Jootae Kim . Outside Directors,Ownership Structure and Firm Profitability in Korea[J].Corporate Goverance,2007,(3):433-449.
②胡铭.我国上市公司董事会与经营绩效的实证分析[J].吉林财税高等专科学校学报,2002,(4),46-49.
③朱杏珍.董事会的规模与效能探析[J].当代财经,2002,(6):68-70.
④肖曙光.独立董事是否影响上市公司业绩的实证研究[J].湖南商学院学院,2006,(6):74-79.
⑤谢军.董事会制度、管理质量和公司价值:基于上市公司成长性的实证分析[J],华南师范大学学报,2007,(5),36-41.
⑥范利民,李秀燕.公司董事会结构与企业绩效的实证研究[J].广西大学学报,2009,(3):25-30.
①陈怿.董事会规模与公司绩效实证研究—以中小板上市公司为例[J].现代经济信息,2010,(5),16-17.
②王有鸿,黄解宇,费威.董事会结构、公司绩效与高管层报酬关系的实证分析[J].技术经济,2010,(3):89-102.
①潘丽洁.担保与民营上市公司绩效关系研究[D].浙江:浙江大学,2009.
①引自企业会计准则——或有事项.
②石赛霞.金字塔股权结构下民营上市公司大股东利益侵占与对策研究[D].安徽:合肥工业大学,2008.
①温忠麟,张雷,侯杰泰等.中介效应检验程序及其应用[J].心理学报,2004,(5):614-620.
①于东智,池国华.董事会规模、稳定性与公司绩效[J].经济研究,2004,(4):78-86.
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