项目融资公司治理模式研究
摘要
论文的目的是研究项目融资公司的公司治理问题,为其构建一种效率更高的公司治理模式,以此提高其公司治理水平。研究的理论价值在于项目融资公司是负责管理项目融资的公司,而项目融资传统上属于金融学的研究领域,学者们多侧重于研究其融资结构和风险管理方式,公司治理属于经济学和管理学的研究领域,学者们多侧重于研究一般上市公司的治理问题。因此,作为多学科交叉的项目融资公司的公司治理问题,便长期被学者们忽略,至今仍是一个研究空白。研究的实践价值在于我国目前处于主要依靠投资拉动经济发展的阶段,项目融资公司在国民经济中占有重要地位,但是项目融资公司在实践中仍沿用一般公司的传统治理模式,因公司治理的缺陷导致项目融资公司的经营出现问题的案例屡见不鲜。因此,提高项目融资公司的管理效率,对于保障我国重大基础设施项目的投资成功,保持我国经济持续稳定发展,具有十分重要的作用。
论文采用了逻辑分析、定性分析与定量分析和比较分析与实证分析等研究方法,在以下四个方面取得了具有创新意义的研究成果:
首先,论文从资产专用性的角度揭示了项目融资公司治理问题的特殊性。与一般公司相比,项目融资公司在行业分布、财务特征、资产特征和资本结构方面存在着显著的特殊性,其根本特征是专门从事专用性资产投资,由大量契约组成的公司。因此,传统的家族主导、股东主导、债权人主导和政府主导等四种公司治理模式都无法彻底解决项目融资公司治理中存在的道德风险和“敲竹杠”等问题,因此需要为项目融资公司构建新型的治理模式。
其次,论文从契约理论的角度重新审视了项目融资公司的公司治理,将契约理论和资产专用性理论作为分析项目融资公司的基础理论分析工具,从企业是一组契约组合出发,从契约治理的角度分析公司治理问题,从而推导出公司治理就是对组成公司的契约进行治理,项目融资公司的公司治理问题就是如何对对资产专用性强的长期契约进行治理。构建公司治理模式的关键则是完善和修订相关的合同和契约的内部条款,强化契约之间相互约束的外部关系。
第三,论文设计了项目融资公司治理模式并对其治理效率进行了实证分析。项目融资公司治理模式需要解决如何通过项目契约和融资契约分散专用性资产的风险并合理分配各个利益相关者的治理权益的问题。传统的公司治理模式呈现从单边治理到共同治理的发展趋势,利益相关者越来越多地参与到公司治理中来。这种共同治理的趋势也符合契约理论要求各个缔约者利益均衡的原理。因此,论文在利益相关者共同治理的基础上,提出了项目融资公司治理模式要满足的公司治理契约化、事前投资激励最大化、风险分担与控制权转移对称化、事后剩余控制权最小化和公司治理弹性化等五条项目融资公司治理模式的特殊标准,通过对长期销售协议、建设协议、原料供应协议、运营和维护协议等一系列项目契约,股本支持协议和贷款协议等融资契约,以及各契约之间的关系提出治理要求,构建了一套完整的项目融资公司治理模式。这种治理模式可以初步表述为:一种由股东、债权人和其他利益相关者通过事前签订一系列的契约,分享公司治理权益,分担公司的经营风险的共同治理模式。
项目融资公司治理模式是一种有弹性的治理模式,各利益相关者在公司治理中发挥作用的大小,将根据其投入的专用性资产的重要性而变化。这种治理模式的优势是降低了项目融资公司的代理成本,避免了投资不足,建立了利益相关者共同治理的激励相容约束机制,可以获得长期稳定的公司治理参与者,能够在保护债权人利益的基础上,符合卡尔多-希克斯标准。该治理模式的局限性是事前的交易成本较高,存在滥用法人格和“公司法人格否认”问题,以及仅适用于业务类型比较单一的公司。
论文从数据库ProjectWare中选择了1998年1月–2003年5月拥有贷款息差的1145个项目融资公司和拥有债务/权益比例的1278个项目融资公司作为分析样本,从实证的角度证明了事前签订了长期销售协议、建设协议、原料供应协议或运营和维护协议的项目融资公司比没有签订这些长期契约的息差更低,债务/权益比例更高,即建立了项目融资公司治理模式的企业比没有建立的管理效率更高。
最后,论文为如何借鉴项目融资公司治理模式,提高我国企业的公司治理效率提出了建议。我国国有股东、公众股东、家族股东、债权人和作为交易对手的其他利益相关者等公司治理参与者都具备一定的治理能力,具备应用项目融资公司治理模式的条件。论文参照项目融资公司治理的一般模式,为电力生产、收费公路和城市基础设施等三个在我国最典型、规模最大的专用性资产投资领域,具体设计了符合各领域特点的公司治理模式,并论证了项目融资公司治理模式也可以在我国国有控股企业中广泛适用。因此,论文提出了根据各类公司的特点差异化选择公司治理模式,在我国电力、公路和城建领域推广项目融资公司治理模式以及培育利益相关者参与公司治理的意识和外部条件等三个方面的建议,为提高我国企业公司治理水平提供参考。
The purpose of this paper is studying corporate governance of project finance companys and trying to setup a new coprate governance pattern for project finance companys in order to promote their management efficiency. The theory value of this study is as follows. The project finance companys are the companys in charge of managing project finance. Project finance traditionally belongs to finance area. The reseachers always study its finance structure and risk management. Corporate governance belongs to economic and management area. Reseachers always study the corporate governance of listed companys. As the cross area of several subject, the corporate governance of corporate finance company is still a blank area. The practice value of this study is as follows. Infrustructer investment is the power of economic development in China. Project finance companys are very important in Chinese economy, but they still use normal corporate governance patterns. The shortcomings of corporate governance sometime make there project companys fail in management. So promote the corporate governance level of the project finance companys is very important to support the suceess of big infrastructure investment and the continued economy development.
The paper uses logical analyse, qualitative and quantitive analyse, comparable analyse and evidence analyse to reseach and get some innovative results as follows:
Firstly, the paper finds the special characters of project finance companys from the specialty assets view. Comparing with normal corporates, project finance companys are special in the area of dispersal of industry, finance characters, asset characters and capital structure. Their basic charater is a company focusing in specialty assets investment and composed with lots of contracts. Traditional corporate governance patterns such as family dominated pattern, share holder dominated pattern, creditor dominated pattern and government dominated pattern are not fit for project companys. They can’t solve moral hazard and hold-up problems, so the project finance companys need a new pattern.
Secondly, the paper rescans corporate governance from the contract theory view. It uses contract theory and specialty assets theory as basic analytic tools. It takes the companys as a group of contracts and analyse corporate governance problems from the view of contract governance. So the corporate governance of project finance company is how to governance the long term contract of specialty assets. The key point of setting up th new corporate governance pattern is modifying the content of the relavent contract and managing the relationship of contracts.
Thirdly, the paper sets up a project finance company corporate governance pattern and demonstrates it with real evidence. The new pattern needs to solute how to spread the risk and allocate the rights of governance among the stake holders by project contracts and finace contracts. According to the order of different corporate governance patterns appearance, the trend is single side governance changing to multi-sides governance. More and more stakeholders involve in corporate governance. The common governance trand also follows the contract theory which says the contractors should be treated eaqully. So based on the stake shold common governance pattern, the paper provides five standards of building project finance company corporate governance patern, which are governance by contract, maximum ex-ante incentive, symmetrical risk sharing and right transferring, minimum ex-post residual right and flexible. By giving the requirement of how to manage selling contract, buying contract, construction contract, O&M contract and credit contract, we setup the SPV governant patern. This patern can be summarized as a common governance patern by signing contracts with shareholder, creditor and other stakeholder ex-anti, sharing governance rights and risks.
The project finance company corporate governance pattern is a flexible pattern. The status of stakeholder is decided by the importance of the specialty assets he invests. The advantage of this pattern is lowering the agent cost, avoiding lack of investment and setting up an incentive compatibility mechanism for stakeholds joining corporate governance. This pattern can have longterm stable governance joiners, can protact the shareholders and creditors interest at the same time, which followes Kaldor - Hicks standard. The shortcoming of this pattern is ex-ante trade cost is relative high, disregard of corporate personality and only fitting for one main business companies.
The paper uses database, Project Ware (Dealogic), to select 1145 project finance data with spread available and 1278 project finance data with debt/equity available from Jan 1998 to May 2003 as a sample, to verify the project finance companys who set up the project finance company corporate governance pattern by signing longterm project contract ex-anti, have lower spread and higher debt/equity ratio than those who doesn’t. That means the former is more efficient than the latter.
Finally, the paper gives some advices about how to use the project finance company corporate governance patter to promote Chinese companys’management efficiency. The state owned shareholder, public shareholder, family shareholder, creditor and stakeholder who act as counterparties, they all have the ability of governance, which shows that it is possible to set up project finance company corporate governance pattern. After that, the paper builds three specific governance patterns for power, toll road and public utility which has the most project finance company in China and verifies the pattern can also be used for some state owned companies. The paper has four suggestions to inprove Chinese companies, which are to select corporate governance pattern base on the company’s own character, to use project finance company corporate governance pattern in infrastructure investment area and to nurture all kinds of stakeholders’governance ability.
论文采用了逻辑分析、定性分析与定量分析和比较分析与实证分析等研究方法,在以下四个方面取得了具有创新意义的研究成果:
首先,论文从资产专用性的角度揭示了项目融资公司治理问题的特殊性。与一般公司相比,项目融资公司在行业分布、财务特征、资产特征和资本结构方面存在着显著的特殊性,其根本特征是专门从事专用性资产投资,由大量契约组成的公司。因此,传统的家族主导、股东主导、债权人主导和政府主导等四种公司治理模式都无法彻底解决项目融资公司治理中存在的道德风险和“敲竹杠”等问题,因此需要为项目融资公司构建新型的治理模式。
其次,论文从契约理论的角度重新审视了项目融资公司的公司治理,将契约理论和资产专用性理论作为分析项目融资公司的基础理论分析工具,从企业是一组契约组合出发,从契约治理的角度分析公司治理问题,从而推导出公司治理就是对组成公司的契约进行治理,项目融资公司的公司治理问题就是如何对对资产专用性强的长期契约进行治理。构建公司治理模式的关键则是完善和修订相关的合同和契约的内部条款,强化契约之间相互约束的外部关系。
第三,论文设计了项目融资公司治理模式并对其治理效率进行了实证分析。项目融资公司治理模式需要解决如何通过项目契约和融资契约分散专用性资产的风险并合理分配各个利益相关者的治理权益的问题。传统的公司治理模式呈现从单边治理到共同治理的发展趋势,利益相关者越来越多地参与到公司治理中来。这种共同治理的趋势也符合契约理论要求各个缔约者利益均衡的原理。因此,论文在利益相关者共同治理的基础上,提出了项目融资公司治理模式要满足的公司治理契约化、事前投资激励最大化、风险分担与控制权转移对称化、事后剩余控制权最小化和公司治理弹性化等五条项目融资公司治理模式的特殊标准,通过对长期销售协议、建设协议、原料供应协议、运营和维护协议等一系列项目契约,股本支持协议和贷款协议等融资契约,以及各契约之间的关系提出治理要求,构建了一套完整的项目融资公司治理模式。这种治理模式可以初步表述为:一种由股东、债权人和其他利益相关者通过事前签订一系列的契约,分享公司治理权益,分担公司的经营风险的共同治理模式。
项目融资公司治理模式是一种有弹性的治理模式,各利益相关者在公司治理中发挥作用的大小,将根据其投入的专用性资产的重要性而变化。这种治理模式的优势是降低了项目融资公司的代理成本,避免了投资不足,建立了利益相关者共同治理的激励相容约束机制,可以获得长期稳定的公司治理参与者,能够在保护债权人利益的基础上,符合卡尔多-希克斯标准。该治理模式的局限性是事前的交易成本较高,存在滥用法人格和“公司法人格否认”问题,以及仅适用于业务类型比较单一的公司。
论文从数据库ProjectWare中选择了1998年1月–2003年5月拥有贷款息差的1145个项目融资公司和拥有债务/权益比例的1278个项目融资公司作为分析样本,从实证的角度证明了事前签订了长期销售协议、建设协议、原料供应协议或运营和维护协议的项目融资公司比没有签订这些长期契约的息差更低,债务/权益比例更高,即建立了项目融资公司治理模式的企业比没有建立的管理效率更高。
最后,论文为如何借鉴项目融资公司治理模式,提高我国企业的公司治理效率提出了建议。我国国有股东、公众股东、家族股东、债权人和作为交易对手的其他利益相关者等公司治理参与者都具备一定的治理能力,具备应用项目融资公司治理模式的条件。论文参照项目融资公司治理的一般模式,为电力生产、收费公路和城市基础设施等三个在我国最典型、规模最大的专用性资产投资领域,具体设计了符合各领域特点的公司治理模式,并论证了项目融资公司治理模式也可以在我国国有控股企业中广泛适用。因此,论文提出了根据各类公司的特点差异化选择公司治理模式,在我国电力、公路和城建领域推广项目融资公司治理模式以及培育利益相关者参与公司治理的意识和外部条件等三个方面的建议,为提高我国企业公司治理水平提供参考。
The purpose of this paper is studying corporate governance of project finance companys and trying to setup a new coprate governance pattern for project finance companys in order to promote their management efficiency. The theory value of this study is as follows. The project finance companys are the companys in charge of managing project finance. Project finance traditionally belongs to finance area. The reseachers always study its finance structure and risk management. Corporate governance belongs to economic and management area. Reseachers always study the corporate governance of listed companys. As the cross area of several subject, the corporate governance of corporate finance company is still a blank area. The practice value of this study is as follows. Infrustructer investment is the power of economic development in China. Project finance companys are very important in Chinese economy, but they still use normal corporate governance patterns. The shortcomings of corporate governance sometime make there project companys fail in management. So promote the corporate governance level of the project finance companys is very important to support the suceess of big infrastructure investment and the continued economy development.
The paper uses logical analyse, qualitative and quantitive analyse, comparable analyse and evidence analyse to reseach and get some innovative results as follows:
Firstly, the paper finds the special characters of project finance companys from the specialty assets view. Comparing with normal corporates, project finance companys are special in the area of dispersal of industry, finance characters, asset characters and capital structure. Their basic charater is a company focusing in specialty assets investment and composed with lots of contracts. Traditional corporate governance patterns such as family dominated pattern, share holder dominated pattern, creditor dominated pattern and government dominated pattern are not fit for project companys. They can’t solve moral hazard and hold-up problems, so the project finance companys need a new pattern.
Secondly, the paper rescans corporate governance from the contract theory view. It uses contract theory and specialty assets theory as basic analytic tools. It takes the companys as a group of contracts and analyse corporate governance problems from the view of contract governance. So the corporate governance of project finance company is how to governance the long term contract of specialty assets. The key point of setting up th new corporate governance pattern is modifying the content of the relavent contract and managing the relationship of contracts.
Thirdly, the paper sets up a project finance company corporate governance pattern and demonstrates it with real evidence. The new pattern needs to solute how to spread the risk and allocate the rights of governance among the stake holders by project contracts and finace contracts. According to the order of different corporate governance patterns appearance, the trend is single side governance changing to multi-sides governance. More and more stakeholders involve in corporate governance. The common governance trand also follows the contract theory which says the contractors should be treated eaqully. So based on the stake shold common governance pattern, the paper provides five standards of building project finance company corporate governance patern, which are governance by contract, maximum ex-ante incentive, symmetrical risk sharing and right transferring, minimum ex-post residual right and flexible. By giving the requirement of how to manage selling contract, buying contract, construction contract, O&M contract and credit contract, we setup the SPV governant patern. This patern can be summarized as a common governance patern by signing contracts with shareholder, creditor and other stakeholder ex-anti, sharing governance rights and risks.
The project finance company corporate governance pattern is a flexible pattern. The status of stakeholder is decided by the importance of the specialty assets he invests. The advantage of this pattern is lowering the agent cost, avoiding lack of investment and setting up an incentive compatibility mechanism for stakeholds joining corporate governance. This pattern can have longterm stable governance joiners, can protact the shareholders and creditors interest at the same time, which followes Kaldor - Hicks standard. The shortcoming of this pattern is ex-ante trade cost is relative high, disregard of corporate personality and only fitting for one main business companies.
The paper uses database, Project Ware (Dealogic), to select 1145 project finance data with spread available and 1278 project finance data with debt/equity available from Jan 1998 to May 2003 as a sample, to verify the project finance companys who set up the project finance company corporate governance pattern by signing longterm project contract ex-anti, have lower spread and higher debt/equity ratio than those who doesn’t. That means the former is more efficient than the latter.
Finally, the paper gives some advices about how to use the project finance company corporate governance patter to promote Chinese companys’management efficiency. The state owned shareholder, public shareholder, family shareholder, creditor and stakeholder who act as counterparties, they all have the ability of governance, which shows that it is possible to set up project finance company corporate governance pattern. After that, the paper builds three specific governance patterns for power, toll road and public utility which has the most project finance company in China and verifies the pattern can also be used for some state owned companies. The paper has four suggestions to inprove Chinese companies, which are to select corporate governance pattern base on the company’s own character, to use project finance company corporate governance pattern in infrastructure investment area and to nurture all kinds of stakeholders’governance ability.
引文
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21詹森和梅克林,《企业理论:管理行为、代理成本与所有权结构》,[美]《金融经济学杂志》,1976年10月
22法马和詹森,《所有权与控制权的分离》,[美]《法律学杂志》,1983年6月
23詹森和墨菲,《绩效报酬与对高层管理的激励》,[美]《政治经济学杂志》第98卷第2期(1990年)
24 Ross, westerfield and Jaffe,《Corporate Finance》(6th edition),机械工业出版社,2002年版
25 Diane K. Denis, Twenty-five Years of Corporate Governance Research and Counting,Review of Financial Economics 2001 (10): 191-212.
26公司治理结构中的博弈分析,<<数量经济技术经济研究>>2002年第19卷第02期
27公司治理中股权制衡的博弈分析,《审计与经济研究》,2007年02期
28 Benjamin C. Esty, The Economic Motivations for Using Project Finance, 2003-2-14, Harvard Business School, 1
29 Global project finance review, 2006, 2005, 2004, Thomson
30 Thomson Financial, Global Project Finance Review, 2006 4th quarter, 1
31 Benjamin C. Esty, An overview of project finance, 2002-4-4, Harvard Business School, 1
32中国人民银行网站,2007年统计数据,金融机构人民币信贷收支表。
33 Benjamin C. Esty, The Economic Motivations for Using Project Finance, 2003-2-14, Harvard Business School, 37
34数据来源:Benjamin C. Esty, The Economic Motivations for Using Project Finance, 2003-2-14, Harvard Business School, 37
35数据来源:汤普森金融证券数据项目融资数据库(TFSD)
36哈特,《企业、合同与财务结构》,上海三联书店、上海人民出版社2006年版,第25~26页。
37张维迎,《产权、激励与公司治理》,经济科学出版社,2005年7月版
38米尔格罗姆和罗伯茨,《经济学、组织与管理》,Prentice-Hall, 1992年版
40全国工商联,《中国民营经济发展分析报告(2007年度)》
41中国证监会网站,统计信息年鉴,2007年12月主要指标。
[1] Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny,A Survey of Corporate Governance,The Journal of Finance, June, 1997: 737-783.
[2] Adams. Renee B.. The Dual Role of Corporate Boards as Advisors and Monitors of Management. SSRN Working Paper.
[3] Admati. Anat R.. Pfleiderer. Paul. and Zechner. Josef. Large Shareholder Activism. Risk Sharing, and Financial Market Eguilibrium. Journal of Political Economy 1994(102): 1097-1130.
[4] Aghion Philippe and Bolton Patrick, An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting, Review of Economic Studies 1992 (59): 473-494.
[5] Baker, George, Gibbons, Robert, and Murphy, Kevin. Implicit Contracts and the Theory of the Firm, Harvard Business School Working Paper. 1999.
[6] Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards, 2005-11, 49
[7] Benjamin C. Esty, An overview of project finance, 2002-4, Harvard Business School, 2
[8] Bennedsen Morten and Wolfenzon Daniel, The Balance of Power in Closely Held Corporations, Journal of Financial Economics 2000 (58): 113-139.
[9] Berglof Erik and Thadden Ernst-lgdwig Von, Short-term Versus Long-term Interests, Capital Structure with Multiple Investors, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1994:1055-1084.
[10] Bolton, Patric, and Scharfstein, David S.. Optimal Debt Structure and the Number of Creditors. Journal of Political Economy 104 February, 1996: 1-25.
[11] Bolton, Patrick, and Thadden. Blocks, Liquidity, and Corporate Control. The Journal of Finance,February, 1998: 1-25.
[12] Brealey, R. A., Cooper, I. A., and Habib, M. A. Using project Wnance to fund infrastructure investments,Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 9, 25–38. 1996
[13] Brealey, R. A., Myers, S., and Allen, F, Principles of corporate Wnance. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1996
[14] Burkart, Mike, Gromb, Denis, and Panunzi, Fausto. Large Shareholders, Monitoring,and the Value of the Firm. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. August, 1997: 963-728.
[15] Clifford chance法律公司著,龚辉宏译,项目融资,华夏出版社1997年版,P1-2
[16] Comes Armando and Novaes Walter, Sharing of Control as A Corporate Governance Mechanism, SSRN Working Paper.
[17] Dailami, M., and Hauswald, R. Contract risks and credit spread in determi-nants in the international project bonds markets. Working paper. Washington, DC: World Bank Institute, 2001
[18] Dailami, M., and Hauswald, R. The emerging project bond market: covenant provisions and credit spreads. Policy research working paper no. 3095. Washington, DC: World Bank Institute, 2003
[19] Dailami, M., Lipkovich, I., and Van Dyck, J. Infrisk: a computer simulation approach to risk management in infrastructure project Wnance transactions. Policy research working paper no. 2085. Washington, DC: IBRD, 1999
[20] Denis, Diane K.. Twenty-five Years of Corporate Governance Research and Counting. Review of Financial Economics 2001 (10): 191-212.
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[24] Diamond Douglas, Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets, Journal of Political Economy, 1989 (97): 828-862.
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[26] Esty, B. C., Returns on project-financed investments: evolution and managerialimplications, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Vol. 15, 2002, pp. 71–86.
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[28] Esty, B. C., Why study large projects? An introduction to research on project finance, European Financial Management, Vol. 10, 2004, pp. 213–24.
[29] Esty, B. C. and Megginson, W. L., Creditors’rights, enforcement and debt ownership structure: evidence from the global syndicated loans market, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 38, 2003, pp. 37–59.
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[64]阿尔钦,德姆塞茨,《生产、信息成本与经济组织》,美国经济评论,1972年
[65]陈郁编,《所有权、控制权与激励——代理经济学文选》,上海三联书店、上海人民出版社2006年版,第7~9页。
[66]德姆塞茨,《所有权、控制与企业》,经济科学出版社,1999年1月版
[67]法马和詹森,《所有权与控制权的分离》,[美]《法律学杂志》,1983年6月
[68]傅绍文,公司治理中的剩余控制权研究,2004年11月,浙江大学博士论文
[69]公司治理结构中的博弈分析,<<数量经济技术经济研究>>2002年第19卷第02期
[70]公司治理中股权制衡的博弈分析,《审计与经济研究》,2007年02期
[71]哈特,《产权和企业的性质》,[美]《政治经济学杂志》第98卷第2期(1990年)
[72]哈特,《企业、合同与财务结构》,上海三联书店、上海人民出版社,2006年3月版
[73]汉斯曼,《企业所有权论》,中国政法大学出版社,2001年4月版
[74]蒋先玲,项目融资模式及法律问题研究,2002年3月,对外经济贸易大学博士论文
[75]凯德伯瑞委员会,《凯德伯瑞报告》,1992年12月
[76]兰艳泽,中国国有控股上市公司债权治理功效研究,2005年10月,暨南大学博士论文
[77]李瑞跃,国际项目触资法律研究,2004年4月,中国政法大学博士论文
[78]李维安,《天津开发区200家跨国公司在华三资企业的调查分析》,2003年
[79]李维安,《现代公司治理研究》,中国人民大学出版社,2002年4月版
[80]李维安,唐跃军,上市公司利益相关者治理评价及实证研究,《证券市场导报》2005年第3期
[81]卢家仪卢有杰编著,项目融资,1998年,清华大学出版社,21
[82]蒙克斯和米诺,《公司治理》,中国财政经济出版社,2004年1月版
[83]米尔格罗姆和罗伯茨,《经济学、组织与管理》,Prentice-Hall, 1992年版
[84]宁向东,《公司治理理论》,中国发展出版社,2005年1月版
[85]牛德生,资产专用性理论分析,经济经纬,2004年第3期
[86]谭劲松,郑国坚,产权安排、治理机制、政企关系与企业效率——以“科龙”和“美的”为例,管理世界,2004年第2期
[87]王永海,范明,资产专用性视角下的资本结构动态分析,中国工业经济,2004年第1期
[88]尉维斌,水电项目融资模式及风险管理研究,1999年,武汉水利电力大学博士论文,第17页
[89]徐柔建,所有权与公司治理机制研究,2003年5月,复旦大学博士论文
[90]叶向阳,债权融资与公司治理研究,2004年10月,暨南大学博士论文
[91]尹田,物权与债权的区分价值:批判与思考,中国论文下载中心,2006年5月
[92]于东智,《资本结构、债权治理与公司绩效:一项经验分析》,《中国工业经济》,2003年1月
[93]詹森和梅克林,《企业理论:管理行为、代理成本与所有权结构》,[美]《金融经济学杂志》,1976年10月
[94]詹森和墨菲,《绩效报酬与对高层管理的激励》,[美]《政治经济学杂志》第98卷第2期(1990年)
[95]张极井,项目融资,2003-11,中信出版社,1-5
[96]张维迎,《产权、激励与公司治理》,经济科学出版社,2005年7月版
[97]中华人民共和国交通运输部,《收费公路权益转让办法》,2008年8月
2尉维斌,水电项目融资模式及风险管理研究,1999年,武汉水利电力大学博士论文,第17页
3凯德伯瑞委员会,《凯德伯瑞报告》,1992年12月
4 Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny,A Survey of Corporate Governance,The Journal of Finance, June, 1997: 737-783.
5蒙克斯和米诺,《公司治理》,中国财政经济出版社,2004年1月版
6 OECD,《公司治理准则》,1998年版
7李维安,《现代公司治理研究》,中国人民大学出版社,2002年4月版
8宁向东,《公司治理理论》,中国发展出版社,2005年1月版
9张维迎,《产权、激励与公司治理》,经济科学出版社,2005年7月版
10李维安,《现代公司治理研究》,中国人民大学出版社,2002年4月版
11 Gvaham D. Vinter, Project Finance: A legal guide, 1998, second edition, Sweet & Maxwell, 31
12 Clifford chance法律公司著,龚辉宏译,项目融资,华夏出版社1997年版,P1-2
13卢家仪卢有杰编著,项目融资,1998年,清华大学出版社,21
14 Nevitt, P.K., and F.J. Fabozzi, 2000, Project financing, 7th edition, Euromoney Books
15 Scott L. Hoffman,The Law and Business of International Project Finance(1990), Law and Practice of International Finance, p4-5
16 Benjamin C. Esty, An overview of project finance, 2002-4, Harvard Business School, 2
17转自卢家仪卢有杰等,项目融资,1998年,清华大学出版社,20-21
18张极井,项目融资,2003-11,中信出版社,1-5
19 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards, 2005-11, 49
20 Standard and Poor’s, Global project finance year book 2005, 73
21詹森和梅克林,《企业理论:管理行为、代理成本与所有权结构》,[美]《金融经济学杂志》,1976年10月
22法马和詹森,《所有权与控制权的分离》,[美]《法律学杂志》,1983年6月
23詹森和墨菲,《绩效报酬与对高层管理的激励》,[美]《政治经济学杂志》第98卷第2期(1990年)
24 Ross, westerfield and Jaffe,《Corporate Finance》(6th edition),机械工业出版社,2002年版
25 Diane K. Denis, Twenty-five Years of Corporate Governance Research and Counting,Review of Financial Economics 2001 (10): 191-212.
26公司治理结构中的博弈分析,<<数量经济技术经济研究>>2002年第19卷第02期
27公司治理中股权制衡的博弈分析,《审计与经济研究》,2007年02期
28 Benjamin C. Esty, The Economic Motivations for Using Project Finance, 2003-2-14, Harvard Business School, 1
29 Global project finance review, 2006, 2005, 2004, Thomson
30 Thomson Financial, Global Project Finance Review, 2006 4th quarter, 1
31 Benjamin C. Esty, An overview of project finance, 2002-4-4, Harvard Business School, 1
32中国人民银行网站,2007年统计数据,金融机构人民币信贷收支表。
33 Benjamin C. Esty, The Economic Motivations for Using Project Finance, 2003-2-14, Harvard Business School, 37
34数据来源:Benjamin C. Esty, The Economic Motivations for Using Project Finance, 2003-2-14, Harvard Business School, 37
35数据来源:汤普森金融证券数据项目融资数据库(TFSD)
36哈特,《企业、合同与财务结构》,上海三联书店、上海人民出版社2006年版,第25~26页。
37张维迎,《产权、激励与公司治理》,经济科学出版社,2005年7月版
38米尔格罗姆和罗伯茨,《经济学、组织与管理》,Prentice-Hall, 1992年版
40全国工商联,《中国民营经济发展分析报告(2007年度)》
41中国证监会网站,统计信息年鉴,2007年12月主要指标。
[1] Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny,A Survey of Corporate Governance,The Journal of Finance, June, 1997: 737-783.
[2] Adams. Renee B.. The Dual Role of Corporate Boards as Advisors and Monitors of Management. SSRN Working Paper.
[3] Admati. Anat R.. Pfleiderer. Paul. and Zechner. Josef. Large Shareholder Activism. Risk Sharing, and Financial Market Eguilibrium. Journal of Political Economy 1994(102): 1097-1130.
[4] Aghion Philippe and Bolton Patrick, An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting, Review of Economic Studies 1992 (59): 473-494.
[5] Baker, George, Gibbons, Robert, and Murphy, Kevin. Implicit Contracts and the Theory of the Firm, Harvard Business School Working Paper. 1999.
[6] Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards, 2005-11, 49
[7] Benjamin C. Esty, An overview of project finance, 2002-4, Harvard Business School, 2
[8] Bennedsen Morten and Wolfenzon Daniel, The Balance of Power in Closely Held Corporations, Journal of Financial Economics 2000 (58): 113-139.
[9] Berglof Erik and Thadden Ernst-lgdwig Von, Short-term Versus Long-term Interests, Capital Structure with Multiple Investors, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1994:1055-1084.
[10] Bolton, Patric, and Scharfstein, David S.. Optimal Debt Structure and the Number of Creditors. Journal of Political Economy 104 February, 1996: 1-25.
[11] Bolton, Patrick, and Thadden. Blocks, Liquidity, and Corporate Control. The Journal of Finance,February, 1998: 1-25.
[12] Brealey, R. A., Cooper, I. A., and Habib, M. A. Using project Wnance to fund infrastructure investments,Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 9, 25–38. 1996
[13] Brealey, R. A., Myers, S., and Allen, F, Principles of corporate Wnance. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1996
[14] Burkart, Mike, Gromb, Denis, and Panunzi, Fausto. Large Shareholders, Monitoring,and the Value of the Firm. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. August, 1997: 963-728.
[15] Clifford chance法律公司著,龚辉宏译,项目融资,华夏出版社1997年版,P1-2
[16] Comes Armando and Novaes Walter, Sharing of Control as A Corporate Governance Mechanism, SSRN Working Paper.
[17] Dailami, M., and Hauswald, R. Contract risks and credit spread in determi-nants in the international project bonds markets. Working paper. Washington, DC: World Bank Institute, 2001
[18] Dailami, M., and Hauswald, R. The emerging project bond market: covenant provisions and credit spreads. Policy research working paper no. 3095. Washington, DC: World Bank Institute, 2003
[19] Dailami, M., Lipkovich, I., and Van Dyck, J. Infrisk: a computer simulation approach to risk management in infrastructure project Wnance transactions. Policy research working paper no. 2085. Washington, DC: IBRD, 1999
[20] Denis, Diane K.. Twenty-five Years of Corporate Governance Research and Counting. Review of Financial Economics 2001 (10): 191-212.
[21] Dewatripont, Mathias, Jewitt. lan. and Tirole, Jean. A Theory of Debt and Equity. Diversity of Securities and Manager-shareholder Congruence. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1994: 1027-1054.
[22] Dewatripont, Mathias. Jewitt. lan. and Tirole, Jean. The Economics of Career Concerns. Part I. Comparing Information Structures. Review of Economic Studies 1999 (66): 183-198.
[23] Dewatripont. Mathias. Jewitt. lan. and Tirole. Jean. The Economics of Career Concerns. Part II: Application to Missions and Accountability of Government Agencies. Review of Economic Studies 1999, (66): 199-217.
[24] Diamond Douglas, Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets, Journal of Political Economy, 1989 (97): 828-862.
[25] Diane K. Denis, Twenty-five Years of Corporate Governance Research and Counting,Review of Financial Economics 2001 (10): 191-212.
[26] Esty, B. C., Returns on project-financed investments: evolution and managerialimplications, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Vol. 15, 2002, pp. 71–86.
[27] Esty, B. C., The economic motivations for using project finance, Working Paper (Harvard Business School, 2003).
[28] Esty, B. C., Why study large projects? An introduction to research on project finance, European Financial Management, Vol. 10, 2004, pp. 213–24.
[29] Esty, B. C. and Megginson, W. L., Creditors’rights, enforcement and debt ownership structure: evidence from the global syndicated loans market, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 38, 2003, pp. 37–59.
[30] Fama Eugene and Jensen Michael. Agency Problems and Residual Claims. Journal of Law and Economics 1983. (26): 327-349.
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