双重上市对公司治理与公司绩效的影响研究
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摘要
双重上市(Dual listing)是指一家公司的股票在一个以上的证券交易所挂牌上市的行为。相对于西方企业,中国企业的双重上市活动起步较晚,但是近年来,中国企业的双重上市活动日益增多,不仅越来越多的境外上市中国企业返回境内证券市场双重上市,而且境内证券市场上市的中国企业也开始选择到境外证券市场双重上市。双重上市对于投资者、上市公司、证券市场的影响日益增强。
本文按照首次上市发行地点将企业的双重上市行为分成“先外后内”、“先内后外”以及“同时上市”三种模式,分别分析了采取“先外后内”双重上市模式和采取“先内后外”双重上市模式的两类企业双重上市前后公司治理和公司绩效的变化,在此基础上探讨了双重上市对企业公司治理和公司绩效的影响。基于研究结果,本文对投资者、上市公司管理层和政府管理部门提出了相应建议。
首先,本文回顾和梳理了国内外学者的有关企业双重上市的研究,并对双重上市所涉及的公司治理理论、法律渊源理论和约束假说等理论进行阐释,在此基础上提出了一个双重上市对公司治理与企业绩效影响的分析框架。
其次,本文分析了中国境内企业双重上市的历程和政策背景,并对在香港地区上市的境内双重上市公司的特征进行分析。
第三,本文比较分析了中国内地和香港地区两地上市公司的法律制度环境的差异,包括两地法律渊源的差异、公司法和证券法的差异以及有关公司治理准则的差异,并对两地的执法质量进行了比较。
第四,本文以境内首家采取“先内后外”模式双重上市的公司——中兴通讯公司为例,分析中兴通讯公司到香港地区双重上市后公司治理、公司绩效的变化,讨论双重上市对公司治理与公司绩效的影响。
第五,本文从纵向和横向两个维度对采取“先外后内”模式双重上市企业的公司治理与企业绩效进行比较研究。在纵向维度,本文选择了10家双重上市公司为样本实证检验其双重上市前后公司治理、企业绩效的变化。在横向维度,本文选择29家双重上市公司以及29家仅在境内证券市场上市的同类匹配公司为样本实证检验两类公司的公司治理差异、公司绩效差异以及双重上市对于调节公司治理与公司绩效关系的影响。
最后,对本文的案例研究和实证研究的结论进行总结,根据研究结果对投资者、上市公司管理层和政府管理部门提出了相应建议。同时,指出本文的研究局限以及未来进一步的研究方向。
Dual listing refers to the situation in which a company has its stock listed on more than one exchange. In recent years, more and more Chinese companies dual listed their shares both domestic stock exchange and foreign stock exchange although there are a few companies decided to dual listing a few years ago. Many companies listing in foreign stock exchange decide to issue their shares in domestic exchange as well as some companies listing in domestic exchange make the opposite decision. Dual listing is having an increasing impact on investors, listed companies and stock exanges.
Three modes of dual listing are distinguishes according to the destination of initial public offering in the literature. The first refers to a company issues its shares to foreign stock exchange before it issues its shares to domestic exchange. The second refers to a company issues its shares to domestic exchange before it issues its shares to foreign stock exchange. The third refers a company issues its shares to both foreign stock exchange and domestic exchange at the same time. The thesis selects companies that chose the first and the second dual listing mode as our sample and examines the difference in corporate governance and performance of these companies between pre-listing and after listing period. Futhermore the paper analyses the impact of dual listing on the relationship between corporate governance and performance. And it provides some suggestion to investors, listed companies and the governanment.
Firstly, this thesis reviews the existing literature on dual listing, including related theories and empirical studies. It proposes an analytical framework on the impact of dual listing on the relationship between corporate governance and performance through synthesizing the key elementsof these studies.
Secondly, this thesis analyzes the policy background and process of dual listing in mainland of China and presents descriptive characteristics of the companies that dual list in HongKong stock exchanges.
Thirdly, this thesis compares the difference in regulation environment between Chinese mainland and HongKong, including legal origin, corporate law and security law and rules on corporate governance. In addition, the paper compares the difference in quality of law enforcement for the two markets.
Fourthly, this thesis make a case study based on Zhong Xing Telecom Co. LTD. that is the first company issuing its shares to domestic exchange before it issues its shares to foreign stock exchange. This paper studies the changes in corporate governance and performance after the company listed its shares in HongKong stock exchanges and examines impact of dual listing on corporate governance and performance.
Fifthly, this thesis studies companies that issuing its shares to foreign stock exchange before it issues its shares to domestic exchange from longitudinal data and cross-section data. The paper examines changes in corporate governance and performance around dual listing based on longitudinal data of ten companies. Furthermore, the paper makes a comparision between 29 dual listed companies and a control sample based on cross-section data. It examines the difference in corporate governance and performance between dual listed companies and control sample, and also it studies impact of dual listing on the relationship between corporate governance and performance.
Finally, this thesis makes conclusions from case study and empirical study and provides suggestions to investors, listed companies and the governanment. Meanwhile, it points out limitation of this thesis and future research directions.
本文按照首次上市发行地点将企业的双重上市行为分成“先外后内”、“先内后外”以及“同时上市”三种模式,分别分析了采取“先外后内”双重上市模式和采取“先内后外”双重上市模式的两类企业双重上市前后公司治理和公司绩效的变化,在此基础上探讨了双重上市对企业公司治理和公司绩效的影响。基于研究结果,本文对投资者、上市公司管理层和政府管理部门提出了相应建议。
首先,本文回顾和梳理了国内外学者的有关企业双重上市的研究,并对双重上市所涉及的公司治理理论、法律渊源理论和约束假说等理论进行阐释,在此基础上提出了一个双重上市对公司治理与企业绩效影响的分析框架。
其次,本文分析了中国境内企业双重上市的历程和政策背景,并对在香港地区上市的境内双重上市公司的特征进行分析。
第三,本文比较分析了中国内地和香港地区两地上市公司的法律制度环境的差异,包括两地法律渊源的差异、公司法和证券法的差异以及有关公司治理准则的差异,并对两地的执法质量进行了比较。
第四,本文以境内首家采取“先内后外”模式双重上市的公司——中兴通讯公司为例,分析中兴通讯公司到香港地区双重上市后公司治理、公司绩效的变化,讨论双重上市对公司治理与公司绩效的影响。
第五,本文从纵向和横向两个维度对采取“先外后内”模式双重上市企业的公司治理与企业绩效进行比较研究。在纵向维度,本文选择了10家双重上市公司为样本实证检验其双重上市前后公司治理、企业绩效的变化。在横向维度,本文选择29家双重上市公司以及29家仅在境内证券市场上市的同类匹配公司为样本实证检验两类公司的公司治理差异、公司绩效差异以及双重上市对于调节公司治理与公司绩效关系的影响。
最后,对本文的案例研究和实证研究的结论进行总结,根据研究结果对投资者、上市公司管理层和政府管理部门提出了相应建议。同时,指出本文的研究局限以及未来进一步的研究方向。
Dual listing refers to the situation in which a company has its stock listed on more than one exchange. In recent years, more and more Chinese companies dual listed their shares both domestic stock exchange and foreign stock exchange although there are a few companies decided to dual listing a few years ago. Many companies listing in foreign stock exchange decide to issue their shares in domestic exchange as well as some companies listing in domestic exchange make the opposite decision. Dual listing is having an increasing impact on investors, listed companies and stock exanges.
Three modes of dual listing are distinguishes according to the destination of initial public offering in the literature. The first refers to a company issues its shares to foreign stock exchange before it issues its shares to domestic exchange. The second refers to a company issues its shares to domestic exchange before it issues its shares to foreign stock exchange. The third refers a company issues its shares to both foreign stock exchange and domestic exchange at the same time. The thesis selects companies that chose the first and the second dual listing mode as our sample and examines the difference in corporate governance and performance of these companies between pre-listing and after listing period. Futhermore the paper analyses the impact of dual listing on the relationship between corporate governance and performance. And it provides some suggestion to investors, listed companies and the governanment.
Firstly, this thesis reviews the existing literature on dual listing, including related theories and empirical studies. It proposes an analytical framework on the impact of dual listing on the relationship between corporate governance and performance through synthesizing the key elementsof these studies.
Secondly, this thesis analyzes the policy background and process of dual listing in mainland of China and presents descriptive characteristics of the companies that dual list in HongKong stock exchanges.
Thirdly, this thesis compares the difference in regulation environment between Chinese mainland and HongKong, including legal origin, corporate law and security law and rules on corporate governance. In addition, the paper compares the difference in quality of law enforcement for the two markets.
Fourthly, this thesis make a case study based on Zhong Xing Telecom Co. LTD. that is the first company issuing its shares to domestic exchange before it issues its shares to foreign stock exchange. This paper studies the changes in corporate governance and performance after the company listed its shares in HongKong stock exchanges and examines impact of dual listing on corporate governance and performance.
Fifthly, this thesis studies companies that issuing its shares to foreign stock exchange before it issues its shares to domestic exchange from longitudinal data and cross-section data. The paper examines changes in corporate governance and performance around dual listing based on longitudinal data of ten companies. Furthermore, the paper makes a comparision between 29 dual listed companies and a control sample based on cross-section data. It examines the difference in corporate governance and performance between dual listed companies and control sample, and also it studies impact of dual listing on the relationship between corporate governance and performance.
Finally, this thesis makes conclusions from case study and empirical study and provides suggestions to investors, listed companies and the governanment. Meanwhile, it points out limitation of this thesis and future research directions.
引文
①资料来源:世界交易所联盟网站, http://www.world-exchanges.org/publications/WFE%202005%20Annual%20Report.pdf, 2008.1.23.
②资料来源:中国证监会网站, http://www.csrc.gov.cn/n575458/n776436/n805070/n829715/n829734/9407307.html, 2008.1.23.
①资料来源:香港董事学会上市公司企业管治水准报告2006,香港董事会学网站. http://www.hkiod.com/eng/Scorecard%202006%20presentation%20slides.pdf, 2007.12.12.
⑦资料来源:全国律协成立20年来律师从业人数逾15万.新浪网. http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2006-07-11/08009424797s.shtml, 2006.7.11
⑧资料来源:香港律师会2006年年报.香港律师会网站. http://www.hklawsoc.org.hk/pub_c/about/report/
⑧资料来源:中兴通讯陷入H股尴尬.新浪网. http://tech.sina.com.cn/it/t/2002-08-21/1521133906.shtml,2002.8.21.
⑨资料来源:中兴通讯股份有限公司2006年公司治理评级报告.鹏元资信评估有限公司网站. http://www.scrc.com.cn/pjgg/zhilipingji/zhongxing4.html, 2006.6.30.
⑩资料来源:华为海外上市但资本更看好中兴.比特网. http://www.chinabyte.com/telecom/303/1625803.shtml, 2002.8.19.
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