基于有限理性与互惠和利他偏好的项目多主体合作行为研究
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摘要
随着科学技术的演进,技术的复杂性和拥有不同知识资产的各个主体之间的相互依存性都呈现递增的趋势,单个主体已经越来越不能完全满足项目技术等方面的需求,需要拥有不同专业优势的主体共同合作,即跨组织(企业)之间的合作。于是,多主体参与这一新型项目团队的组织形式将是未来项目发展的趋势。但是随着参与主体的增多,业主对各参与方监督的难度就会增大,团队中也更容易出现搭便车的现象,各参与方之间的信任机制和合作机制建立的难度也会加大。因而,研究多个主体参与的项目团队合作问题是十分必要的。
区别于现有项目管理方面的研究,本论文结合项目组织模式和经济学研究的发展趋势,讨论有限理性、互惠和利他偏好条件下的多主体参与项目团队合作问题。在现有研究的基础上,在团队成员的效用函数中加入了互惠和利他偏好,讨论了社会偏好对各方主体行为策略和团队绩效等的影响,并运用演化博弈理论分析了团队成员偏好属性随周围环境变化的规律,为促进多主体参与项目团队的合作、提高团队绩效提供理论支撑和策略建议。
首先,结合当前项目组织模式的发展趋势和相关领域的研究进展,提出本论文研究的课题,并讨论了论文研究的理论意义和应用前景,确定了论文工作的研究主体、研究目标、研究内容和技术方法路线。
接着,运用演化博弈理论讨论有限理性条件下的项目多主体合作问题,构建了有限理性条件下的多主体参与项目团队合作模型,分析了项目属性、团队成员对项目产出的贡献度、团队成员单位合作努力的成本等因素对团队成员行为策略选择的影响。
其次,单独讨论了互惠偏好和利他偏好对多主体项目团队成员合作策略,以及团队绩效和最优利润分享的影响,并分别讨论了团队成员的合作策略选择和互惠偏好之间的相互影响,以及利他偏好和自私偏好之间的相互演化规律。假定团队成员按照其偏好选择分为均等的两类：一类具有互惠偏好,一类没有互惠偏好,建立了非对称演化博弈模型。具有互惠偏好的团队成员的偏好属性可以随环境的变化而变化,即可以在“互惠”和“不互惠”策略之间进行选择。不具有互惠偏好的个体则可以选择“合作”和“不合作”两种策略。在利他偏好和自私偏好的演化博弈模型中,假设项目团队中的所有参与主体只有“利他”和“自私”两种策略选择,并建立了基于有限群体的对称演化博弈模型。
由于在实际项目中,参与主体不一定只会拥有一种社会偏好,因而论文进一步讨论了互惠和利他偏好同时存在情况下的项目团队多主体合作问题,并深入讨论了团队成员互惠和利他偏好的相互影响。此外,建立了基于互惠和利他偏好的非对称演化博弈模型,分析了互惠和利他偏好与合作策略的相互影响。
论文针对每部分的理论结果都进行了数值模拟和检验,并在最后一部分用具体的案例进一步说明了本论文研究的现实意义和应用价值。在论文的结论部分,对论文得出的主要理论结论进行了总结,并指出了论文的不足之处和后续需要进一步研究的方向。
Modern technologies introduced to enhance efficiency and increase profit in joint projects have become considerably more common and at the same time more complex, and the activities of the agents (e.g. organizations, companies) who possess differential knowledge about these technologies have become progressively more interdependent. With few exceptions, the time when a single agent has proved sufficient for the technology requirements of a project is over; joint projects that require heterogeneous agents with differential knowledge of technology and multiple skills have become the norm. The multi-participant model is clearly the future form of project organization. But the increase in the number of participants who jointly contribute to the success of the project necessarily has its costs:it increases the difficulty of the project manager to supervise them. Based on this observation, it is important to understand the mechanisms that enhance cooperation, and consequently increase efficiency, in multi-participant project teams.
Applying the methodology and procedures of economic research, the present dissertation focuses on the cooperation problem in multi-participant project teams. In contrast to previous approaches that endow the multiple agents with full rationality, the thesis makes the weaker, and more realistic, assumption that the agents'rationality is bounded, that they are altruistic to some extent, and that they possess preference for reciprocity. Based on the present literature in behavioral economics, the present study incorporates altruism and reciprocity preference into the team members'utility functions. It then examines how social preferences influence the behavior of individual agents, as well as the team performance. Additionally, using the tools of evolutionary game theory, this study also analyzes the dynamics of change in the social preferences of project participants as they gain more experience with the project. All of this is done in an attempt to provide theoretical guidelines and strategic suggestions to multi-participant projects in order to enhance the cooperative behavior of the agents.
Firstly, I begin with a statement of the problem and elaborate on its theoretical and practical aspects. This is followed by a description of the purpose of the dissertation and the methods it employs.
Secondly, using evolutionary game theory, I propose a cooperative model of multi-participant project team behavior under bounded rationality. Following that, the study analyzes in detail the impact of the nature of project and the contribution per unit effort of team members on team performance and choice of strategies.
Thirdly, this study discusses the impact of altruism and reciprocity preference on the agent's strategy, team performance, and optimal profit share. The joint effects of cooperative strategy choices and reciprocity preferences are discussed, as well as the interplay of altruism and selfish preferences. An asymmetric evolutionary game model is proposed under the assumption that the agents may be classified into two categories according to their preference: members in one category have reciprocity preferences, and members in the other category do not. Agents in the first category are assumed to choose between two strategies:"reciprocity" and "non-reciprocity", whereas members in the second category have to choose between "cooperative" and "Non-cooperative" strategies. In the altruism-selfish game, I propose a symmetric evolutionary game model with finite populations, which assumes that the agents choose one of the following two strategies:"altruism" and "selfish".
Noticing that in real life agents may not have only one kind of preference, this study goes one step further by studying the case where agents express altruism and have reciprocity preferences at the same time. An asymmetric evolutionary game model is constructed in order to study how altruism and reciprocity preferences interact with the cooperative strategies of the agents.
The theoretical results of each part are all tested, and a case study is used to indicate the practical implications of this study. In the final section of the dissertation, the major theoretical results are summarized, and the limitations of the study as well as future directions research are pointed out.
区别于现有项目管理方面的研究,本论文结合项目组织模式和经济学研究的发展趋势,讨论有限理性、互惠和利他偏好条件下的多主体参与项目团队合作问题。在现有研究的基础上,在团队成员的效用函数中加入了互惠和利他偏好,讨论了社会偏好对各方主体行为策略和团队绩效等的影响,并运用演化博弈理论分析了团队成员偏好属性随周围环境变化的规律,为促进多主体参与项目团队的合作、提高团队绩效提供理论支撑和策略建议。
首先,结合当前项目组织模式的发展趋势和相关领域的研究进展,提出本论文研究的课题,并讨论了论文研究的理论意义和应用前景,确定了论文工作的研究主体、研究目标、研究内容和技术方法路线。
接着,运用演化博弈理论讨论有限理性条件下的项目多主体合作问题,构建了有限理性条件下的多主体参与项目团队合作模型,分析了项目属性、团队成员对项目产出的贡献度、团队成员单位合作努力的成本等因素对团队成员行为策略选择的影响。
其次,单独讨论了互惠偏好和利他偏好对多主体项目团队成员合作策略,以及团队绩效和最优利润分享的影响,并分别讨论了团队成员的合作策略选择和互惠偏好之间的相互影响,以及利他偏好和自私偏好之间的相互演化规律。假定团队成员按照其偏好选择分为均等的两类：一类具有互惠偏好,一类没有互惠偏好,建立了非对称演化博弈模型。具有互惠偏好的团队成员的偏好属性可以随环境的变化而变化,即可以在“互惠”和“不互惠”策略之间进行选择。不具有互惠偏好的个体则可以选择“合作”和“不合作”两种策略。在利他偏好和自私偏好的演化博弈模型中,假设项目团队中的所有参与主体只有“利他”和“自私”两种策略选择,并建立了基于有限群体的对称演化博弈模型。
由于在实际项目中,参与主体不一定只会拥有一种社会偏好,因而论文进一步讨论了互惠和利他偏好同时存在情况下的项目团队多主体合作问题,并深入讨论了团队成员互惠和利他偏好的相互影响。此外,建立了基于互惠和利他偏好的非对称演化博弈模型,分析了互惠和利他偏好与合作策略的相互影响。
论文针对每部分的理论结果都进行了数值模拟和检验,并在最后一部分用具体的案例进一步说明了本论文研究的现实意义和应用价值。在论文的结论部分,对论文得出的主要理论结论进行了总结,并指出了论文的不足之处和后续需要进一步研究的方向。
Modern technologies introduced to enhance efficiency and increase profit in joint projects have become considerably more common and at the same time more complex, and the activities of the agents (e.g. organizations, companies) who possess differential knowledge about these technologies have become progressively more interdependent. With few exceptions, the time when a single agent has proved sufficient for the technology requirements of a project is over; joint projects that require heterogeneous agents with differential knowledge of technology and multiple skills have become the norm. The multi-participant model is clearly the future form of project organization. But the increase in the number of participants who jointly contribute to the success of the project necessarily has its costs:it increases the difficulty of the project manager to supervise them. Based on this observation, it is important to understand the mechanisms that enhance cooperation, and consequently increase efficiency, in multi-participant project teams.
Applying the methodology and procedures of economic research, the present dissertation focuses on the cooperation problem in multi-participant project teams. In contrast to previous approaches that endow the multiple agents with full rationality, the thesis makes the weaker, and more realistic, assumption that the agents'rationality is bounded, that they are altruistic to some extent, and that they possess preference for reciprocity. Based on the present literature in behavioral economics, the present study incorporates altruism and reciprocity preference into the team members'utility functions. It then examines how social preferences influence the behavior of individual agents, as well as the team performance. Additionally, using the tools of evolutionary game theory, this study also analyzes the dynamics of change in the social preferences of project participants as they gain more experience with the project. All of this is done in an attempt to provide theoretical guidelines and strategic suggestions to multi-participant projects in order to enhance the cooperative behavior of the agents.
Firstly, I begin with a statement of the problem and elaborate on its theoretical and practical aspects. This is followed by a description of the purpose of the dissertation and the methods it employs.
Secondly, using evolutionary game theory, I propose a cooperative model of multi-participant project team behavior under bounded rationality. Following that, the study analyzes in detail the impact of the nature of project and the contribution per unit effort of team members on team performance and choice of strategies.
Thirdly, this study discusses the impact of altruism and reciprocity preference on the agent's strategy, team performance, and optimal profit share. The joint effects of cooperative strategy choices and reciprocity preferences are discussed, as well as the interplay of altruism and selfish preferences. An asymmetric evolutionary game model is proposed under the assumption that the agents may be classified into two categories according to their preference: members in one category have reciprocity preferences, and members in the other category do not. Agents in the first category are assumed to choose between two strategies:"reciprocity" and "non-reciprocity", whereas members in the second category have to choose between "cooperative" and "Non-cooperative" strategies. In the altruism-selfish game, I propose a symmetric evolutionary game model with finite populations, which assumes that the agents choose one of the following two strategies:"altruism" and "selfish".
Noticing that in real life agents may not have only one kind of preference, this study goes one step further by studying the case where agents express altruism and have reciprocity preferences at the same time. An asymmetric evolutionary game model is constructed in order to study how altruism and reciprocity preferences interact with the cooperative strategies of the agents.
The theoretical results of each part are all tested, and a case study is used to indicate the practical implications of this study. In the final section of the dissertation, the major theoretical results are summarized, and the limitations of the study as well as future directions research are pointed out.
引文
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